(a) To charge any person upon or by reason of a representation or assurance concerning the character, conduct, credit, ability, trade, or dealings of another, to the intent or purpose that such other may obtain thereby credit, money, or goods; or
(b) To charge any person upon a promise made, after full age, to pay a debt contracted during infancy; or upon a ratification after full age, of a promise or simple contract made during infancy; or
(c) To charge a personal representative upon a promise to answer any debt or damages out of his own estate; or
(d) To charge any person upon a promise to answer for the debt, default, or misdoings of another; or
(e) Upon any agreement made upon consideration of marriage; or
(f) Upon any agreement that is not to be performed within a year; or
(g) Upon any offer, agreement, representation, assurance, understanding, commitment, or contract of a bank, savings and loan association, or credit union, to extend credit or to make a loan in excess of fifty thousand dollars, primarily for nonagricultural, business or commercial purposes, not including charge or credit card accounts, personal lines of credit, overdrafts, or any other consumer account: Provided, That this subsection shall not apply to any offer, agreement, representation, assurance, understanding, commitment or contract with a bank, savings and loan association or credit union in which a transaction has been completed as evidenced by a fund transfer;
Unless the offer, promise, contract, agreement, representation, assurance, or ratification, or some memorandum or note thereof, be in writing and signed by the party to be charged thereby or his agent. But the consideration need not be set forth or expressed in the writing; and it may be proved (where a consideration is necessary) by other evidence.
(1) If the final maturity date of the obligation is ascertainable from the lien instrument, the lien expires five years after that date.
(2) If the final maturity date of the obligation is not ascertainable from the lien instrument, the lien expires thirty-five years after the date of the lien instrument. However, if the lienholder rerecords the lien instrument prior to thirty-five years from the date of the lien instrument and includes a copy of the obligation secured by the lien so that the final maturity is ascertainable, the lien expires five years after the date of maturity.
(b) If an affidavit or extension notice executed by the secured party or beneficiary of the lien instrument or an amendment to the lien instrument executed by the grantor or mortgagor and the secured party or beneficiary is recorded prior to expiration of the original period of limitation, as specified in subsection (a) of this section, the period of limitation is extended as follows:
(1) If the final maturity date of the obligation, as extended, secured by the lien instrument is ascertainable from the affidavit, extension notice or amendment, the lien expires five years after the date of final maturity of the obligation, as extended.
(2) If the final maturity date of the obligation, as extended, secured by the lien instrument is not ascertainable from the affidavit, extension notice or amendment, the lien expires thirty-five years after the date of the lien instrument. However, if the lienholder rerecords the lien instrument prior to thirty-five years from the date of the lien instrument and includes a copy of the obligation secured by the lien so that the final maturity is ascertainable, the lien expires five years after the date of maturity.
(c) Any affidavit, extension notice or amendment filed pursuant to subsection (b) of this section after the effective date of this section, shall include, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) The unpaid balance of the debt and interest secured by the lien instrument;
(2) The final maturity date of the obligation, as extended; and
(3) The book and page of recordation of the original lien instrument.
The clerk of the county commission shall record and index any affidavit, extension notice or amendment in the same manner as the original lien instrument and shall note that filing on the margin of the page where the original lien instrument is recorded.
(d) If the lien instrument shows that it secures an obligation payable in installments and the maturity date of the final installment of the obligation is ascertainable from the lien instrument, the time runs from the maturity date of the final installment.
(e) For purposes of this section only, a lien instrument securing an obligation which is payable on demand expresses no maturity date.
(f) Nothing in this section extinguishes any lien which was reserved or created and in effect prior to the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred ninety-eight. With respect to any lien reserved or created and in effect prior to the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred ninety-eight, the lien is valid for twenty years after its stated maturity, or if no maturity date is stated in the lien instrument, for thirty-five years after the date of the lien instrument.
(g) The periods of limitation created by this section may be extended only as provided in this section and may not be extended by any other method or by operation of law.
(b) For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a dismissal not based upon the merits of the action includes, but is not limited to:
(1) A dismissal for failure to post an appropriate bond;
(2) A dismissal for loss or destruction of records in a former action; or
(3) A dismissal for failure to have process timely served, whether or not the party is notified by the court of the pending dismissal.
The official of the state or any subdivision thereof who is charged with the duty of collecting any tax, interest and penalty, the collection of which is affected by the limitation hereinbefore provided, may, before the running of the five-year period of such limitation has been completed, enter into a written agreement with the taxpayer consenting to an extension of such period for an additional period of not to exceed two years, and any action or process may be brought or issued to collect such tax, interest and penalty at any time prior to the expiration of the period so agreed upon. The period so agreed upon may be extended for additional periods not in excess of two years each by subsequent agreements in writing made before the expiration of the period previously agreed upon.
The provisions of this section as hereby amended shall apply to tax periods ending on or after the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred seventy-eight, and the provisions of this section as in effect prior to the enactment hereof shall apply to tax periods ending before said date.
(1) That he is the owner or agent of the owner and as such has a right to recover possession of the property;
(2) A brief description of the property sufficient to identify it;
(3) That the tenant is wrongfully occupying such property in that the tenant is in arrears in the payment of rent, has breached a warranty or a leasehold covenant, or has deliberately or negligently damaged the property or knowingly permitted another person to do so, and describing such arrearage, breach, or act or omission; and
(4) A prayer for possession of the property.
(b) Previous to the filing of the petition the person shall request from the court the time and place at which the petitioner shall be heard. The court shall fix a time for such hearing, which time shall not be less than five nor more than ten judicial days following such request.
(c) Immediately upon being apprised of the time and place for hearing the petitioner shall cause a notice of the same to be served upon the tenant in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4 of the West Virginia rules of civil procedure or by certified mail, return receipt requested. Such notice shall inform the tenant that any defense to the petition must be submitted in writing to the petitioner within five days of the receipt by the tenant of the notice, and in no case later than the fifth day next preceding the date of hearing. Upon receipt of the return of service or the return receipt as the case may be, evidencing service upon the tenant, the petitioner shall file with the court his petition and such proof of service.
(b) In the case of a petition alleging arrearage in rent, if the tenant files an answer raising the defense of breach by the landlord of a material covenant upon which the duty to pay rent depends, the court shall proceed to a hearing on such issues.
(c) In the case of a petition alleging a breach by the tenant or damage to the property, if the tenant files an answer raising defenses to the claim or claims set forth in the petition, the court shall proceed to a hearing on such issues.
(d) Continuances of the hearing provided for in this section shall be for cause only and the judge or magistrate shall not grant a continuance to either party as a matter of right. If a continuance is granted upon request by a tenant, the tenant shall be required to pay into court any periodic rent becoming due during the period of such continuance.
(e) At the conclusion of a hearing held under the provisions of subsection (b) or (c) of this section, if the court finds that the tenant is in wrongful occupation of the rental property, the court shall make and enter an order granting immediate possession of the property to the landlord. In the case of a proceeding under subsection (a) of this section, the court may also make a written finding and include in its order such relief on the issue of arrearage in the payment of rent as the evidence may require. The court may disburse any moneys paid into court by the tenant in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(f) The court order shall specify the time when the tenant shall vacate the property, taking into consideration such factors as the nature of the property (i.e., furnished or unfurnished), the possibility of relative harm to the parties, and other material facts deemed relevant by the court in considering when the tenant might reasonably be expected to vacate the property. The order shall further provide that if the tenant continues to wrongfully occupy the property beyond such time, the sheriff shall forthwith remove the tenant, taking precautions to guard against damage to the property of the landlord and the tenant.
(g) In the event an appeal is taken and the tenant prevails upon appeal, the relief ordered by the appellate court shall be for monetary damages only and shall not restore the tenant to possession if the term of the lease has expired, absent an issue of title, retaliatory eviction, or breach of warranty. During the pendency of any such appeal, the tenant is not entitled to remain in possession of the property if the period of the tenancy has otherwise expired.
(h) When an order is issued pursuant to this section granting possession of the property to the landlord, and the tenant fails to remove all personal property by the date and time specified by the order issued pursuant to subsection (f) of this section, the landlord may:
(1) Dispose of the tenant's personal property without incurring any liability or responsibility to the tenant or any other person if the tenant informs the landlord in writing that the personal property is abandoned or if the property is garbage;
(2) Remove and store the personal property after the date and time by which the court ordered the tenant to vacate the property. The landlord may dispose of the stored personal property after thirty days without incurring any liability or responsibility to the tenant or any other person if: (i) The tenant has not paid the reasonable costs of storage and removal to the landlord and has not taken possession of the stored personal property; or (ii) the costs of storage equal the value of the personal property being stored; or
(3) Leave the personal property on the property. The landlord may dispose of personal property left on the property after thirty days without incurring any liability or responsibility to the tenant or any other person if the tenant has not paid the landlord the reasonable costs of leaving the personal property on the landlord's property and has not taken possession of the personal property.
(i) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (h) of this section, if the personal property is worth more than three hundred dollars and was not removed from the property or place of storage within thirty days with the required fees paid as provided in subsection (h) of this section, the landlord shall store the personal property for up to thirty additional days if the tenant or any person holding a security interest in the abandoned personal property informs the landlord of their intent to remove the property: Provided, That the tenant or person holding a security interest in the personal property pays the landlord the reasonable costs of storage and removal.
(a) "Factory-built home" has the same meaning given to that term in West Virginia code section two, article fifteen, chapter thirty-seven of this code.
(b) "Factory-built home site" means a parcel of land provided for the placement of a factory-built home for occupancy as a residence whether or not in a factory-built home community. A factory-built home site is not residential rental property for the purposes of article three-a of this chapter.
(c) "Good cause" means:
(1) The tenant is in arrears in the payment of periodic payments or other charges related to the tenancy;
(2) The tenant has breached a material term of a written rental agreement or repeatedly breached other terms of a written rental agreement including those agreements required in section three, article fifteen, chapter thirty-seven of this code;
(3) Where there is no written agreement, or where the written agreement does not cover the subject matter of a warranty or leasehold covenant, the tenant breached a material term of a warranty or leasehold covenant or repeatedly breached other terms of a warranty of leasehold covenant;
(4) The tenant has deliberately or negligently damaged the property or knowingly permitted another person to do so.
(d) "Section" means a unit of a factory-built home which is transported and delivered as a whole and which contains some or all of the indoor living area.
(b) The tenancy of a factory-built home site that has placed on it a factory-built home that is comprised of one section, other than a camping or travel trailer, may not be terminated by the landlord until twelve months after the tenancy began except for good cause. The tenancy of a factory-built home site that has placed on it a factory-built home that is comprised of two or more sections may not be terminated by the landlord until five years after the tenancy began except for good cause. A written agreement may provide that the tenant may not terminate the tenancy for the same or greater periods of time. A written agreement may provide that the landlord may not terminate the tenancy for greater periods of time.
(c) For a month-to-month or year-to-year tenancy or a tenancy that is created by a written agreement for a definite period of time, the tenancy does not terminate at the end of the month, year or stated period of time unless either party gives timely notice as required in section three of this article. If no notice is given and if no new agreement is made, the tenancy of a factory-built home site that is comprised of one section becomes a month-to-month tenancy and the tenancy of a factory-built home that is comprised of two or more sections becomes a year-to-year tenancy.
(b) Unless the landlord is changing the use of the site, if a tenancy is ended by the landlord at the later of its stated term or at the end of the period set out in subsection (b), section two of this article, without good cause, the owner may not prevent the sale of the factory-built home in place to another tenant who meets the standards and criteria in effect for new tenants prior to the termination of the tenancy.
(1) That he is the owner or agent of the owner and as such has a right to evict the tenant and have the factory-built home of the tenant removed;
(2) A brief description of the factory-built home site sufficient to identify it;
(3) That the tenant is wrongfully occupying such property in that the tenant is:
(A) Holding over after having been given proper notice of termination of tenancy, whether or not the tenant has continued to pay and the landlord has accepted rent; or
(B) The landlord has good cause; and
(4) A prayer for eviction of the tenant and removal of the tenant's factory-built home.
(b) Previous to the filing of the petition the person shall request from the court the time and place at which the petitioner shall be heard. The court shall fix a time for such hearing, which time shall not be less than five nor more than ten judicial days following such request.
(c) Immediately upon being apprised of the time and place for hearing the petitioner shall cause a notice of the same to be served upon the tenant in accordance with the provisions of rule 4 of the West Virginia rules of civil procedure or by certified mail, return receipt requested. Such notice shall inform the tenant that any defense to the petition must be submitted in writing to the petitioner within five days of the receipt by the tenant of the notice and in no case later than the fifth day next preceding the date of hearing. Upon receipt of the return of service or the return receipt as the case may be, evidencing service upon the tenant, the petitioner shall file with the court his petition and such proof of service.
(b) In the case of a petition alleging good cause or holding over after proper termination of a tenancy, if the tenant files an answer raising the defense of breach by the landlord of a material covenant upon which the tenant's duties depend or other defenses to the claim or claims set forth in the petition, the court shall proceed to a hearing on such issues.
(c) Continuances of the hearing provided for in this section shall be for good cause only and the judge or magistrate shall not grant a continuance to either party as a matter of right. If a continuance is granted upon request by a tenant, the tenant shall be required to pay into court any periodic rent becoming due during the period of such continuance.
(d) At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that the landlord is entitled to evict the tenants and have the factory-built home of the tenants removed, the court shall make and enter an order evicting the tenants and ordering the tenants to have the factory-built home removed. In the case of a proceeding pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the court may also make a written finding and include in its order such relief on the issue of arrearage in the payment of periodic payments or other agreed charges related to the tenancy as the evidence may require. The court may disburse any moneys paid into court by the tenant in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(e) The court order shall specify the time when the tenant shall vacate the property, taking into consideration such factors as the nature of the factory-built home, the possibility of relative harm to the parties and other material facts deemed relevant by the court in considering when the tenant might reasonably be expected to vacate the property. The court shall not order the tenant to vacate the premises in less than one month unless the tenant refuses or fails to pay rent for that period in advance as it becomes due or unless the court finds that the tenant has deliberately or negligently damaged the property or the property of other tenants or materially threatened or harmed the quiet enjoyment of the property of other tenants or neighbors or knowingly permitted another person to do so. The court shall not order the tenant to remove the factory-built home in less than three months unless the tenant refuses or fails to pay rent in advance as it becomes due for that period or unless the court finds that the presence of the factory-built home poses an imminent threat to the health or safety of other tenants or neighbors: Provided, That the court may order the home to be removed in not less than thirty days if the factory-built home is a single section and the tenant had held over after having been given notice pursuant to section three of this article. The order shall further provide that if the tenant continues to wrongfully occupy the property beyond such time or if the tenant refuses or fails to remove the factory-built home in the time required, the landlord may apply for a writ of possession and the sheriff shall forthwith remove the tenant, taking precautions to guard against damage to the property of the landlord and the tenant.
(f) In the event an appeal is taken and the tenant prevails upon appeal, and if the term of the lease has expired and proper termination notice was given pursuant to section three of this article, absent an issue of title, retaliatory eviction or breach of warranty, the relief ordered by the appellate court shall be for monetary damages only and shall not restore the tenant to possession. During the pendency of any such appeal, if the period of the tenancy has otherwise expired and proper termination notice was given pursuant to section three of this article, the tenant is not entitled to remain in possession of the property.
(g) When an order is issued pursuant to this section evicting the tenant and ordering the tenant to remove the factory-built home and the tenant fails to remove the factory-built home by the date specified by the order issued pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, the landlord may:
(1) Dispose of the tenant's factory-built home without incurring any liability or responsibility to the tenant or any other person if the tenant informs the landlord in writing that the tenant is abandoning the factory-built home;
(2) Remove and store the factory-built home after the date and time by which the court ordered the tenant to remove the factory-built home. The landlord may sell the stored factory-built home after thirty days without incurring any liability or responsibility to the tenant or any other person if: (i) The tenant has not paid the reasonable costs of storage and removal to the landlord and has not taken possession of the stored factory-built home; or (ii) the costs of storage equal the value of the factory-built home being stored; or
(3) Leave the factory-built home on the property. The landlord may sell the factory-built home left on the property after thirty days without incurring any liability or responsibility to the tenant or any other person if the tenant has not paid the landlord the reasonable costs of leaving the factory-built home on the landlord's property and has not taken possession of the factory-built home.
(h) The sale shall be conducted and the proceeds distributed pursuant to article nine, chapter forty-six of this code as if the landlord became the holder of a security interest on the day the tenant was to have the factory-built home removed from the site except that the landlord shall have first priority to recover unpaid rent and may require as a condition of the sale that the buyer post security or place in escrow the cost of moving the factory-built home from the site.
(i) When an order is issued pursuant to this section granting possession of the property to the landlord and the tenant removes the factory-built home, but fails to remove all other personal property by the date and time specified by the order issued pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, the landlord may:
(1) Dispose of the tenant's personal property without incurring any liability or responsibility to the tenant or any other person if the tenant informs the landlord in writing that the other personal property is abandoned or if the property is garbage;
(2) Remove and store the other personal property after the date and time by which the court ordered the tenant to vacate the property. The landlord may dispose of the stored personal property after thirty days without incurring any liability or responsibility to the tenant or any other person if: (i) The tenant has not paid the reasonable costs of storage and removal to the landlord and has not taken possession of the stored personal property; or (ii) the costs of storage equal the value of the personal property being stored; or
(3) Leave the personal property on the property. The landlord may dispose of personal property left on the property after thirty days without incurring any liability or responsibility to the tenant or any other person if the tenant has not paid the landlord the reasonable costs of leaving the personal property on the landlord's property and has not taken possession of the personal property.
(j) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (g) and (i) of this section, if the personal property is worth more than three hundred dollars and was not removed from the property or place of storage within thirty days with the required fees paid as provided in subsection (i) of this section, or if the factory-built home was not removed within thirty days with the required fees paid as provided in subsection (g) of this section, the landlord shall store the personal property or factory-built home for up to thirty additional days if the tenant or any person holding a security interest in the abandoned personal property or factory-built home informs the landlord of their intent to remove the property: Provided, That the tenant or person holding a security interest in the personal property pays the landlord the reasonable costs of storage and removal.
This section shall apply in cases involving the right to the proceeds of any such land when condemned or sold, as well as in cases where the title to land is directly involved, and shall apply in any case in which the title to any part of the land, or its proceeds, but for this section, would or might be in the state.
The petitioner shall make defendants to said petition all persons having a present interest in the boundary line or lines sought to be ascertained and designated, and the case shall be commenced by serving a copy of the petition upon the defendant or defendants. If the petition shall have been served on the defendant or defendants and filed in the clerk's office not less than thirty days preceding the first day of a term of court the case shall be matured for trial at said term. The defendant or defendants may file an answer to said petition which shall state the grounds of defense, if any, and the parties shall be deemed to be at issue, which issue shall be the true boundary line or lines of such real estate. The trial shall be conducted as other trials at law, and the same rules of evidence shall apply and the same defenses may be made as in other actions at law. A trial by jury may be waived by consent of the parties, and the case be tried by the court. Counsel for the petitioner shall have the right to open and conclude the argument. The judgment of the court shall be recorded in the law order book, and in the current deed book in the office of the clerk of the county court, and indexed in the names of the parties.
The judge of the court in term time or vacation may direct such surveys to be made as he may deem necessary. The judgment of the court, unless reversed, shall forever settle, determine, and designate the true boundary line or lines in question, and be binding upon the parties, their heirs, devisees, and assigns. The judgment may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment in an action of ejectment. A writ of error from the supreme court of appeals shall lie to such judgment in like manner as in a common-law action.
In a proceeding under this section, no claim for rents, profits or damages shall be considered.
If there is not sufficient evidence at the site of the parcels involved to ascertain the true location of the boundary line, the parties to the dispute may secure the judgment and knowledge of another licensed land surveyor or surveyors or registered professional engineer or engineers as to the true location. If an agreement is reached between all of the owners of the land involved in the dispute, then a straw deed or deed of correction shall be made, with the signatures of all parties affixed thereto.
If after the intervention of the additional surveyor, surveyors, engineer or engineers, there still exists a dispute as to the location of the boundary line, then any party may bring an action pursuant to section thirty-one of this article in the circuit court of the county where the land is located to ascertain the true location of the boundary line: Provided, That in any such action no party to such action shall be permitted to introduce into evidence any agreement with respect to the boundary dispute between two or more parties to the action if such agreement is not embodied in a corrective or straw deed executed by the parties.
Nothing in this section shall prevent or be deemed a condition precedent to the institution of an action under section thirty-one of this article.
(b) In every such action for wrongful death, the jury, or in a case tried without a jury, the court, may award such damages as to it may seem fair and just, and, may direct in what proportions the damages shall be distributed to the surviving spouse and children, including adopted children and stepchildren, brothers, sisters, parents and any persons who were financially dependent upon the decedent at the time of his or her death or would otherwise be equitably entitled to share in such distribution after making provision for those expenditures, if any, specified in subdivision (2), subsection (c) of this section. If there are no such survivors, then the damages shall be distributed in accordance with the decedent's will or, if there is no will, in accordance with the laws of descent and distribution as set forth in chapter forty-two of this code. If the jury renders only a general verdict on damages and does not provide for the distribution thereof, the court shall distribute the damages in accordance with the provisions of this subsection.
(c) (1) The verdict of the jury shall include, but may not be limited to, damages for the following: (A) Sorrow, mental anguish, and solace which may include society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice of the decedent; (B) compensation for reasonably expected loss of (i) income of the decedent, and (ii) services, protection, care and assistance provided by the decedent; (C) expenses for the care, treatment and hospitalization of the decedent incident to the injury resulting in death; and (D) reasonable funeral expenses.
(2) In its verdict the jury shall set forth separately the amount of damages, if any, awarded by it for reasonable funeral, hospital, medical and said other expenses incurred as a result of the wrongful act, neglect or default of the defendant or defendants which resulted in death, and any such amount recovered for such expenses shall be so expended by the personal representative.
(d) Every such action shall be commenced within two years after the death of such deceased person, subject to the provisions of section eighteen, article two, chapter fifty-five. The provisions of this section shall not apply to actions brought for the death of any person occurring prior to the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred eighty-eight.
(b) If any such action is begun during the lifetime of the injured party, and within the period of time permissible under the applicable statute of limitations as provided by articles two and two-a of this chapter, (either against the wrongdoer or his personal representative), and such injured party dies pending the action it may be revived in favor of the personal representative of such injured party and prosecuted to judgment and execution against the wrongdoer or his personal representative.
(c) If the injured party dies before having begun any such action and it is not at the time of his death barred by the applicable statute of limitations under the provisions of articles two and two-a of this chapter, such action may be begun by the personal representative of the injured party against the wrongdoer or his personal representative and prosecuted to judgment and execution against the wrongdoer or his personal representative. Any such action shall be instituted within the same period of time that would have been applicable had the injured party not died.
(d) If any such action mentioned in the preceding subsections (a), (b) and/or (c) shall have been begun against the wrongdoer and he or she dies during the pendency thereof, it may be revived against the personal representative of the wrongdoer and prosecuted to judgment and execution.
(e) The applicable provisions of article eight, chapter fifty-six of this code shall govern the actions hereinabove mentioned, with reference to their abatement, revival, discontinuance, reinstatement and substitution of parties.
(f) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to extend the time within which an action for any other tort shall be brought, nor to give the right to assign a claim for a tort not otherwise assignable.
(1) Negotiate or attempt to negotiate a settlement of any claim for such personal injury with or for and on behalf of the injured person;
(2) Obtain or attempt to obtain from the injured person a partial or general release of liability for such injury; or
(3) Obtain or attempt to obtain any statement, either written or oral, from the injured person for use in negotiating a settlement or obtaining a partial or general release of liability with respect to the personal injury: Provided, That nothing herein shall prohibit a person acting or intending to act for and on behalf of the injured person from obtaining any statement, oral or written, from an injured person upon the express request of the injured person.
Nothing herein shall prevent a person who may be liable for damages on account of the personal injury from making an advance payment of all or any part of his or her liability for the damages; any sum paid during the twenty days by a person liable for damages on account of the personal injury is allowed as full credit against any damages which may be finally determined to be due an injured person.
Any settlement, release of liability or statement entered into, obtained or made in violation of this section may be disavowed by the injured person at any time within one hundred eighty days from the date of the personal injury by executing a written statement of disavowal and thereupon forwarding a copy of the same to the person violating this section, in which event the settlement, release or statement may not be admissible in evidence for any purpose in any court or other proceeding relating to the personal injury, if any consideration paid for the settlement of or the general release of liability for the personal injury, at the time of the forwarding of the copy of the written statement of disavowal, is repaid or returned to the person who paid the consideration.
(b) (1) No statement, affirmation, gesture or conduct of a healthcare provider who provided healthcare services to a patient, expressing apology, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion or a general sense of benevolence, to the patient, a relative of the patient or a representative of the patient and which relate to the discomfort, pain, suffering, injury or death of the patient shall be admissible as evidence of an admission of liability or as evidence of an admission against interest in any civil action brought under the provisions of article seven-b, chapter fifty-five of this code, or in any arbitration, mediation or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding related to such civil action.
(2) Terms not otherwise defined in this section have the meanings assigned to them in article seven-b, chapter fifty-five of this code. For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires, "relative" means a spouse, parent, grandparent, stepfather, stepmother, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister or spouse's parents. The term includes said relationships that are created as a result of adoption. In addition, "relative" includes any person who has a family-type relationship with a patient.
In no event, however, shall any owner, licensee or operator or the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or operator of such a station or network of stations be held liable for any damages for any defamatory statement uttered over the facilities of such station or network by any legally qualified candidate for public office.
(b) For the purposes of this section, a national ski patrol system is a national organization whose members are volunteers and do not receive compensation and are required to obtain training in safety and emergency medical treatment.
(c) For purposes of this section, the term "compensation" does not include access to a recreational facility, complimentary lift tickets, food, lodging or other gifts or discounts that may be offered or accessible to a person.
For the purposes of this section, "hazardous substance" means any "hazardous substance" as defined in chapter eighty-eight, Acts of the Legislature, regular session, one thousand nine hundred eighty-five; any "chemical substances and materials" listed in the rules promulgated by the commissioner of labor pursuant to section eighteen, article three, chapter twenty-one, of this code; and any "hazardous waste" as defined in section three, article eighteen, chapter twenty-two of this code.
(b) For the purposes of this section, the presumption of good faith is rebutted upon a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the information disclosed was:
(1) Knowingly false;
(2) Disclosed with reckless disregard for the truth;
(3) Deliberately misleading;
(4) Rendered with malicious purpose toward the former or current employee; or
(5) Disclosed in violation of a nondisclosure agreement or applicable law.
(c) For purposes of this section, "job-related information" means information concerning a person's education, training, experience, qualifications, conduct and job performance which is offered for the purpose of providing criteria to evaluate the person's suitability for employment.
(d) If an employer disclosed job-related information to a prospective employer of a former or current employee that was false or misleading, and if the current or former employee requests, then the employer shall give corrected information to every person or entity that is in the employer's records as having received the original information, with a copy thereof to the former or current employee.
(b) The limitation of liability established by the provisions of this section shall not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross negligence. For purposes of this section, the term "athletic event" includes scheduled practices for any athletic event.
(b) No complaint to a licensing or accrediting entity against a court-appointed licensed psychologist or psychiatrist relating to a child custody evaluation shall be considered if it is filed anonymously and does not include the full name, address and telephone number of the complainant.
(c) Any action filed against a licensed psychologist or licensed psychiatrist alleging tortious conduct related to evidence provided while acting as a court-appointed expert in a child custody matter shall contain a recitation of a specific allegation of breaches of American psychological association's guidelines for child custody evaluations in divorce proceedings. Failure to specifically plead such violations shall be cause for dismissal of the action.
(d) Any licensed psychologist or licensed psychiatrist who is
named in a civil action as a defendant because of his or her performance of a child custody evaluation while acting as a
court-appointed expert and who prevails due to a finding that he or
she acted consistently with the American psychological
association's guidelines shall be entitled to reimbursement of all
reasonable costs and attorneys fees expended.
(b) A lawful occupant within a home or other place of residence does not have a duty to retreat from an intruder or attacker in the circumstances described in subsection (a) of this section.
(c) A person not engaged in unlawful activity who is attacked in any place he or she has a legal right to be outside of his or her home or residence may use reasonable and proportionate force against an intruder or attacker: Provided, That such person may use deadly force against an intruder or attacker in a place that is not his or her residence without a duty to retreat if the person reasonably believes that he or she or another is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm from which he or she or another can only be saved by the use of deadly force against the intruder or attacker.
(d) The justified use of reasonable and proportionate force under this section shall constitute a full and complete defense to any civil action brought by an intruder or attacker against a person using such force.
(e) The full and complete civil defense created by the provisions of this section is not available to a person who:
(1) Is attempting to commit, committing or escaping from the commission of a felony;
(2) Initially provokes the use of force against himself, herself or another with the intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; or
(3) Otherwise initially provokes the use of force against himself, herself or another, unless he or she withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant that he or she desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant continues or resumes the use of force.
(f) The provisions of this section do not apply to the creation of a hazardous or dangerous condition on or in any real or personal property designed to prevent criminal conduct or cause injury to a person engaging in criminal conduct.
(g) Nothing in this section shall authorize or justify a person to resist or obstruct a law-enforcement officer acting in the course of his or her duty.
(b) The provisions of this section are not intended to create a new cause of action.
(1) Instruct the jury to determine, or, if there is no jury, find, the total amount of damages sustained by the claimant and the proportionate fault of each of the parties in the litigation at the time the verdict is rendered; and
(2) Enter judgment against each defendant found to be liable on the basis of the rules of joint and several liability, except that if any defendant is thirty percent or less at fault, then that defendant's liability shall be several and not joint and he or she shall be liable only for the damages attributable to him or her, except as otherwise provided in this section.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (2), subsection (a) of this section, the rules of joint and several liability shall apply to:
(1) Any party who acted with the intention of inflicting injury or damage;
(2) Any party who acted in concert with another person as part of a common plan or design resulting in harm;
(3) Any party who negligently or willfully caused the unlawful emission, disposal or spillage of a toxic or hazardous substance; or
(4) Any party strictly liable for the manufacture and sale of a defective product.
(c) Notwithstanding subdivision (2), subsection (a) of this section, if a claimant through good faith efforts is unable to collect from a liable defendant, the claimant may, not later than six months after judgment becomes final through lapse of time for appeal or through exhaustion of appeal, whichever occurs later, move for reallocation of any uncollectible amount among the other parties in the litigation at the time the verdict is rendered.
(1) Upon the filing of such a motion, the court shall determine whether all or part of a defendant's proportionate share of the verdict is uncollectible from that defendant and shall reallocate such uncollectible amount among the other parties in the litigation at the time the verdict is rendered, including a claimant at fault according to their percentages of fault: Provided, That the court shall not reallocate to any defendant an uncollectible amount greater than that defendant's percentage of fault multiplied by such uncollectible amount.
(2) If such a motion is filed, the parties may conduct discovery on the issue of collectability prior to a hearing on such motion.
(3) Any order regarding such motion shall be entered within one hundred twenty days after the date of filing such a motion.
(4) A defendant's share of the obligation to a claimant may not be increased by reason of reallocation under this subsection if:
(A) The percentage of fault of that defendant is equal to or less than the claimant's percentage of fault; or
(B) The percentage of fault of that defendant is less than ten percent.
(5) A party whose liability is reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.
(6) If any defendant's share of the obligation to a claimant is not increased by reason of the application of subdivision (4) of this subsection, the amount of that defendant's share of the reallocation shall be considered uncollectible and shall be reallocated among all other parties who are not subject to subdivision (4) of this subsection, including the claimant, in the same manner as otherwise provided this subsection.
(d) Nothing in this section may be construed to affect, impair or abrogate any right of indemnity or contribution arising out of any contract or agreement or any right of indemnity otherwise provided by law.
(e) Nothing in this section creates or recognizes, either explicitly or impliedly, any new or different cause of action not otherwise recognized by law.
(f) Nothing in this section may be construed to affect, impair or abrogate the provisions of section seven, article twelve-a, chapter twenty-nine of this code or section nine, article seven-b of this chapter.
(g) This section applies only to causes of action that accrue on or after the first day of July, two thousand five.
(b) Neither a first responder nor his or her supervisor, agency, employer or supervising entity is liable for any civil damages or criminal liability resulting from a forcible entry of a home, business or other structure if the first responder:
(1) Is responding to a documented 911 call for emergency medical assistance;
(2) Has made reasonable efforts to summon an occupant of the home, business, or structure by knocking or otherwise notifying the occupant(s) of his or her presence;
(3) Has not received a response from an occupant within a reasonable period of time; and
(4) Has a good faith belief that it is necessary to make a forcible entry for the purposes of rendering emergency medical assistance or preventing imminent bodily harm.
(c) Nothing in this section shall affect the standard of care
a first responder must employ when rendering aid after gaining
entry.
(a) The malicious and willful injury to the person of another; or
(b) The malicious and willful injury or damage to the property of another, whether the property be real, personal or mixed; or
(c) The malicious and willful setting fire to a forest or wooded area belonging to another; or
(d) The willful taking, stealing and carrying away of the property of another, with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession.
For purposes of this section, "custodial parent or parents" shall mean the parent or parents with whom the minor child is living, or a divorced or separated parent who does not have legal custody but who is exercising supervisory control over the minor child at the time of the minor child's act.
Persons entitled to recover damages under this article shall include, but not be limited to, the state of West Virginia, any municipal corporation, county commission and board of education, or other political subdivision of this state, or any person or organization of any kind or character. The action may be brought in magistrate or another court of competent jurisdiction. Recovery hereunder shall be limited to the actual damages based upon direct out-of-pocket loss, taxable court costs, and interest from date of judgment. The right of action and remedy granted herein shall be in addition to and not exclusive of any rights of action and remedies therefor against a parent or parents for the tortious acts of his or their children heretofore existing under the provisions of any law, statutory or otherwise, or now so existing independently of the provisions of this article.
The provisions of this article shall be applicable to causes of action arising on and after the effective date of reenactment of this article. Causes of actions arising before the effective date of reenactment of this article and proceedings thereon shall be governed by the previously enacted provisions of this article in force at the time the cause arose.
That as in every human endeavor the possibility of injury or death from negligent conduct commands that protection of the public served by health care providers be recognized as an important state interest;
That our system of litigation is an essential component of this state's interest in providing adequate and reasonable compensation to those persons who suffer from injury or death as a result of professional negligence, and any limitation placed on this system must be balanced with and considerate of the need to fairly compensate patients who have been injured as a result of negligent and incompetent acts by health care providers;
That liability insurance is a key part of our system of litigation, affording compensation to the injured while fulfilling the need and fairness of spreading the cost of the risks of injury;
That a further important component of these protections is the capacity and willingness of health care providers to monitor and effectively control their professional competency, so as to protect the public and insure to the extent possible the highest quality of care;
That it is the duty and responsibility of the Legislature to balance the rights of our individual citizens to adequate and reasonable compensation with the broad public interest in the provision of services by qualified health care providers and health care facilities who can themselves obtain the protection of reasonably priced and extensive liability coverage;
That in recent years, the cost of insurance coverage has risen dramatically while the nature and extent of coverage has diminished, leaving the health care providers, the health care facilities and the injured without the full benefit of professional liability insurance coverage;
That many of the factors and reasons contributing to the increased cost and diminished availability of professional liability insurance arise from the historic inability of this state to effectively and fairly regulate the insurance industry so as to guarantee our citizens that rates are appropriate, that purchasers of insurance coverage are not treated arbitrarily and that rates reflect the competency and experience of the insured health care providers and health care facilities;
That the unpredictable nature of traumatic injury health care services often result in a greater likelihood of unsatisfactory patient outcomes, a higher degree of patient and patient family dissatisfaction and frequent malpractice claims, creating a financial strain on the trauma care system of our state, increasing costs for all users of the trauma care system and impacting the availability of these services, requires appropriate and balanced limitations on the rights of persons asserting claims against trauma care health care providers, this balance must guarantee availability of trauma care services while mandating that these services meet all national standards of care, to assure that our health care resources are being directed towards providing the best trauma care available; and
That the cost of liability insurance coverage has continued to rise dramatically, resulting in the state's loss and threatened loss of physicians, which, together with other costs and taxation incurred by health care providers in this state, have created a competitive disadvantage in attracting and retaining qualified physicians and other health care providers.
The Legislature further finds that medical liability issues have reached critical proportions for the state's long-term health care facilities, as: (1) Medical liability insurance premiums for nursing homes in West Virginia continue to increase and the number of claims per bed has increased significantly; (2) the cost to the state medicaid program as a result of such higher premiums has grown considerably in this period; (3) current medical liability premium costs for some nursing homes constitute a significant percentage of the amount of coverage; (4) these high costs are leading some facilities to consider dropping medical liability insurance coverage altogether; and (5) the medical liability insurance crisis for nursing homes may soon result in a reduction of the number of beds available to citizens in need of long-term care.
Therefore, the purpose of this article is to provide for a comprehensive resolution of the matters and factors which the Legislature finds must be addressed to accomplish the goals set forth in this section. In so doing, the Legislature has determined that reforms in the common law and statutory rights of our citizens must be enacted together as necessary and mutual ingredients of the appropriate legislative response relating to:
(1) Compensation for injury and death;
(2) The regulation of rate making and other practices by the liability insurance industry, including the formation of a physicians' mutual insurance company and establishment of a fund to assure adequate compensation to victims of malpractice; and
(3) The authority of medical licensing boards to effectively regulate and discipline the health care providers under such board.
(b) "Collateral source" means a source of benefits or advantages for economic loss that the claimant has received from:
(1) Any federal or state act, public program or insurance which provides payments for medical expenses, disability benefits, including workers' compensation benefits, or other similar benefits. Benefits payable under the Social Security Act are not considered payments from collateral sources except for Social Security disability benefits directly attributable to the medical injury in question;
(2) Any contract or agreement of any group, organization, partnership or corporation to provide, pay for or reimburse the cost of medical, hospital, dental, nursing, rehabilitation, therapy or other health care services or provide similar benefits;
(3) Any group accident, sickness or income disability insurance, any casualty or property insurance (including automobile and homeowners' insurance) which provides medical benefits, income replacement or disability coverage, or any other similar insurance benefits, except life insurance, to the extent that someone other than the insured, including the insured's employer, has paid all or part of the premium or made an economic contribution on behalf of the plaintiff; or
(4) Any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by an employer or otherwise or any other system intended to provide wages during a period of disability.
(c) "Consumer price index" means the most recent consumer price index for all consumers published by the United States Department of Labor.
(d) "Emergency condition" means any acute traumatic injury or acute medical condition which, according to standardized criteria for triage, involves a significant risk of death or the precipitation of significant complications or disabilities, impairment of bodily functions, or, with respect to a pregnant woman, a significant risk to the health of the unborn child.
(e) "Health care" means any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment or confinement.
(f) "Health care facility" means any clinic, hospital, nursing home or assisted living facility, including personal care home, residential care community and residential board and care home, or behavioral health care facility or comprehensive community mental health/mental retardation center, in and licensed by the State of West Virginia and any state-operated institution or clinic providing health care.
(g) "Health care provider" means a person, partnership, corporation, professional limited liability company, health care facility or institution licensed by, or certified in, this state or another state, to provide health care or professional health care services, including, but not limited to, a physician, osteopathic physician, hospital, dentist, registered or licensed practical nurse, optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor, physical therapist, psychologist, emergency medical services authority or agency, or an officer, employee or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of such officer's, employee's or agent's employment.
(h) "Medical injury" means injury or death to a patient arising or resulting from the rendering of or failure to render health care.
(i) "Medical professional liability" means any liability for damages resulting from the death or injury of a person for any tort or breach of contract based on health care services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care provider or health care facility to a patient.
(j) "Medical professional liability insurance" means a contract of insurance or any actuarially sound self-funding program that pays for the legal liability of a health care facility or health care provider arising from a claim of medical professional liability. In order to qualify as medical professional liability insurance for purposes of this article, a self-funding program for an individual physician must meet the requirements and minimum standards set forth in section twelve of this article.
(k) "Noneconomic loss" means losses, including, but not limited to, pain, suffering, mental anguish and grief.
(l) "Patient" means a natural person who receives or should have received health care from a licensed health care provider under a contract, expressed or implied.
(m) "Plaintiff" means a patient or representative of a patient who brings an action for medical professional liability under this article.
(n) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, attorney or other legal agent of another.
(1) The health care provider failed to exercise that degree of care, skill and learning required or expected of a reasonable, prudent health care provider in the profession or class to which the health care provider belongs acting in the same or similar circumstances; and
(2) Such failure was a proximate cause of the injury or death.
(b) If the plaintiff proceeds on the "loss of chance" theory, i.e., that the health care provider's failure to follow the accepted standard of care deprived the patient of a chance of recovery or increased the risk of harm to the patient which was a substantial factor in bringing about the ultimate injury to the patient, the plaintiff must also prove, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, that following the accepted standard of care would have resulted in a greater than twenty-five percent chance that the patient would have had an improved recovery or would have survived.
(b) A cause of action for injury to a minor, brought by or on behalf of a minor who was under the age of ten years at the time of such injury, shall be commenced within two years of the date of such injury, or prior to the minor's twelfth birthday, whichever provides the longer period.
(c) The periods of limitation set forth in this section shall be tolled for any period during which the health care provider or its representative has committed fraud or collusion by concealing or misrepresenting material facts about the injury.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, absent privity of contract, no plaintiff who files a medical professional liability action against a health care provider may file an independent cause of action against any insurer of the health care provider alleging the insurer has violated the provisions of subdivision (9), section four, article eleven, chapter thirty-three of this code. Insofar as the provisions of section three, article eleven, chapter thirty-three of this code prohibit the conduct defined in subdivision (9), section four, article eleven, chapter thirty-three of this code, no plaintiff who files a medical professional liability action against a health care provider may file an independent cause of action against any insurer of the health care provider alleging the insurer has violated the provisions of said section three.
(c) No health care provider may file a cause of action against his or her insurer alleging the insurer has violated the provisions of subdivision (9), section four, article eleven, chapter thirty-three of this code until the jury has rendered a verdict in the underlying medical professional liability action or the case has otherwise been dismissed, resolved or disposed of.
(b) At least thirty days prior to the filing of a medical professional liability action against a health care provider, the claimant shall serve by certified mail, return receipt requested, a notice of claim on each health care provider the claimant will join in litigation. The notice of claim shall include a statement of the theory or theories of liability upon which a cause of action may be based, and a list of all health care providers and health care facilities to whom notices of claim are being sent, together with a screening certificate of merit. The screening certificate of merit shall be executed under oath by a health care provider qualified as an expert under the West Virginia rules of evidence and shall state with particularity: (1) The expert's familiarity with the applicable standard of care in issue; (2) the expert's qualifications; (3) the expert's opinion as to how the applicable standard of care was breached; and (4) the expert's opinion as to how the breach of the applicable standard of care resulted in injury or death. A separate screening certificate of merit must be provided for each health care provider against whom a claim is asserted. The person signing the screening certificate of merit shall have no financial interest in the underlying claim, but may participate as an expert witness in any judicial proceeding. Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the application of rule 15 of the rules of civil procedure.
(c) Notwithstanding any provision of this code, if a claimant or his or her counsel, believes that no screening certificate of merit is necessary because the cause of action is based upon a well-established legal theory of liability which does not require expert testimony supporting a breach of the applicable standard of care, the claimant or his or her counsel, shall file a statement specifically setting forth the basis of the alleged liability of the health care provider in lieu of a screening certificate of merit.
(d) If a claimant or his or her counsel has insufficient time to obtain a screening certificate of merit prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the claimant shall comply with the provisions of subsection (b) of this section except that the claimant or his or her counsel shall furnish the health care provider with a statement of intent to provide a screening certificate of merit within sixty days of the date the health care provider receives the notice of claim.
(e) Any health care provider who receives a notice of claim pursuant to the provisions of this section may respond, in writing, to the claimant or his or her counsel within thirty days of receipt of the claim or within thirty days of receipt of the screening certificate of merit if the claimant is proceeding pursuant to the provisions of subsection (d) of this section. The response may state that the health care provider has a bona fide defense and the name of the health care provider's counsel, if any.
(f) Upon receipt of the notice of claim or of the screening certificate of merit, if the claimant is proceeding pursuant to the provisions of subsection (d) of this section, the health care provider is entitled to pre-litigation mediation before a qualified mediator upon written demand to the claimant.
(g) If the health care provider demands mediation pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f) of this section, the mediation shall be concluded within forty-five days of the date of the written demand. The mediation shall otherwise be conducted pursuant to rule 25 of the trial court rules, unless portions of the rule are clearly not applicable to a mediation conducted prior to the filing of a complaint or unless the supreme court of appeals promulgates rules governing mediation prior to the filing of a complaint. If mediation is conducted, the claimant may depose the health care provider before mediation or take the testimony of the health care provider during the mediation.
(h) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, any statute of limitations applicable to a cause of action against a health care provider upon whom notice was served for alleged medical professional liability shall be tolled from the date of mail of a notice of claim to thirty days following receipt of a response to the notice of claim, thirty days from the date a response to the notice of claim would be due, or thirty days from the receipt by the claimant of written notice from the mediator that the mediation has not resulted in a settlement of the alleged claim and that mediation is concluded, whichever last occurs. If a claimant has sent a notice of claim relating to any injury or death to more than one health care provider, any one of whom has demanded mediation, then the statute of limitations shall be tolled with respect to, and only with respect to, those health care providers to whom the claimant sent a notice of claim to thirty days from the receipt of the claimant of written notice from the mediator that the mediation has not resulted in a settlement of the alleged claim and that mediation is concluded.
(i) Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, a notice of claim, a health care provider's response to any notice claim, a screening certificate of merit and the results of any mediation conducted pursuant to the provisions of this section are confidential and are not admissible as evidence in any court proceeding unless the court, upon hearing, determines that failure to disclose the contents would cause a miscarriage of justice.
(b) Upon receipt and review of the records referred to in subsection (a) of this section, any party may make a written request to any other party for medical records of the plaintiff or the deceased related to his or her medical care and which are reasonably related to the plaintiff's claim. Such request shall be specific as to the type of record requested and shall be accompanied by a brief statement as to why its disclosure would be relevant to preparation of a claim or of a defense. The party receiving the request shall provide access to any such records under his or her control or a release for medical records for such records not under his or her control unless the party receiving the request believes that the records requested are not reasonably related to the claim.
(c) If a party receives a request for existing records he or she believes are not reasonably related to the claim, he or she shall provide written notice to the requesting party of the existence of such records and schedule a hearing before the court to determine whether access should be provided.
(d) If a party has reasonable cause to believe that medical records reasonably related to the claim of medical negligence exist and access have not been provided or a release has not been provided therefor, he or she shall give written notice thereof to the party upon whom the request is made, and if said records are not received within fourteen days of the written notice, obtain a hearing on the matter before the court.
(e) In the event a hearing is required pursuant to the provisions of subsection (c) or (d) of this section, the court at the conclusion thereof shall make a finding as to the reasonableness of the parties' request for or refusal to provide records and may assess costs pursuant to the rules of civil procedure.
(b) During the status conference the parties shall inform the court as to the status of the action, the identification of contested facts and issues, the progress of discovery and the time necessary to complete discovery. The plaintiff shall advise the court whether the plaintiff intends to proceed without an expert, whether the expert who signed the screening certificate of merit will testify upon trial or whether additional experts will be offered by plaintiff. The court shall determine whether the plaintiff may proceed without an expert or otherwise establish dates for the disclosure of expert witnesses by both the plaintiff and all defendants. The court shall also order the parties to participate in mandatory mediation. The mediation shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of trial court rule 25.
(c) Absent an order expressly setting forth reasons why the interests of justice would otherwise be served, the court shall enter a scheduling order which sets a trial date within twenty-four months from the date the defendant made an appearance, or if there is more than one defendant, twenty-four months from the date the last defendant makes an appearance in the proceeding. The trial date shall be adhered to unless, for good cause shown, the court enters an order continuing the trial date.
(d) The court may order a summary jury trial of the case if all parties represent a case is ready for trial and jointly move the court for a summary jury trial, as provided in section six-c of this article.
(e) Counsel and parties are subject to sanctions for failures and lack of preparation specified in rule 16(f) of the rules of civil procedure respecting pretrial conferences or orders and are subject to the payment of reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, for failure to participate in good faith in the development and submission of a proposed discovery plan as required by the rules of civil procedure.
(f) In the event that the court determines prior to trial that either party is presenting or relying upon a frivolous or dilatory claim or defense, for which there is no reasonable basis in fact or at law, the court may direct in any final judgment the payment to the prevailing party of reasonable litigation expenses, including deposition and subpoena expenses, travel expenses incurred by the party, and such other expenses necessary to the maintenance of the action, excluding attorney's fees and expenses.
(b) Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties or representatives of the parties must be present at the summary jury trial.
(c) The trial shall be conducted before a six-member jury selected from the regular jury panel. The court shall conduct a brief voir dire of the panel, and each party may exercise two challenges. No alternate jurors will be impaneled.
(d) All evidence shall be presented by the attorneys for the parties. The attorneys may summarize, quote from, and comment on pleadings, depositions, or other discovery requests and responses, exhibits and statements of potential witnesses. No potential testimony of a witness may be referred to unless the reference is based on: (i) The product of discovery procedures; (ii) a written sworn statement of the witness; or (iii) an affidavit of counsel stating that although an affidavit of the witness is not available and cannot be obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence, the witness would be called at trial and counsel has been told the substance of the testimony of the witness. The substance of the witness' testimony must also be included in the affidavit of counsel.
(e) Unless the court orders otherwise, presentations shall be limited to one hour for each party. In the case of multiple parties represented by separate counsel, the court shall make a reasonable adjustment of the time allowed.
(f) Opposing counsel may object during the course of a presentation if the presentation violates the provisions of subsection (d) of this section or goes beyond the limits of propriety in statements as to evidence or other comments.
(g) Following the presentations by counsel, the court shall give an abbreviated set of instructions to the jury on the applicable law. The jury will be encouraged to return a verdict that represents a unanimous verdict of the jurors. If after a reasonable time a unanimous verdict is not possible, the jury shall be directed to return a special verdict consisting of an anonymous statement of each juror's finding on liability and damages. Following the verdict, the court may invite, but may not require, the jurors to informally discuss the case with the attorneys and the parties.
(h) Unless the court orders otherwise, the proceedings will not be recorded. However, a party may arrange for recording at its own expense. Statements in briefs or summaries submitted in connection with the summary jury trial and statements by counsel at trial are not admissible in any evidentiary proceeding. The summary jury trial verdict is not admissible in any evidentiary proceeding.
(i) Within thirty days following the jury verdict, each party must file a notice setting forth whether the party intends to accept the summary jury trial verdict or whether the party rejects the summary jury trial verdict and desires to proceed to trial. If all parties accept the summary jury trial verdict, the verdict will be deemed a final determination on the merits and judgment may be entered on the verdict by the court. If a verdict is rendered upon the subsequent trial of the case which is not more than twenty percent more favorable to a party who rejected the summary jury trial verdict and indicated a desire to proceed to trial, the rejecting party is liable for the costs incurred by the other party or parties subsequent to the summary jury trial, in a similar manner as is provided in rule 68(c) of the rules of civil procedure when a claimant rejects an offer of judgment, and is liable for attorneys' fees incurred after the summary jury trial.
(b) Nothing contained in this section may be construed to limit a trial court's discretion to determine the competency or lack of competency of a witness on a ground not specifically enumerated in this section.
(b) The plaintiff may recover compensatory damages for noneconomic loss in excess of the limitation described in subsection (a) of this section, but not in excess of five hundred thousand dollars for each occurrence, regardless of the number of plaintiffs or the number of defendants or, in the case of wrongful death, regardless of the number of distributees, where the damages for noneconomic losses suffered by the plaintiff were for: (1) Wrongful death; (2) permanent and substantial physical deformity, loss of use of a limb or loss of a bodily organ system; or (3) permanent physical or mental functional injury that permanently prevents the injured person from being able to independently care for himself or herself and perform life sustaining activities.
(c) On the first of January, two thousand four, and in each year thereafter, the limitation for compensatory damages contained in subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall increase to account for inflation by an amount equal to the consumer price index published by the United States department of labor, up to fifty percent of the amounts specified in subsections (b) and (c) as a limitation of compensatory noneconomic damages.
(d) The limitations on noneconomic damages contained in subsections (a), (b), (c) and (e) of this section are not available to any defendant in an action pursuant to this article which does not have medical professional liability insurance in the amount of at least one million dollars per occurrence covering the medical injury which is the subject of the action.
(e) If subsection (a) or (b) of this section, as enacted during the regular session of the Legislature, two thousand three, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is found by a court of law to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the maximum amount recoverable as damages for noneconomic loss in a professional liability action brought against a health care provider under this article shall thereafter not exceed one million dollars.
(1) The total amount of compensatory damages recoverable by the plaintiff;
(2) The portion of the damages that represents damages for noneconomic loss;
(3) The portion of the damages that represents damages for each category of economic loss;
(4) The percentage of fault, if any, attributable to each plaintiff; and
(5) The percentage of fault, if any, attributable to each of the defendants.
(b) In assessing percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider only the fault of the parties in the litigation at the time the verdict is rendered and shall not consider the fault of any other person who has settled a claim with the plaintiff arising out of the same medical injury. Provided, That, upon the creation of the patient injury compensation fund provided for in article twelve-c, chapter twenty-nine of this code, or of some other mechanism for compensating a plaintiff for any amount of economic damages awarded by the trier of fact which the plaintiff has been unable to collect, the trier of fact shall, in assessing percentages of fault, consider the fault of all alleged parties, including the fault of any person who has settled a claim with the plaintiff arising out of the same medical injury.
(c) If the trier of fact renders a verdict for the plaintiff, the court shall enter judgment of several, but not joint, liability against each defendant in accordance with the percentage of fault attributed to the defendant by the trier of fact.
(d) To determine the amount of judgment to be entered against each defendant, the court shall first, after adjusting the verdict as provided in section nine-a of this article, reduce the adjusted verdict by the amount of any pre-verdict settlement arising out of the same medical injury. The court shall then, with regard to each defendant, multiply the total amount of damages remaining, with interest, by the percentage of fault attributed to each defendant by the trier of fact. The resulting amount of damages, together with any post-judgment interest accrued, shall be the maximum recoverable against the defendant.
(e) Upon the creation of the patient injury compensation fund provided for in article twelve-c, chapter twenty-nine of this code, or of some other mechanism for compensating a plaintiff for any amount of economic damages awarded by the trier of fact which the plaintiff has been unable to collect, the court shall, in determining the amount of judgment to be entered against each defendant, first multiply the total amount of damages, with interest, recoverable by the plaintiff by the percentage of each defendant's fault and that amount, together with any post-judgment interest accrued, is the maximum recoverable against said defendant. Prior to the court's entry of the final judgment order as to each defendant against whom a verdict was rendered, the court shall reduce the total jury verdict by any amounts received by a plaintiff in settlement of the action. When any defendant's percentage of the verdict exceeds the remaining amounts due plaintiff after the mandatory reductions, each defendant shall be liable only for the defendant's pro rata share of the remainder of the verdict as calculated by the court from the remaining defendants to the action. The plaintiff's total award may never exceed the jury's verdict less any statutory or court-ordered reductions.
(f) Nothing in this section is meant to eliminate or diminish any defenses or immunities which exist as of the effective date of this section, except as expressly noted in this section.
(g) Nothing in this article is meant to preclude a health care provider from being held responsible for the portion of fault attributed by the trier of fact to any person acting as the health care provider's agent or servant or to preclude imposition of fault otherwise imputable or attributable to the health care provider under claims of vicarious liability. A health care provider may not be held vicariously liable for the acts of a nonemployee pursuant to a theory of ostensible agency unless the alleged agent does not maintain professional liability insurance covering the medical injury which is the subject of the action in the aggregate amount of at least one million dollars.
(b) In any hearing pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the defendant may present evidence of future payments from collateral sources if the court determines that: (1) There is a preexisting contractual or statutory obligation on the collateral source to pay the benefits; (2) the benefits, to a reasonable degree of certainty, will be paid to the plaintiff for expenses the trier of fact has determined the plaintiff will incur in the future; and (3) the amount of the future expenses is readily reducible to a sum certain.
(c) In the hearing pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the plaintiff may present evidence of the value of payments or contributions he or she has made to secure the right to the benefits paid by the collateral source.
(d) After hearing the evidence presented by the parties, the court shall make the following findings of fact:
(1) The total amount of damages for economic loss found by the trier of fact;
(2) The total amount of damages for each category of economic loss found by the trier of fact;
(3) The total amount of allowable collateral source payments received or to be received by the plaintiff for the medical injury which was the subject of the verdict in each category of economic loss; and
(4) The total amount of any premiums or contributions paid by the plaintiff in exchange for the collateral source payments in each category of economic loss found by the trier of fact.
(e) The court shall subtract the total premiums the plaintiff was found to have paid in each category of economic loss from the total collateral source benefits the plaintiff received with regard to that category of economic loss to arrive at the net amount of collateral source payments.
(f) The court shall then subtract the net amount of collateral source payments received or to be received by the plaintiff in each category of economic loss from the total amount of damages awarded the plaintiff by the trier of fact for that category of economic loss to arrive at the adjusted verdict.
(g) The court shall not reduce the verdict rendered by the trier of fact in any category of economic loss to reflect:
(1) Amounts paid to or on behalf of the plaintiff which the collateral source has a right to recover from the plaintiff through subrogation, lien or reimbursement;
(2) Amounts in excess of benefits actually paid or to be paid on behalf of the plaintiff by a collateral source in a category of economic loss;
(3) The proceeds of any individual disability or income replacement insurance paid for entirely by the plaintiff;
(4) The assets of the plaintiff or the members of the plaintiff's immediate family; or
(5) A settlement between the plaintiff and another tortfeasor.
(h) After determining the amount of the adjusted verdict, the court shall enter judgment in accordance with the provisions of section nine.
(b) The limitation of liability in subsection (a) of this section also applies to any act or omission of a health care provider in rendering continued care or assistance in the event that surgery is required as a result of the emergency condition within a reasonable time after the patient's condition is stabilized.
(c) The limitation on liability provided under subsection (a) of this section does not apply to any act or omission in rendering care or assistance which: (1) Occurs after the patient's condition is stabilized and the patient is capable of receiving medical treatment as a nonemergency patient; or (2) is unrelated to the original emergency condition.
(d) In the event that: (1) A physician provides follow-up care to a patient to whom the physician rendered care or assistance pursuant to subsection (a) of this section; and (2) a medical condition arises during the course of the follow-up care that is directly related to the original emergency condition for which care or assistance was rendered pursuant to said subsection, there is rebuttable presumption that the medical condition was the result of the original emergency condition and that the limitation on liability provided by said subsection applies with respect to that medical condition.
(e) There is a rebuttable presumption that a medical condition which arises in the course of follow-up care provided by the designated trauma center health care provider who rendered good faith care or assistance for the original emergency condition is directly related to the original emergency condition where the follow-up care is provided within a reasonable time after the patient's admission to the designated trauma center.
(f) The limitation on liability provided under subsection (a) of this section does not apply where health care or assistance for the emergency condition is rendered:
(1) In willful and wanton or reckless disregard of a risk of harm to the patient; or
(2) In clear violation of established written protocols for triage and emergency health care procedures developed by the office of emergency medical services in accordance with subsection (e) of this section. In the event that the office of emergency medical services has not developed a written triage or emergency medical protocol by the effective date of this section, the limitation on liability provided under subsection (a) of this section does not apply where health care or assistance is rendered under this section in violation of nationally recognized standards for triage and emergency health care procedures.
(g) The office of emergency medical services shall, prior to the effective date of this section, develop a written protocol specifying recognized and accepted standards for triage and emergency health care procedures for treatment of emergency conditions necessitating admission of the patient to a designated trauma center.
(h) In its discretion, the office of emergency medical services may grant provisional trauma center status for a period of up to one year to a health care facility applying for designated trauma center status. A facility given provisional trauma center status is eligible for the limitation on liability provided in subsection (a) of this section. If, at the end of the provisional period, the facility has not been approved by the office of emergency medical services as a designated trauma center, the facility will no longer be eligible for the limitation on liability provided in subsection (a) of this section.
(i) The commissioner of the bureau for public health may grant an applicant for designated trauma center status a one-time only extension of provisional trauma center status, upon submission by the facility of a written request for extension, accompanied by a detailed explanation and plan of action to fulfill the requirements for a designated trauma center. If, at the end of the six-month period, the facility has not been approved by the office of emergency medical services as a designated trauma center, the facility will no longer have the protection of the limitation on liability provided in subsection (a) of this section.
(j) If the office of emergency medical services determines that a health care facility no longer meets the requirements for a designated trauma center, it shall revoke the designation, at which time the limitation on liability established by subsection (a) of this section shall cease to apply to that health care facility for services or treatment rendered thereafter.
(k) The Legislature hereby finds that an emergency exists compelling promulgation of an emergency rule, consistent with the provisions of this section, governing the criteria for designation of a facility as a trauma center or provisional trauma center and implementation of a statewide trauma/emergency care system. The Legislature therefore directs the secretary of the department of health and human resources to file, on or before the first day of July, two thousand three, emergency rules specifying the criteria for designation of a facility as a trauma center or provisional trauma center in accordance with nationally accepted and recognized standards and governing the implementation of a statewide trauma/emergency care system. The rules governing the statewide trauma/emergency care system shall include, but not be limited to:
(1) System design, organizational structure and operation, including integration with the existing emergency medical services system;
(2) Regulation of facility designation, categorization and credentialing, including the establishment and collection of reasonable fees for designation; and
(3) System accountability, including medical review and audit to assure system quality. Any medical review committees established to assure system quality shall include all levels of care, including emergency medical service providers, and both the review committees and the providers shall qualify for all the rights and protections established in article three-c, chapter thirty of this code.
The amendments to this article as provided in House Bill 601, enacted during the sixth extraordinary session of the Legislature, two thousand one, apply to all causes of action alleging medical professional liability which are filed on or after the first day of March, two thousand two.
(b) The amendments to this article provided in Enrolled Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 2122 during the regular session of the Legislature, two thousand three, apply to all causes of action alleging medical professional liability which are filed on or after the first day of July, two thousand three.
(b) If any provision of the amendments to section five of this article, any provision of new section six-d of this article or any provision of the amendments to section eleven, article six, chapter fifty-six of this code as provided in House Bill 601, enacted during the sixth extraordinary session of the Legislature, two thousand one, is held invalid, or the application thereof to any person is held invalid, then, notwithstanding any other provision of law, every other provision of said House Bill 601 shall be deemed invalid and of no further force and effect.
(c) If any provision of the amendments to sections six or ten of this article or any provision of new sections six-a, six-b or six-c of this article as provided in House Bill 60l, enacted during the sixth extraordinary session of the Legislature, two thousand one, is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this article, and to this end, such provisions are deemed severable.
(b) A physician who has established a trust pursuant to this section may subsequently terminate the trust and elect to acquire coverage from a commercial medical professional liability insurance carrier. The assets of the trust may not be distributed to the physician settlor until the costs associated with the administration of the trust have been satisfied and the trustee receives certification that the physician has acquired medical professional liability insurance tail coverage or prior acts coverage, whichever is applicable. The tail coverage or prior acts coverage must cover the time period from the establishment of the trust to the effective date of the newly acquired medical professional liability insurance coverage or twelve years, whichever is shorter.
(c) For a period of not less than the applicable statute of limitations for medical professional liability, a physician who has established an actuarially sound physician self-funding insurance program under this section and has such a program in effect at the time of retirement shall, following his or her retirement, either maintain the trust in effect at funding levels required by this section, or purchase and maintain in force and effect tail insurance as required by article twenty-d, chapter thirty-three of this code.
(d) The trustee for the trust must be an independent professional, bank or other qualified institutional fiduciary. The trustee has all necessary and appropriate powers to fulfill the purposes of the trust, including, but not limited to, the powers to:
(1) Disburse funds for the maintenance and administration of the trust, and for defense costs, judgments, arbitration indemnity awards and settlements;
(2) Hire an actuary who is a member of the Casualty Actuarial Society and experienced in medical professional liability protection programs to provide a periodic opinion, but not less frequently than annually, as to the actuarial soundness of the fund, a copy of which opinion shall be provided upon request to any facility where the physician maintains clinical privileges;
(3) Hire a qualified, third-party claims manager experienced in handling medical professional liability claims, with the power and authority to set reserves and administer and oversee the defense of all claims; and
(4) Require that the physician replenish the trust so as to maintain at all times a funding level of no less than one million dollars or such greater amount as set forth in the most current actuarial opinion as described in subdivision (2) of this subsection, exclusive of funds needed for maintenance, administration, defense or other costs.
(e) The trustee, acting directly or through its hired professionals, as appropriate, shall periodically, but not less frequently than annually, evaluate and set required trust funding levels for the trust; make assessments against the physician for payments into the trust in order to replenish and maintain the trust at levels required by this subsection and required to render the trust actuarially sound from time to time; and otherwise take such actions as may appear necessary, desirable or appropriate to fulfill the purposes and integrity of the trust. Should the physician fail to timely meet any of the requests or requirements of the trustee with regard to funding of the trust or otherwise, or should the trust at any time fail to meet all the requirements of this subsection, thereupon the trust arrangement will conclusively no longer qualify under this article as an actuarially sound self-funding program: Provided, That all assets of the trust at the time of any such disqualifying event or circumstance will remain trust assets and may not be distributed to the physician settlor of the trust until the latter of the date on which any and all medical professional liability claims asserted or pending against the physician at the time of such disqualifying event or circumstance or within the applicable statute of limitations for medical malpractice liability thereafter have been finally adjudicated or otherwise resolved and fully satisfied to the extent of trust assets available for such purpose.
(f) In the event that more than one claim arises within the period since the last annual evaluation, a new evaluation will be performed within sixty days or at the time of the next annual audit, whichever is shorter, in order to evaluate the trust and replenish funds to ensure that its assets total not less than one million dollars, or such other amount that is actuarially determined necessary to satisfy the aggregate outstanding claims, whichever is greater, exclusive of funds needed for maintenance, administration, legal defense or other costs.
(1) "Managerial function" means the act or acts of a qualified director, whereby such qualified director, through direction, regulation or administration, exercises government, control, or superintendence of the affairs of a volunteer organization or entity. Managerial functions shall include ministerial acts and acts involving the exercise of discretion and judgment, but shall not include the physical or manual handling or use of tangible property, including, but not limited to, motor vehicles, or the direct guidance or supervision of persons.
(2) "Nonprofit hospital" means a nonprofit organization, the principal purpose or function of which is the providing of medical or hospital care, and includes general, tuberculosis, and other types of hospitals, and related facilities, such as laboratories, outpatient departments, nurses' home facilities, extended care facilities, facilities related to programs for home health services, self-care units, and central service facilities, operated in connection with hospitals, and also includes education or training facilities for health professional personnel operated as an integral part of a hospital and medical research organizations directly engaged in the continuous active conduct of medical research in conjunction with a hospital, but does not include any hospital furnishing primarily domiciliary care.
(3) "Qualified director" means an individual who serves without compensation for personal services as an officer, member or director of a board, commission, committee, agency or other nonprofit organization which is a volunteer organization or entity. For purposes of this article, "compensation" does not include reimbursement for expenses, incidental meals, lodging or other accommodations, and does not include per diem compensation fixed by statute.
(4) "Volunteer organization or entity" means:
(A) The state or any political subdivision or subdivisions thereof;
(B) Nonprofit corporations as defined in section six, article one, chapter thirty-one of this code, and other nonprofit organizations, which such corporations or organizations provide or promote:
(i) Religion;
(ii) Charity;
(iii) Music, art or other literary or cultural activities;
(iv) Benevolence;
(v) Child placement or child care;
(vi) Indigent or elderly care;
(vii) Education;
(viii) Scientific activity;
(ix) Community or economic development;
(x) Recreation;
(xi) Maintenance and repair of community owned real property or of real property maintained by a homeowners' association;
(xii) Legal services for the indigent;
(xiii) Conservation of natural resources or animal habitat; or
(xiv) Fire-fighting services and other public safety services.
(C) Any organization that acts as an advocate for its members and that has as its members individuals or organizations that are:
(i) Members of a particular trade or industry; or
(ii) Members of the business community; or
(iii) Members of armed services veteran associations.
"Volunteer organization or entity" shall not include a nonprofit hospital which maintains one hundred fifty or more beds for hospitalization of the sick or injured.
(a) "Apparently fit grocery product" means a grocery product that meets all quality and labeling standards imposed by federal, state and local laws and regulations even though the product may not be readily marketable due to appearance, age, freshness, grade, size, surplus or other conditions.
(b) "Apparently wholesome food" means food that meets all quality and labeling standards imposed by federal, state and local laws and regulations even though the food may not be readily marketable due to appearance, age, freshness, grade, size, surplus or other conditions.
(c) "Donate" means to give without requiring anything of monetary value from the recipient, except that the term includes donations by one nonprofit organization to another nonprofit organization, notwithstanding that the donor organization has charged a nominal fee to the donee organization, if the ultimate recipient or user is not required to give anything of monetary value.
(d) "Food" means any raw, cooked, processed or prepared edible substance, ice, beverage or ingredient used or intended for use, in whole or in part, for human consumption.
(e) "Gleaner" means a person who harvests a donated agricultural crop for free distribution to the needy or for donation to a nonprofit organization for ultimate distribution to the needy.
(f) "Grocery product" means a nonfood grocery product, including disposable paper or plastic products, household cleaning supplies, laundry detergent or other household item.
(g) "Gross negligence" means voluntary and conscious conduct, including a failure to act, by a person who, at the time of the conduct, knew that the conduct was likely to be harmful to the health or well-being of another person.
(h) "Intentional misconduct" means conduct by a person with knowledge, at the time of the conduct, that the conduct is harmful to the health or well-being of another person.
(i) "Nonprofit organization" means an incorporated or unincorporated entity that:
(1) Is operating for religious, charitable or educational purposes; and
(2) Does not provide net earnings to or operate in any other manner that inures to the benefit of, any officer, employee or shareholder of the entity.
(j) "Person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, organization, association or governmental entity, including a retail grocer, wholesaler, hotel, motel, manufacturer, restaurant, caterer, farmer, nonprofit food distributor or hospital. In the case of a corporation, partnership, organization, association or governmental entity, the term includes an officer, director, partner, deacon, trustee, council member or other elected or appointed individual responsible for the governance of the entity.
(b) A nonprofit organization is not subject to civil liability or criminal liability arising from the nature, age, packaging or condition of apparently wholesome food or an apparently fit grocery product which the nonprofit organization received as a donation in good faith from a person or gleaner for ultimate distribution without profit or gain to needy individuals: Provided, That this limitation on liability does not apply to an injury to or the death of an ultimate user or recipient of the food or grocery product which results from an act or omission of the nonprofit organization which constitutes gross negligence or intentional misconduct.
(b) In any action at law, whether in circuit court or magistrate court, on a note or contract, express or implied, for the payment of money, if: (1) The plaintiff files with the complaint an affidavit made by the plaintiff or an agent, stating therein to the best of the affiant's belief the amount of the plaintiff's claim, that the amount is justly due, and the time from which plaintiff claims interest; and (2) a copy of the affidavit together with a copy of any account filed with the complaint is served upon the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment on the affidavit and statement of account without further evidence unless the defendant files an answer denying the claim or otherwise makes an appearance before the court denying that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant on the claim. The affidavit must show the calculation of the amount sought. The calculation is to also include an itemization of the principal and any interest, insurance or other charges of the original obligation. The calculation is also to include an itemization of all credits to the original obligation including credits to principal, interest, insurance, any other charges, rebates of unearned interest, rebates of insurance, rebates of other charges and proceeds of sale of all collateral. If the defendant's pleading or affidavit admits that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant a sum certain less than that stated in the affidavit filed by the plaintiff, judgment may be taken by the plaintiff for the sum so admitted to be due and the case will be tried as to the residue.
This section does not apply to construction bonds or insurance contracts or agreements.
(b) This section shall be applicable prospectively to all
civil actions commenced on or after July 1, 2011.
The clerk of every such county court shall, without delay, record such memorandum or notice in the "lis pendens record," note upon the record the day and hour when such notice was filed for recordation, and index the same in the names of the parties.
(1) "Abandoning owner" means any person, vested with title to any interest in minerals, who is proved to have abandoned the interest, that is, to have relinquished any right to possess or enjoy the interest with the expressed intention of terminating ownership of the interest, but without vesting the ownership in any other person.
(2) "Development of the minerals" or "mineral development" means (a) mining coal by any method, or (b) drilling for and producing oil or gas by conventional techniques, or by enhanced recovery by injection of fluids of any kind into the producing formation, or (c) utilization of a gas-bearing formation as an underground gas storage reservoir within the meaning of article nine, chapter twenty-two of this code, or (d) production of other minerals by any method.
(3) "Interest in minerals" means any interest, real or personal, in coal, oil, gas or any other mineral, for which interest the property taxes are not delinquent as of the date of the filing of a petition under this article.
(4) "Surface owner" means any person vested with any interest in fee in the surface estate overlying the particular minerals sought to be developed under this article. A surface owner's rights under this article shall be subject to any deed of trust or other security instrument, lien, surface lease, easement or other nonpossessory interest in the surface owned by any other person; but such persons other than the surface owner shall have no right to notice and no standing to appear and be heard hereunder.
(5) "Unknown or missing owner" means any person, vested with title to any interest in minerals, whose present identity or location cannot be determined from the records of the clerk of the county commission, the sheriff, the assessor and the clerk of the circuit court in the county in which the interest is located or by diligent inquiry in the vicinity of the owner's last known place of residence, and shall include such owner's heirs, successors and assigns not known to be alive.
(b) A petition to the circuit court for the appointment of a special commissioner may be instituted by any person who is:
(1) Vested with an interest in fee in the surface estate overlying the particular minerals sought to be developed; or
(2) Vested with an interest in fee in the particular minerals sought to be developed; or
(3) The lessee or the assignee or successor to the lessee, under a valid and subsisting mineral lease, the lessor of which is a person entitled to file a petition by reason of subdivision (2) of this subsection.
(b) The petition shall be verified. It shall contain allegations of the facts showing (1) the entitlement of the petitioner to file the petition, (2) an identification of the defendants and the mineral interest of each as far as practical under the circumstances, (3) a description of the tract of land which is the subject of the petition, (4) the interest in the particular minerals sought to be developed, (5) the nature of the proposed development of the minerals, (6) the efforts to locate unknown or missing owners, if any, (7) the relinquishment by abandoning owners, if any, of any right to possess or enjoy their interest with the expressed intention of terminating ownership of the interest, but without vesting the ownership in any other person, (8) such other information known to the petitioner which might be helpful in identifying or locating the present owners thereof, and, as exhibits to the petition, (9) a certified copy of the most recent recorded instrument embracing the interest to be leased, (10) such additional instruments as are necessary to show the vesting of title to the minerals in the last record owner thereof, and (11) a certified copy of any competing lease or easement of record, that is to say, a lease or easement from landowners who are not defendants, embracing all or part of the tract of land which is the subject of the petition, for any mineral development by the lessee or easement owner of record of the minerals sought by the petition; and the petition may contain allegations of the facts showing that (12) mineral development would be advantageous to the defendants and would further the public policy stated in section one of this article; and the prayer shall be for the court to order the sale of a lease covering the subject mineral interest under section six of this article, and thereafter, in the case of any defendant or heir, successor or assign of any defendant who does not appear to claim ownership of the defendant's interest for seven years after the date of the lease, for the court to order a conveyance of the defendant's mineral interest under section seven of this article, subject to the lease, to the owner of the surface overlying the mineral interest.
(c) If personal service of process is possible, it shall be made as provided by the West Virginia rules of civil procedure. In addition, immediately upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall (1) publish a Class III legal advertisement in compliance with the provisions of article three, chapter fifty-nine of this code, and (2) no later than the first day of publication, file a lis pendens notice in the county clerk's office of the county wherein the mineral estate or the larger portion thereof lies. Both the advertisement and the lis pendens notice shall set forth (1) the names of the petitioner and the defendants, as they are known to be by the exercise of reasonable diligence by the petitioner, and their last known addresses, (2) the date and record data of the instrument or other conveyance which immediately created the mineral interest, (3) an adequate description of the land as contained therein, (4) the source of title of the last known owners of the mineral interests, and (5) a statement that the action is brought for the purpose of authorizing the execution and delivery of a valid and present mineral lease for development of the particular minerals described in the petition, and thereafter, in the case of any defendant or heir, successor or assign of any defendant who does not appear to claim ownership of the defendant's interest within seven years after the date of the lease, for the court to order a conveyance of the defendant's mineral interest under section seven of this article, subject to the lease, to the owner of the surface overlying the mineral interest. In addition, the petitioner shall send notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the last known address, if there be such, of all named defendants. In addition, the court may in its discretion order advertisement elsewhere or by additional means if there is reason to believe that additional advertisement might result in identifying and locating the unknown or missing owners.
(d) The circuit court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for any unknown or missing owner or abandoning owner and their unknown heirs, successors and assigns not known to be alive. The compensation and expenses of the guardian ad litem shall be fixed by the court and paid by the petitioner under terms ordered by the court.
(b) Should the court appoint a special commissioner pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the order of the court shall also (1) require the special commissioner to give a bond in favor of the owners of the mineral interest which is to be leased in a specified amount, (2) provide for all of the rental, royalty, and other provisions of the lease which the special commissioner is authorized to make, except for the initial monetary consideration for the sale of the lease, (3) specify whether the special commissioner's sale of the lease shall be public or private, (4) if the order provides for a public sale, determine the notice to be given, and (5) direct that the special commissioner be paid compensation and expenses, including the bond expense, as provided in section eight of this article in an amount agreed upon by the special commissioner and the petitioner; but if no agreement is made within thirty days after the special commissioner is appointed, then the court shall fix the compensation and expenses. The sale shall be for a monetary consideration payable on confirmation of sale. No appraisal shall be required.
(c) The special commissioner shall proceed in compliance with the provisions of the order to sell the lease authorized thereby; and if two or more persons offer to purchase the lease, the sale shall be made to the offeror whose offer is deemed most beneficial to the unknown or missing owner or abandoning owner, and most consistent with the public policy stated in section one of this article. After making the sale, the special commissioner shall make a report thereof to the court. Upon filing the report, the court may hear evidence as to whether or not the sale price and the provisions of the lease are reasonable; and if the court is satisfied with the sale price and the provisions of the lease, the sale of the lease shall be confirmed by the court, whereupon the lease shall be executed, acknowledged and delivered by the special commissioner.
(d) The court shall not authorize a special commissioner's lease of the mineral interest of any owner whose identity and whereabouts is known, or can be ascertained by diligent inquiry, or is discovered as a result of the action brought hereunder, unless such owner is proved to be an abandoning owner who fails to answer the subject petition, notice having been given as provided in section five of this article.
(e) Any person purporting to be the unknown or missing owner or an abandoning owner, or any heir, successor or assign of an unknown or missing owner or abandoning owner, may appear as a matter of right at any time prior to the entry of judgment confirming the special commissioner's lease, for the purpose of establishing his title to a mineral interest. If the appearing owner's claim is established to the satisfaction of the court, the court shall dismiss the action as to the appearing owner's interest at plaintiff's cost.
(f) The lessee shall promptly deliver the sale consideration and subsequent proceeds, if any, from the lease to the special receiver of the court, who shall hold and invest the same for the use and benefit of the unknown or missing owners or abandoning owners. The court, upon its own motion or upon motion of the special receiver, may at any time authorize the special receiver to expend an amount not to exceed ten percent of the funds collected by the special receiver for the purpose of instituting a search for the unknown or missing owners.
(g) Within seven years after the date of the special commissioner's lease, any unknown or missing owner or abandoning owner of a mineral interest leased hereunder may file a motion with the court to re-open the action, and may thereupon present such proof as the court may deem necessary to establish the movant's identity and title to the mineral interest or any part thereof. If the court finds that the identity and interest of the movant has been established, and that the movant has manifested a desire to obtain the benefits of the proceeds resulting from the lease, the court shall enter an order (1) documenting the movant's title, (2) assigning all future attributable proceeds to the movant and (3) directing the special receiver to pay over the funds then held attributable to the movant's interests. The circuit clerk of the court shall file and record a certified copy of the order with the clerk of the county commission of each county wherein such land is; and from the time of recordation, the movant shall be deemed the owner of the mineral interest specified in the order.
(2) If the boundaries of the mineral tract subject to the special commissioner's lease encompass two or more surface tracts, a separate deed shall be made for the mineral interest underlying each surface tract. If a surface tract is owner by more than one person, the deed respecting that surface tract shall convey the mineral interest according to the surface estate and interest of each surface owner.
(b) The special commissioner's deed may be made in the following form, or to the same effect:
This deed, made the _____day of _________________, 19___, between ______________________________, special commissioner, grantor, and _____________________________, grantee,
Witnesseth, that whereas, grantor, in pursuance of the authority vested in him by an order of the circuit court of _____________ county, West Virginia, entered on the _____day of _____________, 19___, in civil action no. ________ therein pending, to convey the mineral interest more particularly described below to the grantee,
Now, therefore, this deed witnesseth: That grantor grants unto grantee, subject to the special commissioner's lease mentioned below, and further subject to all other liens and encumbrances of record, that certain mineral interest in _______________ county, West Virginia, more particularly described in the cited order of the circuit court as follows: (here insert the description in the order); and being (here specify "all" or "a portion") of the mineral interest described in that certain special commissioner's lease dated ___________, 19___, of record in the office of the clerk of __________ county, in _________book______, at page ____.
Witness the following signature.
_________________________________
Special Commissioner
(c) Upon the delivery of the deed or deeds and the payment or payments as directed in subsection (a) of this section, the special commissioner shall make a final report to the court; and upon approval thereof, the court shall order the discharge of the special commissioner's bond.
(d) Prior to the delivery of the special commissioner's deed, no deed from a surface owner to another shall sever ownership of the surface as such from ownership of any benefits under this article. Any deed purporting to create such a severance shall be void.
(a) To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs, next of kin or others; or
(b) To direct the executors, administrators, or trustees to do or abstain from doing any particular act in their fiduciary capacity; or
(c) To determine any question arising in the administration of the estate or trust, including questions of construction of wills and other writings.
(b) Promptly upon the filing of the foreign judgment and the affidavit, the clerk shall mail notice of the filing of the foreign judgment to the judgment debtor at the address given and shall make a note of the mailing in the docket. The notice shall include the name and post-office address of the judgment creditor and the judgment creditor's lawyer, if any, in this state. In addition, the judgment creditor may mail a notice of the filing of the judgment to the judgment debtor and may file proof of mailing with the clerk. Lack of mailing notice of filing by the clerk shall not affect the enforcement proceedings if proof of mailing by the judgment creditor has been filed.
(c) No execution or other process for enforcement of a foreign judgment filed hereunder may issue until thirty days after the date the judgment is filed.
(b) If the judgment debtor shows the circuit court any ground upon which enforcement of a judgment of any court of this state would be stayed, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment for an appropriate period, upon requiring the same security for satisfaction of the judgment which is required in this state.
(1) That due to growing concern with limits on access to justice arising from court case backlog, delays and costs, that it has been beneficial to implement an alternative dispute resolution program in various circuit courts of our state and in certain administrative proceedings;
(2) That since implementation, these procedures have proven to be a highly-effective method for resolving disputes without resorting to adjudicatory measures, thereby easing the burden of cases pending in the judicial system;
(3) That alternative dispute resolution is continually changing the perceptions regarding the appropriateness and effectiveness of court procedures, and that the continuation and growth of these procedures is important in enhancing the quality of life for the citizens of this state;
(4) That the effectiveness of the alternative dispute resolution programs implemented in the state and in other states has increased but more definition and synthesis is necessary to better serve the citizens; and
(5) That the purpose of this article is to create a commission, as hereinafter constituted and appointed, to study various facets of alternative dispute resolution including, but not limited to, defining the objectives and goals of the programs, the types of disputes to be resolved, the promulgation of a system to ensure appropriate uniformity of alternative dispute resolution programs statewide, certification or licensure of persons engaged in providing services in alternative methods of resolving disputes and the structuring and funding of such programs.
(b) The Legislature further declares that it recognizes that the provisions of section 1, article V of the constitution of West Virginia prohibit any person from exercising the powers of more than one branch or department of government at the same time; however, it is the express purpose, intent and finding of the Legislature that those members of the commission who are members of the Legislature are acting as such while serving on the commission and in the furtherance of the Legislature's inherent right and power to investigate and inquire into and report on those matters which are legitimately within its powers, and that since the commission's role and duties are investigative and reportive in nature, the service upon the commission by its legislative members is not violative of nor inimical to the constitutional mandate with respect to the separation of governmental powers.
(a) The chief justice of the supreme court of appeals of West Virginia, or his or her designee, shall serve as the chair of the commission, and shall appoint two additional members, one of whom is currently serving as a circuit court judge;
(b) The speaker of the House of Delegates and the president of the Senate, or their respective designee, shall be members, and the speaker of the House of Delegates and the president of the Senate shall appoint one additional member;
(c) Two members shall be appointed by the governor who shall be representative private citizens;
(d) The dean of the West Virginia university college of law shall appoint one faculty member to the commission who possesses knowledge and experience unique in alternative dispute resolution processes; and
(e) The executive director of the West Virginia state bar.
(b) The expenses of the members of the commission shall be paid from legislative appropriations.
(c) Members of the commission shall receive no other compensation for their services on or with the commission other than the reimbursement of expenses as provided in this section.
(d) The president of the Senate and the speaker of the House of Delegates shall designate a member of the legislative staff to serve as counsel and reporter to the commission.
(a) To conduct a thorough and comprehensive study into the various ways and means of financing and structuring the alternative dispute resolution programs, define the goals and objectives of alternative methods of resolving disputes in the state, determine types of disputes to be included within any alternative dispute resolution programs, evaluate the advantages of establishing certification or licensure of persons engaged in providing services in alternative methods of resolving disputes and propose a system to ensure appropriate uniformity of alternative dispute resolution programs statewide;
(b) To request such information and data from any state officer or agency or from any political subdivision of the state as the commission may deem necessary to assist it in the performance of its duties and it shall be the duty of all such officers and agencies to cooperate with and assist the commission in and about the completion of its studies and deliberations;
(c) To confer with representative citizens, the judiciary, the legal profession and other groups of the private and business sectors with respect to all matters deemed relevant to the duties of the commission;
(d) To notify the chair of the commission on the future of the judiciary so that the commission established herein may share information with such commission on the future of the judiciary;
(e) To perform every other act necessary or desirable to carry out any of the other powers, duties or responsibilities enumerated in this article; and
(f) To file its final report with respect to its findings and conclusions, together with any legislation it deems appropriate to recommend and as it deems necessary to carry its findings and conclusions into effect with the president of the Senate and the speaker of the House of Delegates not later than the thirtieth day of November, one thousand nine hundred ninety-eight.
(b) The commission shall cease its existence on the thirty-first day of December, one thousand nine hundred ninety-eight.
(a) As used in this section, "check" means a draft or other written order payable on demand and drawn on a bank or depository.
(b) If the maker or drawer of a check: (1) Draws, makes, utters, or issues and delivers to another a check drawn on a bank or depository that refuses to honor it because the maker or drawer does not have sufficient funds with which to pay the check on deposit in or credit with the bank or depository upon presentation; and (2) knowingly fails to pay the amount of the check in cash to the payee, within thirty days following written demand, the payee has a cause of action against the drawer or maker.
(c) In an action under this section, the payee may be awarded:
(1) The face amount of the check, less any money received by the payee in partial payment of the debt of the check;
(2) Damages of five hundred dollars or the face amount of the check, whichever is less; and
(3) Reasonable costs incurred in filing the action.
(d) In an action under this section, the court or jury may waive all or part of the damages or fees authorized by subdivision (2), subsection (c) of this section upon a finding that the defendant's failure to satisfy the dishonored check was due to the defendant's recent discharge from his or her employment, personal or family illness, or personal or family catastrophic loss.
(e) The written demand required in subsection (a) of this section shall:
(1) Describe the check and the circumstances of its dishonor;
(2) Contain a demand for payment and a notice of intent to
file suit for damages under this section if payment is not received within thirty days; and
(3) Be delivered by personal service, certified mail or regular mail to the defendant at his or her last known address: Provided, That service by regular mail shall be supported by either a post-marked certificate of mailing or a notarized affidavit of service.
(f) It is an affirmative defense to any claim under this section that:
(1) Full satisfaction of the amount of the check was made before the beginning of the action; or
(2) The bank or depository erred in dishonoring the check.
(g) No action may be brought pursuant to both this section and sections thirty-nine-a through thirty-nine-h, article three, chapter sixty-one of this code on the same check.
(b) The Legislature further finds that there are numerous actions, suits and proceedings filed on behalf of the State of West Virginia or a government agency thereof, that may affect the public interest. Depending upon the outcome, this type of litigation may have significant consequences that can only be addressed by subsequent legislative action. In such litigation, the Governor, Department of Administration and the Legislature may not be directly involved as parties. Additionally, the Governor, Department of Administration and the Legislature need advance notice of potential moneys that may become available as a result of seizure or forfeiture of assets under state or federal criminal law. The Governor, Department of Administration and the Legislature require more timely information regarding these actions in order to protect the public interest. The Legislature further finds that protection of the public interest is best served by requiring notice to the Governor, the Secretary of the Department of Administration, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Delegates of any action brought on behalf of the state or a government agency thereof, which may result in a judgment, award or settlement and when the state or a government agency thereof, becomes eligible for moneys from state or federal seizure or forfeiture of assets in criminal cases.
(c) It is the purpose of this article to establish procedures to be followed in certain civil actions filed on behalf of or against state government agencies and their officials.
(1) "Action" means a proceeding instituted against a governmental agency in a circuit court or in the supreme court of appeals, except actions instituted pursuant to statutory provisions that authorize a specific procedure for appeal or similar method of obtaining relief from the ruling of an administrative agency and actions instituted to appeal or otherwise seek relief from a criminal conviction, including, but not limited to, actions to obtain habeas corpus relief.
(2) "Government agency" means a constitutional officer or other public official named as a defendant or respondent in his or her official capacity, or a department, division, bureau, board, commission or other agency or instrumentality within the executive branch of state government that has the capacity to sue or be sued;
(3) "Judgment" means a judgment, order or decree of a court which would:
(A) Require or otherwise mandate an expansion of, increase in, or addition to the services, duties or responsibilities of a government agency;
(B) Require or otherwise mandate an increase in the expenditures of a government agency above the level of expenditures approved or authorized before the entry of the proposed judgment;
(C) Require or otherwise mandate the employment or other hiring of, or the contracting with, personnel or other entities by a government agency in addition to the personnel or other entities employed or otherwise hired by, or contracted with or by the government agency;
(D) Require or otherwise mandate payment of a claim based upon a breach of contract by a government agency; or
(E) Declare an act of the Legislature unconstitutional and, therefore, unenforceable.
(2) The written notice to the chief officer of the government agency and the Attorney General required by subdivision (1) of this subsection is considered to be provided on the date of mailing of the notice by certified mail, return receipt requested. If the written notice is provided to the chief officer of the government agency as required by subdivision (1) of this subsection, any applicable statute of limitations is tolled for thirty days from the date the notice is provided and, if received by the government agency as evidenced by the return receipt of the certified mail, for thirty days from the date of the returned receipt.
(3) A copy of any complaint filed in an action as defined in section two of this article shall be served on the Attorney General.
(b) (1) Notwithstanding any procedural rule or any provision of this code to the contrary, in an action instituted against a government agency that seeks a judgment, as defined in section two of this article, the chief officer of the government agency which is named a party to the action shall, upon receipt of service, forthwith give written notice thereof, together with a copy of the complaint filed, to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Delegates.
(2) Upon request, the chief officer of the government agency shall furnish the President and Speaker with copies of pleadings filed and discovery produced in the proceeding and other documents, information and periodic reports relating to the proceeding as may be requested.
(3) The chief officer of a government agency who fails without good cause to comply with the provisions of this subsection is guilty of misfeasance. This subsection does not require a notice or report to the President and the Speaker that no action has been instituted or is pending against a governmental agency during a specified period.
(c) The requirements for notice and delivery of pleadings and other documents to the President of the Senate or Speaker of the House of Delegates pursuant to the provisions of this section do not constitute a waiver of any Constitutional immunity or protection that proscribes or limits actions, suits or proceedings against the Legislature or the State of West Virginia.
(d) The exercise of authority granted by the provisions of this section does not subject the Legislature or any member of the Legislature to any terms of a judgment.
(1) A government agency shall be allowed sixty days to serve an answer to a complaint or petition for which a summons has been issued and served upon a government agency;
(2) Judgment by default may not be entered against a government agency in an action as defined in section two of this article unless the court, after a hearing on a motion for default judgment, finds that the government agency clearly intends to fail to appear, plead or otherwise defend in the action; and
(3) No government agency may be ordered to pay punitive damages in any action.
(b) When a government agency becomes aware that moneys may be available to them from a state or federal seizure or forfeiture in a criminal case they shall notify the Governor, the Secretary of the Department of Administration, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Delegates: Provided, That the total value of the assets to be seized or forfeited exceeds two hundred and fifty thousand dollars.
(b) The provisions of this article may not be construed to impose any liability upon a state agency from which the agency is otherwise immune.
The Legislature hereby finds and declares:
(a) The lawful design, marketing, manufacture or sale of firearms or ammunition to the public is not an unreasonably dangerous activity and does not constitute a nuisance per se; (b) To the extent the constitution of this state and the United States protect citizens' rights to keep and bear arms, the Legislature finds and declares that it is within the strict prerogative of its own authority, and not the authority of any county or municipality, to determine whether any manufacturer, dealer or seller of firearms has engaged in any act or omission that would create a cognizable action for damages, injunction or otherwise.
Note: WV Code updated with legislation passed through the 2012 1st Special Session