STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
Report of the Court of Claims 1975-1977
Volume 11
STATE OF WEST
VIRGINIA REPORT OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS
For the Period from July 1, 1975 to June 30, 1977
By
CHERYLE M. HALL
Clerk
VOLUME XI
(Published by authority Code 12-2-25)
3ANRETY
PRINTING COMPANY, CGGNLESTON, W. GA.
e
CONTENTS III
TABLE
OF CONTENTS
Claims reported, table of XLVI
Claims classified according to statute, list of XXVIII
Court of Claims Law VII
Letter of transmittal V
Opinions of the Court XLV
Personnel of the Court IV
References 07
Rules of practice and procedure XXI
Terms of Court VI
IV PERSONNEL OF
THE STATE COURT OF CLAIMS
PERSONNEL
OF THE
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS
HONORABLE JOHN B. GARDEN Presiding Judge
HONORABLE GEORGE S. WALLACE, JR Judge
HONORABLE DA4?.UEL A. RULEY, JR Judge
CHERYLE M. HALL Clerk
CHAUNCEY BROWNING, JR Attorney General
FORMER JUDGES
HONORABLE JULIUS W. SINGLETON, JR July 1, 1967
?July 31, 1968
HONORABLE A. W. PETROPLU5 August 1, 1968
?June 30, 1974
HONORABLE HENRY LAKIN DUCKER July 1, 1967
?October 31, 1975
HONORABLE W. LYLE JONES July 1, 1967
?June 30, 1976
LErI?ER OF
TRANSMI?FrAJ V
LETTER
OF TRANSMITTAL
To His Excellency
The Honorable John D. Rockefeller, IV
Governor of West Virginia
Sir:
In conformity with the requirements of section twenty-five of the Court of
Claims law, approved March eleventh, one thousand nine hundred sixty-seven, I
have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the State Court of Claims for
the period from July one, one thousand nine hundred seventy-five to June
thirty, one thousand nine hundred seventy-seven.
Respectfully submitted,
CHERYLE M. HALL,
Clerk
VI TERMS OF COURT
TERMS
OF COURT
Two regular temis of court are
provided for annually the second Monday of April and September.
STATE COURT OF
CLAIMS LAW VII
STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS LAW
CHAPTER 14 CODE
Article 2. Claims Against the State.
?14-2-1. Purpose.
?14-2-2. Venue for certain suits and actions.
?14-2-3. Definitions.
?14-2-4. Creation of court of claims; appointment and terms of judges;
vacancies.
? 14-2-5. Court clerk and other personnel.
? 14-2-6. Terms of court.
? 14-2-7. Meeting place of the court.
? 14-2-8. Compensation of judges; expenses.
? 14-2-9. Oath of office.
?14-2-10. Quniifications of judges.
?14-2-11. Attorney general to represent State.
?14-2-12. General powers of the court.
? 14-2-13. Jurisdiction of the court.
?14-2-14. Claims excluded.
? 14-2-15. Rules of practice and procedure.
?14-2-16. Regular procedure.
?14-2-17. Shortened procedure.
? 14-2-18. Advisory determination procedure.
?14-2-19. Claims under existing appropriations.
?14-2-20. Claims under special appropriations.
? 14-2-21. Periods of limitation made applicable.
? 14-2-22. Compulsory process.
?14-2-23. Inclusion of awards in budget.
? 14-2-24. Records to be preserved.
? 14-2-25. Reports of the court.
? 14-2-26. Fraudulent claims.
? 14-2-27. Conclusiveness of determination.
? 14-2-28. Award as condition precedent to appropriation.
? 14-2-29. Severability.
?14-2-1.
Purpose.
The purpose of this article is to
provide a simple and expeditious method for the consideration of claims against
the State that because of the provisions of section 35, article VI of the Constitution
of the State, and of statutory restrictions, inhibitions or limitations, cannot
be determined in regular courts of the State; and to provide for proceedings in
which the State has a special interest.
VIII STATE COURT
OF CLAIMS LAW
? 14-2-2. Venue for certain suits and
actions.
(a) The following proceedings shall be
brought and prosecuted only in the circuit court of Kanawha county:K
(1) Any suit in which the governor, any other state officer, or a state agency
is made a party defendant, except as garnishee or suggestee.
(2) Any suit attempting to enjoin or otherwise suspend or affect a judgment or
decree on behalf of the State obtained in any circuit court.
(b) Any proceeding for injunctive or mandamus relief involving the taking,
title, or collection for or prevention of damage to real property may be
brought and presented in the circuit court of the county in which the real
property affected is situate.
This section shall apply only to such proceedings as are not prohibited by the
constitutional immunity of the State from suit under section 35, article VI of
the Constitution of the State.
?14-2-3. Definitions.
For the purpose of this article:
?Court? means the state court of claims established by section four [l4-2-4] of
this article.
?Claim? means a claim authorized to be heard by the court in accordance with
this article.
?Approved claim? means a claim found by the court to be one that should be paid
under the provisions of this article.
?Award? means the amount recommended by the court to be paid in satisfaction of
an approved claim.
?Clerk? means the clerk of the court of claims.
?State agency? means a state department, board, commission, institution, or
other administrative agency of state government:
Provided, that a ?state agency? shall not be considered to include county
courts, county boards of education, municipalities, or any other political or
local subdivision of the State regardless of any state aid that might be
provided.
?14-2-4. Creation of court of claims;
appointment and terms of judges; vacancies.
The ?court of claims? is hereby
created. It shall consist of three judges, to be appointed by the president of
the senate and the speaker of the house of delegates, by and with the advice
and consent of the senate, one of whom shall be appointed presiding
STATE COURT OF
CLAIMS LAW IX
judge. Each appointment to the court shall be made from a list of three
qualified nominees furnished by the board of governors of the West Virginia
State bar.
The terms of the judges of this court shall be six years, except that the first
members of the court shall be appointed as follows:
One judge for two years, one judge for four years and one judge for six years.
As these appointments expire, all appointments shall be for six year terms. Not
more than two of the judges shall be of the same political party. An
appointment to fill a vacancy shall be for the unexpired term.
? 14-2-5. Court clerk and other personnel.
The court shall have the authority to appoint a clerk and a deputy
clerk. The salary of the clerk and the deputy clerk shall be fixed by the joint
committee on government and finance, and shall be paid out of the regular
appropriation for the court. The clerk shall have custody of all records and
proceedings of the court, shall attend meetings and hearings of the court,
shall administer oaths and affirmations, and shall issue all official
summonses, subpoenas, orders, statements and awards. The deputy clerk shall act
in the place and stead of the clerk in the clerk?s absence.
The joint committee on government and finance may employ other persons whose
services shall be necessary to the orderly transaction of the business of the
court, and fix their compensation.
? 14-2-6. Terms of court.
The court shall hold at least two regular terms each year, on the second
Monday in April and September. So far as possible, the court shall not adjourn
a regular term until all claims then upon its docket and ready for hearing or
other consideration have been disposed of.
Special terms or meetings may be called by the clerk at the request of the
court whenever the number of claims awaiting consideration, or any other
pressing matter of official business, make such a term advisable.
?14-2-7. Meeting place of the court.
The regular meeting place of the court shall be at the state capitol, and
the joint committee on government and finance shall provide adequate quarters
therefor. When deemed advisable, in
X STATE COURT
OF CLAIMS LAW
order to facilitate the full hearing
of claims arising elsewhere in the State, the court may convene at any county
seat.
? 14-2-8. Compensation of judges;
expenses.
Each judge of the court shall receive
one hundred dollars for each day actually served, and actual expenses incurred
in the performance of his duties. The number of days served by each judge shall
not exceed one hundred in any fiscal year, except by authority of the joint
committee on government and finance. Requisitions for compensation and expenses
shall be accompanied by sworn and itemized statements, which shall be filed
with the auditor and preserved as public records. For the purpose of this
section, time served shall include time spent in the hearing of claims, in the
consideration of the record, in the preparation of opinions, and in necessary
travel.
? 14-2-9. Oath of office.
Each judge shall before entering upon
the duties of his office, take and subscribe to the oath prescribed by section
5, article IV of the Constitution of the State. The oath shall be filed with
the clerk.
? 14-2-10. Qualifications of judges.
Each judge appointed to the court of claims shall be an attorney at law,
licensed to practice in this State and shall have been so licensed to practice
law for a period of not less than ten years prior to his appointment as judge.
A judge shall not be an officer or an employee of any branch of state
government, except in his capacity as a member of the court and shall receive
no other compensation from the State or any of its political subdivisions. A
judge shall not hear or participate in the consideration of any claim in which
he is interested personally, either directly or indirectly.
? 14-2-11. Attorney general to
represent State.
The attorney general shall represent
the interests of the State in all claims coming before the court.
? 14-2-12. General powers of the
court.
The court shall, in accordance with
this article, consider claims which, but for the constitutional immunity of the
state from suit, or for some statutory restrictions, inhibitions or
limitations, could be maintained in the regular courts of the state. No
liability shall be
STATE COURT OF
CLAIMS LAW XI
imposed upon the state or any state agency by a determination of the court of
claims approving a claim and recommending an award, unless the claim is (1)
made under an existing appropriation, in accordance with section nineteen of
this article, or (2) a claim under a special appropriation, as provided in
section twenty of this article. The court shall consider claims in accordance
with the provisions of this article.
Except as is otherwise provided in this article, a claim shall be instituted by
the filing of notice with the clerk. In accordance with rules promulgated by
the court, each claim shall be considered by the court as a whole, or, by a judge
sitting individually, and if, after consideration, the court finds that a claim
is just and proper, it shall so determine and shall file with the clerk a brief
statement of its reason. A claim so filed shall be an approved claim. The court
shall also determine the amount that should be paid to the claimant, and shall
itemize this amount as an award, with the reasons therefor, in its statement
filed with the clerk. In determining the amount of a claim, interest shall not
be allowed unless the claim is based upon a contract which specifically
provides for the payment of interest.
? 14-2-13. Jurisdiction of the court.
The jurisdiction of the court, except for the claims excluded by section
fourteen [l4-2-14], -shall extend to the following matters:
1. Claims and demands, liquidated and unliquidated, ex contractu and cx
delicto, against the State or any of its agencies, which the State as a
sovereign commonwealth should in equity and good conscience discharge and pay.
2. Claims and demands, liquidated and unliquidated, cx contractu and cx
delicto, which may be asserted in the nature of setoff or counterclaim on the
part of the State or any state agency.
3. The legal or equitable status, or both, of any claim referred to the court
by the head of a state agency for an advisory determination.
? 14-2-14. Claims excluded.
The jurisdiction of the court shall
not extend to any claim:
1. For loss, damage, or destruction of property or for injury or death incurred
by a member of the militia or national guard when in the service of the State.
XII STATE COURT
OF CLAIMS LAW
2. For a disability or death benefit under chapter twenty-three [23-l-1 et seq]
of this Code.
3. For unemployment compensation under chapter twenty-one-A [2lA-l-1 et seq.]
of this Code.
4. For relief or public assistance under chapter nine [9-1-l et seq.] of this
Code.
5. With respect to which a proceeding may be maintained against the State, by
or on behalf of the claimant in the courts of the State.
? 14-2-15. Rules of practice and procedure.
The court shall adopt and may from time to time amend rules of procedure,
in accordance with the provisions of this article, governing proceedings before
the court. Rules shall be designed to assure a simple, expeditious and
inexpensive consideration of claims. Rules shall permit a claimant to appear in
his own behalf or be represented by counsel.
Under its rules, the court shall not be bound by the usual common law or
statutory rules of evidence. The court may accept and weigh, in accordance with
its evidential value, any information that will assist the court in determining
the factual basis of a claim.
?14-2-16. Regular procedure.
The regular procedure for the consideration of claims shall be
substantially as follows:
1. The claimant shall give notice to the clerk that he desires to maintain a
claim. Notice shall be in writing and shall be in sufficient detail to identify
the claimant, the circumstances giving rise to the claim, and ?the state agency
concerned, if any. The claimant shall not otherwise be held to any formal
requirement of notice.
2. The clerk shall transmit a copy of the notice to the state agency concerned.
The state agency may deny the claim, or may request a postponement of
proceedings to permit negotiations with the claimant. If the court finds that a
claim is prima facie within its jurisdiction, it shall order the claim to be
placed upon its regular docket for hearing.
3. During the period of negotiations and pending hearing, the state agency,
represented by the attorney general, shall, if possible,
STATE COURT OF
CLAIMS LAW XIII
reach an agreement with the claimant regarding the facts upon which the claim
is based so as to avoid the necessity for the introduction of evidence at the
hearing. If the parties are unable to agree upon the facts an attempt shall be
made to stipulate the questions of fact in issue.
4. The court shall so conduct the hearing as to disclose all material facts and
issues of liability and may examine or cross-examine witnesses. The court may
call witnesses or require evidence not produced by the parties; may stipulate
the question to be argued by the parties; and may continue the hearing until
some subsequent time to permit a more complete presentation of the claim.
5. After the close of the hearing the court shall consider the claim and shall
conclude its determination, if possible, within thirty days.
?14-2-17. Shortened procedure.
The shortened procedure authorized by
this section shall apply only to a claim possessing all of the following characteristics:
1. The claim does not arise under an appropriation for the current fiscal year.
2. The state agency concerned concurs in the claim.
3. The amount claimed does not exceed one thousand dollars.
4. The claim has been approved by the attorney general as one that, in view of
the purposes of this article, should be paid.
The state agency concerned shall prepare the record of the claim consisting of
all papers, stipulations and evidential documents required by the rules of the
court and file the same with the clerk. The court shall consider the claim
informally upon the record submitted. If the court determines that the claim
should be entered as an approved claim and an award made, it shall so order and
shall file its statement with the clerk. If the court finds that the record is
inadequate, or that the claim should not be paid, it shall reject the claim.
The rejection of the claim under this section shall not bar its resubmission
under the regular procedure.
? 14-2-18. Advisory determination procedure.
The governor or the head of a state
agency may refer to the court for an advisory determination the question of the
legal or equitable
mr
both, of a claim against the State or
a state agency. This
XIV STATE COURT
OF CLAIMS LAW
procedure shall apply only to such claims as are within the jurisdiction of the
court. The procedure shall be substantially as follows:
1. There shall be filed with the clerk, the record of the claim including a
full statement of the facts, the contentions of the claimant, and such other
materials as the rules of the court may require. The record shall submit
specific questions for the court?s consideration.
2. The clerk shall examine the record submitted and if he finds that it is
adequate under the rules, he shall place the claim on a special docket. If he
finds the record inadequate, he shall refer it back to the officer submitting
it with the request that the necessary additions or changes be made.
3. When a claim is reached on the special docket, the court shall prepare a
brief opinion for the information and guidance of the officer. The claim shall
be considered informally and without hearing. A claimant shall not be entitled
to appear in connection with the consideration of the claim.
4. The opinion shall be filed with the clerk. A copy shall be transmitted to
the officer who referred the claim.
An advisory determination shall not bar the subsequent consideration of the
same claim if properly submitted by, or on behalf of, the claimant. Such
subsequent consideration, if undertaken, shall be de novo.
? 14-2-19. Claims under existing appropriations.
A claim arising under an appropriation made by the legislature during the
fiscal year to which the appropriation applies, and falling within the
jurisdiction of the court, may be submitted by:
1. A claimant whose claim has been rejected by the state agency concerned or by
the state auditor.
2. The head of the state agency concerned in order to obtain a determination of
the matters in issue.
3. The state auditor in order to obtain a full hearing and consideration of the
merits.
The regular procedure, so far as applicable, shall govern the consideration of
the claim by the court. If the court finds that the claimant should be paid, it
shall certify the approved claim and award to the head of the appropriate state
agency, the state auditor,
STATE COURT OF
CLAIMS LAW XV
and to the governor. The governor may thereupon instruct the auditor to issue
his warrant in payment of the award and to charge the amount thereof to the
proper appropriation. The auditor shall forthwith notify the state agency that
the claim has been paid. Such an expenditure shall not be subject to further
review by the auditor upon any matter determined and certified by the court.
? 14-2-20. Claims under special appropriations.
Whenever the legislature makes an appropriation for the payment of claims
against the State, then accrued or arising during the ensuing fiscal year, the
determination of claims and the payment thereof may be made in accordance with
this section. However, this section shall apply only if the legislature in
making its appropriation specifically so provides.
The claim shall be considered and determined by the regular or shortened
procedure, as the case may be, and the amount of the award shall be fixed by
the court. The clerk shall certify each approved claim and award, and
requisition relating thereto, to the auditor. The auditor thereupon shall issue
his warrant to the treasurer in favor of the claimant. The auditor shall issue his
warrant without further examination or review of the claim except for the
question of a sufficient unexpended balance in the appropriation.
?14-2-21. Periods of limitation made applicable.
The court shall not take jurisdiction of any claim, whether accruing before
or after the effective date of this article [July 1, 19671, unless notice of
such claim be filed with the clerk within such period of limitation as would be
applicable under the pertinent provisions of the Code of West Virginia, one
thousand nine hundred thirty-one, as amended, if the claim were against a
private person, firm or corporation and the constitutional immunity of the
State from suit were not involved and such period of limitation may not be
waived or extended. The foregoing provisions shall not be held to limit or
restrict the right of any person, firm or corporation who or which had a claim
against the State or any state agency, pending before the attorney general on
the effective date of this article [July 1, 1967], from presenting such claim
to the court of claims, nor shall it limit or restrict the right to file such a
claim which was, on the effective date of this article [July 1, 19671, pending
in any court of record as a legal claim and
XVI STATE COURT
OF CLAIMS LAW
which, after such date was or may be adjudicated in such court to be invalid as
a claim against the State because of the constitutional immunity of the State
from suit.
? 14-2-22. Compulsory process.
In all hearings and proceedings before the court, the evidence and
testimony of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence may be
required. Subpoenas may be issued by the court for appearance at any designated
place of hearing. In case of disobedience to a subpoena or other process, the
court may invoke the aid of any circuit court in requiring the evidence and
testimony of witnesses, and the production of books, papers and documents. Upon
proper showing, the circuit court shall issue an order requiring witnesses to
appear before the court of claims; produce books, papers and other evidence;
and give testimony touching the matter in question. A person failing to obey
the order may be punished by the circuit court as for contempt.
? 14-2-23. Inclusion of awards in budget.
The clerk shall certify to the department of finance and administration, on
or before the twentieth day of November of each year, a list of all awards
recommended by the court to the legislature for appropriation. The clerk may
certify supplementary lists to the governor to include subsequent awards made
by the court. The governor shall include all awards so certified in his
proposed budget bill transmitted to the legislature.
? 14-2-24. Records to be preserved.
The record of each claim considered by the court, including all documents,
papers, briefs, transcripts of testimony and other materials, shall be
preserved by the clerk and shall be made available to the legislature or any
committee thereof for the reexamination of the claim.
? 14-2-25. Reports of the court.
The clerk shall be the official reporter of the court. He shall collect and
edit the approved claims, awards and statements, shall prepare them for
submission to the legislature in the form of an annual report and shall prepare
them for publication.
Claims and awards shall be separately classified as follows:
STATE COURT OF
CLAIMS LAW XVII
1. Approved claims and awards not satisfied but referred to the legislature for
final consideration and appropriation.
2. Approved claims and awards satisfied by payments out of regular
appropriations.
3. Approved claims and awards satisfied by payment out of a special
appropriation made by the legislature to pay claims arising during the fiscal
year.
4. Claims rejected by the court with the reasons therefor.
5. Advisory determinations made at the request of the governor or the head of a
state agency.
The court may include any other information or recommendations pertaining to
the performance of its duties.
The court shall transmit its annual report to the presiding officer of each house
of the legislature, and a copy shall be made available to any member of the
legislature upon request therefor. The reports of the court shall be published
biennially by the clerk as a public document. The biennial report shall be
filed with the clerk of each house of the legislature, the governor and the
attorney general.
?14-2-26. Fraudulent claims.
A person who knowingly and wilfully presents or attempts to present a false
or fraudulent claim, or a state officer or employee who knowingly and
wilfully participates or assists in the preparation or presentation of a false
or fraudulent claim, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. A person convicted, in a
court of competent jurisdiction, of violation of this section shall be fined
not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned for not more than one year, or
both, in the discretion of such court. If the convicted person is a state
officer or employee, he shall, in addition, forfeit his office or position of
employment, as the case may be.
?14-2-27. Conclusiveness of determination.
Any final determination against the claimant on any claim presented as
provided in this article shall forever bar any further claim in the court
arising out of the rejected claim.
XVIII STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS LAW
?14-2-28. Award as condition precedent to appropriation.
It is the policy of the legislature to
make no appropriation to pay any claims against the State, cognizable by the
court, unless the claim has first been passed upon by the court.
?14-2-29. Severability.
If any provision of this article or the application thereof to any person
or circumstance be held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other
provision or applications of the article which can be given effect without the
invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this
article are declared to be severable.
RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES XIX
Rules
of Practice and
Procedure
of the
STATE COURT OF CLAI MS
(Adopted by the Court
September 11, 1967.
Amended February 18, 1970
Amended February 23, 1972.)
XX RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
TABLE
OF RULES
Rules of Practice and Procedure
RULE
1. Clerk, Custodian of Papers, etc.
2. Filing Papers.
3. Records.
4. Form of Claims.
5. Copy of Notice of Claims to Attorney General
and State Agency.
6. Preparation of Hearing Docket.
7. Proof and Rules Governing Procedure.
8. Appearances.
9. Briefs.
10. Continuances: Dismissal For Failure to Prosecute.
11. Original Papers Not To Be Withdrawn: Exceptions.
12. Withdrawal of Claim.
13. Witnesses.
14. Depositions.
15. Re-Hearings.
16. Records of Shortened Procedure Claims Submitted by State Agencies.
17. Application of Rules of Civil Procedure.
RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE XXI
RULES
OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OF THE
COURT OF CLAIMS
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
RULE 1. CLERK, CUSTODIAN OF
PAPERS, ETC.
The Clerk shall be responsible for
all papers and claims filed in his office; and will be required to properly
file, in an index for that purpose, any paper, pleading, document, or other
writing filed in connection with any claim. The Clerk shall also properly
endorse all such papers and claims, showing the title of the claim, the number
of the same, and such other data as may be necessary to properly connect and
identify the document, writing, or claim.
RULE 2. FILING
PAPERS.
(a) Communications addressed to the
Court or Clerk and all notices, petitions, answers and other pleadings, all
reports, documents received or filed in the office kept by the Clerk of this
Court, shall be endorsed by him showing the date of the receipt or filing
thereof.
(b) The Clerk, upon receipt of a notice of a claim, shall enter of record in
the docket book indexed and kept for that purpose, the name of the claimant,
whose name shall be used as the title of the case, and the case number shall be
assigned accordingly.
(C) No paper, exclusive of exhibits, shall be filed in any action or proceeding
or be accepted by the Clerk for filing nor any brief, deposition, pleading,
order, decree, reporter?s transcript or other paper to be made a part of the
record in any claim be received except that the same be upon paper measuring
8/2 inches in width and 11 inches in length.
RULE 3. RECORDS.
The Clerk shall keep the following record books, suitably indexed in the
names of claimants and other subject matter:
(a) Order Book, in which shall be recorded at large, on the day of their
filing, all orders made by the Court in each case or proceeding.
XXII RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(b) Docket Book, in which shall be entered each case or claim made and filed,
with a file or case number corresponding to the number of the case, together
with brief chronological notations of the proceedings had in each case.
(c) Financial Ledger, in which shall be entered chronologically, all
administrative expenditures of the Court under suitable classifications.
RULE 4. FORM OF CLAIMS.
Notice in writing of each claim must be filed with the Clerk of the Court. The
notice shall be in sufficient detail to identify the claimant, the
circumstances giving rise to the claim, and the state agency concerned, if any.
The Court reserves the right to require further information before hearing,
when, in its judgment, justice and equity may require. It is recommended that
notice of claims be furnished in triplicate. A suggested form of notice of a
claim may be obtained from the Clerk.
RULE 5. COPY OF NOTICE OF CLAIMS TO ATTORNEY
GENERAL AND STATE AGENCY.
Upon receipt of a notice of claim to be considered by the Court, the Clerk
shall forthwith transmit a copy of the notice to the State Agency concerned, if
any, and a copy thereof to the office of the Attorney General of the State, and
the Clerk shall make a note of the time of such delivery.
RULE 6. PREPARATION OF HEARING DOCKET.
On and after the date of adoption of these rules by the Court, the Clerk shall
prepare fifteen days previous to the regular terms of Court a docket listing
all claims that are ready for hearing by the Court, and showing the respective
dates, as fixed by the Court for the hearing thereof. The Court reserves the
right to add to, rearrange or change said docket when in its judgment such
addition, rearrangement or change would expedite the work of the term. Each
claimant or his counsel of record and the Attorney General shall be notified as
to the date, time, and place of the hearing.
RULE 7. PROOF AND RULES GOVERNING PROCEDURE.
(a) Claims asserted against the State, including all the allegations in a
notice of claim, are treated as denied, and must be established
RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE XXIII
by the claimant with satisfactory proof, or proper stipulation as hereinafter
provided before an award can be made.
(b) The Court shall not be bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of
evidence. The Court may accept and weigh, in accordance with its evidential
value, any information that will assist the Court in determining the factual
basis of the claim.
(c) The Attorney General shall within twenty days after a copy of the notice
has been furnished his office file with the Clerk a notice in writing, either
denying the claim, requesting postponement of proceedings to permit
negotiations with the claimant, or otherwise setting forth reasons for further
investigation of the claim, and furnish the claimant or his counsel of record a
copy thereof. Otherwise, after said twenty-day period, the Court may order the
claim placed upon its regular docket for hearing.
(d) It shall be the duty of the claimant or his counsel in claims under the
regular procedure to negotiate with the Office of the Attorney General so that
the claimant and the State Agency and the Attorney General may be ready at the
beginning of the hearing of a claim to read, if reduced to writing, or to
dictate orally, if not reduced to writing, into the record such stipulations,
if any, as the parties may have been able to agree upon.
(e) Where there is a controversy between a claimant and any State Agency, the
Court may require each party to reduce the facts to writing, and if the parties
are not in agreement as to the facts, the Court may stipulate the questions of
fact in issue and require written answers to the said stipulated questions.
RULE 8. APPEARANCES.
Any claimant may appear in his own behalf or have his claim presented by
counsel, duly admitted as such to practice law in the State of West Virginia.
RULE 9. BRIEFS.
(a) Claimants or their counsel, and
the Attorney General, may file with the Court for its consideration a brief on
any question involved, provided a copy of said brief is also presented to and
furnished the opposing party or counsel. Reply briefs shag b*.ied within
fifteen days.
(b) All briefs filed with, and for the use of, the Court shaU be in
quadruplicate?original and three copies. As soon as any brief is
XXIV RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
received by the Clerk he shall file the original in the Court file and deliver
the three copies, one each, to the Judges of the Court.
RULE 10. CONTINUANCES: DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE.
(a) After claims have been set for hearing, continuances are looked upon by
the Court with disfavor, but may be allowed when good cause is shown.
(b) A party desiring a continuance should file a motion showing good cause
therefor at the earliest possible date.
(c) Whenever any claim has been docketed for hearing for three regular terms of
Court at which the claim might have been prosecuted, and the State shall have
been ready to proceed with the trial thereof, the Court may, upon its own
motion or that of the State, dismiss the claim unless good cause appear or be
shown by the claimant why such claim has not been prosecuted.
(d) Whenever a claimant shall fail to appear and prosecute his claim on the day
set for hearing and shall not have communicated with the Clerk prior thereto,
advising of his inability to attend and the reason therefor, and if it further
appear that the claimant or his counsel had sufficient notice of the docketing
of the claim for hearing, the Court may, upon its own motion or that of the
State, dismiss the claim.
(e) Within the discretion of the Court, no order dismissing a claim under
either of the two preceding sections of this rule shall be vacated nor the
hearing of such claim be reopened except by a notice in writing filed not later
than the end of the next regular term of Court, supported by affidavits showing
sufficient reason why the order dismissing such claim should be vacated, the
claim reinstated and the trial thereof permitted.
RULE 11. ORIGINAL PAPERS NOT TO BE WITHDRAWN:
EXCEPTIONS.
No original paper in any case shall be withdrawn from the Court files
except upon special order of the Court or one of the Judges thereof in
vacation. When an official of a State Department is testifying from an original
record of his department, a certified copy of the original record of such
department may be filed in the place and instead of the original.
RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE XXV
RULE 12. WITHDRAWAL OF CLAIM.
(%Any claimant may withdraw his claim. Should the claimant later refile the
claim, the Court shall consider its former status, such as previous
continuances and any other matter affecting its standing, and may re-docket or
refuse to re-docket the claim as in its judgment, justice and equity may
require under the circumstances.
(b) Any department or state agency, having filed a claim for the Court?s
consideration, under either the advisory determination procedure or the
shortened procedure provision of the Court Act, may withdraw the claim without
prejudice to the right of the claimant involved to file the claim under the
regular procedure.
RULE 13 WITNESSES.
(a) For the purpose of convenience and in order that proper records may be
preserved, claimants and State Departments desiring to have subpoenas for
witnesses shall file with the clerk a memorandum in writing giving the style
and number of the claim and setting forth the names of such witnesses, and
thereupon such subpoenas shall be issued and delivered to the person calling
therefor or mailed to the person designated.
(b) Request for subpoenas for witnesses should be furnished to the Clerk well
in advance of the hearing date so that such subpoenas may be issued in ample
time before the hearing.
(c) The payment of witness fees, and mileage where transportation is not
furnished to any witness subpoenaed by or at the instance of either the
claimant or the respondent state agency, shall be the responsibility of the
party by whom or at whose instance such witness is subpoenaed.
RULE 14. DEPOSITIONS.
(a) Depositions may be taken when a party desires the testimony of any
person, including a claimant. The deposition shall be upon oral examination or
upon written interrogatory. Depositions may be taken without leave of the
Court. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of subpoenas as
provided in Rule 13.
(b)To take the deposition of any designated witness, reasonable notice of time
and place shall be given the opposite party or counsel, and the party taking
such deposition shall pay the costs
XXVI RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
thereof and file an original and three copies of such deposition with the
Court. Extra copies of exhibits will not be required; however, it is suggested
that where exhibits are not too lengthy and are of such a nature as to permit
it, they should be read into the deposition.
(c) Depositions shall be taken in accordance with the provision of Rule 17 of
this Court.
RULE 15. RE-HEARINGS.
A re-hearing shall not be allowed except where good cause is shown. A
motion for re-hearing may be entertained and considered ex parte, unless the
Court otherwise directs, upon the petition and brief filed by the party seeking
the re-hearing. Such petition and brief shall be filed within thirty days after
notice of the Court?s determination of the claim unless good cause be shown why
the time should be extended.
RULE 16. RECORDS OF SHORTENED PROCEDURE CLAIMS SUBMITTED BY STATE AGENCIES.
When a claim is submitted under the provisions of Chapter 14, Article 2,
Paragraph 17 of the Code of West Virginia, concurred in by the head of the
department and approved for payment by the Attorney General, the record
thereof, in addition to copies of correspondence, bills, invoices, photographs,
sketches or other exhibits, should contain a full, clear and accurate
statement, in narrative form, of the facts upon which the claim is based. The
facts in such record among other things which may be peculiar to the particular
claim, should show as definitely as possible that:
(a) The claimant did not through neglect, default or lack of reasonable care,
cause the damage of which be complains. It should appear he was innocent and
without fault in the matter.
(b) The department, by or through neglect, default or the failure to use
reasonable care under the circumstances caused the damage to claimant, so that
the State in justice and equity should be held liable.
(c) The amount of the claim should be itemized and supported by a paid invoice,
or other report itemizing the damages, and vouched for by the head of the
department as to correctness and reasonableness.
RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE XXVII
RULE 17. APPLICATION OF RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
The Rules of Civil Procedure will
apply in the Court of Claims unlqss the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Court of Claims are to the contrary.
Adopted by Order of the Court
of Claims, September 11, 1967.
Amended February 18, 1970.
Amended February 23, 1972.
CHERYLE M. HALL,
Clerk
I
-
REPORT
OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS
For the Period July 1, 1975 to June 30, 1977
(1) Approved claims and awards not
satisfied but to be referred to the Legislature, 1978, for final consideration
and appropriation:
Amount Amount Date of
No. Name of Claimant Name of Respondent Claimed Awarded Determination
CC-76-136 Boley, Downer B. Department of Highways $ 926.83 $ 926.83 6-30-77
CC-76-119 Boone Sales, Inc. Department of Highways 3,758.30 6-28-77
CC-77-30 Bradbury, Lonnie W. Nonintoxicating Beer
Commission 1,569.20 1,569.20 6-30-77
CC-76-17 Clark, David L., Sr. Department of Highways 50,000.00 5,572.00 6-30-77
xj
CC-77-34 Dunbar Printing Department of
Education,
Company Division of Vocational
Education 759.20 759.20 6-30-77
CC-77-4l Eastes, Clarence V. Department of Highways 144.20 144.20 6-30-77
CC-77-21 Henson, Barbara Department of Highways 128.14 128.14 4-29-77
CC-77-29 Honsaker, Clifford
E., Jr. Department of Highways 10.14 10.14 6-30-77 Z
CC-77-12 Kidd, Marvin Department of
Highways 52.50 52.50 6-9-77
D-992 Kolesar, Moses Department of Highways 50,000.00 6,500.00 6-28-77 .
CC-77-13 Perkins, Mr. & Mrs.
John C., Jr. Department of Highways 72.30 72.30 5-13-77
D-884 Ratcliff, Thelma
and William Glen Department of Highways 75,000.00 4,500.00 6-30-77
D-919 Reed, Ray R. and
Sharon Department of Highways 75,000.00 5,000.00 6-30-77
CC-77-14 Tucker, Paul Edward Department of Highways 93.32 93.32 6-30-77
*Mofion to dismiss overruled in a written opinion. Award made at a later date.
REPORT OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS (Continued)
(2) Approved claims and awards
satisfied by payments out of appropriations made by the Legislature for the
period July 1, 1975, to June 30,
1977:
Amount Amount Date of
No. Name of Claimant Name of Respondent Claimed Awarded Determination
CC-76-128a Adams, Randy R. Department of Public
Institutions $
73.15 $ 73.15
1-13-77 i?i
D-1036 Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., subrogee for Jimmy C)
L. McKinney Department of Highways 989.55 989.55 10-5-76
D-965 American Can Company Department of Mental
Health 1,125.85 1,125.85 1-8-76 0
CC-76-10l American Road In suranc
Company (The), 0
subrogee of Shellie
Morgan, Jr. Department of Highways 199.26 199.26 10-26-76
D-1018 Anderson, Verla R. Department of Highways 15.45 15.45 6-1-76 r
CC-76- 145 Asbury, Virginia F. Department of Highways 89.26 89.26 3-17-77
D-928 Ashland Chemical Department of Public
Company Institutions 249.65 249.65 2-10-76
D-991 Associated Dry Goods Department of Public
d/b/a The Diamond Safety
Department Store 456.05 441.96 9-19-75
D-933 Baker, Robert Douglas Department of Highways 35.00 35.00 10-31-75 .,
CC-76-4 Block, K. L. & Patricia A.
Department of Highways 35,000.00 2,500.00 1-13-77
D-597 Black Rock Contracting, Inc. Department of Highways 141,644.18 30,759.09
11-19-76
D-684a Bohrer, Lane S. &
Barbara S. Department of Highways 35,000.00 9,750.00 1-13-77 Cl)
D970 Brassfield, Roy E., Jr. Department of Highways 69.21 69.21 10-6-75
D-764 Buckeye Union Insurance
Co., subrogee of Raymond
L. Maddy Department of Highways 207.93 207.93 9-9-75 >?
D-674 C & P Telephone Company
of West Virginia Department of Highways 3,856.86 3,856.86 10-6-75 4
REPORT OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS (Continued)
(2) Approved claims and awards
satisfied by payments out of appropriations made by the Legislature for the
period July
1, 1975, to June 30,
1977:
Cl
CII
-4
Cl
-4
0
0
Cl L-4
-4
C?,
3.
CII
|
|
|
Amount |
Amount |
Date of |
|
No. |
Name of Claimant |
Name of Respondent |
Claimed |
Awarded |
Determination |
|
D-900 |
C & P Telephone Company |
|
|
|
|
|
|
of West Virginia |
Department of Highways |
10,731.08 |
10,731.08 |
6-16-76 |
|
D-997 |
C & P Telephone Company |
|
|
|
|
|
|
of West Virginia |
Department of Highways |
308.61 |
308.61 |
3-17-77 |
|
D-1006 |
Cadle, Jay H. dib/a |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Cadle Sanitary Ser. |
Office of Emergency Ser. |
10,545.21 |
10,492.50 |
1-8-76 |
|
D-744 |
Casto, Nelson Gilbert & |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Patricia Joyce |
Department of Highways |
25,000.00 |
15,000.00 |
3-17-77 |
|
D-1014 |
Charleston Area Medical |
Division of Vocational |
|
|
|
|
|
Center, Inc. |
Rehabilitation |
2,972.37 |
2,972.37 |
1-19-76 |
|
D-913 |
Clowser, James R. |
Department of Mental Health |
1,020.00 |
1,020.00 |
10-7-75 |
|
CC-76-93 |
Conley, Larry G. & |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bonita E. |
Department of Highways |
278.52 |
278.52 |
3-17-77 |
|
D-702 |
Cook, Ronald L. Cooper, Randy |
Department of
Finance and Administration |
4,375.00 |
4,375.00 |
10-6-75 |
|
D-980 |
Cremeans, Helen |
Department of Highways |
391.45 |
391.45 |
10-7-75 |
|
D-790 |
Crockett, Daniel |
Department of Highways |
257.96 |
257.96 |
10-7-75 |
|
D-944 |
Day, Archie, Sheriff |
John M. Gates, Auditor |
18.00 |
18.00 |
10-22-75 |
|
CC-76-69 |
DeBoer, Marvin E. |
Board of Regents |
2,033.00 |
1,605.00 |
3-17-77 |
|
D-1029 |
Dorsey, Robert B. |
Department of Highways |
89.55 |
89.55 |
7-19-76 |
|
D-1015 |
Dunbrack, Everett L. |
Department of Highways |
432.00 |
200.00 |
1-29-76 |
|
CC-76-6 |
Dunlap, Betty H. |
Department of Highways |
1,500.00 |
750.00 |
10-6-76 |
|
D-684c |
Dung, W. E. & Minnie |
Department of Highways |
35,000.00 |
28,000.00 |
1-13-77 |
|
D-905 |
Duvernoy, Russell E. & |
John M. Gates, Auditor & |
|
|
|
|
|
Henry Todd |
John H. Kelly, Treasurer |
775.00 |
775.00 |
11-13-75 |
|
CC-76-50 |
England, Robert |
Department of Highways |
7,000.00 |
1,000.00 |
3-17-77 |
|
D-904 |
F. & M. Schaefer |
Nonintoxicating Beer |
|
|
|
|
|
Brewing Co. (The) |
Commission |
24,474.67 |
24,474.67 |
12-10-75 |
|
REPORT OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS (Continued)
(2) Approved claims and awards
satisfied by payments out of appropriations made by the Legislature for the
period July 1, 1975, to June 30,
1977:
Amount Amount Date of
No. Name of Claimant Name of Respondent Claimed Awarded Determination 1?
D-880 Ferguson, Ronald E. Department of Highways 210.73 210.73 7-7-75
CC-76-8 Foster, James P. d/b/a TJ
Western Virginia
Demolition Company Department of Highways 687.00 499.00 1-13-77 .
CC-77-9 Gambro, Inc. Board of Vocational
Education, Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation 536.40 536.40 3-17-77 Z
D-675 Gannon, Wanda M. Department of
Highways 7,500.00 3,450.00 1-19-76
CC-76-128c Gilbert, Louis E. Department of Public
Institutions 375.63 375.63 1-13-77
CC-76-43 Giles, Twila Jean Department of Highways 107.84 107.84 3-17-77 t
CC-76-128d Gough, John Department of Public
Institutions 982.70 982.70 1-13-77
D-972 Gregory, Fred H. Department of Highways 35.63 35.63 2-3-76 11)
CC-76-128e Gwinn, Lacy Department of
Public
Institutions 477.27 477.27 1-13-77
D-842 Hale, Thomas Edison Department of Highways 25,000.00 8,250.00 1-29-76
CC-76-128f Hamons, Beecher D. Department of Public
Institutions 135.85 135.85 1-13-77
CC-76-58 Hamrick, ma M. Department of Highways 1,800.00 1,800.00 3-17-77
D-1016 Harmon, Grover A. Department of Highways 35,000.00 12,039.52 5-5-76
D-831 Hedges, Elizabeth Ann
Executrix of the Estate
of A. Bruce Hedges, dec. Board of Regents 8,756.00 8,756.00 8-9-76
CC-76-128g Hefner, William E. Department of Public Institutions 252.06 252.06 1-13-77
D-932 Heitz, Michael E. Department of Highways 100.00 100.00 9-9-75
CC-76-128h Hill, Edward L. Department of Public
Institutions 125.40 125.40 1-13-77
REPORT OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS (Continued)
(2) Approved claims and awards satisfied by payments out of appropriations made by the
Legislature for the period July 1, 1975, to June 30,
1977:
Amount Amount Date of
No. Name of Claimant Name of Respondent Claimed Awarded Determination
CC-76-128i Hill, Robert L. Department of Public
Institutions 39.54 39.54 1-13-77
D-98l Inland Mutual Ins. Department of Mental
Co., subrogee of Health
Tabitha V. Partlow 342.83 342.83 10-22-75
D-1026 IBM Corporation Secretary of State 70.23 70.23 1-8-76
D-917 J.J. Englert Company Department of Public
Institutions 5,834.40 5,834.40 9-19-75
D-785 James, Larry Office of the Governor
and Dept. of Natural
Resources 2 300.00 1,500.00 10-6-75 -i
D-1023 Jefferson, Robert L. Department of
Highways 250.00 100.00 1-19-76 >
D-680 Jordan, McGettigan & Department
of Mental
Yule Health 10,861.95 5,942.20 11-13-75 CI)
D-810 Kayser, Kenneth S. Department of Highways 100.00 100.00 9-9-75
CC-76-29 Kelly, Helen M. Department of Highways 110,000.00 6,000.00 3-17-77
D-882 Kelly, Mrs. Samuel Department of Highways 58.00 58.00 9-9-75
D-971 Kitching, Richard D. Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation 405.00 405.00 9-19-75
CC-76-31 Landes, Deborah Ann Board of Regents 5,000.00 3,144.65 4-17-77
D-685 Lang Brothers, Inc. Department of Highways 28,732.36 27,458.16 3-17-77
D-912 Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co., subrogee of
Charles C. Simpson Department of Highways 1,775.00 1,775.00 9-16-76 CC-76-14
Linville, James D. Department of Highways 306.00 306.00 6-16-76 D-910 Lohan,
Larry W. &
Pamela Department of Highways 38.37 38.37 10-7-75 D-1027 McConaha, Larry
Department of Highways 31.93 31.93 6-16-76 D-909 McFann, Patricia G. Department
of Highways 61.14 61.14 9-10-75
REPORT OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS (Continued)
(2) Approved claims and awards
satisfied by payments out of appropriations made by the Legislature for the
period July 1, 1975, to June 30,
1977:
Amount Amount Date of
No. Name of Claimant Name of Respondent
Claimed Awarded Determination
D-932 Maryland Casualty Co., CI)
subrogee to Michael E.
Heitz Department of Highways 134.88 134.88 9-9-75
D-684b Mason, Richard L. &
Jeanne Department of Highways 35,000.00 9,750 1-13-77 ?-
D-629 Melrose, Mark A.
Executor of the Estate Z
of J. J. Melrose, Dec.,
& Frank R. Meirose Department of Highways 3,000.00 3,000.00 10-31-75 l
D-962 Mid-Mountain Mack, Inc. Department of Motor (1
Vehicles 2,088.02 2,088.02 1-19-76 t
CC-76-128t Miller, Robert Department of Public
Institutions 296.55 296.55 1-13-77
CC-76-128j Mitchell, Carl Department of Public Ci)
Institutions 828.72 828.72 1-13-77 a
CC-76-128k Moats, Clyde Department of Public Z
Institutions 227.35 227.35 1-13-77 e
D-957 Monongahela Power Co. Department of
Highways 106.85 106.85 10-31-75
D-1001 Montgomery General Department of Public
Hospital Safety 2,898.59 2,898.59 8-9-76
D-1009 Motors Insurance Corp.,
subrogee of Quincy C.
Holstein Department of Highways 228.00 228.00 1-29-76
D-954 Mullins, Lois Department of Highways 3,500.00 300.00 1-13-77
CC-76-1281 Mullins, William Department of Public
Institutions 621.36 621.36 1-13-77
CC-76-133 Murphy, Chester Department of Highways 350.00 350.00 1-13-77
D-753a National Engineering &
Contracting Co. Department of Highways 5,059.01 5,059.01 6-16-76
REPORT OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS (Continued)
(2) Approved claims and awards satisfied by payments out of
appropriations made by the Legislature for the period July 1, 1975, to June 30,
1977:
Amount Amount Date of
No. Name of Claimant Name of Respondent Claimed Awarded
Determination
CC-76-7 Neal, Janice M. Department of Mental
Health 52.48 52.48 9-9-76
D-968 Nohe, Paul G. & June D. Department of Highways 100.00 100.00
10-6-75
CC-77-5 North-Central Dairy Department of Public
Herd Improvement Institutions
Association, Inc. 82.04 82.04 3-17-77
D-1028 Parke, Daivs & Company Department of Mental
Health 586.80 545.96 1-8-76
D-981 Partlow, Tabitha V. Department of Mental o
Health 57.68 57.68 10-22-75
D-973 Peak, Raymond Department of Highways 20,000.00 9,000.00 9-9-76
D-10l2 Peck Brogan Building & Workmen?s Compensation
Remodeling Fund 14,695.00 14,695.00 6-16-76 ?
CC-76-57 Perkins, Romeo G. &
Shelva Jean Department of Highways 3,500.00 3,500.00 3-17-77 rj
D-956 Pfizer, Inc. Department of Mental
Health 473.23 473.23 10-7-75 Z
D-816e Physicians Fee Office Department of
Public
Institutions 111.92 111.92 10-31-75
CC-76-83 Pittsenbarger, Harold L. Department of Highways 149.35 149.35 1-13-77
D-672 Plants, Keimeth E. Department of Highways 35,000.00 14,500.00 12-16-75 a
CC-76-135 Potomac Edison Co. (The) Department of Highways 93.41 93.41
1-13-77
D-921 Prudential Property &
Casualty Ins. Co.,
subrogee of Beverly J.
Maxwell Department of Highways 194.67 194.67 7-7-75
D-923 Queen City Brewing Nonintoxicating Beer
Company (The) Commission 8,974.82 8,974.82 1-19-76
CC-76- 146 Ralston Purina Co. Department of Public
Institutions 620.96 620.96 3-17-77
REPORT OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS (Continued)
(2) Approved claims and awards
satisfied by payments out of appropriations made by the Legislature for the
period July 1, 1975, to June 30,
Amount Amount Date of
No. Name of Claimant Name of Respondent Claimed Awarded Determination
CC-76-128n Reynolds, Charles Department of Public
Institutions 212.52 212.52 1-13-77
CC-76-128o Reynolds, Homer Department of Public
Institutions 291.60 291.60 1-13-77 i?i
D-947 Riddle, Carmie Department of
Highways 87.55 87.55 10-31-75
CC-76-126 Roberts, Alan MacKenzie Department of Highways 80.70 80.70 3-17-77
CC-77-128p Robinson, Ronald Department of Public
Institutions 271.70 271.70 1-13-77 z
D-1022 Rocchio, Frank A., John M. Gates,
State
Sheriff of Hancock Co. Auditor 16.00 16.00 1-8-76
CC-77-22 Romeo, Mike Department of Highways 279.27 190.00 3-17-77
D-570 Ryan, Incorporated of
Wisconsin Department of Highways 181,994.12 40,000.00 11-13-75 i
D-898 Shafer, Bobby Department of Highways
305.85 305.85 10-31-75
CC-76-60 Simpson, Charles C. Department of Highways 125.00 125.00 9-16-76
D-903 Ski South Magazine Department of Commerce 679.50 179.50 9-10-75
CC-76-121 Sloane, Fred E., Jr. z
& Minnie Arlene Department of Highways
194.22 194.22 3-17-77
D-946 Smith, Christine
Ambrosone Department of Highways 125,000.00 16,000.00 3-17-77
CC-76-140 Southern States Morgan- Department of Public
town Cooperative, Inc. Institutions 7,425.98 7,425.98 3-17-77
D-865 Sowards, Gail Department of Highways 250.00 250.00 6-30-77
D-865 Sowards, Paul W. Department of Highways 201,000.00 11,000.00 6-30-77
D-865 Sowards, Paul W. as
father & next friend of
Christina Gail Sowards Department of Highways 500.00 500.00 6-30-77
D-865 Sowards, Paul W. as
father & next friend of
Christopher Sowards Department of Highways 250.00 250.00 6-30-77
REPORT OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS (Continued)
(2) Approved claims and awards
satisfied by payments out of appropriations made by the Legislature for the
period July 1, 1975, to June 30, <
1977:
Amount Amount Date of
No. Name of Claimant Name of Respondent Claimed Awarded Determination
D-906 Speer, Clyde & Mildred Department of Highways 328.60 328.60 9-10-75
D-780 State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co.,
subrogee of Thelma Criner Department of Highways 195.70 195.70 8-28-75
D-1035 State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co., subrogee
of Edgar & Bessie
Damewood Department of Highways 1,653.53 1,200.00 6-16-76
D-1040 State Farm Mutual o
Automobile Ins. Co.,
subrogee of Monroe Hamon Department of Highways 289.69 289.69 4-2-76
CC-76-128s Stemple, Melvin Department of Public
Institutions 683.36 683.36 1-13-77
D-954 Stephy, Florence I. Department of Highways 1,500.00 1,281.53 1-13-77
D-1037 Stonewall Casualty Co., CI)
subrogee of Lloyd Fox Adjutant General
894.00 894.00 3-4-76
D-881a&b Swisher, J. Wilbur & Z
Alice V. dib/a Swisher?s Department of
Mental
Feed & Supply Co. Health 2,580.76 2,580.76 10-31-75
CC-76-128q Sypolt, Harold Department of Public
Institutions 33.00 33.00 1-13-77 .
D-795 Tabit, Louis Adjutant General
5,000.00 2,204.89 10-5-76
D-795 Tabit, Louis father &
next friend of Mary
Janet Tabit Adjutant General 100,000.00 12,150.00 10-5-76
CC-76-3 Teets, Wilmer W. and
Sharon J. Department of Highways 7,216.51 9,216.51 3-17-77
CC-76-10 Thompson, Chloe Department of Highways 200.00 174.10 7-19-76
D-979 Tinsley, Gerald E. Department of Highways 163.10 163.10 1-8-76
D-987 Toppings, Spencer Department of Highways 2,500.00 710.00 7-19-76
IIII .I I lib
V%?iI J1 L.ImJ
jUflhII1UUJ
(2) Approved claims and awards
satisfied by payments out of appropriations made by the Legislature for the
period July 1, 1975, to June 30,
1977:
Amount Amount Date of
No. Name of Claimant Name of Respondent
Claimed Awarded Determination
Travelers Insurance Co.,
subrogee of William R.
Beckner Department of Highways 78.28 78.28 7-7-75 C1
CC-76-142 Tri-State Builders
Department of Public
Hardware, Inc. Institutions 131.40 131.40 1-13-77 i
CC-76-53 Underwood, Ralph, Jr. Department of Mines 1,055.00 1,754.35 3-17-77
D-820b Valley Welding Supply Department of Public
Company Institutions 25.70 25.70 2-10-76
D-370a Wang, Shen K. Department of Public 0
Institutions 15,300.00 15,300.00 10-22-75
CC-76-137 Warner P. Simpson Co. Department of Commerce 406.18 406.18 3-17-77 c
D-859 Westfield Insurance Co.,
subrogee of David Sago Department of Highways 106.02 106.02 9-9-75 fl
D-751 White, Ernest L. &
Florence Department of Highways 5,000.00 2,500.00 6-16-76
D-1004 White, James E. Department of Highways 300.00 43.26 10-22-75
D-781 Wiley, Hershel Ray Department of Highways 594.50 300.00 10-6-75
CC-76-112 Williams, William N. Department of Highways 1,900.00
1,128.66 3-17-77 >
CC-76-128r Wilson, Charles Department
of Public Z
Institutions 222.41 222.41 1-13-77
D-885 Wilson, Ralph Department of Highways 5,000.00 3,000.00 6-1-76
D-843 Wingate, Larry Lee Department of Highways 50,000.00 11,000.00 1-29-76
CC-76- 130 Woodley, Robert Department of Highways 55.00 55.00 3-17-77
CC-76-87 Wray, Jesse Department of Highways 1,101.45 542.00 3-17-77
D-963 Wright, D.A., Sheriff John M. Gates, Auditor 762.00 762.00 10-22-75 cj
D-948b Xerox Corporation
Department of Public
Institutions 1,166.18 1,166.18 10-31-75
CC-76-76 Yanasy, Marie Department of Highways 79.25 79.25 3-17-77 ><
(3) Approved claims and awards
satisfied by payment out of a special appropriation made by the Legislature to
pay claims arising during the < fiscal year: (None).
REPORT OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS (Continued)
(4) Claims rejected by the Court with reasons therefor:
-4
Amount Amount Date of ?
No. Name of Clahnant
Name of Respondent Claimed
Awarded Detenninatimi
D-l000 Ace Doran Hauling & Public Service
Rigging Co. Commission $
600.00 Disallowed 6-16-76
D-10l1 Adams, Clinton, Et al
Department of Highways 3,800.00
Disallowed 3-17-77
CC-76-45 Anton, Gladys A. Department of Highways 20,000.00
Disallowed 3-17-77
D-966b Barker, Joyce Elaine Department of Highways 10,000.00 Disallowed
11-19-77
D-966a Barker, William F. &
Elfa Mae Department of Highways 12,500.00 Disallowed 11-19-77
CC-76-24 Bastin, Olie G. &
Priscilla Department of Highways 4,500.00 Disallowed 3-17-77 z
D-1024 Beaucham, Edna Department of
Highways 174.95 Disallowed 5-5-76
D-746 Bickerstaff, Ronald L Department of Highways 50,000.00 Disallowed 4-18-77
D-934a Bird, Sylvester Department of Highways 50.00 Disallowed 1-27-76
CC-76-28 Bodo, John J. Department of Highways 863.71 Disallowed 10-6-76
CC-76-64 Burgher, Ronald Board of Regents 13,140.00 Disallowed
6-30-77
D-967 Butcher, Athel Department of Highways 65.97 Disallowed 10-31-75
D-690 Caidwell, Maude Department of Highways 15,000.00 Disallowed
10-31-75
D-240 Cantrell, Margaret Mae
Adm. of the Estate of z
Melvin Aaron Cantrell,
deceased Department of Highways 112,000.00 Disallowed 5-28-76
D-725e Can?oll, Ora J. and
Gwendolyn Y. Department of Highways 16,000.00 Disallowed 10-31-75
D-964 Catlett, Dorotha Jean Department of Public
Institutions 1,500.00 Disallowed 6-1-76
D-715 Clarke, Mrs. Harold P. Department of Highways 193.17 Disallowed 9-10-75
D-725a Cunningham, Robert G.
& Barbara L. Department of Highways 15,000.00 Disallowed 10-31-75
CC-76-18 Davis, William L. Department of Highways 66.00 Disallowed 7-19-76
D-938 Dickinson, Sharon L. Department of Highways 416.02 Disallowed 12-10-75
D-691 Early, Florence N. Department of Highways 17,000.00 Disallowed
10-31-75
D-692 Eddy, Arza Department of Highways 8,000.00 Disallowed
10-31-75
REPORT OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS (Continued)
(4) Claims rejected by the Court with reasons therefor:
Amount Amount Date of
No. Name of Claimajit Name of Respondent Claimed Awarded
Detennination t
D-955 Ervin, Curtis L. Department of Highways 1,600.00 Disallowed 9-9-76
CC-76-8 Foster, James P.,
d/b/a Western Virginia ?
Demolition Company Department of Highways
678.00 Disallowed 9-2-76
D-899 Fox, Lyime B. Department of Highways 75,000.00 Disallowed 4-18-77
D-725c Fricker, flene and
Harold, and Pearl G.
and Eugene Cyphers Department of Highways 3,000.00 Disallowed 10-31-75
D-725d Fricker, Ilene and
Harold A. Department of Highways 15,000.00 Disallowed 10-31-75
D- 1017 Gibson, Virgie Department of Public
Institutions 25,000.00 Disallowed 5-13-77 >
D-796 Hammond, John Dee Department of
Highways 50,000.00 Disallowed 3-17-77
D-988 Heflin, Pansy Department of Highways 4,000.00 Disallowed 7-19-76
D-607 Holdren, Paul W.
Committee for Frank u
T. fleming,
Incompetent Department of Highways 20,000.00 Disallowed 12-10-75
D-769 Hoover, Karl Department of Highways 4,768.00 Disallowed 5-5-76
CC-76-61 Horace Mann Insurance
Co., subrogee of
Agnes Stewart Bradshaw Department of Highways 3,356.62 Disallowed 3-17-77
D-683 Hot, Brown & Harold Miller Cl)
dib/a Hott and Miller,
General Contractors Department of Highways 473.91 Disallowed 7-30-75
D-771 Huffinan, Lewis Department of Highways 190.84 Disallowed 9-9-75
D-941 Hundley, Emmett and
Frances Department of Highways 20,000.00 Disallowed 6-30-77
CC-76-5 Hutchens, Karen Department of Highways 102.00 Disallowed 7-19-76
REPORT OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS (Continued)
(4) Claims rejected by the Court with reasons therefor:
N..
Name ol Claimant
CC-76-20 Jeter, Nancy
C.
D-725b Joy, Harry E., Jr. and
Nelda L
CC-76-44 Lafferty, Eugene and
Wanda
CC-76-27 Lashley Tractor Sales
CC-76-59 Lae, Frances N., Mother
and next friend of
Rodney K. Lee
D-853 Lovejoy, J. E. and
Edith
D-879 Lyons, Edna May
CC-76-118 Martinsburg Concrete
Products Company
CC-77-64 Null, Macil J. and
Melvin L
D-767 Paden City own of), a
municipal corporation
CC-76-128m Poling, Fred, Sr.
D-693 Postlethwait, Daniel A.
and Betty D.
D-924 Price, Robert K.
D-794 Riffle, Harold Wffliam
and Vemia
CC-76-lll Riffle, Mamie M.
D-982 Robinette, Dewey and
Shirley
Ci)
Ci)
0
I 0 z
0
0
z
Ci,
Name of Respondent |
Amount Claimed |
Amount Awarded |
Date of Determination |
Department of Highways |
48.15 |
Disallowed |
7-19-76 |
Department of Highways |
14,000.00 |
Disallowed |
10-31-75 |
Department of Highways Department of Public Institutions |
2,000.00 |
Disallowed |
3-17-77 |
Board of Education |
2,959.24 |
Disallowed |
5-13-77 |
Department of Highways Department of Highways |
28,000.00 |
Disallowed |
9-2-76 |
Department of Highways |
7,922.22 |
Disallowed |
6-30-77 |
Board of Regents |
20,000.00 |
Disallowed |
6-30-77 |
Department
of Highways Department of Public |
2,328.00 |
Disallowed |
10-31-75 |
Department
of Highways Department of Public |
33,411.00 |
Disallowed |
10-31-75 |
Department of Highways Department of Highways |
95,000.00 |
Disallowed |
3-17-77 |
Department of Highways |
10,000.00 |
Disallowed |
10-6-76 |
REPORT OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS (Continued)
(4) Claims rejected by the Court with
reasons therefor:
Amount Amount Date of
No. Name of Claimant Name of Respondent Claimed Awarded Determination
D-614 S. J. Groves & Sons Co. Department of Highways 11,437.40
Disallowed 6-30-77
D-735 Sanitary Board of the
City of Wheeling (The) Department of Highways 8,544.42 Disallowed
4-2-75
CC-76-42 Shawver, Roy G. Department of Highways 183.91 Disallowed 10-6-76 >
D-984 Shortridge, Rockford A. Department
of Highways 748.40 Disallowed 10-22-75
CC-76-86 Simms, Eloise Ballard Department of Highways 110.22 Disallowed 3-17-77
0
D-694 Smith, Roger H. and Z
Ramona C. Department of Highways
10,260.00 Disallowed 10-31-75 0
D946 Smith, William Joseph Department of Highways 25,000.00 Disallowed 3-17-77
J
D-908 Snyder, Ira D. Department of Highways 10,000.00 Disallowed 9-2-76 0
D-934b State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co.,
Subrogee of Sylvester
Bird Department of Highways 515.39 Disallowed 1-27-76
D-723 Vance, Oather T. Department of Highways 600.00 Disallowed 3-26-75 >
D-696 Webb, Myrtle Department of Highways
25,000.00 Disallowed 10-6-75 Z
D-811b West Virginia State Department of Public
Industries Institutions 15,572.06 Disallowed 1-16-76
D-758 White, Lucy Department of Highways 10,000.00 Disallowed 6-1-76
D-268o White, William Fredrick
Adm. of the Estate of
James A. White, dec. Department of Highways 110,000.00 Disallowed 5-28-76 ci
D-937 Whittington, John G. &
Merlene M. Department of Highways 25,000.00 Disallowed 10-31-75
CC-76-1 Widlan, Marilyn Department of Highways 312.79 Disallowed 6-16-76
D-985 Wine, L. E. Department of Highways 10,000.00 Disallowed 6-30-77
t-4
I-
I
-I REPORT
OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS (Continued)
(5) Advisory determinations made at
the request of the Governor or the head of a State agency:
Amount Amount Date of
No. Name of Claimant Name of Respondent Claimed Awarded
Determination
D-798a Department of Department of Public Advisory o
Employment Security Institutions $ 14,047.01 Determination 8-28-75 J
D-798b Department of Department of Public Advisory
Employment Security Institutions 12,747.42 Determination 8-28-75 t?
CC-76- 138 Department of Highways Department of Public
Institutions 1,673.19 Disallowed 2-4-77
CC-77-105 Slack, Robert B. Insurance Board 1,496.92 $ 1,496.92 6-29-77 Ci)
D-876a West Virginia State Department
of Mental Advisory
Industries Health 1,268.50 Determination 9-18-75 Z
D-876b West Virginia State Department of Mental Advisory
Industries Health 1,039.40 Determination 9-18-75
D-811b West Virginia State Department of Public Advisory
Industries Institutions 575.30 Determination 1-16-76
Ci)
REPORT OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS (Continued)
(6) Claims rejected by the Court but
payments made by special appropriation by the Legislature in the 1976 and 1977
Legislative sessions:
Amount Amount Date of
No. Name of Claimant Name of
Respondent Claimed Awarded Determination p
D-928 Ashland Chemical Co. Department of
Public
Institutions $
51.80 Disallowed 2-10-76
CC-76-105 C & P Telephone Company Department of Public
of W. Va. Institutions 3,305.55 Disallowed 1-20-77
CC-76-llOb Columbia Gas of West Department of Public
Virginia, Inc. Institutions 156.72 Disallowed 1-13-77
CC-77-20a Cox, Lewis Edmon Department of Mental
Health 185.64 Disallowed 4-29-77 z
D-969 Doctors Butler, Aceto Department of Public
& Assoc., Inc. Institutions 8.00 Disallowed 10-9-75
CC-76-91a&b Exxon Company, U.S.A. Department of Public
Institutions 514.75 Disallowed 1-20-77
D-1013 International Business
Machines Corporation Sinking Fund Commission 61.40 Disallowed 11-20-75
CC-77-20b McPherson, Ruth Department of Mental
Health 1,267.25 Disallowed 4-29-77
D-772 Mellon-Stuart Company Department of Public z
Institutions 5,919.64 Disallowed 11-20-75
CC-76-15 Mountaineer Motel, Inc. Department of Public
Institutions 250.79 Disallowed 3-4-76
CC-76-98 Ohio Valley Drug Department of Public
Company Institutions 656.58 Disallowed 1-20-77
CC-77-20c Racer, John C. Department of Mental
Health 178.80 Disallowed 4-29-77
CC-76-94 Reynolds Memorial Department of Public
Hospital Institutions 8,742.00 Disallowed 1-20-77
CC-76-114 St. Joseph?s Hospital Department of Mental
A-F Health 6,155.56 Disallowed 2-10-77 ><
CC-77-10 St. Joseph?s Hospital Department
of Mental
Health 1,790.46 Disallowed 3-17-77
REPORT
OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS (Continued)
(6) Claims rejected by the Court but payments made
by special appropriation by the Legislature in the 1976 and 1977 Legislative
sessions:
Amount Amount Date of
No. Name of Clannant Name of Respondent Claimed Awarded Determination
C
CC-76-96 Standard Exterminating Department of Public
Institutions 476.00 Disallowed 1-20-77 C)
D-8llb West Virginia State Department of Public
Industries Institutions 3,857.84 Disallowed 1-16-76
CC-76-103 Wheeling Electric Department of Public
Company Institutions 4,281.21 Disallowed 1-20-77
D-948a Xerox Corporation Department of Public
Institutions 798.46 Disallowed 10-31-75
(7) Approved claims and awards satisfied by payment by the State agency through
an opinion decided by the Court under the Shortened Procedure: (None).
rj
OPINIONS
XLVI TABLE OF
CASES REPORTED
TABLE
OF CASES REPORTED
Ace Doran Hauling & Rigging
Company v.
Public Service Commission 140
Adams, Clinton et al v. Department of Highways 227
Adams, Randy R. v. Department of Public Institutions 194
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., subrogee for
Jimmy L. McKinney v. Department of Highways 173
American Can Company v. Department of
Mental Health 83
American Road Insurance Company (The),
subrogee of Shellie Morgan, Jr. v.
Department of Highways 186
Anderson, Verla R. v. Department of Highways 135
Anton, Gladys A. v. Department of Highways 229
Asbury, Virginia F. v. Department of Highways 230
Asland Chemical Company v. Department
of Public Institutions 97
Associated Dry Goods d/b/a The Diamond
bdepartment Store v. Department of
Public Safety 21
Baker, Robert Douglas v. Department of Highways 48
Barker, Joyce Elaine v. Department of Highways 187
Barker, Wffliam F. & Elfa Mae v.
Department of Highways 187
Bastin, Olie G. & Priscilla v.
Department of Highways 230
Beaucham, Edna v. Department of Highways 103
Bickerstaff, Ronald L. v. Department of Highways 254
Bird, Sylvester v. Department of Highways 91
Block, K. L. & Patricia A. v. Department
of Highways 195
Black Rock Contracting, Inc. v.
Department of Highways 189
Bodo, John J. v. Department of Highways 179
Bohrer, Lane S. & Barbara S. v.
Department of Highways 197
Boley, Downer B. v. Department of Highways 272
Boone Sales, Inc. v. Department of Highways 269
Bradbury, Lonnie W. v. Nonintoxicating
Beer Commission 274
Brassfield, Roy E., Jr. v. Department of Highways 24
TABLE OF CASES
REPORTED XLVII
Buckeye Union Insurance Co., subrogee of
Raymond L. Maddy v. Department of Highways 9
Burgher, Ronald v. Board of Regents 275
Butcher, Athel v. Department of Highways 49
C & P Telephone Company of West Virginia v.
Department of Highways (No. D-674) 25
C & P Telephone Company of West Virginia v.
Department of Highways (No. D-900) 141
C & P Telephone Company of West Virginia v.
Department of Highways (No. D-997) 210
C & P Telephone Company of West Virginia v.
Department of Public Institutions (No. CC-76-105) 205
Cadle, Jay H. d/b/a Cadle Sanitary
Service v. Office of Emergency Services 83
Caidwell, Maude v. Department of Highways 50
Cantrell, Margaret Mae, Administratrix of the
Estate of Melvin Aaron Cantrell, deceased v.
Department of Highways 110
Carroll, Ora J. and Gwendolyn Y. v.
Department of Highways 51
Casto, Nelson Gilbert & Patricia Joyce
v. Department of Highways 259
Catlett, Dorotha Jean v. Department of
Public Institutions 135
Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. v.
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation 101
Clark, David L., Sr. v. Department of Highways 279
Clarke, Mrs. Harold P. v. Department of Highways 15
Clowser, James R. v. Department of Mental Health 35
Columbia Gas of West Virginia, Inc.
v. Department of Public Institutions 198
Conley, Larry G. & Bonita E. v. Department
of Highways 206
Cook, Ronald L. v. Department of Finance
and Administration 28
Cooper, Randy v. Department of Highways 1
Cox, Lewis Edmon v. Department of Mental Health 260
Cremeans, Helen v. Department of Highways 37
Crockett, Daniel v. Department of Highways 38
Cunningham, Robert G. & Barbara L.
v. Department of Highways 50
Cyphers, Eugene & Pearl G. v.
Department of Highways 51
XL VIII TABLE OF
CASES REPORTED
Davis, William L. v. Department of Highways 150
Day, Archie, Sheriff v. John M. Gates, Auditor 42
DeBoer, Marvin E. v. Board of Regents 232
Department of Employment Security v.
Department of Public Institutions, (No. D-798a) 6
Department of Employment Security v.
Department of Public Institutions (No. D-798b) 6
Department of Highways v. Department
of Public Institutions 207
Dickinson, Sharon L. v. Department of Highways 72
Doctors Butler, Aceto & Assoc. Inc. v.
Department of Public Institutions 41
Dorsey, Robert B. v. Department of Highways 151
Dunbar Printing Company v. Department of
Education, Division of Vocational Education 282
Dunbrack, Everett L. v. Department of Highways 137
Dunlap, Betty H. v. Department of Highways 181
Dung, W. E. & Minnie v. Department of Highways 197
Duvernoy, Russell E. & Henry Todd v.
John M. Gates, Auditor and John H.
Kelly, Treasurer 63
Early, Florence N. v. Department of Highways 50
Eastes, Clarence V. v. Department of Highways 283
Eddy, Arza v. Department of Highways 50
England, Robert v. Department of Highways 210
Ervin, Curtis L. v. Department of Highways 168
Exxon Company, U.S.A. v. Department of
Public Institutions 205
F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co. (The)
v. Nonintoxicating Beer Commission 73
Ferguson, Ronald E. v. Department of Highways 1
Foster, James P., d/b/a Western Virginia Demolition
Company v. Department of Highways 162
Foster, James P., dfb/a Western Virginia
Demoliton Company v. Department
of Highways (Rehearing) 199
Fox, Lynne B. v. Department of Highways 257
Fricker, ilene & Harold, and Pearl G. &
Eugene Cyphers v. Department of Highways 51
Fricker, Ilene and Harold A. v.
Department of Highways 51
TABLE OF CASES
REPORTED XLIX
Gambro, Incorporated v. Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation 211
Gannon, Wanda M. v. Department of Highways 104
Gibson, Virgie v. Department of Public Institutions 264
Gilbert, Louis E. v. Department of
Public Institutions 194
Giles, Twila Jean v. Department of Highways 212
Gough, John v. Department of Public Institutions 194
Gregory, Fred H. v. Department of Highways 98
Gwinn, Lacy v. Department of Public Institutions 194
Hale, Thomas Edison v. Department of Highways 93
Hammond, John Dee v. Department of Highways 234
Hamons, Beecher D. v. Department of
Public Institutions 194
Hamrick, ma M. v. Department of Highways 242
Harmon, Grover A. v. Department of Highways 107
Hedges, Elizabeth Ann, Executrix of the Estate of
A. Bruce Hedges, deceased v. Board of Regents 156
Heflin, Pansy v. Department of Highways 152
Hefner, William E. v. Department of
Public Institutions 194
Heitz, Michael E. v. Department of Highways 14
Henson, Barbara v. Department of Highways 261
Hill, Edward L. v. Department of Public Institutions 194
Hill, Robert L. v. Department of Public Institutions 194
Hoidren, Paul W., Committee for
Franklin T. Fleming, Incompetent
v. Department of Highways 75
Honsaker, Clifford E., Jr. v.
Department of Highways 284
Hoover, Karl v. Department of Highways 109
Horace Mann Insurance Co., subrogee of Agnes
Stewart Bradshaw v. Department of Highways 237
Hoft and IVIiller, General Contractors
v. Department of Highways 3
Huffman, Lewis v. Department of Highways 9
Hundley, Emmett & Frances v.
Department of Highways 284
Hutchens, Karen v. Department of Highways 153
L TABLE OF CASES
REPORTED
Inland Mutual Insurance Co.,
subrogee of Tabitha V. Partlow
v. Department of Mental Health 44
International Business Machines
Corporation v. Secretary of State 85
International Business Machines Corporation
v. Sinking Fund Commission 71
J. J. Englert Company v. Department
of Public Institutions 22
James, Larry v. Office of the Governor
& Department of Natural Resources 31
Jefferson, Robert L. v. Department of Highways 90
Jeter, Nancy C. v. Department of Highways 154
Jordan, MeGettigan & Yule v.
Department of Mental Health 64
Joy, Harry E., Jr. and Nelda L. v.
Department of Highways 50
Kayser, Kenneth S. v. Department of Highways 12
Kelly, Helen M. v. Department of Highways 214
Kelly, Mrs. Samuel v. Department of Highways 12
Kidd, Marvin v. Department of Highways 269
Kitching, Richard D., M.D. v. Division
of Vocational Rehabilitation 23
Kolesar, Moses v. Department of Highways 271
Lafferty, Eugene and Wanda v.
Department of Highways 239
Landes, Deborah Ann v. Board of Regents 215
Lang Brothers, Inc. v. Department of Highways 217
Lashley Tractor Sales v. Department of
Public Institutions 159
Lee, Frances N., Mother and next
friend of Rodney K. Lee v.
Board of Education 266
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,
subrogee of Charles C. Simpson
v. Department of Highways 171
Linvifie, James D. v. Department of Highways 142
Lohan, Larry W. & Pamela v.
Department of Highways 39
Lovejoy, J. E. and Edith v.
Department of Highways 163
TABLE OF CASES
REPORTED LI
Lyons, Edna May v. Department of Highways 287
McConaha, Larry v. Department of Highways 143
McFann, Patricia G. v. Department of Highways 17
McPherson, Ruth v. Department of Mental Health 260
Martinsburg Concrete Products
Company v. Department of Highways 279
Maryland Casualty Co., subrogee of
Michael E. Heitz v. Department of Highways 14
Mason, Richard L. and Jeanne v.
Department of Highways 197
Mellon-Stuart Company v. Department
of Public Institutions 71
Melrose, Mark A., Executor of the Estate of
J. J. Melrose, deceased, and Frank
R. Melrose v. Department of Highways 57
Mid-Mountain Mack, Inc. v. Department
of Motor Vehicles 90
Miller, Robert v. Department of
Public Institutions 194
Mitchell, Carl v. Department of
Public Institutions 194
Moats, Clyde v. Department of
Public Institutions 194
Monongahela Power Co. v.
Department of Highways 58
Montgomery General Hospital v.
Department of Public Safety 160
Motors Insurance Corp., subrogee of Quincy C.
Holstein v. Department of Highways 98
Mountaineer Motel, Inc. v.
Department of Public Institutions 99
Mullins, Lois v. Department of Highways 201
Mullins, William v. Department of Public Institutions 194
Murphy, Chester v. Department of Highways 203
National Engineering & Contracting
Company v. Department of Highways 143
Neal, Janice M. v. Department of
Mental Health 170
Nohe, Paul G. and June D. v.
Department of Highways 33
LII TABLE OF
CASES REPORTED
North-Central Dairy Herd Improvement
Association, Inc. v. Department of
Public Institutions 250
Null, Macil J. and Melvin L. v.
Board of Regents 288
Ohio Valley Drug Company v.
Department of Public Institutions 205
Paden City (Town of), a municipal
corporation v. Department of Highways 51
Parke, Davis & Company v. Department
of Mental Health 85
Partlow, Tabitha V. v. Department
of Mental Health 44
Peak, Raymond v. Department of Highways 170
Peck Brogan Buildin & Remodeling
v. Workmen?s Compensation Fund 145
Perkins, Mr. & Mrs. John C., Jr.
v. Department Of Highways 268
Perkins, Romeo G. & Shelva Jean
v. Department of Highways 242
Pfizer, Inc. v. Department of Mental Health 41
Physicians Fee Office v. Department
of Public Institutions 59
Pittsenbarger, Harold L. v.
Department of Highways 204
Plants, Kenneth E. v. Department of Highways 78
Poling, Fred, Sr. v. Department
of Public Institutions 208
Postlethwait, Daniel A. and Betty D.
v. Department of Highways 50
Potomac Edison Co. (The) v.
Department of Highways 204
Price, Robert K. v. Department of
Public Safety 4
Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance
Co., subrogee of Beverly J. Maxwell
v. Department of Highways 2
Queen City Brewing Company (The) v.
Nonintoxicating Beer Commission 100
Racer, John C. v. Department of
Mental Health 260
TABLE OF CASES
REPORTED LIII
Ralston Purina Company v. Department
of Public Institutions 250
Ratcliff, Thelma and William Glen
v. Department of Highways 291
Reed, Ray R. and Sharon v. Department
of Highways 294
Reynolds, Charles v. Department of
Public Institutions 194
Reynolds, Homer v. Department of
Public Institutions 194
Reynolds Memorial Hospital v.
Department of Public Institutions 205
Riddle, Carmie v. Department of Highways 59
Riffle, Harold William and Vernia
v. Department of Highways 244
Riffle, Mamie M. v. Department of Highways 246
Roberts, Alan MacKenzie v. Department
of Highways 248
Robinette, Dewey and Shirley
v. Department of Highways 182
Robinson, Ronald v. Department of
Public Institutions 194
Rocchio, Frank A., Sheriff of Hancock
County v. John M. Gates, State Auditor 86
Romeo, Mike v. Department of Highways 220
Ryan, Incorporated of Wisconsin v.
Department of Highways 69
S. J. Groves & Sons Company v.
Department of Highways 297
Shafer, Bobby v. Department of Highways 60
Shawver, Roy G. v. Department of Highways 184
Shortridge, Rockford A. v. Department
of Highways 45
Silver Bridge Claimants v.
Department of Highways 110
Simms, Eloise Ballard v. Department
of Highways 248
Simpson, Charids C. v. Department
of Highways 172
Ski South Magazine v. Department of Commerce 17
Slack, Robert B. v. Insurance Board 272
Sloane, Fred E., Jr. and Minnie
Arlene v. Department of Highways 249
LIV TABLE OF
CASES REPORTED
Smith, Christine Ambrosone v.
Department of Highways 221
Smith, Roger H. and Ramona C. v.
Department of Highways 50
Smith, William Joseph v. Department
of Highways 221
Snyder, Ira D. v. Department of Highways 166
Southern States Morgantown
Cooperative, Inc. v. Department
of Public Institutions 250
Sowards, Gail v. Department of Highways 299
Sowards, Paul W. v. Department of Highways 299
Sowards, Paul W., as father and next friend of
Christina Gail Sowards v. Department of Highways 299
Sowards, Paul W., as father and next friend of
Christopher Sowards v. Department of Highways 299
Speer, Clyde and Mildred v.
Department of Highways 18
St. Joseph?s Hospital v. Department
of Mental Health (No. CC-76-1 14a-f) 209
St. Joseph?s Hospital v. Department
of Mental Health (No. CC-77-10) 251
Standard Exterminating v. Department
of Public Institutions 205
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
subrogee of Edgar & Bessie
Damewood v. Department of Highways 147
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co., subrogee of Thelma Criner
v. Department of Highways (D.-780) 6
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co., subrogee of Sylvester Bird
v. Department of Highways (D-934b) 91
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co., subrogee of Monroe Hamon
v. Department of Highways (D-1040) 103
Stemple, Melvin v. Department of
Public Institutions 194
Stephy, Florence I. v. Department of Highways 201
Stonewall Casualty Co., subrogee
of Lloyd Fox v. Adjutant General 101
TABLE OF CASES
REPORTED LV
Swisher, J. Wilbur & Alice V. d/b/a
Swisher?s Feed & Supply Co. v.
Department of Mental Health 61
Sypolt, Harold v. Department of
Public Institutions 194
Tabit, Louis v. Adjutant General 174
Tabit, Louis, father & next friend
of Mary Janet Tabit v. Adjutant General 174
Teets, Wilmer W. and Sharon J. v.
Department of Highways 225
Thompson, Chloe v. Department of Highways 155
Tinsley, Gerald E. v. Department of Highways 87
Toppings, Spencer v. Department of Highways 156
Travelers Insurance Co., subrogee
of William R. Beckner v. Department
of Highways 2
Tn-State Builders Hardware, Inc.
v. Department of Public Institutions 250
Tucker, Paul Edward v. Department of Highways 302
Underwood, Ralph, Jr. v. Department of Mines 262
Valley Welding Supply v. Department
of Public Institutions 97
Wang, Shen K., M.D. v. Department
of Public Institutions 46
Warner P. Simpson Co. v. Department
of Commerce 208
Webb, Myrtle v. Department of Highways 33
West Virginia State Industries v.
Department of Mental Health (No. D-876a) 19
West Virginia State Industries v.
Department of Mental Health (No. D-876b) 19
West Virginia State Industries v.
Department of Public Institutions (D-811b) 88
Westfield Insurance Co., subrogee of
David Sago v. Department of Highways 15
Wheeling Electric Company v.
Department of Public Institutions 205
White, Ernest L. & Florence v.
Department of Highways 148
White, James E. v. Department of Highways 47
LVI TABLE OF
CASES REPORTED
White, Lucy v. Department of Highways 138
White, William Frederick, Administrator
of the Estate of James A. White, deceased
v. Department of Highways 110
Whittington, John G. & Merlene M. v.
Department of Highways 51
Widlan, Marilyn v. Department of Highways 149
Wiley, Hershel Ray v. Department of Highways 35
Williams, William N. v. Department of Highways 263
Wilson, Charles v. Department of
Public Institutions 194
Wilson, Ralph v. Department of Highways 139
Wine, L. E. v. Department of Highways 303
Wingate, Larry Lee v. Department of Highways 93
Woodley, Robert v. Department of Highways 252
Wray, Jesse v. Department of Highways 252
Wright, D. A., Sheriff v. John M. Gates,
State Auditor 42
Xerox Corporation v. Department of
Public Institutions (No. D-948a) 62
Xerox Corporation v. Department of
Public Institutions (No. D-948b) 62
Yanasy, Marie v. Department of Highways 253
Cases
Submitted and Determined
in the Court of Claims in the
State of West Virginia
Opinion issued July 7, 1975
RANDY COOPER
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-922)
PER CURIAM:
Due to negligent construction of a culvert by respondent?s employees across a
public road, an unsecured metal clamp caught the underside of claimant?s
automobile, damaging the oil pan and other parts. Liability and damages in the
amount of seventy-one dollars and forty-four cents are stipulated.
Award of $71.44
Opinion issued July 7, 1975
RONALD E. FERGUSON
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-880)
PER CURIAM:
Claim for damages to automobile by striking a loose steel plate negligently
placed by respondent?s employees on a public bridge. Liability and damages
stipulated.
Award of $210.73.
2 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued July 7, 1975
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY
INSURANCE CO., SUBROGEE OF
BEVERLY J. MAXWELL
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-921)
PER CURIAM:
Beverly J. Maxwell?s automobile was negligently sprayed with paint by
respondent?s employees, and claimant as her insurer sustained a loss of
$194.67. Liability of respondent and the amount of damages were stipulated.
Award of $194.67.
Opinion issued July 7, 1975
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY
AS SUBROGEE OF
WILLIAM R. BECKNER
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No.
D-901)
PER CURIAM:
Claim for damages to truck caused by negligent spraying of paint by
respondent?s employees stipulated as to liability and damages in the amount of
Seventy-eight Dollars and Twenty-eight cents
($78.28).
Award of $78.28.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 3
Opinion issued July 30, 1975
BROWN HOTI? and HAROLD MILLER
d/b/a Hott and Miller, a partnership
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-683)
Marvin Downing, Esq. for claimant.
Dewey Jones, Esq. for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
Although this claim was originally filed on behalf of ?Hott and Miller, General
Contractors?, it developed at the hearing that this entity was actually a
partnership consisting of Brown Hott and Harold Miller. In the spirit of
liberality, we permitted an amendment to reflect the name of the claimant as
being ?Brown Hott and Harold Miller d/b/a Hott and Miller, a partnership.? In
1971 the Department of Highways had undertaken certain road construction in Oak
Flats in Pendleton County and as a result of this construction, it became
necessary to relocate a community water line. The claimant was an unsuccessful
bidder on the road construction but was later requested by a representative of
the Department of Highways to submit a bid for the relocation of the community
water line. The claimant submitted a bid of $4,275.00 which was approved by the
Department of Highways on April 19, 1971, Claimant?s Exhibit No. 1. The work
was performed by claimant in May and June of 1971, and the same was approved by
the Department of Highways on July 13, 1971, Claimant?s Exhibit No. 2.
Claimant was not paid its bid price of $4,275.00 until July 24, 1973, and no
explanation for the delay was given. No formal contract was entered into
between claimant and the Department of Highways, and while the record does not
so disclose, we assume that an agreement was entered into between the
Department of Highways and the owners of the community water line to the end
that the Department of Highways would defray this expense in conjunction with
the road project. This assumption is based on the fact that when the state
warrant in payment of the $4,275.00 was finally issued on July 17, 1973, it was
made payable to the individual owners of the water line who, in turn, endorsed
the same
4 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
and delivered the same to the claimant on July 24, 1973, Respondent?s Exhibit
No. 1. Claimant is requesting an award of interest on the sum of $4,275.00 for
a period of 150 days after July 13, 1971, (the date the work was approved) to
July 24, 1973, the date of ultimate payment, in accordance with Code 14-3-1.
The Legislature in creating this Court set forth our general powers in Code
14-2-12 but, in addition, explicitly limited our right to award interest on
claims which we allowed by providing in the above-mentioned section as follows:
In determining the amount of a claim, interest shall not be allowed unless the
claim is based upon a contract which specifically provides for the payment of
interest.?
Had the respondent not paid the $4,275.00 and had this claim sought an award of
that amount, we could make an award for the principal amount but could not
allow interest because of the lack of any contract specifically providing for
the payment of interest. Lacking jurisdiction to award interest, we must as a
result deny this claim.
No award.
Opinion issued July 30, 1975
ROBERT K. PRICE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
(No. D-924)
Claimant present in person.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Assistant
Attorney General for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
The claimant, Robert K. Price, an employee of the Department of Public Safety
for over thirty years was retired on August 28, 1972. At the date of retirement
he had accumulated 30 days annual leave time and 90 days sick leave time.
Respondent paid claimant for his accrued annual leave time but not any
compensation for accrued sick leave time. At the date of his retirement he was
earning a
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 5
monthly salary of $1066.00 and he thus seeks an award of $3198.00 representing
the 90 day sick leave time.
The claimant contends that he is being penalized by the respondent for being in
good health. We believe the issue unfortunately is governed by the Rules and
Regulations Governing the Working Hours, Leaves, Weekly Time Off Duty, filed by
the West Virginia Department of Public Safety on June 11, 1970.
Section 5 of the regulations specifically authorizes the payment of accrued
annual leave under the facts of this claim, said section reading as follows:
?5. A member who has resigned, or who has been discharged shall be entitled to
and shall receive all accrued annual leave, except that a member discharged for
misconduct may, at the discretion of the Superintendent, be denied all or any
part of accrued leave. .
Section 17 of the regulations relates to
Sick Leave, and it is to be noted that it does not contain a corresponding
provision authorizing the payment of accrued sick leave upon the termination of
employment. To the contrary Section 17 provides that upon termination of
employment all sick leave credited is to be canceled as of the employee?s last
working day, said section reading as follows:
?17. When the services of a member have been terminated, all sick leave
credited to him shall be cancelled as of his last working day with the
Department.?
Being of the opinion that respondent did not and does not have any statutory
authority or regulation authorizing the payment of accrued sick leave, we are
of the opinion to deny the claim.
No award.
6 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinicm issued August 28,1975
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY AS SUBROGEE
OF THELMA CRINER
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No.
D-780)
PER CURIAM:
Due to blasting operations conducted by employees of the Department of
Highways, a truck owned by Thelma Criner was damaged to the extent of $195.70
on August 2, 1973 near the Town of Amma in Roane County, West Virginia.
Liability and damages have been stipulated.
Award?$195.70.
Opinion issued August 28, 1975
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(Hopemont State Hospital)
(No. D-798a)
and
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(Pinecrest Hospital)
(No. D-798b)
Herman E. Rubin, Special Counsel, West Virginia Department of Employment
Security, for Claimants.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for Respondents. GARDEN,
JUDGE:
These claims were consolidated for hearing and opinion because, with the
exception of the amounts involved, they involve identical
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 7
factual situations. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the issues presented
are between two state agencies, this Court is rendering an advisory
determination pursuant to Code 14-2-18.
Public Law 91-373 (HR 14,705) approved and passed by Congress on August 10,
1970, cited as the Employment Security Amendments of 1970, effective January 1,
1972, made it mandatory that the states and the District of Columbia amend
their unemployment compensation laws to cover services rendered in employment
for state hospitals, and state institutions of higher education, and for
non-profit organizations exempt from payment of income tax employing four or
more individuals for some portion of a day in each of twenty weeks within the
current or preceding calendar year. With the exception of non-profit
organizations, said amendment of 1970 extended coverage to employers of one or
more individuals in contrast to the prior statute covering employers of four or
more individuals.
In compliance with that Congressional mandate, the West Virginia Legislature
amended the West Virginia Unemployment Compensation Law effective January 1,
1972, which covered employment in state hospitals and reads as follows (Chapter
21A, Article 1, Section 3, Subsection 7, of the West Virginia Code of 1931, as
amended,):
?Any employing unit which, after December thirty-one, one thousand nine hundred
seventy-one, (i) in any calendar quarter in either the current or preceding
calendar year paid for service in employment wages of one thousand five hundred
dollars or more, or (ii) for some portion of a day in each of twenty different
calendar weeks, whether or not such weeks were consecutive, in either the
current or the preceding calendar year had in employment at least one
individual (irrespective of whether the same individual was in employment in
each such day);?
and Chapter 21A, Article 1, Section 3, Subsection 9,
?(9) Service performed after December thirty-one, one
thousand nine hundred seventy-one, by an individual in the
employ of this State .
. . when such service is performed for a
hospital .
.
The West Virginia Unemployment
Compensation Law, Chapter 21A, Article 5, Section 17 of the West Virginia Code
of 1931, as amended, provides as follows:
8 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W.VA.
?Interest on past-due payments.
?Payments unpaid on the date on which due and payable, as prescribed the
commissioner, shall bear interest at the rate of one percent per month, until
payment plus accrued interest is received by the commissioner.
?Interest collected pursuant to this section shall be paid into the employment
security special administration fund.?
Hopemont State Hospital failed to pay unemployment compensation contributions
for the first and second quarters of 1972 in a total amount of $10,467.45, and
with statutory interest of one percent per month on said sum through April 21,
1975, a total of $14,047.01 was due claimant as of April 21, 1975.
Pinecrest Hospital failed to pay unemployment compensation contributions for
the first and second quarters of 1972 in a total amount of $9,490.64, and with
statutory interest of one percent per month on said sum through April 21, 1975,
a total of $12,747.42 was due claimant as of April 21, 1975.
It was developed at the hearing that the Legislature had failed to appropriate
funds for expenditure in fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, in anticipation of
unemployment taxes that became due and payable for the taxable periods from
January 1, 1972 through June 30, 1972, and consequently, the Commissioner of
Public Institutions had no funds available to make payment of these taxes. Any
attempted payment of these taxes by the Commissioner of Public Institutions
would have been illegal. This being an advisory determination, we could not
make awards even if we were so inclined. We believe that the issue in these
claims are governed by the decision of this Court in the Airkem case, 8
Ct. Cl. Rep. 180, and that these claims would be denied were it not for the
fact that this is an advisory determination. It is suggested that this matter
could be rectified by the Legislature through a special appropriation if it so
desires.
The clerk of this Court is directed to forward copies of this opinion to the
respective heads of the state agencies involved in these claims.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 9
Opinion issued September 9, 1975
BUCKEYE UNION INSURANCE CO.,
SUBROGEE OF RAYMOND L. MADDY
vs.
WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No.
D-764)
No appearance for the claimant.
Emerson Salisbury, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Claimant, as subrogee of Raymond Lee Maddy, alleges that on June 17, 1974, said
Maddy, a resident of Princeton, West Virginia and an employee of the
respondent, parked his 1970 Plymouth automobile on State property and while his
car was so parked it was subjected to paint spray by employees of the
respondent resulting in damages therefor in the sum of $207.93. The facts of
negligence and the reasonableness of the amount of damages having been
stipulated by the parties hereto, the claimant is hereby awarded the sum of
$207.93.
Award of $207.93.
Opinion issued September 9, 1975
LEWIS HUFFMAN
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-771)
Claimant appeared in person.
Emerson Salisbury, Attorney at Law, for Respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
Around 5:00 A.M. on May 17, 1974, the claimant was operating his
1974 Plymouth Satellite automobile in a westerly direction on U.S.
Route 60 about one mile west of Cedar Grove. Route 60 at this point
is a two-lane road. It is level and comparatively straight. Except for
a slight haze, the weather conditions were excellent. The terrain to
10 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W.VA
the right of a motorist proceeding in a westerly direction is mountainous, and
the claimant who was very familiar with this particular area testified that
rock slides frequently occurred near this section of the road, and that the
road had been closed a week before as a result of a large slide.
As the claimant proceeded west at a speed of about 45 miles per hour, he
testified that he observed small rocks about the size of a skillet falling from
the hillside and into the westbound lane. In order to avoid these rocks, he
swerved to the left and into the eastbound lane where he struck a large rock
which was in the center of the eastbound lane. According to the claimant, this
rock weighed about 400 pounds and was about 18 inches thick. No testimony was
presented to indicate how long this rock had been present in the road, but the
claimant did testify that he had passed an eastbound tractor-trailer about 100
feet before he struck this rock, and that he had not observed this
tractor-trailer make any unusual movements indicative that the tractor-trailer
was attempting to avoid this rock. It could therefore be assumed that this rock
had fallen into the eastbound lane between the time the tractor-trailer passed
the point of the accident and the arrival of the claimant?s vehicle. Cost of
repairs to claimant?s car amounted to $190.84, and this claim was filed to
recover that amount.
As indicated above, the claimant was well aware that rock slides occurred in
this area and that ?he had seen it happen before? to use his own words. Asked
on cross examination why he didn?t see this rock, the claimant responded, ?Just
lack of concentration. I hadn?t been out of bed that long anyway.? Again, on
cross examination, he was asked if he could have seen this rock had he been
looking, and he replied, ?Yes, if I had been looking closely.?
We are of the opinion that the evidence in this case fails to establish any
negligence on the part of the respondent. No evidence was presented to
demonstrate that the respondent knew or should have known of the presence of
this rock, and that it had sufficient time to remove the same. As a matter of
fact, the evidence would support an inference that the rock had fallen only
seconds before being struck by the claimant?s car. This claim is closely akin
factually to Lowe v. Department of Higkways, 8 Ct. Cl. 210, where this
Court stated:
?From all of the evidence in this case, it seems to the Court that this highway
cut and resultant hillside with its many layers of
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 11
rock and shale is little different from the hundreds and hundreds of other cuts
and hillsides along highways all round the State of West Virginia. The unhappy
reality of the situation is that our Department of Highways cannot guarantee
the traveling public that rocks or trees may not fall upon our highways and
thereby cause injury and damage to persons and property.?
The duty owed by respondent to the claimant in this case was also clearly set
forth in Parsons v. State Road Commission, 8 Ct. Cl. 35, where
this Court said:
?This Court has many times held that the State is not a guarantor of the safety
of its travelers on its roads and bridges. The State is not an insurer and its
duty to travelers is a qualified one, namely, reasonable care and diligence in
the maintenance of a highway under all the circumstances. The case of Adkins
v. Sims, 130 W. Va., 645, 46 S.E. (2d) 81, decided in 1947, holds that the
user of the highway travels at his own risk, and that the State does not and
cannot assure him a safe journey. The maintenance of highways is a governmental
function and funds available for road improvements are necessarily limited.?
Leaving the issue of the negligence of the respondent, we are of the further
opinion that the testimony of the claimant establishes that he was guilty of
negligence which proximately and directly caused the accident and resultant
damage to his car. He admitted that his failure to see the rock resulted from a
lack of concentration and that he would have seen it had he been looking
closely. Having observed small rocks falling in the westbound lane and thus
being aware that a slide of some magnitude was occurring, we believe that
claimant failed to act as a reasonably prudent man, and for these reasons, we
are of the opinion to deny this claim.
No award.
12 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued September 9, 1975
KENNETH S. KAYSER
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-810)
No appearance for the claimant.
Emerson Salisbury, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Kenneth S. Kayser, owner of a tract of land in Lewis County, West Virginia,
claims damages in the amount of $100.00 by reason of the acts of employees of
the respondent on July 31, 1974 in cutting a right of way for a road and
destroying claimant?s strawberry patch containing approximately 175 plants on a
parcel of his land sixteen feet wide and forty-eight feet long. The parties
have stipulated facts which constitute negligence and that the amount of
damages claimed is reasonable. The claimant is, accordingly, awarded the sum of
$100.00.
Award ?f $100.00.
Opinion issued September 9, 1975
MRS. SAMUEL KELLY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-882)
Claimant appeared in person.
Emerson Salisbury, Attorney at Law, for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
On the morning of October 30, 1974, at about 8:10 A.M., the claimant was
proceeding in a southerly direction on West Virginia Route No. 21 toward
Charleston where she was employed by the County Court of Kanawha County. In
route she was stopped by a flagman employed by the respondent. After being
detained for a
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 13
short time, she was directed by the flagman to proceed, she being the first car
in the line of stopped traffic. At that time she did not observe any road work
being conducted, and she was directed by the flagman to continue her journey in
the southbound lane. Route 21 at and near the subject area is a two-lane
roadway, one lane for northbound traffic and one lane for southbound traffic.
After proceeding some 200 to 300 feet, the claimant testified that her car?s
movements felt strange and that she thought one of her tires had become flat.
She thereupon pulled off the road and onto the berm and thereupon discovered
that her car, and in particular, the tires were covered with tar. Apparently
the respondent?s employees had been engaged in tarring this particular section
of Route 21. The claimant testified that it had been raining that morning, and
that she had been unable to visualize the fresh tar on the asphaltic surface of
the road. Claimant testified that the tar had not been applied on the
northbound lane, and that as she proceeded south in the southbound lane, she
did not observe any traffic coming north on the northbound lane. Claimant
further testified that she and her husband worked almost all day in attempting
to remove the tar from her car, and that they suffered a combined loss of
income of $36.00; that they spent $2.00 for diesel fuel for use in removing the
tar; and that clothing valued at $20.00 was ruined. The respondent offered no
evidence to dispute the testimony of the claimant.
We are of the opinion that the undisputed evidence establishes negligence on
the part of the respondent?s employee flagman. We must assume that this
employee was aware of the tarring operation taking place in the southbound lane
but failed to warn the claimant of the freshly applied tar in the southbound
lane and failed to instruct her to proceed south temporarily in the northbound
lane.
For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion to and do hold that the
claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $58.00.
Award of $58.00.
14 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued September 9,1975
MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY,
SUBROGEE OF MICHAEL E. HEITZ
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-932)
No appearance for the claimant.
Emerson Salisbury, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Maryland Casualty Company, as subrogee of Michael E. Heitz of Parkersburg, West
Virginia, alleges that said Heitz, on December 31, 1974, was traveling in a
westerly direction on State Route 50 near the town of Gormania, West Virginia,
when the automobile he was driving struck some steel tie rods protruding from
the road surface of a bridge near the intersection of Routes 50 and 560. The
tie rod extended a foot above the road surface and caught the underside of the
automobile causing damage in the amount of
$234.88.
As the verity of the allegations and the reasonableness of the amount of
damages are stipulated by the parties, and the negligence so proven, we hereby
award the claimant the sum of $134.88 which it paid, and $100.00 to Michael E.
Heitz which was not paid by the claimant because the latter amount was
deductible under the provisions of the insurance policy.
Award of $134.88 to Maryland Casualty Company.
Award of $100.00 to Michael E. Heitz.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 15
Opinion issued September 9, 1975
WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY,
SUBROGEE OF DAVID SAGO
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-859)
P. A. Rush, representative of Insurance Co., for the claimant.
Emerson Salisbury, Attorney at Law, for the Respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Claimant, as subrogee of David Sago, alleges that on the 15th of March, 1974,
while employees of the respondent were cutting brush and trees along State
Route 19 at a point on said highway near what is known as Swisher?s Barbecue,
David Sago, driving his automobile, was waved or signaled by a flagman of the
respondent to pass through the area of such cutting, and while doing so his car
was struck by a falling tree which damaged the car in the amount of $106.02.
The parties having stipulated as to verity of such facts and the reasonableness
of the amount of damages, we hereby award the claimant the sum of $106.02.
Award of $106.02.
Opinion issued September 10, 1975
MRS. HAROLD P. CLARKE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-715)
Claimant appeared in person.
Emerson Salisbury, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
JONES, JUDGE:
The claimant, Mrs. Harold P. Clarke seeks recovery of the sum of $193.17 from
the respondent, Department of Highways, for
damages to the loss of use of her 1973
Dodge automobile, resulting when she drove her car into flood waters on Guyan
River Road in
16 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
r near the City of Huntington as she was going to work at
?arboursville State Hospital at about 5:50 a.m. on November 29,
1973. The claimant was alone at the time of the incident, and she
was the only witness at the hearing.
Claimant testified that it was very dark at the time and her car lights were
on. It was not raining and she was not sure whether it had rained during the
night, although the road was clear when she returned home from work the night
before. She testified that she did not see the water on the road and ran into
it to the depth of three feet.
Her car choked and stopped, but thanks to a ?miracle? she was able to start the
car and back it out of the water. She then turned her car around and drove it
home. Maj or replacements and repairs to the vehicle include installation of a
new windshield wiper motor at a cost of $50.11 and a new starter for $77.00.
She also presented an invoice for one week?s car rental in the amount of
$51.81.
It is the contention of claimant that respondent should have provided flagmen
at the flood area or that the area should have been marked with flares or other
warnings of danger. However, there is nothing in the record to show when the
water crossed the road or when, if at all, the respondent had notice of the
flooding. The claimant had been traveling this road for about fourteen years
and she was well aware of the occasional flooding of the area.
There is considerable question as to whether the respondent is guilty of any
negligence whatever in this case. As this Court has consistently held the State
is not an insurer, and its duty to travelers is one only of reasonable care and
diligence in the maintenance of a highway under all the circumstances.
Furthermore, evidence of any causal connection between the flood water and the
alleged damages to the claimant?s car is unsatisfactory. However, the
aforementioned issues need not be finally resolved, as in the Court?s opinion
the claimant is barred from recovery by her own negligence.
If claimant?s car had been under proper control, as the law requires; if she
had seen, what in the careful operation of her vehicle, she should have seen;
and even thereafter if she had not carelessly continued into the flood water to
the depth of three feet, no damage would have occurred. Either her car was not
under proper control, or she assumed the risk of injury by proceeding through
the waters to a hazardous depth. Accordingly, we
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 17
conclude that the claimant?s damages are the proximate result of her own acts
and omissions, and her claim is disallowed.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued September 10, 1975
PATRICIA G. MCFANN
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-909)
PER CURIAM:
The Court has examined the stipulation of liability, injury and damages in this
case and pursuant thereto finds that the respondent, Department of Highways, is
liable to the claimant, Patricia G. McFann, in the amount of sixtyone dollars
and fourteen cents ($61.14).
Award of $61.14.
Opinion issued September 10,1975
SKI SOUTH MAGAZINE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
(No. D-903)
Claimant appeared through its
President, James Richard Wells. Henry
C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General,
for respondent.
JONES, JUDGE:
The Travel Division of the respondent, Department of Commerce, through its
regularly retained Publicity Agent, Robert Goodman Agency of Baltimore,
Maryland, contracted for the publication of two-page centerfold ?SKI CANAAN
VALLEY? advertisements in the January and February, 1973, issues
of the claimant Ski South Magazine at a price of $679.50 for each publication.
18 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Confusion developed in the billing process and only the invoice for the January
issue was paid before the expiration of funds for the fiscal year 1972-73. The
invoice for the February publication in the amount of $679.50 was submitted
under date of March 1, 1973, and funds were available for payment. However, the
invoice was disregarded in the belief that it had been paid, and when the
confusion was cleared, the fiscal year had expired and payment could not be made.
The claimant?s proof of its claim is not contradicted; and the
Court is of opinion that the amount claimed is due and owing.
Therefore, the claim of Ski South Magazine in the amount of
$679.50 is hereby allowed.
Award of $679.50.
Opinion issued September 10, 1975
CLYDE SPEER and MILDRED SPEER
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-906)
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to stipulation, the claim of Clyde Speer and Mildred Speer against
Department of Highways for blasting damage to the claimants? house in the amount
of three hundred twenty-eight dollars and sixty cents ($328.60) is hereby
allowed,
Award?$328.60.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 19
Opinion issued September 18,1975
W. VA. STATE INDUSTRIES
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
(Huntington State Hospital)
(No. D-876a)
and
W. VA. STATE INDUSTRIES
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTh
(Spencer State Hospital)
(No. D-876b)
Claimant appeared through its business manager, Kenny Hinds. Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for respondent
GARDEN, JUDGE:
These claims were heard on a consolidated basis because they involved factual
situations that were almost identical. The claimant in each of these claims is
an entity established pursuant to Chapter 28, Article SB, of the Official Code
of West Virginia of 1931, as amended, the ?Prison-Made Goods Act of 1939.?
This organization?s primary purpose is to afford prisoners at the state prison
in Moundsville with some means of occupying their time. At the prison the
claimant organization produces clothing, license plates, paint, road signs,
etc. and it also purchases tobacco in bulk and re-packages the same for
re-sale. The claimant then sells these products to other state agencies.
In respect to Claim No. D-876a, in January, 1970, the respondent by purchase
order ordered a quantity of smoking tobacco from claimant for delivery to the
Huntington State Hospital. This tobacco was shipped at intervals, the final
shipment being made in September of 1970, and claimant then on September 22,
1970 invoiced Huntington State Hospital for $1,268.50. Although the delivery of
the tobacco and the invoice price were not disputed, the claimant?s invoice was
not paid.
20 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
In Claim No. D-876b, the respondent purchased both paint and tobacco from the
claimant for delivery to the Spencer State Hospital. These items were ordered
and shipped in June of 1970, and claimant invoiced Spencer State Hospital under
date of June 30, 1970 for a total amount of $1,039.40 but has never received
payment. Here again, no dispute arose as to the delivery or the invoice price.
No evidence was presented at the hearing to establish whether there were
sufficient funds appropriated from which these invoices could have been paid
during fiscal year ending June 30, 1970. However, the Deputy Attorney General
subsequent to the hearing filed a memorandum with this Court clearly indicating
that there were funds available in both the account of Huntington State
Hospital and the account of Spencer State Hospital from which these claims
could have been paid. Consequently, these are not claims which would have
involved an over expenditure had they been paid. This is simply a case where
the appropriated funds expired before the invoices reached the proper hands for
payment.
We further believe that these claims should have been filed by the Commissioner
of Public Institutions rather than by an entity within that State agency.
However, we are treating these claims as requests for advisory determinations
pursuant to Code 14-2-18 and thus we will make no formal award; however, we are
of the opinion that there are legal claims against the respondent in the
respective amounts of $1,268.50 and $1,039.40, and we recommend that the claims
be paid.
The Clerk of this Court shall transmit copies of this Opinion to the proper
parties within the Department of Public Institutions and Department of Mental
Health.
W. VA.]
REPORTS STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 21
Opinion issued September 19, 1975
ASSOCIATED DRY GOODS
D/B/A THE DIAMOND DEPARTMENT STORE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
(No. D-991)
No appearance on behalf of claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for respondent. GARDEN, JUDGE:
This claim was submitted on the pleadings which consisted of the claimant?s
Notice of Claim and the respondent?s Answer and Amended Answer, the latter of
which admits the issues of liability and damages.
It would appear from the pleadings that on February 17, 1975, two
representatives of the West Virginia Department of Public Safety stopped the
claimant?s tractor trailer and used it to establish a roadblock in order
to capture two thieves fleeing south in a stolen car on Interstate 77 in
Kanawha County. As a result of the roadblock, the stolen car crashed into claimant?s
tractor trailer causing damages admitted to be in the amount of $441.96. The
Notice of Claim also requests interest on the amount of damages in the sum of
$14.09.
While we are prohibited from awarding interest on this claim by Code 14-2-12,
we are of opinion that the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of
the actual damages to its tractor trailer in the sum of $441.96.
Award of $441.96.
22 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued September 19,1975
J. J. ENGLERT COMPANY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(No. D-917)
Claimant appeared through its President, Raymond
J. Englert. Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy
Attorney General, for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
Sometime prior to May 15, 1974, the respondent entered into a contract with the
Commissioner of Public Institutions whereby the former was to perform certain
window replacement work and glazing at the West Virginia Penitentiary at
Moundsville, a project involving a total contract price of $116,688.00. On May
15, 1974, the claimant submitted its Estimate No. 6 in the amount of $5,834.40,
representing the balance due on the contract. For some reason, not apparent on
the face of the record, this estimate was not approved by the respondent?s
architect, Henry Elden & Associates, until October 24, 1974, well beyond
the close of fiscal year 1973-74.
At the hearing counsel for respondent admitted that the work had been performed
by claimant in a satisfactory manner, and that sufficient funds were available
in the respondent?s appropriation during fiscal year 1973-74 from which
Estimate No. 6 could have been paid. The problem arose when the estimate was
not presented to the respondent until subsequent to October 24, 1974, the date
when the same was approved by respondent?s architect. Unfortunately, by this
time, the prior available funds had been expired by operation of law.
Subsequent to the hearing, the claimant, by counsel, submitted additional
claims in the form of a claim for interest on the unpaid amount as reflected on
Estimate No. 6 from May 15, 1974, until paid, and a claim for reinbursement of
expenses incurred by Raymond J. Englert in attending the hearing in Charleston
on July 30, 1975 in a total amount of $108.35. In respect to the claim for
interest, Code 14-2-12 prohibits us from making such an award unless the claim
is based on a contract which specifically provides for the payment of interest,
and the contract in this case makes no such provision. We are also of the
opinion that the claim for expenses incurred in attending the hearing cannot be
allowed.
W. VA.]
REPORTS STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 23
These expenses, much like attorney?s
fees, must in cases such as this, be treated as an unfortunate expense of
litigation and must be borne by the party incurring them.
On the other hand, we believe the claimant has clearly established its right to
recover the remaining balance due on the contract in the amount of $5,834.40,
and that equity and good conscience dictates that the same should be paid.
Award of $5,834.40.
Opinion issued September 19,1975
RICHARD D. KITCHING
vs.
DIVISION OF VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION
(No. D-971)
No appearance on behalf of claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for respondent. GARDEN, JUDGE:
This claim has been submitted for decision on the pleadings filed which consist
of the claimant?s Notice of Claim and the respondent?s Answer and Amended
Answer.
It appears from the Amended Answer that the claimant?s services were requested
by the respondent, that the services were rendered and the charges in the total
amount of $405.00 were reasonable and that there were sufficient funds in the
respondent?s appropriation at the close of fiscal year 1973-74 from which the
claim could have been paid at the end of such fiscal year.
Based on the foregoing, an award in the amount of $405.00 in favor of the
claimant is hereby made.
Award of $405.00.
24 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued October 6, 1975
ROY E. BRASSFIELD, JR.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-970)
PER CURIAM:
This claim was submitted for decision upon a written stipulation of fact which
revealed that the claimant on May 16, 1975, was operating his automobile on
West Virginia Route 65 in Logan County, West Virginia, near the Town of Holden,
when it struck a hole in the paved portion of the highway. The stipulation
further reveals that the claimant was a resident of Kanawha County, West
Virginia, and had not regularly travelled this section of the highway and had
not travelled the same for several months prior to the date of his accident.
The hole which was struck was in or just beyond a curve in the highway, and
that at the time of the accident, it was dark and the hole was hidden by water
with no warning signs or markers of any kind notifying the public of the
existence of the hole. Most importantly, the stipulation further sets forth the
fact that the respondent had prior notice of the existence of the hole but did
not repair the same until subsequent to the claimant?s accident. Damages in the
amount of $69.21 were sustained as a result of claimant?s automobile striking
this hole.
We conclude on the basis of the stipulation, that liability does exist and that
the damages claimed are reasonable.
Award?$69.21.
W. VA.) REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 25
Opinion issued October 6, 1975
THE CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC
TELEPHONE COMPANY OF WEST VIRGINIA
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-674)
Robert D. Lynd, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Dewey Jones, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
DUCKER, JUDGE:
The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of West Virginia claims damages in
the amount of $3,856.86 allegedly caused by the West Virginia Department of
Highways through its contractor, Bayless & Ramey, Inc., in the work of the
latter in the installation of traffic control signals at the intersection of
U.S. Route 60 and Smith Street in the town of Milton, Cabell County, West
Virginia. The contractor proceeded with its work without knowledge of the
underground cable conduits of the claimant and in doing so bored through one of
the telephone wire cables, necessitating repairs which cost the amount alleged.
On March 14, 1957 the claimant made application to the respondent pursuant to
Section 6, Article 15, Chapter 17 of the Code of West Virginia, for a permit to
enter upon and under U.S. Route 60 at said place for the purpose of placing
underground conduits beginning at the southwest corner of Pike Street and
continuing in an easterly direction along Route 60 for a distance of
approximately 707 feet, and on March 26, 1957 the application was approved in
behalf of respondent by the District Engineer of District Two. Prior to October
9, 1971 the firm of Bayless & Ramey, Inc., electrical contractors, was
awarded a contract by respondent to install traffic signal control devices
along the same portion of Route 60 as claimant had earlier placed its
underground conduits.
The contractor was provided by respondent with a construction plan or print
covering the construction which, although appearing to be sufficiently complete
for the purpose, contained no reference to or information about the claimant?s
conduits at that place. So without knowledge of the existence of the conduits,
one of claimant?s cables in the conduit was cut by the contra?tQr in the progress
of his work.
26 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Respondent does not deny the facts alleged and proven by claimant except to say
claimant?s manhole was adequately marked, and to say it has nothing in its
files in regard to the permit issued to claimant or in regard to the existence
of the conduits. The claimant filed complete copies of its application, permit
and drawing accompanying the application and permit, showing exactly where the
conduits were to be placed, and proved that the conduits were placed in
accordance with the permit. Evidently the respondent had lost or misplaced its
records as to the permit and the conduits.
The respondent first moved to dismiss this claim on two grounds, namely, first,
that the facts do not show a breach of duty on the part of the respondent, and
secondly, that according to Regulation No. 9 of the respondent in respect to
the permit issued by the respondent to an applicant and under the provisions of
Paragraphs Nos. 5 and 10 of the permit, the claimant has waived any right to
damages, said Regulation No. 9 and paragraphs 5 and 10 being in the following
language:
?9. It is understood and agreed that the issuance of a permit under these or
any other regulations to any applicant therefor does not, in any event, impose
upon the State Road Commission any responsibility or liability for damages
which may be incurred by the applicant by reason of the location of the pole
lines within the right of way limits of the state road, whether such damages
may be the result of injury to the line caused by passage of State Road
Commission equipment thereunder or otherwise.?
?5. The State Road Commission will not assume any liability for damage to the
proposed work by reason of construction or maintenance work on the road in
question.?
?10. The applicant, his heirs or assigns, shall repair, in a manner
satisfactory to the Commission or its duly authorized agents, all damage done
to the State Roads by reason of the work authorized by the permit, and all
damage that may result therefrom and agrees to save the State Road Commission
harmless from any damage or recourse whatsoever arising from the permission
granted under this permit.?
We are of the opinion that the provisions of Regulation No. 9 are intended to
eliminate any responsibility or liability on the part of the respondent for
damages which the applicant may suffer from traffic or road equipment passing
on the right of way over the
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CIAIMS 27
conduit line, and not for damages of the nature here involved, and that
Paragraphs 5 and 10 of the permit are intended to release the respondent only
from liability for damages which the claimant itself might cause to the road by
reason of claimant?s own work. Furthermore, the provisions of paragraph 10 to
save the respondent harmless from any damage or recourse whatsoever arising
from the permission granted under this permit is so self-serving in its attempt
to release the respondent from its own negligence or the negligence of its
agents as to be contrary to public policy and, therefore, invalid. For these
reasons the motion of respondent to dismiss the claim and for this Court to
enter a summary judgment in its favor was and is denied; and the consideration
of the claim is now heard upon its merits.
Respondent contends the manhole into which the damaged conduit entered was not
sufficiently marked to indicate its location to the contractor and that
consequently the claimant was guilty of contributory negligence. Witnesses for
the claimant testified that the manhole cover had lettering of the utility?s
initials on it, although how clearly the cover was visible is not clear. We are
of the opinion that regardless of any positive evidence as to that question,
the respondent gave the claimant ample authority to place its conduit in the
right of way according to the plan and design contained in the application and
permit.
Considerable testimony was taken as to the distance from the line of the
conduit from the southern boundary of a brick building located on the northeast
corner of U.S. Route 60 and Smith Street and as to the distance from the line
of said building to the right of way line of Route 60. The proof was that the
first distance was 19?3? and the second 3? or 4?, all of which showed that the
conduit line was within the right of way and wholly in accordance with the
print or plan which was made a part of the application made by claimant and the
permit granted to it by the respondent.
We are of the opinion that the claimant had the right under the permit to have
and maintain its telephone and conduit lines located in the Route 60 right of
way and that it was not guilty of contributory negligence, that it was the duty
of the respondent to notify its contractor of the existence of the conduit and
lines, that the lack of records on the part of the respondent is the latter?s
own fault and is no defense to this claim, and that the claimant is entitled to
recover for the damages done by respondent?s agent, and we, therefore, award
the claimant the sum of $3,856.86.
Award of $3,856.86.
28 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued October
6, 1975
RONALD L. COOK
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION
(No. D-702)
Warren McGraw, Attorney at Law for the Claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Assistant Attorney General for the Respondent.
DUCKER, JUDGE:
Ronald L. Cook, of Oceana, Wyoming County, West Virginia, claims damages in the
amount of $4375.00 against the West Virginia Department of Finance and
Administration on account of the latter?s failure to pay rent for eighteen
sites or spaces in the claimant?s mobile homes park at Oceana.
On March 9, 1972, Hoy G. Shingleton, Jr. and Thomas L. Craig, Jr. contacted
claimant by phone and arranged a meeting with claimant in Man, West Virginia,
for the purpose of securing mobile home spaces in Oceana for victims of the
Buffalo flood disaster, which had just previously thereto occurred. The meeting
of the claimant with said Shingleton and Craig took place as arranged and the
latter, acting as agents of the respondent, inquired of claimant as to the
latter?s park and if claimant would lease the park to the State, whereupon they
were told by claimant that he had ten spaces already available and shortly
thereafter would have eighteen more available, and that he would lease them all
to the State for a year at $25 per month per space. The claimant was then given
a letter which read as follows:
3/10/7 2
Mr. Ronald Cook:
I agree to lease in the name of the State of West Virginia, twenty-eight mobile
home sites in Pine Acres Park in Oceana, W.Va., upon completion of all
necessary installations of utilities and other services.
I agree to lease 10 spaces which are presently available, and the other 18
spaces upon completion, which should be within 30 days.
W. VA.) REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 29
All spaces shall be leased at $25 per space.
Hoy Shingleton
Thomas L. Craig, Jr.
The respondent immediately took possession of the ten spaces and claimant
proceeded to complete grading and arranging for utilities on the remaining
eighteen spaces. A formal contract for the first ten spaces at $250 per month
dated March 10, 1972 was signed by both Lessors, Ronald L. Cook and Betty A.
Cook, and the State of West Virginia as Lessee, and approved by the Attorney
General on March 21, 1972, but no reference was made therein as to the
additional eighteen spaces. At the expiration of the one year period the
agreement was renewed for a second year as to the ten spaces and the rental
paid, and the claim here does not involve the first ten spaces.
Claimant contends that he made it clear to respondent?s agents, Shingleton and
Craig, that in order to complete the work on the eighteen spaces he would need
funds to finance the work and in order to obtain money he would have to have
written assurance about the deal; Shingleton and Craig then gave claimant the
letter herein before shown.
Claimant testified that he immediately borrowed from the Castle Rock Bank in
Pineville $6,000 to complete the work, and that within a three week period he had
the additional eighteen spaces ready, and he then advised the agents of such
fact, but two days later he was told that due to cancellations of people who
had applied for sites the respondent was not going to need the spaces. The
respondent did not confirm by formal agreement the leasing of the eighteen
additional spaces or give claimant any formal revocation of the purported
agreement.
The evidence of the respondent consisted only of the testimony of one witness,
Joseph Edwin Neil, a program design specialist for the Office of Federal State
Relations, an employee of the State, and who was assisting in getting relief
for victims of the Buffalo flood disaster. He testified that he visited.the
park on April 1, 1972, and had to walk through mud and water around the homes,
two to six inches deep in some places, that some of the tenants had complained
about the water and that a drainage ditch did not drain the water off. He said
the same situation prevailed at the time of a second visit at the end of April
and a third visit in the middle of May. He said that Cook indicated he would do
something about the
30 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
condition but nothing was done. The Court does not consider this evidence
sufficient to eliminate a contractual liability, if there was one, and such
question of liability is the real issue involved in this case, even though such
evidence may have some feeble semblance of supporting the right of the
respondent to refuse to proceed further with a formal consummation of the
agreement as to the additional eighteen spaces.
The real question for decision then is that of the validity of the agreement
alleged by claimant to have been made by claimant with the respondent. If there
was no valid agreement, then attempts to revoke it were not necessary. If there
was a valid contract, evidence to the effect that the respondent no longer
needed the eighteen spaces and gave notice to the claimant of such fact does
not, in our opinion, create for respondent a legal basis for cancellation of
the purported agreement.
The agreement of the two agents of the respondent with the claimant is not in
the form required by law, and it may be difficult to understand why claimant,
when he signed the formal agreement as to the first ten spaces, did not then or
shortly thereafter demand a similar formal contract as to the remaining
eighteen spaces. However, it should be remembered that claimant is not a lawyer
and could not be expected to be aware fully of the legal requirements necessary
to make a perfectly formal contract with the State. Here we have two of
respondent?s agents, one of them, Shingleton, admittedly being the leasing
agent of the respondent, giving claimant a written memorandum covering all
twenty-eight spaces when told by claimant that the latter needed some proof of
agreement in order to enable claimant to borrow money for the completion of all
of the spaces. So when claimant?s work under the agreement was completed,
claimant had eighteen spaces left which he could not rent and so suffered the
loss of rent on all the spaces he could not otherwise lease. The claimant made
the spaces available to respondent and the latter was thus unjustly enriched at
claimant?s expense.
The Court cannot absolve the State of liability from a contract which its
agents made without compliance with the letter of the law where a private
citizen has been injured by the agents? actions in behalf of the State,
especially when there has been no question, except technically, as to the
agents? authority.
Accordingly we are of the opinion to, and do hereby award the claimant the sum
of $4,375.00.
Award of $4,375.00.
W.VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 31
Opinion issued October 6, 1975
LARRY JAMES
vs.
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
AND
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
(No. D-785)
Thomas Myles, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the respondent.
DUCKER, JUDGE:
In May 1970 pursuant to a proclamation of the Governor establishing a program
designed as ?The West Virginia Rolling River Campaign and Celebration?, the
respondent sent to a designated Chairman in each County a brochure for the
purpose of the celebration and for the paying of statewide tribute to workers
in the campaign and to ?establish a scholarship for high school students
pursuing conservation careers?. Larry James of Oak Hill, Fayette County, West
Virginia, now claims that pursuant to the representations made in the brochure
and by the respondent he performed services in response to and in accordance
with the brochure and that he is now entitled to a scholarship in a State
college or compensation for the time he worked on the project in the amount of
$2300.00.
The evidence is that about three months before the end of the school year in
the Spring of 1970 and when claimant was a Junior in the high school in Fayette
County, the brochures were handed out to the students and about twenty of the
students, including claimant, applied for service in the project. They were
advised to see the Project Chairman in the County, Harry Marshall, who was also
a Probation Officer of the Circuit Court. All of the twenty students, except
the claimant and one Keith Smith, dropped out of the project, with only James
continuing his work thereon for over a year.
Claimant testified that he and Keith Smith drew up plans for the reclamation of
a strip mining area by eliminating water flooding through an old mine air
shaft, which had caused soil washout and erosion in the Minden area in the
County. The plans which the
32 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
claimant made were submitted to the respondent, the Department of Natural
Resources, and though claimant was never notified that the plans had been
accepted, apparently the plans were adopted, as the work was later done on the
reclamation strip in accordance with the plans.
From the testimony, while not specific as to time, it would appear that the
claimant started immediately at work on the project but was unable to get
specific information or direction from the Governor?s Office or the
respondent?s office or officers as to any details of the program or the
scholarships. Some of the testimony indicated that the project had been
abandoned and that no one wanted to take any responsibility for the brochures
or the work of any student. Claimant testified that he made numerous trips to
the Capitol to see about his claim but to no avail. There is no evidence which
indicates that the claimant was ever notified of a termination of the project
or that claimant should cease to pursue or perform further work on the project.
Unquestionably the respondent completely abandoned the project outlined in its
brochure, but the claimant in good faith relied upon the brochure and expended
his time and effort to perform, and his work was impliedly accepted.
As is so often the case in dealings of citizens with public authorities, the
strictness and clearness of contractual relations do not exist and we feel it
necessary in order to do justice that we should be liberal in interpreting the
acts of individuals in such dealings. In view of all the facts, we are of the
opinion that to disallow this claim would be to approve unfair conduct on the
part of State officers.
Inasmuch as the nature and kind of scholarship was too vague and uncertain,
compensation to claimant can only be made on the basis of monetary compensation
for the work done and therefore, on a quantum meruit basis we hereby award the
claimant the sum of $1500.00.
Award of $1500.00.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 33
Opinion issued October
6, 1975
PAUL G. NOHE & JUNE D. NOHE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-968)
PER CURIAM:
On or about August 13, 1974, respondent as a result of spraying its
right-of-way adjacent to claimants? property with a chemical known as HY-VOR XL
destroyed considerable vegetation in claimants? meadow and pasture. Respondent
by stipulation has admitted liability, and damages have been agreed to in the
amount of $100.00.
Award of $100.00.
Opinion issued October 6, 1975
MYRTLE WEBB
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-696)
Jerry W. Cook, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. DUCKER, JUDGE:
In December 1971, the respondent was engaged in the construction of what was
designated as ?Corridor G?, in Boone County, West Virginia, the work being done
by the W. & H. Contracting Company under contract with the respondent.
Right of way over claimant?s property had been obtained and paid for by the
respondent, but the procurement of an access road for claimant was the
obligation of the contractor. In order to enable the claimant to receive her
mail, her mail box was moved from time to time along the construction work of
the principal highway, and on December 18, 1971 claimant, in returning from her
mail box then erected in the corridor right of way at or about the junction of
her access road, stepped and fell on some wet slate which had been
34 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
placed to fill up a muddy surface in the way to the mail box. Claimant alleges
she suffered injuries to her back and here seeks damages in the sum of $25,000
from the respondent. By way of compromise with the contractor and the latter?s
release from liability she received $1500.00.
The evidence consists only of the testimony of claimant herself and of Charles
M. Shady who was Project Supervisor for the respondent in connection with the
construction work. The total medical expenses of claimant were stipulated by
the parties as $179.50. The injuries which claimant alleged she suffered were
to her dorsal vertebra T-2 requiring a back brace which she said she must
continue to wear.
The witness Shady testified that claimant had to traverse the access road to go
to her mail box which was in the right of way of the main road; that when he
found the access road in bad condition he instructed the contractor to repair
it. It was evidently in response to this that the shale was placed to offset
mud near where claimant fell.
Claimant says that about eleven o?clock of the morning of December 18, 1971 she
went to the mail box to pick up her mail, describing the situation as follows:
?as I came back down a high bank which they had put in gray slate, down I
went?; ?the slate hadn?t been there too long but it had been a mud hole till
you couldn?t get in and out over the bank at all?; and that ?was why the slate
was put in?.
The issues in this case appear to be, first whether there was a breach of duty
on the part of the respondent, and secondly, whether there was contributory
negligence on the part of the claimant.
There may have been some duty on the part of the respondent through its
contractor to provide some access by claimant to her mail box, but more than
some reasonable passage way could not be expected under the circumstances of
construction. The contractor attempted to relieve the muddy condition by
placing gray slate on the route to the mall box and it can reasonably be said
was all that should have been expected. It is, therefore, very doubtful in the
minds of the Court whether any negligence creating liability has been
established.
As to the conduct of the claimant who testified she had been over to the mall
box, evidently by the same route, and was returning
W. VA.]
REPORTS STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 35
over the slate covered path, it is
clear that she had seen the condition of the way and admittedly knew blue slate
was slippery. We are of the opinion that her own negligence proximately caused
her accident and bars recovery. Accordingly, we make no award.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued October 6, 1975
HERSHEL RAY WILEY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-781)
PER CURIAM:
The respondent while performing maintenance work on Local Service Route 83 in
Whittaker, West Virginia, between January and July of 1974, damaged the
claimant?s property including a portion thereof where the claimant had planted
a substantial garden. The respondent has stipulated liability and damages of
$300.00, all of which we deem to be proper.
Award of $300.00.
Opinion issued October 7, 1975
JAMES R. CLOWSER
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
(No. D-913)
Claimant appeared in person.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for respondent. JONES, JUDGE:
Pursuant to the provisions of House Bill No. 1187, Acts of the
Legislature of West Virginia, Regular Session 1973, effective July 1,
1973, certain pay raises to State employees for the fiscal year
1973-74 were authorized. Guidelines also were established by the
36 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Bill requiring that no increase in the salary of any app ointive State officer
should be paid until and unless every full-time employee employed in such
appointive State officer?s Department was paid at an annual rate of $4,200.00
or more, and that every full-time employee receiving compensation of less than
$10,000.00 annually was paid at a rate of 105% of the rate of compensation such
employee was paid on June 30, 1972.
The respondent did not have available sufficient funds to grant all of the
required salary increases at the same time, so the increases were put into
effect throughout the fiscal year, effective July 1, 1973, or retroactively to
that date, giving attention first to the employees receiving less than
$4,200.00 annually, then to those receiving less than $10,000.00 annually, and
lastly attention was given to those whose annual salaries were over $10,000.00.
Dr. Mildred Bateman, Director of the Department of Mental Health, who was to
receive a specific statutory salary increase of $2,500.00 per year, and the
claimant, James R. Clowser, Deputy Director of Mental Health, delayed the
processing of their salary raises until it was certain that budgeted funds
would be available at the end of the fiscal year. Having sufficient funds on
hand for the purpose, the raises of Dr. Bateman in the amount of $2,500.00 and
the claimant in the amount of $1,020.00, bringing his annual salary to
$21,900.00, in accordance with the Department?s Expenditure Schedule of
budgeted funds for personal services, were requisitioned on July 25, 1974,
funds were duly encumbered and payments made on July
30, 1974, all within the 30 day grace period provided by law. Thereafter, or so
it appears from statements of witnesses in this case, the Legislative Joint
Committee on Government and Finance questioned the legality of both of these
retroactive salary payments and urged that the respective sums be refunded to
the State until some legal determination could be made. Pursuant to the
Committee?s request, both Dr. Bateman and the claimant did refund the entire
sums received by them and filed claims for recovery in this Court.
In an opinion of this Court issued on February 6, 1975, based on the petition
of Dr. Bateman and the answer of the Department of Mental Health by its
counsel, the Attorney General of West Virginia, admitting the allegations of
the petition, Dr. Bateman was awarded the full amount of her claim in the sum
of $2,500.00.
It is our belief that the clear intention of the Legislature was that the
several Departments of State Government involved in the pay
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 37
increases were to proceed exactly in the manner prescribed and followed by the
Director and Deputy Director of the respondent, giving attention first to those
in the greatest need, and leaving the very top echelon until last. We can only
assume that all employees of the department were given raises in accordance
with the spirit and letter of House Bill No. 1187, and it certainly was not
intended that the claimant be the only person excluded from the benefits of the
Act. Therefore, we hold that the sum of $1,020.00 was due and owing from the
respondent to the claimant at the end of the 1973-74 fiscal year and was
properly payable to him at any time during the first thirty days of the month
of July, 1974, pursuant to Code
12-3-12.
Accordingly, an award in the amount of $1,020.00 is hereby made to the
claimant, James R. Clowser.
Award of $1,020.00.
Opinion issued October 7, 1975
HELEN CREMEANS
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-980)
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to stipulation, Helen Cremeans is substituted as claimant in place of
her husband, Troy E. Cremeans, an employee of the respondent, Department of
Highways, and the claimant is awarded the sum of $391.45 for damages to her
truck by a fire negligently caused by respondent?s employees at the
Barboursville Maintenance Garage.
Award of $391.45.
38 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued October 7, 1975
DANIEL CROCKETT?
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-790)
Claimant appeared in person.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. JONES, JUDGE:
On July 18, 1974, at about 8:00 a.m., the claimant, Daniel Crockett, was
driving his 1971 Gremlin automobile west on Charles Avenue, near the City of
Dunbar. A stretch of the road, approximately 60 feet in length, was in very bad
condition, having been subjected to heavy truck traffic. The State-maintained
old concrete road had been covered by layers of asphalt, and both the concrete
and asphalt were broken and intermingled. The claimant was aware of the rough
condition of the road, as he had travelled it on numerous occasions. He
testified that he ?had to bob and weave to avoid the major holes?, but said he
was used to driving on bad roads and anticipated no difficulty as he proceeded
at a slow rate of speed. Suddenly the claimant?s car was impaled on a concrete
slab and he was thrown against the windshield. The car would not move forward
and claimant, having suffered only minor bruises, left the car and telephoned
the State Police. Trooper David L. Adkins came promptly to the scene, and made
an investigation.
As a witness called by the claimant, Trooper Adkins testified that he found the
claimant?s car in the westbound lane and that it could not be moved forward,
but was backed off of the obstruction and moved out of the way of traffic. He
examined the slab of concrete on which the car had stuck and found that ?it did
stick up approximately five, six, possibly eight inches?, that it was loose,
and that when he placed his weight on one end of the slab, the other end would
rise, giving credence to his estimate that the weight of the claimant?s car
upon one end of the slab would cause the other end to rise as much as 10 to 12
inches.
While there is no evidence that the respondent had specific notice of the
dangerous condition, the road had been breaking up and deteriorating for a
considerable period of time and the condition had been worsening rapidly in the
weeks prior to the
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 39
collision, due to extremely heavy loads carried by trucks over this stretch of
road. The Court is not unmindful of its repeated adherence to the holding that
the State is not an insurer of the safety of travellers on its roads and that
its only duty is reasonable care and diligence under all the circumstances.
However, we feel that the circumstances of this case are unusual, that the
condition which developed should have been anticipated by the respondent, and
that its failure to investigate the breakup of the concrete base and the
dislodgment of portions thereof constitutes negligence. On the other hand, in
view of the hidden nature of the dangerous condition, we find that the claimant
could not reasonably be expected to have anticipated or to have recognized the
danger and was not guilty of contributory negligence as charged by the
respondent.
Accordingly, the Court holds that the claimant is entitled to recover, and as
the damages to the windshield and undercarriage of the car are not contested,
we hereby award the claimant, Daniel Crockett, the sum of $257.96, the amount
sought by the claimant and supported by the evidence.
Award of $257.96.
Opinion issued October 7, 1975
LARRY W. LOHAN & PAMELA LOHAN
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-910)
Claimants appeared in person.
Emerson Salisbury, Attorney at Law, for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
At about 10:30 P.M. on the evening of December 28, 1974, the claimant, Larry W.
Lohan, was operating his 1973 Lemans Sport Coupe in a westerly direction on
U.S. Route 60 just east of Charleston in the vicinity of the Daniel Boone
Roadside Park. Route 60, in this area, was a four-lane highway, two lanes being
reserved for westbound vehicles. The claimant testified that the weather was
clear and that he was travelling at a speed of about 35 miles per hour when his
left front wheel suddenly struck a hole in
40 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
the asphalt highway. Claimant fuither testified that this hole was near the
dividing line between the two westbound lanes and was approximately three feet
long, six inches wide and seven to nine inches deep.
The claimant was accompanied by his wife and two children, and they were
returning to their home in Charleston after visiting his parents. He testified
that he was very familiar with this area of the highway, and although he had
been over this road about one week previously, he had not observed this hole.
The impact damaged his left front wheel beyond repair, and he submitted
competitive estimates of $38.37 and $54.48 for its replacement.
Nothing is more exasperating to an operator of a motor vehicle than to suddenly
strike an unobserved hole in a highway, particularly when its presence is
entirely unanticipated. Occurences such as described in the evidence, must
repeat themselves thousands of times during the winter and spring months in the
State of West Virginia. On the other hand, it must be realized that it is not
humanly possible for the respondent to insure the motoring public of highways
free from holes or other defects, when you consider the thousands of miles of
roads in this State that they are charged with the duty of maintaining.
While the respondent is not an insurer of those using its highways, it does owe
a duty of exercising reasonable care and diligence in the maintenance of the
highways. We further believe that if the respondent knows or should have known
of a defect in the highway that it must take the necessary steps within a
reasonable period of time to repair the defect.
This accident took place at night, and the claimant had no prior knowledge of
its existence. U.S. Route 60 just east of Charleston is one of the most heavily
travelled highways in this State, and we believe deserves more attention from a
maintenance standpoint than possibly some secondary roads in more remote areas.
Obviously a hole three feet long, six inches wide and seven to nine inches deep
did not develop over night and must have been in existence for some time prior
to claimant?s accident.
Believing the respondent should have discovered this hole and made the
necessary repairs, and further believing that the claiMant was free from
contributory negligence, we are of opinion to award claimant the amount of his
low estimate of repairs.
Award of $38.37.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 41
Opinion issued October 7, 1975
PFIZER, INC.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
(No. D-956)
PER CURIAM:
Upon consideration of the petition and answer filed in this case, it appears
that the goods described in the Notice of Claim were ordered by and delivered
to Weston State Hospital; that the charge therefor in the amount of $473.23 is
reasonable and proper; that the respondent had sufficient funds on hand at the
close of the fiscal year from which said account could have been paid, but
through inadvertence it was not paid and funds for the fiscal year expired.
Accordingly, the Court awards the sum of $473.23 to the claimant, Pfizer, Inc.
Award of $473.23.
Opinion issued October 9, 1975
DRS. BUTLER, ACETO & ASSOC., INC.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(No. D-969)
PER CURIAM:
The foregoing claim is disallowed for the reasons set forth in the
Opinion of this Court heretofore filed in deciding the claims of
Airlcem Sales and Service, et al v.
Department of Mental Health, 8
Ct. Cl. 180, the factual situations and the law applicable thereto
being the same as that involved in the foregoing decision of this
Court.
Claim disallowed.
42 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued October 22, 1975
ARCHIE DAY, SHERIFF, MCDOWELL COUNTY
vs.
JOHN M. GATES, STATE AUDITOR
(No. D-944)
D. A. WRIGHT, SHERIFF, PUTNAM COUNTY
vs.
JOHN M. GATES, STATE AUDITOR
(No. D-963)
D. Michael Fewell, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Putnam County for the
claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. DUCKER,
JUDGE:
The Circuit Courts of Putnam and McDowell Counties, West Virginia, respectively
paid jury fees in the amounts of $18.00 in McDowell County and $762.00,
including one witness fee in Putnam County, in their April and March 1973 terms
of court respectively, and, according to custom, submitted in October 1973 to
the respondent, vouchers or checks for said amounts requesting reimbursement for
said expenditures. The respondent refused to make reimbursement because all
funds budgeted for that purpose in the 1972-73 budget had been exhausted.
Claimants here seek awards in the amounts of $18.00 and $762.00 respectively.
The testimony taken disclosed that as of the close of the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1973 the amount of $43,000 remained available to pay claims of this
kind, but that by the time the claimants submitted their vouchers to the
respondent for reimbursement, namely, October 1973, all of the said funds had
been used to pay similar claims from other counties.
The respondent cited, as justification for his refusal to pay these claims,
Section 17, Article 3, Chapter 12 (12-3-17) of the Code of West Virginia, which
is in the following words:
?Except as provided in this section, it shall be unlawful for any state board,
commission, officer or employee: (1) to incur any liability during any fiscal
year which cannot be paid out of the
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 43
then current appropriation for such year, or out of funds received from an emergency
appropriation; or (2) to authorize or to pay any account or bill incurred
during any fiscal year out of the appropriation for the following year, unless
a sufficient amount of the appropriation for the fiscal year during which the
liability was incurred was cancelled by expiration or a sufficient amount of
the appropriation remained unexpended at the end of the year.?
From the evidence it would appear that efforts to seek a deficiency
appropriation from the Legislature to satisfy these claims were unsuccessful.
This Court in the case of Airlcem
Sales and Service et al V. Department
of Mental Health, 8 Ct. Cl. 180,
held that when an agency of the State purchased supplies in excess of the
budgetary amount specified and appropriated for that fiscal year, there could
be no recovery on such claims because of the illegality thereof as being in
violation of the statutory law applicable thereto. However, this case is
distinguishable from the Airkem case in that there was no illegality in the incurring
of the obligations, because there was an apparently adequate appropriation in
1972-73 budget when the obligations were incurred in the spring of 1973. The
question in this case is whether the delay in presenting the vouchers for
reimbursement until the appropriated funds were expired cancelled the right of
the claimants. The expiration of the funds, in our opinion, simply deprived the
claimants of their immediate satisfaction or remedy of recovery, not the
legality of the claims. The claims having been legally incurred should be paid,
and, accordingly we hereby make the following awards:
Award of $18.00 to Archie Day, Sheriff, and Award of $762.00 to D. A. Wright,
Sheriff.
44 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued Octo,er 22, 1975
TABITHA V. PARTLOW
AND
INLAND MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
(No. D-981)
James D. Mc Queen, Jr., Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. DUCKER,
JUDGE:
Claimant, Tabitha V. Partlow, and her insurer, Inland Mutual Insurance Company,
as assignee and subrogee of said Partlow, allege damages in the amount of
$400.51 to the automobile of said Partlow resulting from a falling limb from a
tree in the parking lot of the Huntington State Hospital, where said Partlow
had lawfully parked her car on March 1, 1974.
The factual situation, as stipulated by the parties, is that an employee of the
respondent was operating a chain saw in removing a poplar tree on the grounds
of the respondent and in doing so he negligently caused a limb from the tree to
fall against the automobile of said Partlow and damaged the automobile
necessitating repairs in the amount of $342.83 and the cost of car rental during
the repair period in the amount of $57.68. These damages were paid by the
claimants respectively by the Insurance Company in the first amount and by
Tabitha Partlow in the second amount.
Pursuant to the stipulation of liability and reasonableness of the charges, we
hereby make an award of $57.68 to Tabitha Partlow and an award of $342.83 to
Inland Mutual Insurance Company.
Award of $57.68 to Tabitha Partlow and award of $342.83 to Inland Mutual
Insurance Company.
Award of $57.68 to Tabitha Partlow.
Award of $342.83 to Inland Mutual Insurance Company.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 45
Opinion issued October 22, 1975
ROCKFORD A. SHORTRIDGE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-984)
Claimant appeared in person.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney
at Law, for the respondent. DUCKER, JUDGE:
Claimant at about 7:30 o?clock p.m. on June 26, 1973 parked his automobile in
the driveway to the State owned recreational area on old U.S. Route No. 50 east
of Lamberton, Ritchie County, West Virginia, for the purpose of having in the
area a family cook-out, and shortly after parking, taking his food from the car
and putting it on the grills, a storm came up and the wind of the storm broke
two limbs from a tree extending across the fence of the park area, which limbs
struck claimant?s car damaging the same and necessitating repair costs in the
amount of $748.40, the amount for which the claimant here seeks an award.
The evidence is that the two broken limbs extended about 20 or 25 lineal feet
across the road completely blocking the road, and they appeared to have ?just
snapped off? with no ?splitting?. There was no visible evidence that the tree
was rotten. The limbs measured, one larger than the other, from ?a foot in
diameter? to ?maybe 16 inches? and were live with the leaves on them. Claimant
said they, meaning himself and his family, were ?all sort of shook up? in the
storm and never looked to examine the tree to see if it was rotten on the
outside.
Respondent?s witness, Ralph McClead, County Superintendent of the respondent
for Ritchie County, testified that he had the responsibility for the roadside
park here involved and he had one maintenance man who had the responsibility to
notice hazards of any type including rotten or dangerous trees and tree limbs,
and that he reported to McClead each morning, that no report of any hazard to
visitors had been made prior to the claimant?s visit to the park, that he saw
the tree after the accident and cut the limbs with a power saw, and that he saw
no rottenness in the tree or the limbs.
46 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
The evidence is convincing that the storm consisting of a high wind and later
rain, blew severely enough to break the tree limbs, which were not rotten and
that the accident was not the result of any negligence on the part of the
respondent. The storm amounted to what in legal parlance is known as an ?Act of
God? for which the respondent cannot be held responsible or liable even though
it occurred on the premises of the respondent.
As we are of the opinion that there has been no showing of any negligence on
the part of the respondent, we make no award to the claimant herein.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued October 22, 1975
SHEN K. WANG
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(No. D-370a)
Hershel Rose, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. DUCKER,
JUDGE:
Claimant, Shen K. Wang, an orthopedic surgeon of Fairmont, West Virginia, seeks
compensation in the total sum of $15,300.00 for professional services rendered
to State patients at the Fairmont Emergency Hospital between March 3, 1969 and
March 10, 1970.
The evidence shows that the claimant was requested by Dr. Jack C. Morgan,
Superintendent of the hospital to render professional orthopedic services to
the State patients in the hospital according to their needs and that it was
agreed by Morgan and Lawrence Shingleton, the Administrator of the hospital,
that the claimant would be paid for his services on the basis of each case.
The evidence that the claimant performed all the services for which he claims
compensation is not in any respect disputed or contradicted. The claim was
fully supported by the testimony of Dr. Jack Morgan as well as by the detailed
transcript of the record of the rendering of services. That the charges made
for the services were fair and reasonable are fully supported by the evidence.
The
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 47
only difficulty in the employment was the lack of proper procedure in the
payment of the bills rendered from time to time by the claimant to the
Department, with no fault appearing on the part of the claimant in that
respect, as he was assured by Dr. Morgan and by Mr. Shingleton that he would be
paid. Nor was there ever evidence of lack of budgetary appropriation for the
employment.
As the State accepted the services of claimant and received the benefit of the
same, we find the situation similar to that involved and decided by this Court
in the case of Harold E. Bondy, M.D., V. Department
of Public Institutions, 9 Ct. Cl. 123, and likewise we are of the opinion to
and do award the claimant the sum of
$15,300.00.
Award of $15,300.00.
Opinion issued October 22, 1975
JAMES E. WHITE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-1004)
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to written stipulation, the claim of James E. White against the
Department of Highways for damage to claimant?s automobile in the amount of
$43.26 as a result of a fire is hereby allowed.
Award of $43.26.
48 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W: VA.
Opinion issued October 31, 1975
ROBERT DOUGLAS BAKER
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-933)
Claimant appeared in person.
Nancy Norman, Attorney at Law, for respondent.
JONES, JUDGE:
On January 27, 1975, at about 10:45 p.m. the claimant, Robert Douglas Baker,
was driving his automobile in a westerly direction on Route 33 and 119, about
eleven miles west of Weston in Lewis County. The claimant testified that it was
slightly foggy and that he was proceeding cautiously at a speed of approximately
35 miles per hour towards his home at Alum Bridge. He further testified that as
he came out of an ?S? curve he suddenly ran into a 12-inch deep hole extending
about halfway across the road, that there was no way to miss the hole in his
lane of traffic, and that there was not time to turn completely into the left
or east bound lane, which would have been necessary to avoid the hole. On
cross-examination he said that he had been over the road about one and one-half
weeks before and had observed no hazardous condition. As a result of the
collision a tire and rim of his car were damaged beyond repair.
The claimant filed his Notice of Claim on March 18, 1975, and the hearing
thereon was had on October 6, 1975. The respondent called no witnesses and
apparently had made no investigation. There being no contradiction, the
testimony of the claimant must be given full credence.
Route 33 and 119 is a heavily traveled primary road, the claimant was traveling
at night, the hole in the road was unusually deep and wide, and the Court
believes that the reasoning expressed by Judge Garden in the recent opinion in
the case of Lohan vs. Department of
Highways (No. D-91 0) applies to the
facts of this case. Accordingly, we find that the claimant, Robert Douglas Baker,
is entitled to recover his damages in the amount of $35.00.
Award of $35.00.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 49
Opinion issued October 31, 1975
ATHEL BUTCHER
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-967)
Claimant appeared in person.
Nancy Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
JONES, JUDGE:
The claimant in this case, Athel Butcher, seeks recovery from the respondent,
Department of Highways, for damages to the right rear wheel of his 1975
Chrysler New Yorker automobile while he was driving the vehicle south on Route
10 at Henlawson in Logan County.
The claimant testified substantially as follows: The time of the accident was
about 4:00 o?clock in the afternoon on May 26, 1975; the two-lane asphalt road
was level, straight and dry, and the day was clear; cars were approaching,
being driven on or near but not over the center line, and the claimant was
paying particular attention to them; the claimant?s speed was approximately 35
miles per hour; his right rear wheel dropped off the edge of the road, straight
down a foot or more to the berm, the force of the drop causing the damage
complained of; prior to the accident the claimant had driven over this road at
least once a week for a long time and had observed no hazard; and the claimant
charged that the respondent was negligent in allowing a hazardous condition to
exist.
Perhaps the respondent knew or should have known that a hazardous condition
existed along this road, but we cannot avoid the conclusion that in the
exercise of due care the claimant should have observed the edge of the blacktop
surface of the road and having sufficient room on his side of the road to
operate his vehicle in safety, he should have stayed in his lane of traffic and
thereby avoided the accident. We, therefore, hold that the contributory
negligence of the claimant bars recovery, and this claim is disallowed.
Claim disallowed.
50 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued October 31, 1975
MAUDE CALDWELL
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-690)
FLORENCE N. EARLY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-691)
ARZA EDDY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-692)
DANIEL A. POSTLETHWAIT and BETTY D. POSTLETHWAIT
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-693)
ROGER H. SMITH and RAMONA C. SMITH
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-694)
ROBERT G. CUNNINGHAJVI and BARBARA L. CUNNINGHAM
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-725a)
HARRY E. JOY, JR. and NELDA L. JOY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-725b)
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 51
ILENE FRICKER and HAROLD FRICKER,
and
PEARL G. CYPHERS and EUGENE CYPHERS
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-725c)
ILENE FRICKER and HAROLD A. FRICKER
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-725d)
ORA J. CARROLL and GWENDOLYN Y. CARROLL
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-725e)
TOWN OF PADEN CITY,
a municipal corporation
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-767)
JOHN G. WHIINGTON and MERLENE M. WHITI?INGTON
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-937)
Robert E. Wright and James M.
Powell, Attorneys at Law, for the
claimants.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. DUCKER, JUDGE:
The claimants in these twelve claims have alleged various
amounts of damage to their homes and properties situate in Paden
City, West Virginia, north of and below State Route 26 and south of
52 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
and above 8th, 9th and 10th Avenues, as a result of the respondent?s alleged
negligent maintenance of the road and collecting surface water and diverting
and channeling it through culverts and casting said surface water upon their
lands.
The parties agreed that the question of liability of the respondent is the same
as to all of the claimants, but that the amounts of damage, if any, are to be
determined separately as to the respective claimants, and accordingly the
evidence upon the question of liability is made applicable to all of the
claims.
A careful and detailed view of the subject properties was taken by the Court at
the inception of the hearing. Both claimants and respondent introduced extensive
testimony of experts concerning the question of water drainage over and upon
the area involved, and all of the expert testimony was to the same effect that
continuous saturation of the soil by water from the hillside was the direct
cause of the seepage and slides of earth in, under and about the homes and
properties of the claimants, including waterlines of the municipal claimant.
The experts differed as to whether or not the respondent had so carelessly
maintained its road as to prevent the proper drainage from the road and the
upper land and had diverted water from natural channels and into artificial
channels to the detriment of the claimants.
State Route 26 was formerly a County road running along a ridge south of Paden
City before any of the claimants? homes were built. It is shown on a 1906
topographical map. A picture taken in 1911 shows the road and only the Caldwell
and Eddy houses. The road was relocated with a gravel surface in 1929-30, and
was blacktopped by the respondent in 1963. When the State took over County
roads, including this one, the road and its drainage were substantially the
same as they are today, except for the culvert above the Fricker property which
was plugged at Mrs. Fricker?s request about 1970 or 1971. At about the same
time a drain pipe was put under Kendall Road, which connects with State Route
26 from the southwest, to drain into the ditch along the south side of Route
26. This took care of part of the water that previously had passed through the
Fricker culvert, but during hard rains, substantial quantities of water ran
across the road and onto the Fricker land.
The several claimants were unanimous and firm in their testimony that water
running over the road and through its culverts had soaked into the slope above their
homes and properties, and they vividly described the saturation of their lands,
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 53
causing, in their certain opinion, the downward movement of the hillside and
ultimate damage to their homes and properties. George Kapnicky, a geologist,
supported the claimants? views, testifying that surface water running over the
road and onto the slope was diffused and not channeled into natural drains. He
made specific reference to the Fricker farm, where the culvert had been
plugged, but it is apparent from all the testimony that the landslide had
commenced long before this culvert was abandoned.
George Sovick, an engineer employed by the? respondent, testified that the
drainage area above the road directly behind the Fricker farm contained only
1.4 acres, while the Fricker farm itself is a 14.75 acre tract on the slope
abutting the road. The entire drainage area above the road is approximately 18
to 20 acres, and about the same acreage owned by the claimants lies below the
road and is part of the watershed. Dr. Robert E. Behling, a professor at West
Virginia University, with outstanding qualifications as an expert in geology
and soils, and William Roth, a soils scientist, both testified that all of the
homes were built upon colluvial material, originally unstable and highly
susceptible to water saturation and resultant slippage. Roth called the material
Vandalia soil and termed it subject to severe limitations for home sites,
including slip hazard and high shrink-swell potential. Test holes drilled by
the respondent upon the claimants? lands show conclusively that all of the
homes were built on soil which is characterized by both Roth and Dr. Behling as
unstable, and these witnesses substantially testified that in their opinions,
in view of the natural drainage area above, all of these home sites were unsafe
from the beginning, and it was only a question of time until natural forces
would produce the results in these cases. As a contributing factor, both Roth
and Dr. Behlmg found natural springs on the hillside which added underground
waters to the surface rainfall.
The damage to the Whittington home, which was so severe that the building was
demolished and removed from the premises, is an example of water saturation and
slippage which cannot be attributed to water from the State road. Dr. Behling
testified that the slope above this property was the most severely disturbed by
downslope movement, trees were pushed over and it was a very chaotic slope.
Further in his testimony, Dr. Behling described the road and adjacent lands as
sloping away from the Whittington property and he was emphatic in his opinion that
no water flowed from Route 26 or its culverts towards or upon that property.
Dr. Behling also noted foundation damage to another home east of the
54 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Whittington property, similarly situated on the hillside but even farther
removed from Route 26.
Turning our attention from the Whittington property, being the most easterly of
the claimants? several parcels of land, to the most westerly parcel, the
Caidwell property, we have a difference of opinion in the testimony of Mr.
Kapnicky and Dr. Behling. Mr. Kapnicky attributed damage to this property from
waters passing through ?Culvert No. 5?, but Dr. Behling testified that the
water from this culvert was following a natural channel, and at least one-half
of that water would not reach the Caldwell property. Dr. Behling further stated
that in his opinion this house was built on a slump block and that renewed
activity of the slump block created the tension cracks he found in the back of
the house and the bulging out in front. In his opinion the Eddy house also was
built upon a slump block.
To some extent at least it would have been possible for these claimants to have
protected their properties by pilings, cribbing or by well engineered drainage.
While efforts were made, some of them apparently did more harm than good. For
example, the Fricker backyard was excavated to slope towards the hillside,
holding water instead of releasing it. House gutters and downspouts collected
and discharged water upon the already unstable soil near some of the
residences, causing more water saturation and instability. In practically every
case, when these homes were built a cut was made into the slope to make level
ground for the building, thereby lessening support of the hillside.
The law applicable to this case is well stated by Judge Petroplus in Whiting
v. State Board of Education, et al., 8 Ct. Cl. 45, as follows:
?It is well established law that land at lower levels is subject to the
servitude of receiving waters that flow naturally upon it from adjoining higher
land levels, and that unless a property owner diverts the natural flow of
surface water in such a manner as to damage the property of another, there is
no liability on the owner of the higher property. Unless a landowner collects surface
water into an artificial channel, and precipitates it with greatly increase- or
unnatural quantities upon his neighbor?s land, causing damage, the law affords
no redress. If no more water is collected on the property than would naturally
have flowed upon it in a diffused manner, the dominant tenement cannot be held
liable for damage to land
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 55
subject to the servitude of flowing waters. The evidence in this case does not
reveal that the flow was increased in volume or changed in its character to the
substantial damage of the Petitioner. Nor was it shown by evidence that the
flow accelerated or was artificially channeled so as to increase the servitude
upon Petitioner?s lot as was shown in Manley v. Brown, 90 W. Va. 564,
111 S.E. 505, cited by Petitioner.
?To constitute a moral obligation of the State justifying the appropriation of
public funds, it is necessary that an obligation or duty be imposed on the
State, by Statute or Contract, or that wrongful conduct be shown, which would
be judicially recognized as legal or equitable in cases between private
persons. State ex. rel. Cashman v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 430, 43 S.E. 2d 805.
In the recent decision of State ex. rel. Vincent v. Gainer, 151 W. Va.
1002, (1967), our Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed prior decisions holding
that whether such moral obligation exists is a judicial question, and proof of
negligence by the State Road Commission was required to be shown.
?The common law rule that surface water is considered a common enemy, and that
each landowner may fight it off as best he can prevails in Virginia and West
Virginia, with the modification that an owner of higher ground may not inflict
injury on the owner of lower ground beyond what is necessary. Norfolk & W.
R. Co. v. Carter, 91 Va. 587, 22 S.E. 517, Jordan v. Bentvood, 42
W.Va. 312,26 S.E. 266, and Lindamood v. Board of Education, 92
W.Va. 387, 114 S.E. 800.?
Culverts are required for the protection of our highways and an extraordinary
number of culverts necessarily are provided in the building and maintenance of
highways in West Virginia. It stands to reason that these culverts discharge
into natural drains wherever possible as engineering and simple logic require a
culvert where a road is to pass over and through a natural drain. While the
claimants contend that waters were allowed to spread over practically all of
the hillside, we do not believe they have proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that the respondent did anything to substantially change the course of
the flow of waters down the hillside from the time the culverts were installed,
prior to the State?s ownership. If there were no culverts at all, it appears
that the properties lying to the east would receive much less water and as you
go down the highway to the west the properties would receive more water. as the
road without culverts would itself
56 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS 1W. VA.
become a drain and the waters running down the highway would eventually flow
onto the more westerly properties. As a matter of fact, however, the greatest
damage was done to the most easterly property, being the Whittington residence,
which we believe was not affected by water from Route 26, and one of the least
damaged homes was Mrs. Caidwell?s, which is the most westerly of all the
properties. Every road, as well as every house, roof, driveway or other hard
surface, is bound to collect water and accelerate its flow, so some
acceleration and accumulation of run-off is an unavoidable consequence of the
construction of roads.
The expert witnesses for both sides in this case agree that the continuous
saturation by water of the hillside above the claimants? properties over a
period of many years was the direct cause of the downslope movement of the
land. The difference of opinion is whether or not the State road was a
substantial contributing factor, and whether the respondent diverted waters
from natural channels and into artificial channels to the detriment of
landowners over whose lands the waters flowed. Considering all of the facts and
circumstances developed at the hearing of these cases, and the legal principles
applicable thereto, the Court is of opinion that there is not sufficient proof
that acts or omissions of the respondent were the direct, proximate cause of
the damages sustalned by the claimants.
The Court is not unmindful of the disaster which has overtaken these claimants.
According to the respondent?s own witness, a qualified real estate appraiser,
the total damages sustained by the claimants stands at $63,078.00. The
claimants? witness fixed damages at $107,078.00. Several of these claimants
purchased their properties after 1967, when the hazardous condition of the
hillside was well-known by many people but was not disclosed to the purchasers.
However, our duty is plain, and reluctantly we hold that while many
contributing factors brought about the damages complained of, nothing that the
respondent has done or failed to do is sufficient to support awards in any of
these cases.
For the foregoing reasons the Court is of opinion to and does hereby disallow
these claims.
Claims disallowed.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 57
Opinion issued October 31, 1975
MARK A. MELROSE, Executor of the
Estate of
J. J. Meirose, Deceased, and FRANK R. MELROSE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-629)
Claimant, Mark A. Meirose, appeared in person in his fiduciary capacity and as
agent for Frank R. Meirose.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney
at Law, and Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent.
JONES, JUDGE:
J. J. Meirose filed this claim on May 9, 1973. Thereafter he died and Mark A.
Melrose qualified as Executor of his estate on September 4, 1974. At the
hearing had on July 30, 1975, the claim was revived in the names of Mark A.
Meirose, Executor of the Estate of J. J. Meirose, deceased, and Frank R.
Melrose, successor in title to the real estate involved by devise from his
father.
Damages are claimed to a barn located on a 300 acre farm near Mineral Wells in
Wood County. The barn, 40 feet x 70 feet in size, built in 1969 with a concrete
block first floor set on a concrete footer and haymow of wooden construction,
was moved to its present location in 1964 or 1965. It was set on solid ground
approximately four to five feet south of the toe of a slope extending 120 feet,
more or less, from Sycamore Road, a gravel road serving about twenty families.
At a low place in the road back of the barn a culvert had been plugged and out
of use for several years and water was permitted to stand in the ditchlines. A
slip became apparent in 1971 and during that year the road dropped about a
foot, at which time the claimants notified the respondent, Department of
Highways, of the impending hazardous condition. Each time the road subsided the
respondent would dump in rock and fill material, adding weight to the already
unstable area. Since 1971 the center-line of the road has moved southward about
15 feet, indicating the extent of the slide which developed to a width of about
150 feet at its base. The slide finally reached and pushed in the rear wall and
lowered the northeast portion of the barn about 18 inches. Subsequent to the
damage complained of the respondent
58 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
installed a new culvert, but it discharges water upon the slide area which may
induce further movement. The claimants have dug an open ditch in an attempt to
divert water from the barn.
The respondent produced no witnesses at the hearing and from the testimony of
witnesses for the claimants we can only conclude that the respondent has not
exercised reasonable care and diligence in the maintenance of this road, and
thereby has created and permitted to continue a landslide of sufficient size to
cause the damages described by the claimants.
A witness for the claimants, a civil engineer with many years of experience in
construction, testified that the difference in fair market value of the barn
before and after the damage was the sum of $3,000.00. We consider this a
reasonable figure and, therefore, an award in the amount of $3,000.00 hereby is
made to Mark A. Meirose, Executor of the estate of J. J. Meirose, deceased, and
Frank R. Meirose, as their respective interests may appear.
Award of $3,000.00.
Opinion issued October 31, 1975
MONONGAHELA POWER COMPANY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-957)
PER CURIAM:
By stipulation filed in this claim, it appeared that respondent on or about
July 26, 1974, while clearing its right of way in Randolph County, West
Virginia, negligently permitted a tree which it had cut to damage a power line
owned and maintained by the claimant. Being of the opinion, and as confirmed by
the aforesaid stipulation, that damages in the amount of $106.85 are fair and
reasonable, we thus make an award in that amount.
Award of $106.85.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 59
Opinion issued October 31,1975
PHYSICIANS FEE OFFICE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(No. D-816e)
PER CURIAM:
On March 21, 1973, professional services were rendered to Jesse W. White, an
inmate of the West Virginia State Penitentiary at Moundsville, West Virginia,
by Doctors Evans and Tercan, members of claimant?s organization. Respondent?s
Amended Answer acknowledges that the claim in the amount of $111.92 is a valid
obligation of the respondent, and an award in that amount is thus allowed.
Award of $111.92.
Opinion issued October
31, 1975
CARMIE RIDDLE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-947)
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to written stipulation, the claimant, Carmie Riddle, is awarded the
sum of $87.55 for damages to her automobile caused by a fire negligently
started by respondent?s employees at respondent?s garage.
Award of $87.55.
60 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued October 31, 1975
BOBBY SHAFER
V.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-898)
Claimant appeared in person.
Emerson Scilisbury, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
DUCKER, JUDGE:
Claimant, Bobby Shafer, a resident of Route 1, Clendenin, West Virginia,
alleges damages in the amount of $305.85 to his 1967 Ford Fairlane automobile,
by reason of an accident during the latter part of December, 1974 when his car
struck rocks and was flooded with water in a creek through which a temporary
roadway passage was permitted and authorized by the respondent.
The testimony was to the effect that a bridge, located about four miles south
of Clendenin over a tributary creek of Elk River, was in such a dangerous
condition that the respondent had placed signs on it closing the road over the
bridge. The road to and from the bridge had no other passage way than by
fording the creek. The bridge and the road were as to maintenance and
supervision within the jurisdiction of the respondent, and the respondent at
least acquiesced in the fording of the creek by automobiles traveling the road.
Claimant in attempting to ford the creek on this occasion encountered large
rocks and high water, which damaged and flooded his car, costing him in repair
bills the amount alleged. The water in the creek was much higher than it
usually was for fording the creek but there were no warning or other signs
there to prohibit the regular use of that part of the road for fording it.
We are of the opinion that it was the duty of respondent, which knew of the
possible hazardous condition and the reasonable foreseeable probability of
damage to users of the highway, to either prohibit the traffic or to provide
reasonable measures of safety to the public at that place, and we conclude that
as there does not appear to be any contributory negligence on the part of the
claimant, the respondent?s failure under the circumstances of this case
rendered it guilty of actionable negligence.
Accordingly, we award the claimant the sum of $305.85.
Award of $305.85.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 61
Opinion issued October
31, 1975
J. WILBUR SWISHER and ALICE V. SWISHER
d/b/a SWISHER?S FEED AND SUPPLY COMPANY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
(Nos. D-881a and D-881b)
John R. Hailer and Joseph W.
Wagoner, Attorneys at Law, for the
claimants.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. JONES,
JUDGE:
These consolidated claims are for damages to a building, equipment and
merchandise, owned and operated by the claimants, J. Wilbur Swisher and Alice
V. Swisher, d/b/a Swisher?s Feed and Supply Company at Weston, in Lewis County,
caused by acts committed by two patients of Weston State Hospital, who
allegedly were negligently allowed to leave the hospital grounds. The incidents
occurred on February 28, 1974, and March 2, 1974, respectively, and in each
case the patient appears to have been bent on violence and destruction. The
front door and a plate glass window were smashed, shelving torn out, business
machines and office supplies damaged or destroyed, floors damaged, and
substantial quantities of merchandise were placed under embargo and destroyed
by order of the West Virginia Department of Agriculture.
Counsel for the parties have filed a Stipulation wherein the respondent admits
the negligence of its employees and the damages in the total amount of
$2,580.76. The damages are further substantiated by exhibits.
Upon consideration of the Notice of Claim and its exhibits, and the Stipulation
of facts and liability, together with the exhibits filed therewith, the Court
is of opinion to approve the Stipulation and allow the claims. Accordingly, an
award is ?made to the claimants, J. Wilbur Swisher and Alice V. Swisher, dfb/a
Swisher?s Feed and Supply Company, in the amount of $2,580.76.
Award of $2,580.76.
62 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued October 31, 1975
XEROX CORPORATION
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(No. D-948 a&b)
No appearance for the claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent.
respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This claim is for copies run and services rendered on equipment furnished by
the claimant, Xerox Corporation, to the respondent, Department of Public
Institutions, at the West Virginia State Penitentiary during the fiscal year
1973-74 in the amount of $798.46 and during the fiscal year 1974-75 in the
amount of $1,166.18, and the issues are submitted for decision upon the Notice
of Claim and Amended Answer.
Upon consideration of the pleadings the Court is of opinion that the decision
in Airkem Sales and Service, et al,
vs. Department of Mental Health, 8 Ct.
Cl. 180, applies to the invoices covering the period from March 1, 1974, to May
31, 1974, in the total amount of $798.46, and therefore, that portion of the
claim is disallowed. However, the Amended Answer of the respondent asserts no
defense to the items of claim invoiced in the fiscal year 1974-75 in the total
amount of$1,166.18, and it appearing to the Court that said claim is valid and
unpaid and the Court perceiving no reason to deny the same, an award hereby is
made to the claimant, Xerox Corporation, in the amount of $1,166.18.
Claim No. D-948a is disallowed.
Award of $1,166.18 in Claim No. D-948b.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 63
Opinion issued November 13, 1975
RUSSELL E. DUVERNOY &
HENRY TODD DIJVERNOY
vs.
JOHN M. GATES, AUDITOR &
JOHN H. KELLY, TREASURER
(No. D-905)
Leo Catsonis, Attorney at Law, for claimants.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for respondent. GARDEN,
JUDGE:
In January of 1971, the claimant, Henry Todd Duvernoy, was indicted by the
Grand Jury of Roane County for possession of marijuana. Thereafter, he was
tried, convicted and sentenced on March 26, 1971 to an indeterminate term in
the West Virginia Penitentiary and fined $1,000.00. The confinement portion of
the sentence was suspended and young Duvernoy was placed on probation. For
reasons not apparent on the face of the record before us, a motion for a stay
of execution was denied by the Circuit Court of Roane County pending an appeal
to the Supreme Court of Appeals, and the fine was ordered to be paid.
On November 1, 1971, the S4preme Court f Appals ,granted a writ of error and
supersedeas, but by this time, the claimant, Russell E. Duvernoy, the father of
Henry Todd Duvernoy, had paid $775.00 of the fine imposed by the Circuit Court.
On April 3, 1973, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and
awarded a new trial on the ground that the arresting officer had committed an
unlawful search and seizure. State v.
Duvernoy, W. Va., 195 S.E. 2d 631, the
case was not re-tried. By order of the Circuit Court entered the 4th day of
June, 1973, the indictment was dismissed and the portion of the fine that had
been paid was directed to be returned.
Thereafter, counsel for the claimant, through correspondence directed to the
State Auditor and to the office of Governor Moore, attempted to secure a refund
of the $775.00 through administrative means but was advised that there was no
statutory vehicle by which the fine could be refunded. With this conclusion, we
agree. Code 5-1-17 authorizes the Governor to remit fines but only in instances
where the fme has not been paid.
64 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Counsel for claimant has cited several federal decisions where fines paid as a
result of invalid convictions were ordered refunded:
DeCecco v. United States, 485 F.2d 372 (1st Cir. 1973); United States
v. Bluso, 519 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1975). These cases both involved
convictions under the Wagering Tax Law, 26 U.s.c. ?7203. They are
distinguishable from the present factual situation in that the Federal courts
relied on the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. ?1346, which specifically authorizes the
refund of a penalty collected without authority under the internal revenue
laws.
Although we are aware of no statutory procedure in this State authorizing
refund of a paid fine, we are of opinion that we have jurisdiction to effect a
refund. Code 14-2-13 authorizes this Court to make awards in claims against the
State which the State, as a sovereign commonwealth, should in equity and good
conscience pay. This claim in our opinion comes within this jurisdictional
framework. Any other result would constitute unjust enrichment to the State.
Award of $775.00.
Opinion issued November 13,1975
JORDON, McGErflGAN & YULE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
(No. D-680)
Albert J. Bader, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. JONES,
JUDGE:
Early in May, 1967, the claimant, Jordon, McGettigan & Yule, a partnership,
was employed by the respondent, Department of Mental Health, to perform
architectural-engineering services for the construction of a Mental Retardation
& Rehabilitation Center at Roneys Point in Ohio County. After a conference
between the principals in Charleston, a letter ws writt?r thrrespnden.to the
claimant faTb, 1, confirming that a previously employed afhitect was unable to
meet time requirements nd had withdrawn from the project, expressing the
respondent?s intent to enter into a contract with the claimant, and
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 65
pointing out that a contract could not be processed until federal funds were
encumbered, meaning that the respondent must have substantially complete
working drawings and estimates of cost to meet a deadline set by Hill-Burton
Authorities for the encumbrance of lapsing federal funds. The deadline was the
week beginning June 19, 1967, allowing approximately 45 days for completion of
the work. While it appears that the usual and customary fee for such services
would have been 6 percent, it was agreed between the parties that due to the
urgency of the project and the consequential extra overhead and overtime costs
an 8 percent fee would be paid, and this was carried into the formal contract
dated and executed on October 1, 1967, as ?a fee of 8 per cent of the
construction cost of the project.? The contract specifically provided that the
claimant should not furnish cost estimates, in view of a federal requirement
that two such estimates be given by local contractors. The contract further
provided that payment for services at the completion of each phase of work
should be divided as follows:
?Schematic Design Phase 15%
Design Development Phase 35%
Construction Documents Phase 75%
Receipt of Bids 80%
Construction Phase 100%?
A purchase order for this project dated May 23, 1968, constituting acceptance
of the contract entered into by the parties and approved by the Attorney
General and Department of Finance and Administration, recited the following:
?Estimated cost of construction $604,000.00
Fee based on 8 percent of
construction cost $
48,320.00?
The deadline was met by the claimant, two estimates were obtained from local
contractors based on the cJaimant? 1ans and specifications, both within
$10,O00i0 of the $604,000.00 allocation for the project. While the federal
requirements for the encumbering of funds had been met, the State Department of
Health did not approve the drawings which showed sewage from the building to be
connected to the nearest manhole. The change required the sewage to be
connected with an abandoned sewage treatment plant, necessitating plans for
renovating the plant and constructing a 1,500 foot access road, the cost of
which was not eligible for federal participation. For no apparent reason, but
66 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
perhaps taking time to acquire additional funds, the project did not move from
July, 1967, to June, 1968, when the claimant was authorized to prepare plans
and specifications for rehabilitation of the sewage plant. The revisions were
made and approved and the project was let to bids on March 3, 1970. The low bid
was $861,000.00, two higher bids being in amounts of $884,724.00 and
$1,389,930.84. The project was not let to contract as the low bid exceeded the
available funds.
A meeting was held on April 10, 1970, and the agreements arrived at were set
out in a letter directed to the respondent by the claimant under date of April
13, 1970. Plans and specifications were to be revised for re-bidding, including
the deletion of one wing of the building and other substantial changes,
contemplating savings of approximately $200,000.00 to $250,000.00. The
respondent?s letter further stated that it would keep accurate records and bill
for the revisions ?on the basis of 2.5 x Technical Payroll.? Contrary to the
quoted language, the contract between the parties provided that for additional
services the respondent would be paid ?two (2) x the Direct Personnel Expense ***? Shortly thereafter the respondent revised its previous
billing to conform to 8 percent of the low bid of
$861,000.00.
On May 15, 1970, the claimant was advised by the respondent that it should
proceed with changes in the plans and specifications necessary to reduce the
cost of the project of the amount of funds available. Under date of November
24, 1970, the claimant billed the respondent in the amount of $13,959.20, based
on 8 percent of the low bid, which was paid by the respondent, and in the same
letter listed items to be included in the revised documents, including
elimination of all sewage treatment plant ?.rork. By letter dated August 10,
1971, the respondent presented its bill for additional work in the total amount
of $8,320.95, and replying under date of August 16, 1971, the Director of the
respondent department informed the claimant that funds were not available to
pay the invoice, reminded the claimant that the bid price was not acceptable
because it exceeded the cost estimate of the project, and further stated that
the respondent was attempting to obtain additional funds out of which the
invoice would be paid. On November 15, 1972, the respondent informed the
claimant that additional funds had been received. The respondent?s letter to
claimant dated February 2, 1973, advised that the respondent planned to place
the project out for bids as soon as possible and that further payments would be
withheld until the construction
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 67
contract was awarded. From this point the project wound down in a hurry. Four
letters, two of which apparently crossed in the mail, tell the story. The
respondent wrote the claimant on February 20, 1973, that the project had been
placed out for bids again since additional State money was available and the bid
opening was set for March 21, 1973. This letter further set out a rather
extensive list of changes to be made in the plans and specifications. By letter
dated February 26, 1973, the claimant informed the respondent that its file and
records pertaining to the project had been turned over to counsel for
consideration and advice concerning the respondent?s failure to pay outstanding
invoices and added that it would be impossible for any firm of
architects-engineers to prepare the required contract documents in time for
bids on March 21, 1973. A letter dated February 27, 1973, from the respondent
to the claimant advised that the bid opening date had been changed to April 4,
1973, and another such letter dated March 1, 1973, advised the claimant that
the requisition for the Roneys Point project had been cancelled. The project
was thereupon abandoned and was never re-activated.
The respondent claims a balance due under the original contract, based on the
low bid with 80 percent of the work completed, in the amount of $6,895.20. Two
invoices for additional work in respective amounts of $1,425.75 and $2,541.00
were submitted to the respondent, making a total claim of $10,861.95 The
respondent contends that under the original contract it only should be required
to pay for services at the rate of 8 percent based on the estimated $604,000.00
cost of construction, 80 percent completed, which the Court calculates to be
$38,656.00. The respondent has paid to the claimant $48,266.40, which would put
the respondent in the rather awkward position of having overpaid the account in
the sum of $10,610.40.
While the State may not be estopped from denying liability on the ground that
an employee of the respondent has accepted and acted in accord with the
claimant?s interpretation of the agreement, we think the statements and actions
of the respondent throughout the period involved are indicative of the fact
that there was a meeting of the minds and no major misunderstanding except of
the Monday morning quarterback variety. The claimant presented plans and
specifications t.o the respondent in June, 1967, which were satisfactory to the
respondent, but a revision was necessary and promptly made to meet requirements
of the Department of Health. For reasons that are not apparent but which we
cannot
68 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
attribute to any fault on the part of the claimant, letting the project to bids
was delayed until March 3, 1970. The Court will take judicial notice of the
inflationary conditions in our country during this period of delay. The
inflationary situation also must have been obvious to the respondent and we
doubt if anyone was much surprised that the low bid exceeded the estimates of
the local contractors, made some 32 months before. As before stated the
claimant?s fees were to be based on the construction cost of the project and
that cost is further defined in the contract as the lowest acceptable bona fide
contractor?s proposal received. In the circumstances, we deem the low bid of
$861,000.00 to have been ?acceptable? and we find no indication in the record
that the bid would have been declined if sufficient funds had been available.
The fee set out in the purchase ordered dated May 23, 1968, was an estimate and
nothing more. Considerable hope and some expectation of receiving additional
funds appears from the record from the early days of the project to its dismal
end. The failure of the project lies in a financial deficiency for which we
cannot penalize the claimant.
Considering first the $6,895.20 claim under the original contract, we conclude
that the claimant should be paid for the services represented by this charge,
but with a limitation based on the Court?s right to invoke equity and good
conscience. It appears that the 8 percent fee written into the employment
contract would have been 6 percent except for the accelerated schedule required
to meet the deadline for federal funds. It further appears that the decrease in
cost from the time the claimant?s work was practically completed to the date of
the bid letting was $257,900.00, substantially due to inflation, which a
partner of the claimant?s firm described as spiraling upwards at the rate of 11/2 percent
per month. To put it plainly, the Court feels it would be inequitable to allow
the additional 2 percent fee on the inflated cost of the project, where the
certain intention was that the additional fee was to be for additional work.
Therefore, the Court will allow this portion of the fee based on 8 percent of
$604,000.00 and 6 percent of $257,900.00, with the work 80 percent completed,
or the sum of $51,035.20, of which $48,266.40 has been paid, leaving a balance
of $2,768.80.
We further find that the contract in this case provides for payment for
additional services at a rate of 2 x the Direct Personhel Expense, which we
cannot satisfactorily differentiate from Technical Payroll Expense, and
accordingly the two invoices for
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 69
$1,425.75 and $2,541.00 are reduced by 20 percent to $1,040.60 and
$2,032.80, respectively.
Upon consideration of the foregoing the Court is of opinion to and does hereby
award to the claimant, Jordon, McGettigan & Yule, the sum of $5,942.20.
Judge Ducker participated in the hearing and decision of this case prior to his
retirement from the Court.
Award of $5,942.20.
Order issued November 13, 1975
RYAN INCORPORATED OF WISCONSIN
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No.
D-570
ORDER AND STIPULATION
This day came Ryan Incorporated of
Wisconsin, the claimant, by Mark L. Korb its attorney and came the West
Virginia Department of Highways and the State of West Virginia, respondents, by
Dewey B. Jones their attorney, and jointly represented to the Court that the
parties in the above styled claim have compromised and settled all items of
claim, issues and matters involved in said claim and jointly move the Court to
accept the following stipulation and make an award in this action based upon
the pleadings filed herein and this stipulation.
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between Ryan Incorporated of
Wisconsin, claimant, and the West Virginia Department of Highways and the State
of West Virginia, respondents, that the claimant is entitled to recover from
the respondent the West Virginia Department of Highways the following sums of
money on the following items alleged in its complaint on page 2, thereof, under
Roman Numeral I, Unclassified Excavation, A. Differences in Measurement, 6,773
cubic yards, at 88 cents per cubic yard, $5,960.24; D. Unsuitable Excavation,
15,165-6/11 cubic yards, at 88 cents per cubic yard, $13,345.68; E. Fill
Benches, 23,516 cubic yards, at 88 cents per cubic yard, $20,694.08; Total
45,454-6/11 cubic yards, at 88 cents per cubic yard, $40,000.00.
70 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
It is further stipulated and agreed by and between the claimant and the
respondents hereto that all other items of claim and the parts of the above set
out and described items of claim not agreed to be paid in this stipulation, as
set out and alleged in claimant?s notice of claim filed in this action, are to
be disallowed and not considered by the Court for any award and are to be
dismissed.
Upon consideration of the claimant and the respondents representations, motion
and stipulation set out aforesaid the Court is of the opinion to and does
sustain the same and the same are hereby received, filed, and accepted; and it
is hereby further ordered that the claimant be and it is hereby granted an
award against the respondents the following sums on the following items of
claim alleged in its complaint.
I Unclassified Excavation
A. Differences in Measurement $ 5,960.24
D. Unsuitable Excavation $13,345.68
E. Fill Benches $20,694.08
TOTAL AWARD $40,000.00
It is hereby further ordered that all other items of claim and the parts of claims
set out and alleged in claimant?s notice of claim, which were not allowed in
the above award, are hereby disallowed.
ENTER:
W. Lyle Jones
JUDGE
APPROVED BY:
RYAN INCORPORATED OF WISCONSIN,
Claimant
By Mark L. Korb
Its Counsel
WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
and the STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Respondents
By Dewey B. Jones
Its Counsel
By Henry C. Bias, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 71
Opinion issued November 20, 1975
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES
CORPORATION
vs.
SINKING FUND COMMISSION
(No. D-1013)
PER CURIAM:
The foregoing claim is disallowed for the reasons set forth in the
Opinion of this Court heretofore filed in deciding the claims of
Airkem Sales and Services, et al v.
Department of Mental Health, 8
Ct. Cl. 180, the factual situations and the law applicable thereto
being the same as that involved in the foregoing decision of this
Court.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued November 20, 1975
MELLON-STUART COMPANY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(No. D-772)
PER CURIAM:
The foregoing claim is disallowed for the reasons set forth in the
Opinion of this Court heretofore filed in deciding the claims of
Airkem Sales and Service, et al v.
Department of Mental Health, 8
Ct. Cl. 180, the factual situations and the law applicable thereto
being the same as that involved in the foregoing decision of this
Court.
Claim disallowed.
72 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued December 10, 1975
SHARON L. DICKINSON
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-938)
The claimant appeared in person.
Emerson Salisbury, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
JONES, JUDGE:
Sharon L. Dickinson has filed a claim for damages to her 1969 Chevrolet Impala
automobile sustained at about 12:00 p.m. on March 14, 1975, when she drove her
vehicle into a large rock on the highway about 1?/2 to 2 miles from her home in
Elkins. The claimant testified that as she drove along the Tygart River
westerly on Route 33, it was foggy and her vision was somewhat limited. In
claimant?s own words, ?Well, I could see something in the road but I wasn?t
sure. I can?t say how far. I can?t really say how far back I was but I could
see something and I waited just a few minutes to make sure that there was
something there, pulled out, saw the traffic coming around the curve and then I
looked back and saw the ambulance and had to pull back in my lane.? She further
testified that there were two cars coming out of the curve towards her; that
the ambulance following her had its red lights flashing; and that the objects
in her lane of traffic were a large rock, approximately 12 inches thick, and
other smaller rocks. It appears that the claimant was faced with an emergency
judgment and she chose to pull back in her lane and strike the large rock,
thereby avoiding possible injuries to the approaching cars and the ambulance
behind her. The claimant?s automobile was severely damaged. Two estimates of
damage were in amounts of $416.02 and
$445.72.
The claimant complains of the absence of a ?Falling Rocks? sign, and the
presence in the highway of the large rock which her automobile struck. However,
there is nothing in the record to show that the failure to erect and maintain
such sign had any causal connection with the accident. The road was straight
and the claimant says she was travelling at a moderate rate of speed. There is
no evidence as to how long the rock had laid on the highway, or whether the
respondent had any notice or reason to know that it
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 73
was there. Neither is there sufficient evidence to show that a dangerous
condition had existed at the place of the accident prior to its occurrence.
While the Court believes the claimant was not without fault in the exercise of
her duty to keep her vehicle more completely under control after she saw
?something? in the highway a substantial distance in front of her, we are of
the opinion that this case falls within the purview of many prior holdings of
this Court which are exemplified by a quotation from Parsons v. State
Road Commission, 8 Ct. Cl. 35, as follows:
?This Court has many times held that the State is not a guarantor of the safety
of its travelers on its roads and bridges. The State is not an insurer and its
duty to travelers is a qualified one, namely, reasonable care and diligence in
the maintenance of a highway under all the circumstances. The case of Adkins v. Sims, 130 W.Va. 645, 46 S.E. (2d) 81, decided in 1947, holds that the user of
the highway travels at his own risk, and that the State does not and cannot
assure him a safe journey.?
In consideration of the foregoing, this claim is disallowed.
Judge Ducker participated in the decision of this case, but his resignation
from the Court was effective before this opinion was prepared and approved.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued December 10, 1975
THE F. & M. SCHAEFER BREWING CO.
vs.
NONINTOXICATING BEER COMMISSION
(No. D-904)
Louie A. Paterno, Jr., Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. JONES,
JUDGE:
The claimant, the F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., was engaged in the
distribution of beer in the State of West Virginia from August,
74 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
1973, until June 30, 1974, when it discontinued business for economic reasons.
During 1973 in compliance with Chapter 11, Article 16 of the Code of West
Virginia and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, the claimant purchased
tax paid crowns and lids from the respondent, Nonintoxicating Beer Commission,
in the total sum of $32,160.00. At the time of withdrawal from the State, the
claimant had on hand unused, prepaid tax crowns and lids in the sum of
$24,474.67. There being no statutory remedy for the recovery of such prepaid
taxes, the claimant seeks redress in this Court.
Under pertinent regulations the claimant had no choice but to estimate how much
its taxes would be for an arbitrary period, and prepaid crowns and lids were
purchased accordingly. However, sales were far below estimates, and financial
losses dictated the claimant?s withdrawal. The respondent has joined in a
stipulation that tax paid beer closures, representing West Virginia Beer Tax
paid by the claimant in the amount of $24,474.67, have been destroyed, and that
the respondent does not deny the validity of any part of this claim.
Cases heretofore decided by this Court have held that the retention of
similarly prepaid taxes constituted unjust enrichment and reimbursement was
required after destruction of the unused tax tokens. General Foods
Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 9 Ct. Cl. 193, and Central
Investment Corporation v. Nonintoxicating Beer Commission, Ct. Cl. (D-740).
The Court considers the amount claimed to be an overpayment of tax which the
respondent is not entitled to withhold on the ground that such retention would
constitute unjust enrichment.
Accordingly, the Court hereby awards the claimant, The F. & M. Schaefer
Brewing Co., the sum of $24,474.67.
Judge Ducker participated in the decision of this case, but his resignation
from the Court was effective before this opinion was prepared and approved.
Award of $24,474.67.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 75
Opinion issued December 10, 1975
PAUL W. HOLDREN, Committee for
Franklin T. Fleming, incompetent
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-607)
William Talbott, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. JONES, JUDGE:
This claim was filed by Paul W. Holdren, as Committee for Franklin T. Fleming,
an incompetent, for damages to the Fleming resident situate about 1,000 feet
below State Route 20 on Miller Mountain near Webster Springs. This is one of
several homes fronting on the Elk River Road in a community known as Doortown.
It was built by Franklin Fleming?s father in 1947, and after his death Franklin
and his mother continued to live there until August, 1972, when the home was
abandoned because of water damage which rendered it uninhabitable. The
Franklins had dug a drainage ditch, about 2 feet wide and 3 feet deep, part of
the way up the mountain, and it was connected with a rock culvert near the
southeast, rear corner of the residence, leading to an 8 inch pipe laid
underground along the side of the residence and extending through the front
yard retaining wall. Mr. Holdren, Cashier of the Webster Springs National Bank
for many years, was appointed Committee for Franklin Fleming in 1964 and from
that time looked after necessary repairs to the residence. He testified that
between April 1967, and May 1972, he expended $4,116.70 for repairs, including
a new wall in front of the house in March 1972. As a result of accumulation of
water and the effects of freezing and thawing, the old concrete block wall had
cracked and broken and was beyond repair. Except for structural defects which
occasioned these repairs, witnesses for the claimant testified that there was
no apparent damage to the home until May 1972, when cracks appeared in the
foundation and walls and total deterioration set in.
During the period beginning in March 1972, and ending in August 1972, the
respondent, Department of Highways, was engaged in a repair and improvement
project on State Route 20 involving widening the highway approximately 6 feet
on the upper
76 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
side, replacing old culvert pipes, installing new concrete drop-inlets,
installing curbing designed to channel surface water to the culverts, and
blacktopping. The respondent?s inspector on the project testified that the
replaced drainpipes were old and bordering on collapse, and that each one was
taken up and replaced during the same day. He also testified that after the
curbing was completed it did not catch all of the water and some of it did run
across the highway and over the lower side due to the imperfect crown of the
road grade.
Mrs. Fleming testified that during the night of April 13-14, 1972, heavy rains
caused the yard to flood, water oozed through basement walls and parts of the
new retaining wall collapsed. A neighbor, Maxine Coakley, viewed the property
on the morning of April 14 and saw the broken wall and flooded yard, and she
said it looked to her like the water ?was coming through under the house and
was coming up out of the ground just like one of these artesian wells. I mean
it was just bubbling up out of the ground.? Vivian Bennett, who was living with
her grandmother and uncle, testified that during the night she heard strange,
rumbling sounds under the house like water running. She had experienced several
other rains as hard as this one without any apparent damage. The United States
Department of Commerce record of rainfall for Webster Springs shows .10 of an
inch for April 13, 1972, and 1.98 inches for April 14, 1972. Other heavy
rainfalls for the area were recorded as 1.24 inches on February 26 and 1.14
inches on April 8 of the same year.
The claimant?s contentions of liability are concentrated upon this one flooding
incident. He alleges that the highway improvement project of the respondent was
so carried on that the course of drainage was changed and excessive quantities
of water were gathered and thrown upon the claimant?s property. The respondent
says that the project was conducted in a workmanlike and reasonable manner,
that the culvert above the Fleming property was replaced by a pipe of equal
size, that the location of the new pipe remained the same, and that the
drainage was not changed in any appreciable degree. The culvert in question has
discharged into the same natural drain for many years, and from the testimony
of the respondent?s witnesses it appears that all of the water running through
this culvert does not stay in the beginning drain but branches out and a
substantial part flows away from the claimant?s property.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 77
It appears from the evidence that the claimant?s property was at least 1,000
feet from State Route No. 20. The residence was located at the foot of a
mountain at a point where it has been obvious to the owners that surface water
from the mountain must be diverted from the ground at the rear of and
underlying the dwelling. Many years ago the ditch was dug which terminated at a
point only a few feet from the house, where it entered the rock culvert which
witnesses described as a big, dark hole in the ground. No witness could see the
end of the pipe known to be near the hole, and it could only be measured where
it discharged through the front yard retaining wall. John Sefton, a State
geologist, testified that in his opinion both the ditch and the pipe were
inadequate to contain the flow of surface water from the area between the
highway and the house.
The Court can find little, if anything, that the respondent has done that in
any way could have contributed to this calamity. Conversely, based on all the
evidence, direct and circumstantial, the Court believes that the claimant did
not provide adequate protection against the ever-present water hazard, as he
was required by law to do if his property was to be kept safe from injury. It
appears to the Court that one storm did not cause the destruction of the
claimant?s home, but that over the years the supporting ground had become so
saturated that it approached a condition which Franklin Fleming?s niece
described as sounding like a spring. The saturated soil had become so unstable
that it could not support the structure and the heavy rain on the night in
question was only a contributing factor.
The case of Osborne v. Department of
Highways, 10 Ct. Cl. 83, (D-579 and
D-634), cited by the claimant and involving the same highway project, is
clearly distinguishable. In fact, there is no valid comparison that can be made
of the causes and conditions contributing to the damages sustained in the two
cases, Wotring v. Department of
Highways, 9 Ct. Cl. 138, also cited by
the claimant, involved new road construction, the abandonment of an old road,
the stopping-up of two culverts adjacent to the claimant?s land, and notice to
the State that a hazardous condition existed. None of these circumstances is
present in this case.
The State can only be held to the duty of exercising reaonab1e care and
diligence in the maintenance of its highways. UtL the law of this State surface
water is considered a common enemy which each landowner must fight off as best
he can, provided that
78 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
an owner of higher ground may not inflict injury to the owner of lower ground
beyond what is reasonably necessary. The evidence in this case shows that the
respondent did conduct its highway improvement project in a reasonably prudent
manner; that the respondent did nothing appreciably to increase the flow of
water or change the character of the established drainage to the damage of the
claimant; and in the Court?s opinion, no act or omission of the respondent
proximately caused the damages sustained by the claimant. Accordingly, the
claim is disallowed.
Judge Ducker participated in the decision of this case, but his resignation
from the Court was effective before this opinion was prepared and approved.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued December 16, 1975
KENNETH E. PLANTS
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-672)
Robert Lee White, Attorney at Law, for claimant.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
Around 5 o?clock P.M., on the evening of February 17, 1972, the claimant was
proceeding in his car from his place of employment in Charleston to his home in
Winfield, West Virginia. He was travelling in a westerly direction on Seventh
Avenue in Charleston near its intersection with 35th Street. Seventh Avenue, at
this point, is a two-lane roadway for westbound traffic and was of concrete
construction. The weather conditions were poor in that it was raining and the
roads were wet. Apparently, some work in the nature of grading had been done
along the north berm of Seventh Avenue for there was a considerable amount of
mud along the north side of the street.
The claimant was traveling at a speed of about 35 miles per hour in the
left-hand lane, and when just west of the intersection, he observed traffic
ahead of him slowing down. Looking into his
W. VA.1 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 79
rear-view mirror, he was able to determine that the right-hand lane was free of
traffic, and he, thus, turned to the right and into the right-hand lane. As
this movement was being made, his left-front wheel struck a large hole in the
highway which was located in the right-hand lane. As a result, the left-front
tire of claimant?s car ruptured causing claimant to lose control of his automobile.
Out of control, he continued about 150 feet west in the right-hand lane of
Seventh Avenue where his car left the highway and struck the guardrail erected
on the north side of the highway.
On cross-examination, the claimant testified that he was an accountant and
worked in an office in downtown Charleston, and that Seventh Avenue was his
usual route home from the office. He indicated, however, that his work took him
to, at least, ten counties in central West Virginia. and he, thus, did not use
Seventh Avenue too frequently. He did admit that he had observed the hole three
or four days prior to the accident and that it was about three feet by three
feet and maybe two feet deep. On this prior observation, the hole was not
filled with water. He explained his failure to observe the hole on the date of
the accident by reason of it being covered with water.
Officer D. W. Vaughan of the Charleston Police Department testified that he,
together with Officer Arthur E. Collier, investigated the accident. He stated
that while he wasn?t sure of the dimensions of the hole, he was of the opinion
that it was a large hole and between 8 to 10 inches in depth. While he did not
remember the hole being covered completely with water, he did state that it had
some water in it. According to Officer Vaughan, Seventh Avenue at and near the
accident scene was of concrete construction; that it was poured in blocks with
expansion joints between the blocks; and that the hole was located at a corner
Qf one of the blocks. He was of the opinion that the hole had beei worn over a
period of months and had not resulted from a sudden breaking.
Officer Collier, whose testimony was introduced through his deposition,
testified that when he arrived at the accident scene, the right-hand westbound
lane was partially covered by water and that he also observed a big hole in the
right-hand lane which was covered with water. He indicated that prior to the
date of claimant?s accident, he had struck the hole and had almost lost control
of his car; that the hole was 12 inches long, 2 feet wide and 8 to 10 inches
deep; that he had reported the existence of the hole
80 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
two or three times to police headquarters within one to two weeks prior to the
claimant?s accident, and that while he didn?t know if headquarters had reported
the same to respondent, standard procedure required headquarters to report the
same to respondent or to the Charleston Street Department, depending on which
agency had the responsibility of a particular street.
The respondent called as its only witness, its claims investigator, Edward
Goodwin. Through Mr. Goodwin there was introduced into evidence a foreman?s
report reflecting that on February 3, 1972, a work crew had requisitioned two
tons of ?cold patch? and had used the same to patch Seventh Avenue, a street of
one and three quarter miles length. He was unable to state whether the subject
hole was in existence on February 3, 1972, and if so, whether it had been
patched. He stated that he had made an investigation as to whether the
respondent had received notice of the hole prior to claimant?s accident and
could find none. He admitted, however, that respondent did not follow any set
procedure in respect to logging or recording complaints concerning highway
conditions.
In passing, it should be noted that both Officers Vaughan and Collier testified
that upon examination of the hole, they were unable to detect any evidence of
recent patching. They further testified that after the claimant and his car had
been removed from the accident scene, and as they were leaving the accident
scene, another car proceeding west of Seventh Avenue struck the same hole, spun
completely around but managed to avoid striking the guardrail.
Addressing ourselves first to the question of claimant?s alleged contributory
negligence, we are of opinion that the evidence does not sustain this
affirmative defense. It is true that the claimant quite candidly admitted that
he had observed this hole three or four days prior to the accident, but as he
testified, and as corroborated by Officer Collier, its presence was completely
obscured by water. In addition, we are of opinion that claimant had the right
to assume that respondent would have discharged its legal duty and repaired this
hole within the three or four day interval. We also do not believe that
claimant violated any statutory prohibition in attempting to pass the slower
moving left lane of traffic on the right.
On the other hand, and while we recognize that the respondent is not an insurer
of those using its highways, we believe the evidence
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 81
clearly indicates that respondent failed to discharge its duty of exercising
reasonable care in maintaining Seventh Avenue in a reasonably safe condition
for the traveling public, and, in particular, this claimant. While there was no
proof that the respondent received direct notice of the existence of this
dangerous condition, it is clear from the testimony of Officer Collier that
this defect was in existence for, at least, one and possibly two weeks prior to
the accident. This Court recently made an award in Lohan v. Department of Highways, 11 Ct. Cl. 39, (D-910), partially on the basis that the
highway defect was on U. S. 60 east of Charleston, a heavily traveled highway.
This accident took place on Secondary State Route 28 which, in 1972, was a
principal artery leading from downtown Charleston to Dunbar and other points
west. As indicated before, while the evidence fails to establish that respondent
knew of the defect, we feel that a preponderance of the evidence clearly
demonstrates that it should have known of the same.
As a result of striking the guardrail, the claimant suffered a mid-shaft
fracture of the femur of his left leg and a large scalp wound. He was removed
from the accident scene by ambulance and was taken to the Charleston General
Hospital where he was placed under the care of Dr. Carl J. Roncaglione, an
orthopedic surgeon. He remained in the hospital until March 16, 1972. While
confined, he was first placed in skeletal traction in order to reduce the
fracture, and thereafter, the traction was removed and an internal medullary
pin was inserted in the left femur. On March 17, 1974, the claimant was again
admitted to the hospital at which time Dr. Roncaglione removed the medullary
pin, and he was discharged on March 20, 1974.
He was followed by the doctor on three occasions in his office, the last visit
being on April 25, 1974. According to Dr. Roncaglione?s report dated December
17, 1974, which was introduced into evidence, the claimant suffered a severe
fracture of his femur, much soft tissue damage and great pain; that as a result
of the injury, a good bit of scar tissue will develop which will, in the
future, cause early fatigue and some limitation of motion in the left leg, but
the doctor doubted that the injury would precipitate any arthritic development.
The respondent obtained an independent examination of the claimant by Dr.
Robert L. Ghiz, also an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Ghiz?s report dated November
13, 1974, was also introduced into evidence and it reflected that the
82 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
claimant?s prognosis was quite good, but that the claimant would suffer
intermittent soreness and pain in his left hip and left thigh for some time to
come.
In respect to damages, the claimant testified that he was employed as an
accountant and lost wages of $1,937.50 in 1972, and $825.00 in 1974, or a total
of $2,762.50. While his testimony was not corroborated by his employer, we are
of opinion that he sufficiently established this item of loss. He further
testified that his clothing, which was ruined as a result of the accident, was
worth $100.00, and copies of bills from the Charleston General Hospital covering
the charges for claimant?s two confinements in a total amount of $2,647.63 were
introduced into evidence. These last two items of special damage will also be
considered in fixing the amount of the award.
On the other hand, the only proof offered in respect to Dr. Roncaglione?s bill
was the claimant?s testimony that it was about $678.00. No further evidence was
introduced in support of this charge, nor was any testimony offered that the
doctor?s charge was reasonable or necessary. In respect to the claimant?s 1970
Datsun, which claimant testified was damaged beyond repair, the only testimony
offered as to fair market value was that of claimant who testified at one point
that it was worth $1,400.00 and at another point $1,510.00. While this Court
has been liberal in the past in respect to proper proof of damages, we are of
opinion that unless items of special damages can be stipulated, we must require
some semblance of proper evidence to support items of special damage.
Consequently, the doctor bill and the automobile property damage claim will not
be considered.
As heretofore indicated, being of opinion that the accident and resulting
injuries to claimant proximately resulted from the negligence of respondent,
and further believing that the claimant was free of contributory negligence,
and that his injuries were serious, painful and to some extent permanent, we
hereby make an award of $14,500.00.
Judge Ducker participated in the hearing and the decision of this case prior to
his retirement.
Award of $14,500.00.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 83
Opinion issued January 8, 1976
AMERICAN CAN COMPANY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
(No. D-965)
PER CURIAM:
This claim was submitted upon the notice of claim and respondent?s amended
answer, from which it appears that the goods described in the notice were
ordered by and delivered to Weston State Hospital in fiscal year 1972; that the
charge therefor in the amount of $1,125.85 is fair and reasonable; and that the
respondent had sufficient funds on hand at the close of the fiscal year from
which said account could have been paid, but inadvertently the account was not
paid and funds for the fiscal year expired.
In consideration of the foregoing, the Court awards the sum of $1,125.85 to the
claimant, American Can Company.
Award of $1,125.85.
Opinion issued January 8, 1976
JAY H. CADLE, DIB/A CADLE SANITARY SERVICE
vs.
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES
(No. D-1006)
Bobbie Ann Cadle, Secretary, appeared for the claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. JONES,
JUDGE:
Shortly after the Buffalo Creek disaster in late February, 1972, the claimant
entered into an agreement with the Office of Emergency Planning, a State
agency, to furnish portable toilet facilities to the disaster area in Logan
County. The first units were delivered on February 29, 1972, and during the
term of the agreement, which was terminated by the respondent in September,
1975, a total of 97 units were delivered to the area. ?The
84 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
agreement provided for a $10.00 delivery and installation charge and $37.50 per
month for serving and maintaining each of the units, which latter charge was
increased to $45.00 per month beginning July 1, 1975. In another emergency and
under a similar agreement, 6 such portable facilities were delivered by the
claimant to the Meadow Bridge area in Fayette County in April, 1974.
As of July 1, 1973, the Office of Emergency Planning and the Office of Civil
and Defense Mobilization were abolished by the Legislature and all of their
respective functions and responsibilities were transferred to the respondent,
Office of Emergency Services. Payment of the monthly rentals for the Buffalo
Creek units continued through April 30, 1974, but further rental payments were
not received although the claimant continued to service and maintain from 14 to
19 units until September 26, 1975, when the remaining units were picked up upon
notice of the respondent to do so. On December 13, 1974, the respondent paid to
the claimant $513.50 as a final rental payment for the units delivered to
Meadow Bridge, $4.00 less than the amount due. When the claimant was requested
by the respondent to pick up the remaining units, two were missing at Buffalo
Creek and one at Meadow Bridge. A diligent search was made for these units but
they were never found.
The claimant introduced records showing Buffalo Creek rentals unpaid in the
amount of $9,678.50 and the cost price of two missing units in the amount of
$540.00, a total of $10,218.50. The Meadow Bridge claim is for the $4.00
balance of rentals due and the cost of one missing unit in the amount of
$270.00, a total of $274.00. The aggregate claim is $10,492.50.
Richard Lee Weekly, Director of the Office of Emergency Services, testified
that to the best of his knowledge and belief toilet facilities were furnished,
serviced and maintained as shown by the claimant, that all services were satisfactory
and the charges made appeared to him to be reasonable and proper. He was not
able to give a satisfactory explanation as to why payments were withheld, but
it appears that the merging of Emergency Services in 1974 may have resulted in
some confusion contributing to the inadvertent failure to pay rentals as they
came due.
The Court perceives no defense to this claim and finds that the claimant is
entitled to recover for the facilities and services furnished in the amount
claimed. Therefore, an award hereby is
W. VA] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 85
made to the claimant, Jay H. Cadle, d/b/a Cadle Sanitary Service, in the amount
of $10,49250,
Award of $10,492.50.
Opinion issued January 8, 1976
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES
CORPORATION
vs.
WEST VIRGINIA SECRETARY OF STATE
(No. 1)1026)
PER CURIAM:
During the month of June 1975 the claimant?s copier, installed in respondent?s
office was used by the respondent?s employees, but the claimant did not invoice
for these copies until August of 1975, after the close of fiscal 1974-75. At
the hearing, a letter from the respondent was filed as an exhibit which
admitted the validity of the claim in the amount of $70.23 and further set
forth the fact that sufficient funds were on hand at the close of the fiscal
year from which the bill could have been paid.
In consideration of the foregoing, the Court awards the sum of $70.23 to the
claimant.
Award of $70.23.
Opinion issued January 8, 1976
PARKE, DAVIS & COMPANY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
(No D-1028)
PER CURIAM:
The claimant in its Notice of Claim alleges that between July 14, 1972 and
November 7, 1973 it shipped certain medical merchandise to respondents Weston
State Hospital, and that during the above-mentioned period invoices totalling
$586.80 were not paid. Respondent in its answer admits that the merchandise was
86 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
received, but that the correct total amount of the unpaid invoices is $545.96.
At the hearing the Court was advised that claimant was willing to accept the
sum of $545.96 in full statisfaction of its claim.
In consideration of the foregoing, the Court awards the sum of $545.96 to the
claimant.
Award of $545.96.
Opinion issued January 8, 1976
FRANK A. ROCCHIO,
SHERIFF OF HANCOCK COUNTY
vs.
JOHN M. GATES, STATE AUDITOR
(No. D-1022)
PER CURIAM:
This claim was submitted for decision on the facts as set forth in the Notice
of Claim and the Answer. These pleadings reveal that during the September 1972
Term of the Circuit Court of Hancock County an individual served on a petit
jury and was paid the sum of $16.00; however, reimbursement by the respondent
was not requested until May 20, 1974, well after the close of fiscal year
1972-73. The pleadings further reflect that at the close of fiscal year
1972-73, there were sufficient funds on hand from which reimbursement could
have been made, had the request been submitted timely.
In 1975 this Court in the claims of Archie
Day, Sheriff of Putnam County v. John M. Gates, State Auditor, (D-944), and D.
A. Wright, Sheriff of McDowell County v. John M. Gates, State Auditor, (D-963), made awards in similar factual situations. The
awards were made in those claims mainly on the basis that sufficient funds were
on hand at the close of the fiscal year in question to pay the claims, had the
requests been submitted timely. The foregoing being true in this claim, we
therefore make an award of $16.00 to Frank A. Rocchio, Sheriff of Hancock
County.
Award of $16.00.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 87
Opinion issued Janussry 8, 1976
GERALD E. TINSLEY
vs
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-979)
The claimant appeared in person.
Nancy Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
JONES, JUDGE:
The only witnesses in this case were the claimant, Gerald E. Tin sley, and his
father, Paul E. Tinsley, and following is a summary of their testimony. On or
about May 6, 1975, a storm drain became clogged on a State maintained highway
known as 40th Street in the City of Nitro. Paul E. Tinsley, who lives nearby, called
the North Charleston Maintenance Office of the respondent, Department of
Highways, and reported the flooded condition of the street. He was assured that
the water would be taken care of promptly. During the ensuing period of
approximately five weeks before the claimant?s accident, Edward Tinsley called
the respondent?s employees five or six times, but nothing was done to remove
the hazard. On or about June 12, 1975, at 6:30 am. the claimant was driving to
work along 40th Street when he came out of a curve at about 20-25 miles per
hour within a short distance of the?culvert. It had rained earlier and suddenly
the claimant was confronted with an approaching car in the claimant?s lane of
traffic. The oncoming driver had swerved into his left lane to avoid the
deepest part of the water which extended completely across the street. There
was not sufficient space to drive his car off the street on his right side so
the claimant swerved to the left into the water and into the culvert, blowing
out the left front tire and damaging the left front wheel and fender and front
panel of his automobile. The other driver did not stop. When the accident was
reported to the responcent, immediate action was taken to repair the drain and
the flooding hazard was eliminated. The claimant has proved damages to his
automobile in the amount of $163.10.
The Court concludes that the respondent was negligent in its failure to correct
a dangerous condition within a reasonable time after receiving notice thereof;
and further that in view of the sudden emergency which confronted th? c?aimant,
he acted as a
88 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
reasonable, prudent person in the circumstances, and is entitled to recover.
Accordingly, the Court awards the claimant, Gerald E. Tinsley, the sum of
$163.10.
Award of $163.10.
Opinion issued January 16, 1976
W.VA. STATE INDUSTRIES
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(No. D-811b)
Claimant appeared through its business manager, Kenny Hinds. Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
In an opinion recently rendered in the consolidated claims of W. Va. State Industries vs. Department of Mental
Health, Claims D-876a and D-876b, were
pointed out that the claimant is an entity established pursuant to Chapter 28,
Article 5B, of the Official Code of West Virginia of 1931, as amended, the
?Prison-Made Goods Act of 1939,? For the purpose of providing prisoners at the
state prison in Moundsville with a means of occupying their time, it produces a
varied line of products for sale to other state agencies. The consolidated
claims mentioned above were treated as requests for advisory determinations
pursuant to Code 14-2-18 because they involved disputes between state agencies,
and this claim likewise will be so treated.
This claim involves a total of $20,005.20 represented by invoices for paper
products, mattresses, smoking and chewing tobacco, soap and bleach products and
clothing items sold by claimant to respondent in fiscal year 1968-69 and during
the following three fiscal years. Broken down, the following total dollar
amount of invoices were unpaid during the four fiscal years: fiscal 1968-69,
$15,482.71; fiscal 1969-70, $4,391.40; fiscal 1970-71, $124.89; and fiscal
1971-72, $6.20. No explanation was offered at the hearing for the non-payment
of these invoices.
W. VA.J REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 89
Under the provisions of Code 14-2-21, this Court is prohibited from taking
jurisdiction of any claim that is not filed with the Clerk within the
applicable period of limitation, as prescribed by law. The claimant here seeks
an award for a total of various separate invoices. These invoices constitute
open accounts, and we are thus of the opinion that the five year statute of
limitation is applicable. The claim was filed on August 30, 1974, and
consequently the unpaid invoices rendered during fiscal 1968-69 in the total
amount of $15,482.71 cannot be considered. Of the total unpaid invoices in
fiscal 1969-70, a total of $89.35 were rendered prior to August 30, 1969, and
they also cannot be considered, thus reducing the claim in fiscal 1969-70 to
$4,302.05.
Mrs. Hazel Kinder, Chief of Business Management for Public Institutions,
testified that during the years under consideration, certain funds in the
current expense account were expired as follows: fiscal 1969-70, $444.21;
fiscal 1970-71, $1,837.02; and fiscal 197 1-72, $112.00. Payments to claimant
to the extent of the expired funds in the respective years would have been
legal, but to the extent that the total of the invoices exceeded the expired
funds in the respective years, payments would have been illegal. We are thus of
the opinion that the claimant should recover the following amounts for the
following fiscal years:
fiscal year 1969-70 $444.21
fiscal year 1970-71 $124.89
fiscal year 197 1-72 $
6.20
TOTAL $575.30
The $3,857.84 difference between the total amount of the invoices dated within
the five year period prior to August 30, 1974, namely $4,433.14, and the
$575.30 which we feel claimant should be awarded, accrued in fiscal 1969-70,
and payment of this difference cannot be sanctioned under our holding in Airkem
Sales and Service, et al v. Department of Mental Health, 8 Ct. Cl. 180.
This being a request for an advisory determination, io award will be made, but
the Clerk of this Court is requested to forward copies of this opinion to the
claimant and the Commissioner of Public Institutions.
90 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued January 19, 1976
ROBERT L. JEFFERSON
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-1023)
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a written stipulation by the parties hereto, an award hereby is
made to the claimant, Robert L. Jefferson, in the amount of $100.00, for the
cutting of trees growing upon the claimant?s property adjacent to the
respondent?s right of way known as Country Club Road in Harrison County.
Award of $100.00.
Opinion issued January 19, 1976
MID-MOUNTAIN MACK, INC.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES
(No. D-962)
Larry Whitt, Comptroller, represented the claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. JONES,
JUDGE:
The claimant, Mid-Mountain Mack, Inc., sold a truck to Marcus Coal Company and
took the company?s check for $2,334.27, including $2,088.02 for the State of
West Virginia privilege tax. Thereupon the claimant mailed its own check in the
amount of $2,334.27 to the respondent, Department of Motor Vehicles, in payment
of the privilege tax and other charges. Marcus Coal Company then asserted that
the truck was not what it had ordered and stopped payment on its check. The
claimant contacted the respondent and was advised to return all documentation
for cancellation. The license plate was returned unused and with the original
package unopened, but the Certificate of Title, issued in the name of Marcus
Coal Company, already had been sent to Mack Financial Corporation in Atlanta,
Georgia, for financing purposes.
W. VA.]
REPORTS STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 91
Almost immediately, the truck was sold
to Melvin Cox and the privilege tax again was required to be paid to the
respondent in order to obtain a license in Mr. Cox?s name. Before the first
title could be recovered, assigned by Marcus Coal Company and returned to the
respondent, such a period of time.had elapsed that there was nothing that could
be done within the authority of the respondent to correct the anomalous
procedure.
The respondent says that if all the transaction documents had been returned
promptly, the Department could have ?backed it out of the computer and out of
the files?, and the claimant?s check would have been returned. The respondent
recognizes and admits that there was only one completed transaction and that
the State is only entitled to one tax. However, two licenses were applied for
and, technically, two privilege taxes were required by law to be paid. The
Court is satisfied that only one sale transaction actually was consummated, and
believes that to permit the respondent to retain the duplicate tax payment
would constitute unjust enrichment. Therefore, the Court is of opinion that the
claimant, Mid-Mountain Mack, Inc., is entitled to reimbursement and does hereby
make an award in its favor in the sum of $2,088.02.
Award of $2,088.02.
Opinion issued January 27, 1976
SYLVESTER BIRD and STATE FARM
MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-934 A & B)
Richard Bush for the claimants.
Gregory W. Evers, for the respondent.
JONES, JUDGE:
The claimants, Sylvester Bird and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, seek recovery for damages to a 1969 2-door Pontiac Catalina
automobile, owned by Bird and insured for $50.00 deductible collision coverage
by the insurance company, alleging that the corner of the blade of a snow plow
or grader, operated by the respondent?s employee, collided with and
92 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
caused the damage to the automobile. The amount of damages, estimated and
claimed as $565.39, is not contested.
During a heavy snowfall, on March 17, 1973, at approximately 5:30 p.m.,
claimant Bird was forced by hazardous road conditions to park his vehicle along
the side of State Route 33, about 5 miles east of Spencer in Roane County. He
testified that he left his car about 3 feet from the edge of the pavement, locked
the doors, and then returned to his home in Spencer with a friend who had been
with him on a fishing trip and had chains on his tires.
At about 10:00 o?clock the following morning, claimant Bird returned to his
vehicle and found a cut along the left side from the rear bumber to the center
of the door, obviously inflicted by a sharp object. Claimant Bird testified
that the snow had been stacked along side the highway to a depth of about 12
inches, and that it ?was pushed up and rolled back in approximately four inches
from the gash where the car was cut open and there was snow under it.? Claimant
Bird went to the District Office of the respondent, where he was told that the
highway had been plowed but that the respondent?s employees had reported no accidents.
Eugene Rhodes, a grader operater for the respondent, testified that he had
plowed Route 33 from about 6:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. on March 17; that the grader
was equipped with a 12-foot blade, about 18 inches high and not extending
outside the tractor wheels; that the operating speed of the tractor was 5 to 8
miles per hour; that he saw an automobile parked along the road in front of the
office of Joe Cann, a veterinarian, where claimant Bird said he left his car;
that he passed the car with the wheels and blade of the tractor on the highway;
and that he made no contact with the parked vehicle.
It appears to the Court that the speculative, circumstantial evidence of the
claimants may not be deemed to approach the preponderance required for a
recovery in this case, particularly in view of the direct, adverse testimony of
the respondent?s operator, who was the only person having certain knowledge of
the snow plowing operation.
Accordingly, it is the opinion of the Court that the claimants have not proved
the allegations of their complaint, and their claim is disallowed.
Claim disallowed.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 93
Opinion issued January 29, 1976
THOMAS EDISON HALE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-842)
LARRY LEE WINGATE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-843)
Norris Kantor and Ralph
Masinter Attorneys at Law, for the
claimants.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. JONES, JUDGE:
Pursuant to agreement of counsel these claims were consolidated for purposes of
hearing and decision. The claims are for personal injuries sustained in
separate accidents occurring a few hours apart on March 8, 1974, at the
location of a Department of Highways construction project on State Route No. 35
near Winfield in Putnam County.
Claimant Thomas Edison Hale, 44 years of age, was employed by Hennis Freight
Lines of Roanoke, Virginia, and was driving a tractor-trailer in a northerly
direction on a dry road and in good weather. Hale had operated tractor-trailers
for more than 18 years and his vehicle was approximately 57 feet long and had a
gross weight of approximately 40,000 pounds. He had driven this road as many as
three to six times a week over a period of 15 years. According to his
testimony, at about 1:00 a.m. on said day he was driving at approximately 20 to
30 miles per hour when he reached the top of a gradual grade where the road
leveled out and his headlights revealed a ditch, 18 inches to 2 feet deep,
completely across the road, 20 to 30 feet in front of him. The entire length of
his vehicle struck and passed over the ditch, coming to a stop about the length
of the vehicle beyond. He was thrown against the steering wheel and the top of
the cab. Hale drovE his vehicle about 10 miles to Pimey Truck Stop, where he
called his employer and then called an ambulance. It was later determined that
the
94 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
tractor-trailer had to be towed back to the owner because the frame was bent,
the motor mounts broken and the engine cracked. An ambulance arrived and on the
way back along the road Hale had traveled, he saw the claimant Wingate falling
to the ground from the cab of his tractor-trailer, which had just struck the
same ditch and had come to a stop. Wingate was placed in the ambulance and both
claimants were taken to Thomas Memorial Hospital in South Charleston. Hale
remained in the hospital for 2 ? to 3 hours.
On the same night, at about 3:00 a.m., at the same place and under the same
conditions, except for a possible variance in the depth of the ditch, claimant
Larry Lee Wingate, 38 years of age, was driving a tractor-trailer owned by his
employer, Superior Motor Express, of Gold Hill, North Carolina. He had driven
tractor-trailers for approximately 15 years and over this road for about 7
years. His vehicle was approximately 55 feet long and was loaded with lumber,
all with a gross weight of about 69,000 pounds. According to his testimony,
Wingate had slowed to about 25 to 30 miles per hour upon approaching a sign
warning of a dip or rough road which he had known of for several years. He was
within 15 to 20 feet of the ditch when he first saw it, he struck the ditch,
about
18 inches deep by his estimate, and was thrown about and against the top of the
cab. He was able to bring the tractor-trailer to a stop, got out of the cab,
fell to the ground and crawled to the front of the truck. There, almost
immediately, he was picked up by the aforementioned ambulance driver and was
taken, along with Hale, to the Thomas Memorial Hospital. He was discharged and
returned to his home 8 days later. Upon cross-examination, Wingate admitted
that he had answered a pre-trial interrogatory that he was traveling
approximately 40 to 50 miles per hour as he approached the ditch; and then he
asserted that he had no way of knowing how fast he was traveling at the time.
Both claimants testified that the only signs they saw were ones that had been
along the highway for several years. They did not recall a blinker light or
road construction signs. They both testified that they slowed down, knowing
that they were approaching a rough place and dip in the road, which had long
been marked by a warning sign. All witnesses agreed that Route 35 was a heavily
traveled road with a large amount of truck traffic. Evidence regarding speed
limits was conflicting and inconclusive.
Donald Wright, Sheriff of Putnam County, testified that he had driven south
along the highway between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. on March 7, 1974, while the ditch
was being dug, and that he returned
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 95
at about 9:00 p.m. when the work had stopped and the workmen had left the job.
It looked to him like the ditch had been filled with gravel or similar material
and he said it had been thrown out by traffic until the ditch was approximately
12 inches deep. He observed the blinker light about one-fourth mile from the
ditch, but did not recall seeing road construction signs, and said there were
no flares or ?men working? signs near the project. Knowing the ditch was there,
he struck it at about 15 miles per hour and said that was ?too fast?. He
returned to his office in Winfield where two or three telephone calls were
received, reporting a ?bad situation?, and notice thereof was given by his
office to the Department of Highways.
The respondent?s general foreman on the project testified substantially as
follows: A blinker ?construction ahead? sign was placed about one mile away on
either side of the ditch, and on the south side there was a reflector-type road
construction sign at 1,000 feet and one at 500 feet, ?men working? signs near
the ditch, two flagmen until quitting time and flares at night, which he could
not say were burning at the time of the accidents; that he had asked his
superiors for flagmen around the clock until the work was finished but that no
flagman was on duty at the times of the accidents; that the ?men working? signs
were laid down at night; that the ditch was not entirely across the road, but
about 26 feet long overall and about 8 feet into the claimants? right-hand lane;
that the blacktop had been ripped up with a bulldozer over a strip about 8 feet
wide and the ditch in which the drainpipe was laid was about 6? feet deep; that
they used two truck loads of slag in fifing the ditch, which was not enough, so
the workmen finished the fill with pea gravel and sand; that the ditch was
packed and ieveled with a bulldozer; that when he arrived at work the following
morning, a flagman, who had been dispatched to the scene during the night, was
on duty, and the ditch was about 18 inches deep; and that the County office of
the respondent had sent the flagman to the job during the night because of the
hazardous situation.
While the filling of the ditch by the respondent?s employees may have appeared
to them to be sufficient for the duration of the night, it obviously was a
temporary job and was not stable enough to withstand the heavy traffic to which
it was subjected. The inherent danger was such, in our opinion, that only the
stationing of flagmen would have been a sufficient safeguard under the
circumstances. The fact that the respondent?s employees ran out of slag and
substituted less stable material, pea gravel and sand, to
96 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
finish the fill, should have alerted them to the apparently inevitable result.
Sheriff Wright?s testimony establishes that much of the fill had been knocked
out of the ditch by traffic not long after work was finished, and the
respondent?s general foreman admitted that the ditch was 18 inches deep before
7:00 o?clock the next morning. Assuming that the ?road construction? signs were
properly in place, the claimants came upon this hazardous condition suddenly
and, we believe, without sufficient warning. There is nothing to show that
either of them was driving at an unreasonable speed, or that they failed to
take any proper precaution or defensive measure. We find that the respondent
was negligent; and we cannot say that the claimants were guilty of such conduct
as would bar their recovery.
With regard to damages, we have considered the testimony of the claimants
relating to their injuries, all medical evidence and the claimants? loss of
earnings as shown in the record. Both claimants were in good health at the time
of the accidents. While both claim limitations of their activities, they have
resumed their former employment.
Claimant Hale sustained injury to his cervical spine, with continuing residual
strain of the muscles and ligaments of his neck, not of a permanent nature, and
his physician confirms that he is still suffering from tinnitus (hearing
noises) in the left ear, which may not be reversible, and that some loss of
hearing has resulted. He missed five weeks? work and his loss of wages was
$2,082.13. Medical and hospital charges amounted to $679.70. The Court assesses
his damages at $8,250.00.
Claimant Wingate sustained a fracture of the second lumbar vertebrae of his
spine, and while the prognosis is unclear, he is not expected to attain final
recovery for several years. He was confined to the hospital for eight days and
was unable to return to work for about eight months. His loss of wages was
approximately $3,750.00, and his medical and hospital bills totalled $794.30.
We have assessed his damages at $11,000.00.
In consideration of the foregoing, the Court hereby awards the claimant, Thomas
Edison Hale, the sum of $8,250.00, and the claimant, Larry Lee Wingate, the sum
of $11,000.00.
Awards: Thomas Edison Hale?$8,250.00.
Larry Lee Wingate?$11,000.00.
W. VA.]
REPORTS STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 97
Opinion issued February 20, 1976
ASHLAND CHEMICAL COMPANY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(No. D-928)
PER CURIAM:
The claimant during fiscal year 197 2-73 delivered certain material to the West
Virginia Penitentiary and invoiced the respondent for a net amount of $249.65.
Likewise, during fiscal year 1973-74 material was delivered to respondent, and
it was invoiced in the net amount of $51.80.
The record clearly reflects that the respondent expired sufficient funds in its
current expense appropriation in fiscal year 1972-73 from which the net amount
of $249.65 could have been paid. This is not true for fiscal year 1973-74, and
consequently we must deny the claim for the year in the amount of $51.80 on the
basis of our decision in Airlcem Sales
and Service, et al v. Department of Mental Health, 8
Ct. Cl. 180.
Award of $249.65.
Disallowed?$5 1.80.
Opinion issued February 20, 1976
VALLEY WELDING SUPPLY COMPANY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(No. D-820b)
PER CURIAM:
The respondent in May of 1973 ordered certain welding rods from the claimant,
and these welding rods were shipped to the West Virginia Penitentiary on May
25, 1973 and were accepted by the respondent. The claimant submitted an invoice
dated May 25, 1973 for these rods, but for some unexplainable reason the
invoice in the amount of $25.70 was not paid. The record reflects that
sufficient funds in the respondent?s current expense appropriation
98 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
for fiscal year 1972-73 were expired from which this invoice could have been
paid, and the Court accordingly makes an award in favor of the claimant in the
amount of $25.70.
Award of $25.70.
Opinion issued March 4, 1976
FRED H. GREGORY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-972)
PER CURIAM:
A stipulation was filed in this claim which revealed that during the month of
February, 1975, the claimant, while operating his automobile in a prudent and
reasonable manner, was involved in an accident on State Route 4 in Cross Lanes,
West Virginia, approximately one-half mile from the route?s intersection with
West Virginia State Route 62. The stipulation further revealed that the
claimant?s vehicle struck a hole or sunken area in the highway which was at
least 8 inches deep and that the area was not marked in any manner to give
warning of its existence, although the respondent was aware of the condition.
Damages in the amount of $35.63 were also stipulated, and being of the opinion
that the facts set forth in the stipulation create liability and that the
damages are reasonable, we thus make an award in favor of the claimant in the
amount of $35.63.
Award of $35.63.
Opinion issued March 4, 1976
MOTORS INSURANCE CORPORATION,
SUBROGEE OF QUINCY E. HOLSTEIN
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-1009)
PER CURIAM:
The stipulation filed in this claim reveals that the claimant?s insured, Quincy
E. Holstein, sustained damage to his automobile
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 99
on June 12, 1975, on State Route 3 in Boone County, West Virginia, when the
same was struck by certain rocks and other debris resulting from dynamiting
being performed by the respondent. The stipulation further reveals that the
claimant, pursuant to its policy with Holstein, paid him the sum of $228.00 to
reimburse him for his loss. Being of the opinion that the stipulation reflects
liability against the respondent and being of the opinion that the damages are
reasonable, an award is accordingly made.
Award of $228.00.
Opinion issued March 4, 1976
MOUNTAINEER MOTEL, INC.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(No. CC-76-15)
PER CURIAM:
From May 22, 1974 until June 9, 1974, a period of 19 days, one Jerry Daff, a
Correctional Officer employed by the respondent, was required to stay at the
Mountaineer Motel in Morgantown, West Virginia, in connection with his
custodial duties relating to Eugene Venerable, an inmate of the West Virginia
Penitentiary, but, who during the above mentioned dates, was confined to the
University Hospital at Morgantown, West Virginia.
The claimant billed the respondent for $250.79 covering its charges for the
lodging of Daff. The record reflects that the respondent did not expire any
funds for this purpose at the close of fiscal year 1973-74, and consequently,
any payment of this claim would be illegal, and we must deny the same pursuant
to our decision in Airkem Sales and
Service, et at v. Department of Mental Health, 8 Ct. Cl. 180.
Claim disallowed.
100 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued March 4, 1976
THE QUEEN CITY BREWING COMPANY
vs.
NONINTOXICATING BEER COMMISSION
(No. D-923)
E. W. Hiserman, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. GARDEN,
JUDGE:
On December 20, 1974, the claimant, The Queen City Brewing Company of Cumberland,
Maryland, ceased its brewing operations. Earlier in 1974 it had paid to the
respondent, in advance, the tax on a certain amount of crowns and lids and had
purchased a certain amount of tax stamps for affixing to its barreled beer
products. As a consequence of having purchased these items in advance, a
considerable number were still on hand and unused when its operations ceased.
An affidavit of two representatives of respondent?s office was introduced which
reflected the destruction of certain crowns, lids and barrel tax stamps
representing a total prepaid tax of $8,974.82. Claimant now seeks a refund of
this amount.
The issue in the present claim has been before this Court in the claims of General Foods Corporation v. State Tax Commissioner, 9 Ct. Cl. 193, Central
Investment Corporation v. Nonintoxicating Beer Commissioner, (D-740), and The
F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co.
v. Nonintoxicating Beer Commissioner, (D-904),
and we have consistently held that to permit the retention of prepaid taxes, in
situations such as this, would constitute the sanctioning of unjust enrichment.
Believing that in equity and good conscience that this claim should be paid, we
make an award in Vcor of claimant in the amount of $8,974.82.
Award of $8,974.82.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 101
Opinion issued March 4, 1976
STONEWALL CASUALTY COMPANY
vs.
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
(No. D-1037)
PER CURIAM:
On December 28, 1973, in Summers County, West Virginia, Hubert D. Adkins and
Steven P. Rollyson in their capacity as members of the West Virginia National
Guard commandeered an automobile owned by one Lloyd Fox. As a result of their
carelessness and negligence, the automobile was destroyed. Lloyd Fox?s
automobile was insured by claimant, and as a result, the claimant paid Fox
$1,200.00. A $306.00 salvage was later realized, leaving claimant with a net
loss of $894.00. These facts appear from a written stipulation entered into
between the parties, and believing that liability does exist, an award of
$894.00 is accordingly made to the claimant.
Award of $894.00.
Opinion issued April 2, 1976
CHARLESTON AREA MEDICAL CENTER, INC.
vs.
DIVISION OF VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION
(No. D-1014)
John Krivon yak, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. JONES,
JUDGE:
Prior to March 31, 1975, the respondent, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation,
referred eligible clients for inpatient hospitalization to the claimant,
Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., at a fixed charge on a per diem basis.
The arrangement became unsatisfactory to the claimant, and negotiation of a new
contract had been underway for several months. On March 31, 1975, a contract
was executed and by its express terms was made
102 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
retroactive to October 1, 1974. The contract established a schedule of charges
at 97% of the regularly billed charges for each individual patient sponsored by
the respondent.
There appears to have been an oral understanding between the parties that
billings for the difference between the old per diem rate, which the respondent
had continued to pay during the period of negotiation, and the new percentage
rate provided by the written contract, would be submitted not later than March
31, 1975, and by letter dated February 14, 1975, directed to ?Hospital
Administrators of West Virginia?, the claimant was so advised. This so-called
deadline later was extended to April 14, 1975.
The claimant says that all billings were submitted on time and that nine
remaining separate accounts totalling $2,972.37 are owing and unpaid. The
respondent says that ten accounts totalling $3,156.77 were not received until
August, 1975, after budgeted funds had expired. By letter to the claimant dated
August 29, 1975, the respondent expressed ?regret? that it could not pay the
claims ?direct? but that a claim could be filed in this Court.
Contrary to the import of the letter last referred to, its writer and the
respondent?s witness at the hearing of this case, invoked a contract provision
as follows: ?This agreement may be modified with the mutual consent of both
parties.? The witness contended that the contract was modified by ?agreement?
of the parties to conform to deadlines for the submission of bills. The record
indicates that this was largely a unilateral proposition, but whether it was or
not, the contract is silent as to when billings should be submitted, so there
was nothing in the contract in that regard that could be modified. The contract
is clear that all proper bills from October 1, 1974, were included and should
be paid under its terms. There is no question that the services were rendered
and full value was received.
There is some confusion as to whether or not the unpaid invoices were submitted
by the claimant prior to the close of the 1974-75 fiscal year, but in any
event, the Court is of opinion that the billings constitute just claims, there
were expired funds sufficient to pay them, and in good conscience they should
be paid.
Accordingly, the Court awards the claimant, Charleston Area Medical Center,
Inc., the sum of $2,972.37.
Award of $2,972.37.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 103
Opinion issued April 2, 1976
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
CO.,
SUBROGEE OF MONROE HAMON
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-1040)
PER CURIAM:
The written Stipulation filed in this claim reveals that on September 18, 1975,
Monroe Hamon, after being so directed by an employee of respondent, attempted
to drive his automobile across Fenwick Bridge, a part of W. Va. Route 39, in
Fenwick, West Virginia, and upon which respondent?s employees were working; and
that while crossing the bridge, employees of respondent dropped hot metal on
the automobile causing damages in the amount of $289.69. Being of opinion that
liability does exist, and that the damages are reasonable, an award in that
amount is hereby made.
Award of $289.69.
Opinion issued May 5, 1976
EDNA BEAUCHAM
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-1024)
Claimant appeared in person.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, of the Department of Highways, for the
respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
At about 5:30 P.M. on October 26, 1975, the claimant was operating her 1967
Oldsmobile Cutlass on W. Va. Route 119 between Blair, W. Va. and Sharples, W.
Va. when she struck a large pothole which extended across the entire width of
Route 119. As a result, her entire exhaust system, including the muffler, was
damaged and had to be removed from the car before the car could be extricated
from the hole. In addition, her gas tank was ruptured
104 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
and had to be replaced. The automobile was repaired at a cost of
$174.95.
Mrs. Beaucham and her daughter had left Charleston earlier that day to attend
to some personal matters in Logan County, and it was during their return trip
when the accident occurred. She quite candidly admitted during her testimony
that she was well aware of the existence of this hole. She stated that on the
way down earlier in the day, she avoided the hole by driving onto the berm to
her right and off of the paved portion of the highway. She accounts for her
failure to observe the hole on her return trip by reason of it being obscured
by a small knoll in the road over which she had passed just prior to striking
the hole. The hole must have been quite large for she testified that school bus
drivers were in the habit of discharging their children, having them walk on
the berm, and then re-enter the bus after it had traversed the hole in the
highway.
We have no difficulty under these circumstances in finding respondent guilty of
negligence, but we cannot at the same time overlook the lack of due care on the
part of the claimant. She testified that she was traveling around 45 to 50
miles per hour when she struck this hole. We doubt that her speed was that high
but certainly, whatever her speed, it was too great for the conditions then and
there existing, conditions of which she was fully aware. Reluctantly, we must
conclude that the claimant was guilty of contributoiy negligence which was the
proximate cause of the accident and damages to claimant?s automobile.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued May
5,1976
WANDA M. GANNON
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-675)
Claimant appeared in person.
Nancy Norman, Attorney at Law, for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
In 1972 the claimant was the owner of certain real estate adjacent to Route 52
in Mingo County between the Towns of Gilbert and
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 105
Justice, the same having been devised to her in 1966 by her aunt, Josie I.
Pratt. This real estate consisted of two separate and distinct tracts, one on
each side of Route 52 which, near these properties, runs in an
easterly-westerly direction. On the south side of Route 52, the claimant owned
four lots upon two of which were constructed small five-room residences. These
lots will be hereinafter described as Parcel 1. Just east of Parcel 1 and on
the north side of Route 52, the claimant owned about eight acres upon which was
constructed a much larger residence and several out-buildings. This property
will be hereinafter referred to as Parcel 2.
The testimony disclosed that when the respondent constructed Route 52 in 1925,
a culvert was constructed under Route 52 which carried surface water from
Parcel 1 and the mountain area behind Parcel 1, and then through a drain to the
Guyandotte River, located some 300 feet north of and running parallel to Route
52. The respondent in 1925, also constructed an additional culvert under Route
52 to the east of the above-mentioned culvert and which discharged surface
water upon Parcel 2. Apparently, the volume of water through this culvert was
minimal, and the water so flowing through this culvert meandered through Parcel
2 in a small ditch to the Guyandotte River.
Early in 1972 this area experienced a rather severe rainfall and resultant
flood. Apparently, the culvert ncJ drain
constructed in the area of Parcel 1 caused considerable flooding in the
building then owned by the Bailey Lumber Company which was located north of
Route 52 and directly across Route 52 from Parcel 1. As a result of this
flooding, either the Bailey Lumber Company or the respondent concreted the
culvert near the north side of Route 52. As a result, the surface water which
ordinarily would have flowed through this culvert was backed up and into the
basements of the two residences on Parcel 1. Additionally, the water then
flowed on the southerly side of Route 52 in an easterly direction to the
culvert near Parcel 2. Because of the resultant large flow of water through
this culvert, waters inundated Parcel 2 owned by claimant on each occasion of a
heavy rainfall. Claimant called this condition to the attention of respondent
by letter, but respondent took no action to remedy the problem.
While there was no direct evidence presented that the respondent concreted the
culvert at its end near the Bailey Lumber Company and even assuming that
respondent did not do the
106 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
concreting, we are of opinion that liability for the damage to claimant?s
properties must rest with respondent. This Court has held where an open ditch
which has served as adequate drainage for a road was removed in widening the
road and caused flooding, the inadequate drainage provisions were the proximate
cause of damages to claimant?s property. Osborne
v. Department of Highways, 10 Ct. Cl.
83. Even if respondent did not do the concreting, having been notified of the
fact and failing to take appropriate remedial action, we feel liability must be
cast upon respondent.
Claimant testified that she sold Parcel 1 in November of 1973, one month after
she filed this claim, for $8,500.00. She was of opinion that before the
flooding, the property had a fair market value of $12,500.00, and thus she had
sustained a loss of $4,000.00 by reason of the continual flooding. In respect
to Parcel 2, she was of the opinion that this property had depreciated
$2,000.00 in value. Mrs. Gannon testified that while she has resided in
Greenville, South Carolina, for the past six years, that for a period of
seventeen (17) years, she sold real estate in the Charleston area for the Fred
W. Smith Company, and we are of opinion that she was qualified to express an
opinion as to valuation in respect to her property.
The respondent?s only witness, Gary Tokarcik, testified in respect to damages.
Mr. Tokarcik, a graduate of Fairmont State College and a former staff appraiser
of respondent for over five years, testified that he had examined the subject
properties and had made an examination of sales of comparable properties in
Mingo County, and that he was of opinion that each parcel had suffered damage
in diminution of market value as a result of flooding since the improper
concreting of the culvert. In his opinion, Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 suffered
diminutions in market value of $2,000.00 and $1,450.00 respectively.
We are of opinion to accord greater weight to respondent?s witness as to
damages, because we feel his qualifications in this area are higher than those
of claimant?s. We conclude that Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 have been damaged as a
result of respondent?s negligence in the amounts of $2,000.00 and $1,450.00
respectively.
Award of $3,450.00.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 107
Opinion issued May 5, 1976
GROVER A. HARMON
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-1016)
Lawrence W. Burdette, Jr., Attorney at Law, for the claimant. Nancy Norman, Attorney
at Law, for the respondent.
WALLACE, JUDGE:
On October 26, 1973, at approximately 10:45 p.m. the claimant herein, Grover A.
Harmon, was driving his 1968 Ford F250 pickup truck in a southerly direction in
Kanawha County, West Virginia on West Virginia State Secondary Road Route 5/6,
also known as Woodrum?s Lane. The night was dark and cloudy, the road was dry.
The claimant testified he was traveling at approximately 25 to 30 miles per
hour; that he did not travel the road often, the last time being before it was
paved.
At a point approximately 4/10 of a mile south of the intersection of West
Virginia State Route 5 and West Virginia Secondary Road Route 5/6 or Woodrum?s
Lane, the southbound traffic proceeds up a hill turning to the left and then
down the hill.
As the claimant made the turn to the left and then proceededthe hill, he
suddenly came upon a slip in the road approximately 50 to 100 feet from the
turn where a portion of the road reserved for the southbound traffic had fallen
away.
When the claimant?s truck struck the slip, he lost control, veered across the
road striking the bank on the other side of the road and the truck turned over
on its right side.
Trooper J. R. Smith of the West Virginia Department of Public Safety testified
that he came upon the accident while answering another call. He found the
claimant in his overturned truck an assisted him in getting out. The claimaflt
appeared to be bruise and limping.
The trooper further testified that he had seen the slip prior to the accident
but the paved portion of the road was not broken the first time he saw it. He
testified that he notified the District Office of the Department of Highways in
Charleston, West Virginia, of the accident and that signs were needed right
away.
108 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
At the time of the accident there were no traffic control signs warning of the
slip, broken pavement or one way traffic.
Residents who lived in the area of the slip testified that the slip started
developing sometime after the road was paved in 1972; that it continued to
become worse; that the slip eventually became one to three feet into the lane
of traffic and was approximately ten to fifteen feet long. Several residents
testified that they had notified the North Charleston Office of the Department
of Highways of the condition prior to the accident but nothing was done to
correct the condition nor to erect signs warning of the danger.
No testimony was introduced by the respondent to refute the claimant or the
claimant?s witnesses as to liability.
The claimant left the accident in the wrecker that removed his truck. He did
not seek medical attention until the Monday following the accident at which
time he was treated by Dr. Carl J. Roncaglione for injury to the inside of his
left knee. It later became necessary to operate on the knee in January, 1974.
The claimant returned to work in June, 1974.
The claimant?s left knee had previously been operated on in September, 1972,
and it was again injured in July, 1974. It is difficult to ascertain from the
testimony and the evidence the extent of the injury caused by the accident.
The certificate of Dr. Carl J. Roncaglione introduced by the claimant shows no
permanent disability anticipated. The respondent had the claimant examined by
Dr. H. A. Swart. The written statement of Dr. Swart, introduced without
objection, stated there was some disability due to the various injuries and
operations on the left knee but hcrw much was due to each one was
unascertajnable.
From the testimony and evidence presented, this Court finds that the claimant
was driving at a lawful rate of speed without knowledge or warning of the danger
of the slip and is entitled to recover.
The Court further finds that the claimant is entitled to recover $12,039.52 for
loss of compensation from his employment, medical expenses, personal property
loss, pain and suffering.
Testimony pertaining to damages without supporting proof has not been
considered by the Court.
Award of $12,039.52.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 109
Opinion issued Mctj 5, 1976
KARL HOOVER
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-769)
Claimant appeared in person.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
An abbreviated hearing was held in this claim on November 11, 1975. At that
time, we suggested to the claimant, who was not represented by counsel, that he
should employ an attorney, and we continued the hearing generally to afford him
time to do so. He apparently has elected not to do so, and the claim has been
submitted to us for decision on the pleadings.
The Notice of Claim filed by the claimant does not clearly express the basis of
the claim, but reading between the lines, it would appear that the claimant
owned certain real estate in Nicholas County, a portion of which was earlier
condemned by respondent for highway purposes. Claimant is now seeking recovery
in this Court for certain surveying expenses incurred during the condemnation
proceeding, certain rental expenses, relocation expenses, and the difference
between the value of a home on the subject property and a mobile home which he
was required to purchase. Clearly, all of these items of damage arose directly
or indirectly from the condemnation proceeding.
The respondent has filed an Answer denying liability and, in addition, a Motion
to Dismiss. A certified copy of an agreed Final Order entered by the Circuit
Court of Nicholas County on May 18, 1973 in the then pending condemnation
action was filed as an exhibit with the Motion to Dismiss. This Final Order,
approved and signed by the claimant and his wife, clearly reflects the
acceptance of $3,400.00 by the claimant as full and complete payment for the
take or acquisition and damages, including damage to the residue.
Code 14-2-14 excludes from the jurisdiction of this Court a proceeding which
could be maintained against the State in state court. Had the respondent sin1y
taken claimant?s property. without resort to condemnation, ?I?imant through a
ma?damu
110 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
action instituted in the Circuit Court of Nicholas County could have forced
respondent to institute a condemnation action. We are, for that reason, of the
opinion that we have no jurisdiction to entertain this claim. We are of further
opinion that the Final Order of the Circuit Court of Nicholas County reflects
on its face that claimant has released respondent from the various items of
damage sought to be recovered in this claim.
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is sustained, and this claim
is dismissed.
Claim dismissed.
Opinion issued May 28, 1976
MARGARET MAE CANTRELL,
Administratrix of the Estate of
Melvin Aaron Cantrel], deceased
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS,
(formerly State Road Commission)
(No. D-240)
WILLIAIVI FREDERICK WHITE,
Administrator of the Estate of
James A. White, deceased
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS,
(formerly State Road Commission)
(No. D-268o)
Chester Lovett, Stephen P. Meyer,
Harry A. Sherman, John S. Haight, Perry S. Poffenbarger, James T. Cooper, and L. D.
Egnor, Attorneys at Law for claimants.
Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Attorney General, Edgar E. Bibb, III, Assistant
Attorney General, Anthony G. Halkias, Director-Legal Division, Department of Highways,
counsel for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
On December 15, 1967, at approximately 5:00 p.m., the Silver Bridge, which
spanned the Ohio River from Point Pleasant, West
W. VA.) REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 111
Virginia, to a point on the Ohio shore a few miles north of Gallipolis, Ohio,
collapsed, constituting one of the worst disasters, if not the worst, in the
history of the State of West Virginia. At the time of collapse, there were 37
vehicles on the bridge, 29 vehicles in the westbound lane and the remaining 8
vehicles (six cars and two heavily laden gravel trucks) in the eastbound lane.
Six vehicles were on the approach span and not affected by the collapse. Seven
vehicles fell to the ground below the Ohio side span and the remaining
vehicles, 24 in number, fell into the river. Of the 64 persons in the 31
vehicles that fell with the bridge, 46 died and 9 of the 18 survivors were
injured.
As a result of this disaster, 56 claims for wrongful death, personal injury and
property damage were filed in this Court, and two additional wrongful death
claims were filed just prior to December 15, 1974, seeking recovery for the
wrongful death of two persons whose bodies were never recovered from the Ohio
River. At the initial stages of this litigation, it was stipulated that in
Claim Nos. D-240 and D-268o, Margaret Mae Cantrell, Administratrix, and William
Frederick White, Executor, were the legal representatives of two of the persons
who died as a result of this tragedy. It was further stipulated that a
determination of respondent?s liability in the above-mentioned claims would be
dispositive of all other claims pending in this court as a result of the bridge
collapse. It was further understood that only the issue of liability would be
decided at this time, and that should it be determined that liability rested
with respondent, additional testimony would be presented for the purpose of
determining the proper amount of awards in each case.
On May 13, 1926, Congress authorized the construction of the Silver Bridge by
the Gallia County Ohio River Bridge Company, an Ohio corporation, which had
been formed prior thereto for the purpose of constructing a toll bridge across
the Ohio River between Gallipolis, Ohio, and Point Pleasant, West Virginia.
Initial plans for the bridge were submitted to the United States Engineers?
office in Der.ember of 1?926. Iri.I?y of l927;J. Greii4er Company, as
consultthg engineer, prepared ?lans and specifications for the new bridge using
parallel wire cables with two alternative methods of suspension, including
eyebars. The contract for the construction of the bridge was awarded to the
General Contracting Company of Pittsburgh, Pa., and American Bridge Company (a
division of United States Steel Corporation) was awarded the sub-contract for
the construction of the
112 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
superstructure. On July 1, 1927, American Bridge Company entered into a
contract with General Contracting Company to build the superstructure using
eyebars as the suspension method in lieu of parallel wire cables. The
consulting engineer, J. E. Greiner Company, approved these plans in June of
1927. The bridge was completed in late June of 1928, and on June 29, 1928, the United
States District Engineer reported that the conditions of the permit issued to
the owner of the bridge, ?had been fully complied with and the work completed
in substantial accordance? with the approved plans. The total cost of the
bridge was $898,096.44, of which $862,341.44 was attributed to construction.
After construction, the bridge was operated as toll bridge by its owner until
December 24, 1q41, when it was sold to the State of West Virginia.
As constructed, the Silver Bridge was a heat-treated eyebar chain suspension
bridge. It had a total of seven spans or sections, two 75? 3? spans (one on
each end); two 75-foot spans (one on each side); two 380-foot spans (one on
each side); and a center span of 700 feet. The two 380-foot spans and the 700-foot
span were in suspension, and the eyebar chain also operated as a portion of the
upper chord of the stiffening truss in the 700-foot and the two 380-foot spans.
The bridge and approaches were supported by six concrete piers (number 1
through 6, west to east), and the chain was affixed to two rocker towers
(located on piers 3 and 4) each of which towers was 130? 10?? high, extending
approximately 95 feet above the deck or roadway. The roadway was 21 feet wide,
and there was a 5? 6? wide sidewalk inside the stiffening truss on the upstream
or north side of the bridge. Althougn the roadway, as originally designed, was
to accommodate three lanes of traffic, it was ultimately constructed with only
two lanes for movinffic, The chain suspension system was anc}iored dn each side
of theiver by almost identical anchorage chambers each of which was 44 feet
across the front, 34 feet across the back and 200 feet long. The anchorages
were filled with steel reinforced concrete and earth, each of which weighed
approximately 10,000,000 pounds, and under each was embedded 405 steel
reinforced concrete piles 15 feet long.
The chain suspension system contained a total of 148 eyebars, varying in length
from 34? 8?/2? to 65? ??, the lightest weighing 2,560 pounds and the heaviest
5,306 pounds. Eyebar 330 (the origin of the ultimate collapse) was 63? 11? in
length and weighed 5,053 pounds. The head of the eyebar was 28 inches in
diameter, 1 and 15/16 inches thick and 12 inches wide. It was connected to
other eyebars
W. VA.J REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 113
at what will later be referred to as joint C-13 by a pin which was 11?/2 inches
in diameter, 13 inches in length and weighing in excess of 300 pounds.
As earlier mentioned, the bridge was constructed on six concrete piers. Piers
3, 4 and 5, as constructed, were erected in the river, resting on steel
reinforced concrete caissons which in turn were resting on bedrock. Piers 1 and
6, so-called land piers and being the most westerly and easterly piers of the
bridge, supported only the approaches and were completely independent of any
support for the spans in suspension. Pier 2, on the Ohio side, was also
constructed on land. For vehicular traffic, the roadway of the bridge had a
vertical clearance of 16 feet, and the height of the roadway above the water at
normal pooi stage was in excess of 100 feet.
Two other events took place after the bridge was completed in 1928, both of
which the claimants vigorously contended led to or contributed to the ultimate
collapse of the bridge. In 1937, the Gallipolis Lock and Dam was completed some
14 miles down-stream from the Silver Bridge. This dam raised the elevation of
the river 18? feet above the normal pool stage at the Silver Bridge. Then again
between 1949 and 1952, a floodwall was constructed on the West Virginia side of
the Ohio River at Point Pleasant. It was so constructed that the base of the
floodwall was 26? vertical feet and 100 feet horizontally from the normal pool
stage and the edge of the river.
Respondent?s first concern immediately after the collapse was to rescue any
survivors who might have been trapped in submerged vehicles. Thereafter, its
attention was directed to the recovery of the bodies of the victims, and then
to the removal from the water, those portions of the bridge which had collapsed
in the river with the ultimate purpose of opening the channel for river
traffic.
Prior to the collapse, the U. S. Corps of Engineers had contractors working
upstream on one of their projects and within hours after the collapse, they
were able to move very heavy barge-mounted cranes onto the site. These
contractors obtained a crew of divers who came in and assisted in the salvage
operation. The respondent assigned engineers on a round-the-clock basis to
superintend the salvage operation and instituted a system of marking each
structural member of the bridge as it was removed from the river so that it
could later be identified during the re-assembly process, hereinafter
described. This was a most
114 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
difficult procedure for many of the structural members were buried under
concrete from the roadbed of the bridge and had to be cut before they could be
removed from the river. Most of this material was initially deposited on the
Ohio shoreline. The salvage operation was largely completed in March of 1968
but not fully completed until July of the same year. At the end, it was
estimated that at least 80% of the metal members of the bridge had been
recovered.
When the news of the collapse reached Washington, the Federal Highway
Administration dispatched Charles F. Scheffey to Point Pleasant. Mr. Scheffey,
who was then with the research division of the Bureau of Roads, arrived in
Point Pleasant on the afternoon of December 16, 1967, and worked closely with
local federal highway people and representatives of the respondent in the
supervision of the salvage operation.
In the middle of the following week, and at the request of the Federal Highway
Administration, the National Transportation Safety Board was directed to assume
the investigation and determine the cause of the bridge collapse. The National
Transportation Safety Board was r,Iatively new at the time, haviig been in
existence less than a year. It had been formed when the Federal Department of
Transportation was created, but it is not a part of that department. It is an
independent board consisting of five members appointed by the President with
the specific mission to act as a watchdog on transportation safety. Prior to
its creation, the only comparable group was an aircraft disaster investigating
group within the Civil Aeronautics Board, but after its creation, the National
Transportation Safety Board was given the responsibility of investigating all
transportation-related disasters, including aircraft disasters.
The National Transportation Safety Board designated Admiral Louis M. Thayer, a
member of the Board, to officially head the investigation. Three separate
committees or working groups were appointed. There was a bridge design review
and bridge history group, a witness interrogation group and finally, a
structural analysis and test group, which was chaired by Charles F. Scheffey.
In addition to its own technicians, the structural analysis and test group were
supplemented by technical representatives from all parties in interest.
CwtisequentIy, tlitest roulincluaed representatives from the State of West
Virginia, the State of Ohio, J. E. Greiner Co. of Baltimore, Maryland, the
designers of the
W. VA.] -_REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 115
bridge, and United States Steel Corporation, the parent corporation of American
Bridge Company, the contractor for the erection of the superstructure. Also
named were representatives of the consulting firm of Modjeski & Masters
that had been retained by respondent to conduct an independent investigation
into the cause of the collapse, and representatives of the consulting firm of
Hardesty & Hanover that had also been retained by respondent to assist in
making a determination concerning the future of the Silver Bridge?s twin bridge
which spanned the Ohio River at St. Marys, West Virginia. The official working
group was further supplemented at the meetings by consultants and people from
the laboratories that conducted metallurgical tests on structural members from the
bridge.
Returning again to the salvage operation, sometime during the third night
following the collapse, eyebar 330 was recovered from the river. The people in
charge of the salvage operation had been instructed to be on the lookout for
any eyebar that appeared to be fractured. Upon being notified that an eyebar
had been recovered with a fractured eye, Mr. Scheffey went to the Ohio shore
where the eyebar had been taken and examined it. The mud was washed from the
fracture site, and to preserve the fracture site, a coating of hair spray
lacquer was applied. The outboard portion of the eye which had been fractured
was not found at this time. In order to locate the outboard portion of the eye,
dredging operations were conducted and the dredged material was sifted. In this
manner, several weeks later, the missing portion of eyebar 330 was located.
Respondent soon after the collapse leased a large pastureland area south of
Point Pleasant and on the east bank of the Ohio River. As earlier indicated,
the salvaged material, after being marked, was initially deposited on the Ohio
bank of the river, but after patterns of the bridge trusses were staked out on
the pastureland, the recovered structural members were transported to the
reconstruction site where the bridge was reconstructed with the north and south
sides of the trusses and their suspension chains laid out on horizontal plnes.
Detail?d inspections were conducted at the reconstruction site, and thereafter
various structural members, including eyebar 330, were transported to various
laboratories where extensive and detailed metallurgical tests were conducted.
Critical tests were conducted on eyebar 330 by the National Bureau of
Standards, and corroborative tests were performed by United States Steel Corporation
and Battelle Memorial Institute of Columbus, Ohio.
116 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
On December 16, 1970, and after the submission of several drafts by the three
working groups, the National Transportation Safety Board issued its report concerning
the collapse of the Silver Bridge. This report was introduced into evidence in
these claims in its entirety as Claimants? Exhibit 7. On page 126 of the report
under the caption VI. Cause, the following language was set forth:
?The Safety Board finds that the cause of the bridge collapse was the cleavage
fracture in the lower limb of the eye of eyebar 330 at joint C13N of the north
eyebar suspension chain in the Ohio side span. The fracture was caused by the
development of a critical size flaw over the 40-year life of the structure as
the result of the joint action of stress corrosion and corrosion fatigue.
Contributing causes are:
1. In 1927, when the bridge was designed, the phenomena of stress corrosion and
corrosion fatigue were not known to occur in the classes of bridge material
used under conditions of exposure normally encountered in rural areas.
2. The location of the flaw was inaccessible to visual inspection.
3. The flaw could not have been detected by any inspection method known in the
state of the art today without disassembly of the eyebar joint.?
Prior to taking any testimony, counsel for claimants and the respondent entered
a stipulation designating the issues. They were designated as follows:
1. (a) Negligence in original and/or revised design of the bridge as built in
1927.
(b) Negligence on the part of the State of West Virginia in 1941 in accepting
the bridge based on inadequate design.
(C) Negligence on the part of the State of West Virginia in
not reviewing the design of the bridge from 1941 to 1967.
2. Negligence in construction of the bridge and in the materials used in the
bridge.
3. Failure on the part of the State of West Virginia to adequately inspect the
bridge.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 117
4. Failure on the part of the State of West Virginia to adequately maintain the
bridge.
5. Negligence on the part of the State of West Virginia in failing to warn the
general public of the potential, discoverable or known dangers of the bridge
and/or failing to close the bridge or take other safety precautions.
6. Failure on the part of the State of West Virginia to adequately consider the
effect on the bridge of riverbed activities.
7. Negligence of the State of West Virginia in accepting and in maintaining the
bridge in its condition in violation of the Bridge Act of 1906, as constituting
a public nuisance.
8. Liability of the State of West Virginia in violation of an implied warranty
or representation of fitness for use by the general public.
9. Whether or not the collapse of the Silver Bridge was an unavoidable
accident.
10. Whether or not any of the acts or failures to act by the State of West
Virginia proximately caused or contributed to the collapse of the Silver
Bridge.
11. Whether the applicable West Virginia or applicable Ohio death statute
applied to each claim.
This Court commenced taking testimony on July 15, 1974, and on fourteen
additional days thereafter, completing the same on April 22, 1975. During that
period of time, a record consisting of 2,339 pages was compiled. Claimants
introduced into evidence 50 exhibits, respondent introduced 29, and 51
additional exhibits were introduced on the joint motion of claimants and
respondent.
We believe that the designated issues as set out above have been unduly
fragmented, and that a proper resolution of these claims requires us to resolve
the following three basic issues:
(1) Was the Silver Bridge negligently designed, and if so, was the State of
West Virginia negligent in purchasing the bridge in
1941?
(2) Was the State of West Virginia negligent in failing to consider the effect
on the bridge, if any, of the construction of the Gallipolis Dam in 1937, the
construction of the Point Pleasant floodwall between 1949 and 1952, and the
alleged striking of the
118 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
(3) Was the State of West Virginia negligent in failing to properly maintain
and inspect the Silver Bridge?
With the exception of Eugene Lloyd Gwinn, Edward L. Cundiff and Bill S.
Hanshew, Jr., all of the remaining witnesses testified as experts in their
respective fields. Eugene Lloyd Gwinn, a supervisory civil engineer with the
U.S. Army Engineers in Huntington, was called as a witness by the claimants and
through him, many of the documents in the possession of the U.S. Army Engineers
were identified and later introduced into evidence. Edward L. Cundiff, a bridge
inspector for respondent in District No. 1 during 1963, 1964 and 1965,
testified concerning his inspections of the Silver Bridge during those years,
the manner of making the inspections, the report form used to record the
results of such inspections, and generally, what his inspections during those
years revealed.
Bill S. Hanshew, Jr., the assistant district engineer in District No. 1 at the
time of the collapse, testified as to the training and instructions given to
bridge inspectors by respondent, the manual followed by bridge inspectors in
conducting investigations, and the results of various inspections that he
personally made. It should be noted that Mr. Hanshew was a 1958 civil
engineering graduate of West Virginia University. Because the testimony of the
expert witnesses will be referred to with frequency in the remainder of this
opinion, we deem it appropriate to briefly relate their respective
qualifications.
Dr. Istvan Stephen Tuba of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, testified on behalf of the
claimants. Dr. Tuba received a technology degree in 1952 from an institute in
his native country of Hungary. He thereafter obtained a degree from the Technical
University of Budapest which is the equivalent of a Bachelor of Science degree
in mechanical engineering in this country. He came to this country in 1956 and
continued to further his education. In 1960, he received his Masters degree in
mechanical engineering from Carnegie Institute of Technology in Pittsburgh, and
in 1964, his Doctorate from the University of Pittsburgh. Currently he is the
President of Basic Technology, a Pittsburgh based consulting firm. He has been
a lecturer at various universities in this country and at technical society
meetings all over the world. He is currently, on a part time basis, a professor
of mechanical engineering at the University of Pittsburgh.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 119
Dr. Charles A. Schacht of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, also testified on behalf of
the claimants. Dr. Schacht was graduated from Ohio State University in 1960
with a Bachelor?s degree in civil engineering. He continued his education at
Carnegie Institute of Technology and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and
ultimately obtained his Masters and Doctorate in civil engineering from
Carnegie Institute, the latter having been awarded in 1972. He was the
Executive Vice President of Basic Technology, but in October of 1974, was employed
by the United States Steel Corporation as its senior research engineer at the
company?s research laboratories near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Abba G. Lichtenstein of Leonia, New Jersey, was the remaining expert witness
called by the claimants. Mr. Lichtenstein was the top man in his graduating
class at Ohio State University where he received a civil engineering degree in
1948. Following his graduation, he worked for various companies as a bridge
engineer, including the designing of railroad bridges and highway bridges. In
1963, he formed his own company, A. G. Lichtenstein & Associates. His
company employs some 30 individuals, and 90% of the company?s activities are
bridge related. This includes bridge evaluation for cities, counties and
states, the recommending of repairs for immediate maintenance, the design of
replacements and the study of locations for new bridges. He has been engaged
continuously since 1948 in civil structural engineering. Of all of the
witnesses who testified in these proceedings, Mr. Lichtenstein undoubtedly was
the most experienced in the design of bridges.
Respondent in its case called Joseph S. Jones as its first witness. Mr. Jones,
presently State Highway Engineer-Construction, was graduated from North
Carolina State University with a Bachelor of Science degree in civil
engineering in 1948. He immediately upon his graduation went to work for the
respondent, and with the exception of an eight-year period between 1954 and
1962, he has been with the respondent in one capacity or another. During his
eight-year absence, he was the Assistant Chief Engineer of the West Virginia
Public Service Commission for three years. The other five years were spent with
the consulting engineering firm of Michael Baker Company, acting as its
Assistant Project Engineer in its Charleston office. During that period, the
Michael Baker Company had a consulting contract with the respondent for the
design and details for roadways and bridges for a large portion of Interstate
64 between Huntington and Charleston, and as a result, Mr. Jones actively
participated in the design of approximately 40
120 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
bridges in West Virginia and approximately 10 in the State of Kentucky. During
his many years with the Department of Highways, Mr. Jones has served as a
junior bridge design engineer, a senior bridge design engineer, assistant chief
engineer, chief engineer of operations (the position he held at the time of the
collapse), state highway engineer, and his present position of state highway
engineer-construction. During his years with respondent, he has actively
designed or assisted in the design of some 120 bridges.
Chester F. Comstock of Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, next testified on behalf of
respondent. Mr. Comstock received his civil engineering degree from Drexel
University in 1953, and while he did take some graduate courses, he does not
hold a Masters degree. After graduation in 1953, he joined the firm of Modjeski
& Masters of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and has worked continuously for them
with the exception of several years spent in the Army. The firm of Modjeski
& Masters is engaged basically in bridge and highway design. Mr. Comstock
indicated that he had no experience in design work but that his experience was
limited to bridge inspecting. He has inspected during his years with the firm
some 400 to 500 bridges, including suspension bridges, in all parts of the
country.
Charles F. Scheffey, the Chairman of the Structural Analysis and Test Group of
the National Transportation Safety Board, was the concluding expert witness
called by respondent. Mr. Scheffey received a Bachelor of Science degree in
civil engineering from Drexel University in 1943. He thereafter spent 3 years
in the service, principally in Korea. Following his return to this country, he
began graduate work at the University of California at Berkeley. He became a
part-time and later a full-time lecturer in the area of structural analysis and
design. He continued to teach at Berkeley for a period of 15 years. His principal
teaching assignments were senior engineering courses in bridge analysis and
design and graduate courses in bridge analysis. During this period he did
consulting work and conducted research projects for the California Division of
Highways. Some of his research projects for the Division of Highways included
problems associated with long-span bridges, including at least one suspension
bridge, the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, where he studied the most
appropriate loadings for such a long-span suspension bridge. He received his
Masters degree from the University of California in 1951. During 1957-1958 he
studied toward his Doctorate at the
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 121
Technical University of Darmstadt, Germany, but lacking his dissertation, the
Doctorate was never received. In 1964 he went to Washington, D.C. on a leave of
absence for the purpose of organizing and launching a program of research for
the Structures and Applied Mechanics Division of the Bureau of Public Roads. He
was doing that work when he became involved in the collapse of the Silver
Bridge.
In order to discuss the design of the eyebar suspension system of the Silver
Bridge, a more detailed description of the same is necessary and in particular,
at the precise point of failure. Two separate eyebars made up each link of the
suspension chain on the north side of the bridge as well as in the suspension
chain on the south side. Eyebar 330 was the upstream bar in the second panel
west of Pier 3. It was 63? 11? in length and weighed 5,053 pounds. Next and
adjacent to eyebar 330 and making up the second panel was eyebar 33. The
diameter of the heads of these two eyebars was 28?, and through the heads there
were drilled holes, the holes being eliptical in shape (12? vertically and
11-1/2? horizontally). At each joint, and in particular, at joint C-13, a steel
pin weighing about 300 pounds and being 11-1/2? in diameter was inserted
through the holes of the eyebars. Actually, this pin passed through the heads
of four eyebars. At joint C-13 it ran through the heads of eyebars 330 and 33
and the heads of the two eyebars making up the adjoining panel. In addition,
and between the eyebars, the pin ran through holes in two hanger plates. These
hanger plates were connected to the stiffening trusses which gave support to
the main body of the bridge. Consequently, at each joint, the steel pin went
through and pressure was exerted thereon by four eyebars and two hanger plates.
Through each of the pins, a 4? hole was drilled, through which a steel rod,
1-1/4? in diameter, was inserted. On each end of the rod, and consequently, on
each side of the complete joint, a retaining cap held by a double lock nut was
inserted. These retaining caps were 12-1/2? in diameter. The obvious purpose of these caps was to
keep the elements from the interior of the joint and in particular, those areas
within the joint where the pin went through the heads of the eyebars and the
hanger plates. They also effectively obscured from vision any portion of the
pin within the joint itself.
In order to determine whether the Silver Bridge was negligently designed, it
must be first ascertained the nature of the legal duty owed by the designer to
the bridge owner. We are of opinion that
122 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W.VA
the designers of the Silver Bridge, or of any bridge, are under a duty to
exercise reasonable care in the preparation of the plans and specifications to
the end that the bridge constructed pursuant thereto would be in a reasonably
safe condition for travel. We liken the duty of a bridge designer to that of an
architect, and we would refer to the language contained in 5 Am Jur 2d,
Architects ? 23, where the following is contained.
However, in the absence of any special agreement in that regard, an architect?s
undertaking does not imply or guarantee a perfect plan or satisfactory result,
and there is no assurance that miscalculations will not occur. Liability rests
only on unskilfulness or negligence, and not upon mere errors of judgment, and
the question of the architect?s negligence in the preparation of plans is one
of fact and within the province of the jury
By implication the claimants contended that the mere use of eyebars in the
suspension chain constituted an improper design, and they suggested that the
fact that eyebars are no longer used in bridge construction constituted
evidence of their impropriety. On the other hand, we believe the evidence
clearly reflected that their current lack of use in bridge construction is due
entirely to economic considerations and not to safety considerations.
Respondent?s witness Scheffey testified that currently some 17,000 heat-treated
eyebars are being used as members in various bridges in this country, and that
there were a substantial number of eyebar suspension bridges built between 1900
and 1930. Respondent?s witnesses Jones and Comstock testified that eyebars were
used in the chain suspension system of several European bridges, were used in
the Dresden Bridge over the Muskinghum River which was constructed in 1915,
were used in the Florianopolis Bridge which was built in Brazil in 1925, in the
Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Street Bridges constructed in Pittsburgh between 1925
and 1928, and in the St. Marys Bridge at St. Marys, West Virginia, constructed
in 1929. Testimony further established that eyebars, while not used in the
suspension system, are today present in such large bridges as the Greater New
Orleans and Huey Long Bridges in Louisiana, the Rip Van Winkle Bridge over the
Hudson River, the Walt Whitman Bridge in Philadelphia, and the Bluewater Bridge
at Port Huron, Michigan.
Mr. Lichtenstein was of the definite opinion that the Silver Bridge was
improperly designed. His contention was bottomed on
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 123
the fact that the design of the Silver Bridge differed in various ways from the
design of the Florianopolis Bridge located in Brazil. The Florianopolis Bridge
had been constructed by United States Steel Corporation a year or two before
the Silver Bridge, but it had been designed by Dr. David B. Steinman, who at
that time was one of the world?s most respected bridge designers. The J. E.
Greiner Company, as indicated before, originally designed the Silver Bridge
with the use of cables in the suspension system. They also submitted two
alternatives, one of which substituted eyebars in the suspension system instead
of cables. The design was modified by United States Steel Corporation in
various particulars, the most important of which was the use of heat-treated
eyebars in the suspension system. Mr. Lichtenstein testified that the two side
spans on the Florianopolis Bridge were not connected to the suspension chain,
whereas they were so connected in the design of the Silver Bridge. He pointed
out that this difference caused less vibration and less movement in the
Florianopolis Bridge and that to him, as a bridge designer, it constituted an
important difference. Secondly, he testified that Dr. Steinman reduced the
working load on the Florianopolis Bridge to 46,500 pounds per square inch
(p.s.i.), whereas the Silver Bridge?s working load or stress was designed at
50,000 p.s.i. Thirdly, Mr. Lichtenstein testified that Dr. Steinman thickened
the eyebar heads on the Florianopolis Bridge 1/16th of an inch on each side, or
a total of 1/8th of an inch, thus increasing their strength. Most importantly,
Mr. Lichtenstein was of the opinion that the use of four eyebars in each panel
as used in the Florianopolis Bridge instead of the two eyebars in each panel as
used in the Silver Bridge, greatly increased the safety of the Florianopolis
Bridge. He was of the opinion that if one bar broke on the Florianopolis
Bridge, the whole joint would shift, and that while the bridge would tilt,
traffic would have sufficient time to reach safety, whereas in the Silver
Bridge with one of only two eyebars breaking, an immediate collapse occurred.
His testimony in respect to this was sharply contradicted by witnesses Jones
and Scheffey, they being of the opinion that a fracture of one of four eyebars
in the Florianopolis Bridge would result in an immediate collapse.
Considerable testimony was introduced relating to factor of safety. In order to
understand this term, it is necessary to understand the terms working stress
and yield stress. Working stress is a figure adopted by a designer, and it
represents the amount of stress on a bridge member when it is under its
heaviest
124 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
loaded condition. Yield stress is a much higher figure and represents the
amount of stress necessary to cause bridge members to yield or give to a point
where they will not return to their original shape or position when the stress
is released. The factor of safety is determined by dividing the yield stress by
the working stress. Needless to say, the higher the factor of safety, the
better.
Mr. Lichtenstein pointed out that the Greiner Company in its original design of
the Silver Bridge called for a yield stress of 140,000 p.s.i. and a working
stress of 80,000 p.s.i., or a factor of safety of 1.75. He indicated that this
was a reasonable design but that in his opinion a factor of safety should
always exceed 1.75. On the other hand, after United States Steel Corporation
re-designed the bridge using eyebars, the design called for a yield stress of
75,000 p.s.i. and a working stress of 50,000 p.s.i., which resulted in a factor
of safety of 1.5, which he felt was improper design.
Mr. Lichtenstein did admit on cross-examination that after the bridge
collapsed, tests were run on the recovered eyebar, and the average yield stress
was 81,000 p.s.i., and he further admitted that this yield stress thus produced
a 1.62 factor of safety. Mr. Jones testified that according to his calculations
a factor of safety of 1.77 at eyebar 330 existed at the time of collapse. He
was of the further opinion that there is no magic in a 1.75 safety factor, and
that it is simply a judgement factor used by a designer in commencing the
design of a bridge structure. Mr. Scheffey was of the opinion that the factor
of safety in the Silver Bridge had nothing to do with its collapse. We note
with interest Mr. Jones? testimony that it had been established through
calculations that the stress on eyebar 330 at the time of the collapse was
42,500 p.s.i., or less than the working stress of 50,000 p.s.i. assigned to it
by the designer. We must, therefore, conclude that the factor of safety, be it
1.5 or 1.75 or more, had nothing to do with the collapse of the Silver Bridge.
In discussing the design of the Silver Bridge, the National Transportation
Safety Board used the following language on page 15 of its report adopted
December 16, 1970:
?The computation performed by the Bridge Design Review and History Group
(Reference 3 and Reference 5, Exhibit No. 3-E) indicated that the original
design had been executed in accordance with normal engineering practice in use
at the time of the original design, and that it was without mistakes or
significant errors in the original stress computations, although
W.VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 125
there was a minor error in the computed dead load stress in member L13-L15 of
the Ohio side span and corresponding members of the center span and West
Virginia side span. That group also established the fact that the stresses in
critical members of the eyebar chain and trusses produced by the loading on the
structure at the time of collapse were well below the specified maximum
stresses provided for in the original design. Computations were carried out by
the American Bridge Division of U.S. Steel using a digital computer, and were
independently checked by the firm of Modjeski and Masters.? (Emphasis added.)
After the collapse it was widely reported that the collapse was due to the
bridge being overloaded and due to the fact that the useful life of the bridge
had expired. The expert testimony clearly established that neither of these
reports was true. As part of the investigation and by acquiring copies of bills
of lading reflecting the weight of the loads carried by the trucks, the exact
amount of the live load on the bridge at the time of collapse was determined to
be 486,000 pounds. Live load is the weight superimposed on a bridge by vehicles
as contrasted with dead load which represents the weight of the bridge itself.
Mr. Jones testified that the live load of 486,000 pounds was actually only 40%
of the designed live load. Also the useful life of the bridge had not expired
at the time of collapse, Mr. Scheffey being of opinion that only one-sixth of
the useful life of the bridge had expired on the date of collapse.
We conclude on the basis of all of the foregoing that the design of the Silver
Bridge was prepared in accordance with good engineering practice as it existed
in 1926, and that the respondent was not negligent in purchasing the bridge, so
designed, in 1941.
Claimants through their witnesses, Dr. Tuba and Pr. Schacht attempted to
predicate liability ciii
respondent as a result of the
construction of the Gallipolis Dam in 1937 and the construction of the
floodwall at Point Pleasant, West Virginia, between 1949 and 1952. It was their
position that these activities caused additional waters to be cast upon the
piers and on the Ohio shore causing a weakening of the bridge structure and
anchorages, and that no steps were taken by respondent to rectify the situation.
They also contended that the bridge piers were damaged when they were struck by
run-away barges in April of 1966, and that no steps were taken to remedy that
damage.
126 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Dr. Tuba testified that whenever water level is increased, the moisture content
in the surrounding area is also increased and that this has a weakening effect
on the basic strength and basic behavior of the soil. He stated that this will
tend to soften the soil and that there can be a sinking of any structures on
the soil. He was of further opinion that because the soil was softened, it
could cause distortion patterns to be transmitted to the bridge structure
itself in terms of additional stresses and strains which would in the end
effect the weakest link in the bridge. Dr. Schacht was of the opinion that the
raising of the water level possibly caused a scouring effect on the Ohio shore
resulting from water flowing into the pier areas on the Ohio shore; that it
would change the permeability of the soil, or how it accepted water, and thus
reduce the strength characteristics of the same.
It developed during the testimony of Dr. Tuba and Dr. Schacht that both of
these gentlemen were basing their testimony on 36 source references connected
directly or indirectly with the collapse of the Silver Bridge, these references
having been furnished them by counsel for the claimants. It should be added
that in addition to these source references, their testimony was, of course,
also based on their training and experience in the fields of civil and
mechanical engineering. Counsel for the claimants attempted to elicit their
opinions through hypothetical questions, all of which were objected to
vigorously by counsel for the respondent. These objections were all based on
the fact that the hypothetical questions did not contain all of the material
facts and, in addition, included facts not in evidence or facts unsupported by
the evidence. At the conclusion of both 4Jr. Tuba?s and Dr. Schacht?s
testimony, counsel for respondent moved to strike their respective testimony,
and thereafter supported the motions with persuasive briefs. This Court, when
the motions were orally presented, took the motions under advisement and
indicated that rulings would be made after the Court had an opportunity to read
the transcript of their testimony.
Having reviewed their testimony, it is apparent that Dr. Tuba and Dr. Schacht
had no personal knowledge of the design of the Silver Bridge, the construction
of the Silver Bridge, the supporting structures of the Silver Bridge, the
materials used in its construction, the soils upon which the supporting
structures of the bridge rested, the details of the collapse of the Silver
Bridge, and the methods, accuracy or completeness of the investigation and the
results of the investigation conducted by the National
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 127
Transportation Safety Board. Neither of these witnesses had ever visited the
site of the collapse, nor had they had an opportunity to inspect any of the
structural members of the collapsed bridge. Although Dr. Tuba was testifying as
to the effect of the construction of the Gallipolis Dam on the Silver Bridge,
he was of the opinion that it was constructed in 1933, although, in fact, it
was completed in 1937. He did not know the year in which the Point Pleasant
floodwall was constructed. He did not know the number of piers supporting the
bridge, testifying that there were five, when, in fact, there were six. He
testified that prior to the construction of the dam, there were two piers in
the water and that after the construction, there were three, or maybe four,
piers in the water, when, in fact, the record clearly reflects that before and
after the dam was constructed, there were three piers in the river and three
piers on dry land. Dr. Tuba was of the opinion that the run-away barges
striking the piers of the Silver Bridge contributed to its lack of structural
integrity. He formed the opinion that the piers had been so struck from one of
the source materials furnished him which set forth a Coast Guard report of
run-away barges striking bridge piers at Point Pleasant, West Virginia. He was
unaware of the existence of the railroad bridge immediately north of the Silver
Bridge whose piers could have been struck. He was unable to state how many
barges struck what piers, th weight of the barges and other facts which in the
opinion of this Court would be necessary to form an opinion as to whether the
structural integrity of the Silver Bridge had been damaged. As a matter of
fact, respondent?s witness, Mr. Jones, who at the time of the alleged barge
incident, was in a position with the Department of Highways where he would have
been advised of such an incident, testified that he never in his official
capacity received any notice of such incident.
The above are simply a few illustrations which in this Court?s opinion
militates against our giving much weight to their testimony as experts, and we
conclude that the claimants have failed to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the construction of the Gallipolis Dam, the construction of the
Point Pleasant floodwall, or the run-away barge incident contributed in any way
to the ultimate collapse of the Silver Bridge.
The most serious issue and the one most difficult for this Court to resolve
involves the adequacy of the maintenance and inspection of the Silver Bridge by
respondent. In respect to the maintenance, there was evidence that, at least,
in January of 1963, when the
128 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
witness, Edward L. Cundiff, inspected the bridge, he noted on his report that
the bridge was rusted and in need of paint. The records of respondent as to
repairs were poorly documented, but there was testimony that all recommended
repairs during the years were made with the exception of some pier concrete
patching work. In this respect, witness Jones stated that in his opinion, the
minor deterioration in the piers had no effect on the eyebars in the bridge
structure. There was some testimony to the effect that there was corrosion and
rusting in secondary members, but it was agreed that such corrosion and rusting
in secondary members had absolutely no effect on the structural integrity of
the bridge itself nor in the structural integrity of the eyebars.
Extensive corrosion studies of all recovered structural members of the bridge
were conducted by the firm of Modjeski & Masters, and in respect to Eyebar
330, it was determined that the loss of section due to corrosion was less than
5%, and witness Scheffey testified that any loss of section below 5% was
insignificant. Witness Jones was of the opinion that the loss of section in
Eyebar 330 was no greater than 1%. It should be pointed out that loss of
section is a measure of the present load-carrying capability of a member as
compared to its original load-carrying capacity.
In respect to the painting of the Silver Bridge, an inspection of Eyebar 330
after the collapse revealed an adequate coat of paint, at least, on the
outboard side. The evidence reflected that the Silver Bridge had not been
painted prior to its collapse since 1963, but in the opinion of witness Jones,
the failure to paint between 1963 and December of 1967, did not cause or
contribute to the fracture in Eyebar 330 which led to the collapse of the bridge.
During the hearings, the question Was frequently asked as to why respondent
ultimately tore down the Silver Bridge?s sister bridge located in St. Marys,
West Virginia. Immediately after the collapse of the Silver Bridge, respondent
closed the St. Marys Bridge until a determination could be made as to the cause
of the collapse of the Silver Bridge. As indicated earlier, the firm of
Hardesty & Hanover was employed by respondent to make an extensive
investigation as to the integrity of the St. Marys Bridge. Witness Scheffey
testified that the examination was made with the best equipment which was then
available, but that no defects were found in the St. Marys Bridge. He further
indicated that they then took the same equipment and tested eyebars from the
Silver Bridge, but were also again unable to detect any cracks which they
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 129
knew were present and were critical, and, consequently, they concluded that the
examination of the St. Marys Bridge did not establish one way or the other
whether the structure was safe. They were aware of the fact that in the St.
Marys Bridge, the eyebars, because of the identity of design, were susceptible
to stress-corrosion and, consequently, respondent upon the recommendation of
the National Transportation Safety Board permanently closed the bridge and
ultimately dismantled it.
In the area of inspection, this Court is highly critical of the procedure, or
lack thereof, followed by respondent from its acquisition of the bridge in 1941
to the date of its collapse in December of 1967. The respondent maintained that
during the period of its ownership its records reflected official inspections
on at least 15 occasions, but yet, only 3 record cards reflecting inspections in
1959, 1963 and 1964 were introduced as exhibits. It appeared that these
inspections were conducted on a rather hit and miss procedure and were not
conducted generally by personnel with any specialized training in the art of
bridge inspecting. For example, on January 11, 1963, witness Cundiff, who prior
to his employment by respondent was a welder, inspected the Silver Bridge with
C. W. Morris, who Cundiff described as being a blacktop inspector and who only
accompanied him on this inspection as a safety factor. The evidence further
revealed that when these inspections were made, they were only cur?sory in
nature in respect to many areas of the bridge. This was puilular1y true in
respect to the inspection of the superstructure in spite of the fact that the inspectors
were following the instructions of a 1945 Maintenance Manual which read in part
as follows:
?The corrosion of the top cords of high trusses is not visible from the
roadway, but its inspection should not be slighted due to its inaccessability
In spite of the instructions contained in the manual, not one of respondent?s
witnesses testified that on any occasion was the superstructure inspected by
physically climbing the same. As far as inspecting the eyebars, including the
retainer caps which concealed the junctions of the eyebars and hanger plates,
respondent contented itself by inspecting the same through the use of
binoculars. This visual inspection through binoculars would take place either
by standing on the shore lines or by leaning out over the railing along the
sidewalk on the north side of the bridge. Respondent?s witnesses indicated that
on these occasions, they
130 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
would be looking for the presence of rust stain running from the bottom of the
retainer caps, and that if this rust stain was not observed, they would
conclude that no corrosion was taking place within the eyebars or on the pin
running through them.
Contrast that procedure with the procedure followed by the firm of Modjeski
& Masters as testified to by witness Comstock. Mr. Comstock testified that
prior to 1967, his firm was employed by many bridge authorities and railroad
companies for the purpose of making bridge inspections. He indicated that when
his company was employed to inspect a bridge initially, a team of men whould be
dispatched not only for the purpose of making an in-depth inspection, but also
for the purpose of making a rating analysis, and that after these initial
inspections were made, less formal inspections would be made on an annual
basis, and that ordinarily an in-depth inspection would be made every three
years. He testified that in conducting their inspections, the inspecting
personnel would always climb every part of a bridge superstructure and while
they would not remove all of the retaining caps on bridges similar to the
Silver Bridge, they would remove some on a spot-check basis in order to
deteutilne the existence of any corrosion on the areas of the eyebars and pins
that could be visualized.
We feel that the inspection procedures followed by respondent prior to December
of 1967, fell alarmingly short of good inspecting procedure.
On the other hand, we believe that the testimony overwhelmingly established
that the collapse of th Silver Bridge resulted from the phenomenon of
stress-corrosion which occurred in the inside of the eye in Eyebar 330 at Joint
13. Mr. Lichtenstein testified that the collapse was due to a combination of
two elements, that of extremely high stresses and some corrosion. Mr. Jones
testified that stress-corrosion was a combination of highly localized unit
stress with a mildly corrosive environment over a long period of time resulting
in the development of small cracks. Mr Scheffey was of the opinion that the
phenomenon should be defined as stress-corrosion cracking, and he further
defined it as a cracking of a metal portion of a structure or machine across an
area of tensile stress by the combined aetiGfl of a cQrroSive agent and that
sustained tensile stress. He further testified that in hi o,inion there would
have been no failure nor collapse of the Silver Bridge, absent the phenomenon
known as stress-corrosion cracking.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 131
It was also definitely established by the evidence that the phonemenon of
stress-corrosion or stress-corrosion cracking was either unknown in 1967 or was
unknown in moderate tensile strength steels used in bridge structures. Mr.
Lichtenstein stated that prior to the collapse of the Silver Bridge in 1967, he
was unaware of any instance in which stress-corrosion had been found to be the
cause of a fracture in an eyebar. Mr. Jones testified that prior to the
collapse of the Silver Bridge, he was not familiar with stress-corrosion nor
had he ever had any experience in stress-corrosion and he, like Mr.
Lichtenstein, had never heard of a bridge collapsing as a result of
stress-corrosion. Mr. Comstock, an experienced civil engineer and bridge
inspector, stated that he was unaware of the term stress-corrosion until after
the collapse of the Silver Bridge. Mr. Scheffey, on the other hand, testified
that while he had not studied the phenomenon in engineering school, he had
later become familiar with it and haa lectured about ft at the University of
California, but he indicated that he had never, prior to the collapse of the
Silver Bridge, experienced the phenomenon in moderate tensile strength steels
used in bridge structures, and he was of the opinion that the best bridge
designers in the engineering profession in 1967 would not have known that moderate
tensile strength steels were susceptible to stress-corrosion cracking.
In addition to the apparent lack of knowledge of this phenomenon, the evidence
vividly demonstrated that even if knowledge of this phenomenon did exist prior
to the collapse of the Silver Bridge, its presence inside of the eye of Eyebar
330 could not have been detected through the most careful and sophisticated
inspection by reason of its location within the eye which was tightly
compressed against the steel pin. Mr. Lichtenstein testified that the only way
the pin and the inside of the eye of Eyebar 330 could have been inspected would
have been by taking the pin out of the joint, and that, of course, would cause
a collapse. He did indicate that a system could have been constructed with
cables to support the bridge on a temporary 1ai while such an irspection could
take place, but that the cost of performing this operation would be between
$2,000,000.00 and $2,500,000.00. Mr. Jones agreed that it would have been
impossible to detect the flaw through inspection, and even if the inside of the
eye of the eyebar could have been visualized, the minute crack could not have
been detected except with microscopic instruments. Mr. Comstock and Mr.
Scheffey as well as the report of the National Transportation
132 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Safety Board agreed that the location of the flaw was inaccessible to visual
inspection.
While this Court is of the opinion that the respondent was guilty of negligence
in the inspection procedure which it followed through the years, this
negligence to be actionable, must have been the proximate cause of the collapse
of the Silver Bridge, and to constitute the proximate cause, the
stress-corrosion or stress-corrosion cracking within the eye of Eyebar 330 must
have been forseeable. State ex rel.
Cox v. Sims, 138 W.Va. 482, 77 S.E. 2d
151 (1953); Puffer v. Hub Cigar Store,
140 W.Va. 327, 84 S.E. 2d 145 (1954); Hartley v. Crede, 140 W.Va. 133, 82 S.E. 2d 672 (1.S54) and McCoy v. Cohen, 149 W.Va. 197, 140 S.E. 2d 427 (1965).
In Cox the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed an award of the
Court of Claims arising out of a claim against the State Road Commission. The
claim was the result of a fire caused by sparks from the defendant?s employee?s
creeper while the employee was repairing the leaking gas tank of a truck. The
Court, in refusing to issue a writ of mandamus against the Auditor compelling
him to issue the warrant, addressed itself to the issue of proximate cause and
foreseeability as an element of proximate cause, and stated as follows at page
496 of the West Virginia Reports, the following:
?Actionable negligence necessarily includes the element of reasonable
anticipation that some injury might result from the act. Koehier, Admr. v. Waukesha Milk Company, 190 Wis. 52, 208 N.W. 901. In Gerdes v. Booth and Flinn, 300 Pa. 586, 150 Ati.
483, the court used this language: ?* * * * B%generally a person cannot be
charged with negligence because he failed to anticipate unforeseen or
unusual circumstances or occurrences.? Failure to take pr*ccution1ry meast.i.s
to prevent an injury which if taken would ha?ve pre?ene4 the injury is not negligence
if the injury could not reasonably have been anticipated and would not have
happened if unusual circumstances had not occurred. Dennis v. Odend?Hal-Monks
Corporation, 182 Va. 77, 28 S.E. 2d 4;
Virginia Iron Coal and Coke Company v.
Hughes? Adm?r., 118 Va. 731, 88 S.E.
88. ?Where a course of conduct is not prescribed by mandate of law,
foreseeability of injury to one to whom duty is owed is of the very essence of
negligence. If injurious consequences are not foreseen as a result of the
conduct, then that conduct is not negligence.? 13 M.J., Negligence, Section 22.
See also Cleveland v. Danville
Traction and Power Company, 179 Va.
256, 18 S.E.
W. VA.j REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 133
2d 913. A person is not liable for damages which result from an event which was
not expected and could not have been anticipated by an ordinarily prudent
person. Consumers? Brewing Company v.
Doyle?s Adm?x., 102 Va. 399, 46 S.E.
390; Fowlks v. Southern Railway
Company, 96 Va. 742, 32 S.E. 464; Southern Railway Company v. Bell, 4 Cir., 114 F. 2d 341. * * *
* * One requisite of proximate cause is
the doing or the failure to do an act which a person of ordinary prudence could
foresee might naturally or probably produce an injury, and the other requisite
is that such act or omissiondid produce the injury. Washington and Old Dominion Railway v. Weakley, 140 Va. 796, 125 S.E. 672; Virginia Iron Coal and Coke Company v. Hughes? Adm?r.,
118 Va. 731, 88 S.E. 88. In Donald v. Long Branch Coal Company, 86 W.Va. 249, 103 S.E. 55, this Court held in point 1
of the syllabus that negligence to be actionable must be the proximate cause of
the injury complained of and must be such as might have been reasonably
expected to produce an injury. See also Anderson
v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 74
W.Va. 17, 81 S.E. 579, 51 L. R. A., N. S., 888.?
Although the facts in Puffer bear no resemblance to the present factual situation,
we feel the law as expressed in that decision is fully applicable here. In Puffer, the
plaintiff had entered the defendant?s eating establishment in Charleston and
while standing at the counter awaiting his food order, he was assaulted and
injured by an intoxicated third party. The Court in reversing a lower Court
judgment in favor of the plaintiff found that the defendant could not have
reasonably anticipated or foreseen that the intoxicated third party would
molest or injure the plaintiff, and the Court in discussing foreseeability used
the following language appearing at page 336 of the West Virginia Reports:
?* *
* A person is not liable for damages which
result from an event which was not expected and could not have been anticipated
by an ordinarily prudent person. Barbee
v. Amory, 106 W.Va. 507, 146 S.E. 59; Consumers? Brewing Company v. Doyle?s Adm?x., 102 Va. 399, 46 S.E. 390; Fowlks v. Southern Railway Company, 96 Va. 742, 32 S.E. 464; Southern Railway Company v. Bell, 4 Cir., 114 F. 2d 341. ?If an occurrence is one that
could not reasonably have been expected the defendant is not liable.
Foreseeableness or reasonable anticipation of the consequences of an act is
determinative of defendant?s
134 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
negligence.? Dennis v. Odend?Hal-Monks
Corporation, 182 Va. 77, 28 S.E. 2d 4.
* *
*?
We could cite a legion of cases expressing
the identical principles of negligence law, but to us, string-citing additional
authority would serve no useful purpose. We are of the firm opinion that the
collapse of the Silver Bridge on the evening of December 15, 1967, could not
have been anticipated or foreseen by the respondent in the exercise of
reasonable care. The ultimate collapse was caused by a fracture of Eyebar 330
resulting from a phenomenon unknown to bridge engineers when the Silver Bridge
was constructed in 1926 and unknown to bridge engineers on the date of its
collapse.
The statute which created this Court authorized us to make awards in claims
that the State of West Virginia in equity and good conscience should discharge
and pay. If that was our only guideline, this Court, possessing the normal
attributes of sympathy and compassion, would not hesitate to make awards.
However, we have always interpreted this grant of jurisdiction to include the
necessity of finding legal liability upon the State, before the test of equity
and good conscience can be applied. We believe that in deciding claims, we must
be bound by sound legal principles, and being of opinion that sound legal
principles do not authorize recoveries, we hereby deny the claims arising out
of the collapse of the Silver Bridge.
The opinion expressed herein renders moot the issue of the statute of
limitations pending in the more recently instituted claims of George Byus, Administrator of the Estate of Catherine
Byus, deceased, and Helen Foster, Administratrix of the Estate of May
Maxine Jarrell a.k.a. May Maxine Turner, deceased v. Department of Highways, Claim Numbers D-891 and D-892.
Judge H. Lakin Ducker, who is no longer a member of this Court, fully
participated in the hearing and this decision.
Claims disallowed.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 135
Opinion issued June 1,1976
VERLA R. ANDERSON
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-1018)
PER CURIAM:
Due to the negligence of respondent?s employees, the automobile of claimant was
splashed with tar on September 15, 1975, on Turkey Foot Road in Hancock County,
and as a resiUt, damages in the amount of $15.45 were sustained. The facts of
the incident and the amount of damages being stipulated by claimant and
respondent, the claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $15.45.
Award of $15.45.
Opinion issued June 1, 1976
DOROTHA JEAN CATLETT
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(No. D-964)
The claimant appeared in person.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. JONES,
JUDGE:
The claimant, Dorotha Jean Catlett, seeks to recover damages to her 1970
American Motors Hornet automobile in the amount of $1,500.00, which she alleges
were the result of negligent conduct of the respondent, Department of Public
Institutions. The claimant?s husband, Ronald E. Catlett, is now and was at the
time this claim arose, a State trooper employed by the Department of Public
Safety and stationed at Welch, West Virginia. Prior to October 14, 1974,
Trooper Catlett had been at the Welch barracks for more than a year; and Daniel
Duskey, a convict transferred from the Huttonsville Medium Security Prison to
the Welch barracks as a trusty for housekeeping duties, had lived and worked in
the barracks for several months. His wife desiring to sell her automobile,
Trooper Catlett placed the vehicle on the police headquarters parking lot with
a ?For Sale? sign in the window. The
136 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
parking lot was along Route 52, a main thoroughfare through McDowell County,
where the automobile would get more exposure for purposes of sale than in the
trailer park where the Catletts lived. According to Trooper Catlett, the keys
to the automobile were left in a pigeonhole-type mailbox in the front office so
the vehicle could be moved if in the way or if a prospective customer wanted
the car started. Duskey had his separate sleeping room, and he and at least one
officer were at the barracks on a twenty-four hour basis. On the night this
claim arose two troopers were in the barracks.
At about 5:30 a.m. on October 14, 1974, Trooper D. R. Moore, who testified at
the hearing, was awakened and informed that Duskey had wrecked the claimant?s
automobile. He promptly proceeded to the scene of the accident at Big Sandy and
transported Duskey back to Welch where he was charged with ?joy riding? and
placed in the county jail. It appears that Duskey had obtained the car keys
from the mailbox, where they were easily available to him, locked himself in
his room, then climed out a window and drove the claimant?s vehicle away,
presumably to visit a girl friend. While our decision in this case will
eliminate the need for adjudication of market value of the claimant?s vehicle,
there is no question that it was a total loss.
The only suggestion of negligence on the part of the respondent was the
testimony of Trooper Catlett that the Warden of the Medium Security Prison had
recommended a convict to serve the State Police Detachment as a trusty who
turned out not to be trustworthy. Obviously, a state penitentiary is not the
best place to look for someone to guard your property, but it has long been the
policy of penal institutions to assign rehabilitative and productive tasks to
prisoners who show a degree of trustworthiness above the average among their
fellow prisoners. This trusty had been convicted of writing bad checks. He was
interviewed by an officer from the Welch detachment and selected as many other
trustys had been previously selected to clean and maintain this and other State
Police barracks throughout the State. In his testimony Trooper Catlett admitted
that when he used the word trustworthy as applied to trustys, he meant
?relatively trustworthy?. Trooper Catlett and Moore testified that they had not
known of any misconduct on the part of the trusty until after he was caught in
his ?joy riding? adventure. Apparently, he had attended to his chores in a
satisfactory manner, and there was no reason to anticipate tILat he might
injure the climant?s property through a criminal act.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 137
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company vs. Department of Public Institutions, 7 Ct. Cl. 146, decided by this Court in 1968, was a
?joy riding? case similar to this claim, although the evidence in that case
probably was more favorable to the claimant. That claim was disallowed for
failure to prove negligence, and the Court is of opinion that this claim also
is not supported by proof of negligence, and, therefore, the same is
disallowed.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued June 1,1976
EVERETT L. DUNBRACK
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-1015)
The claimant appeared in person.
Gregory Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
JONES, JUDGE:
On or about August 25, 1975, the claimant, Everett L. Dunbrack, an employee of
the respondent, Department of Highways, reported for work and parked his 1975
Monte Carlo Chevrolet automobile in the parking lot of the District
Headquarters garage at Marlinton. During that day, other employees of the
respondent engaged in spray-painting road equipment located on the parking lot.
The respondent admits that the claimant?s automobile sustained some damage from
the paint spray, but denies that the claimant?s estimate of damages in the
amount of $412.00 is fair and reasonable. The estimate to ?Refinish Complete? in
that amount was obtained from a Marlinton body shop.
There being such a wide difference of oiinion as to the amourt of damages, the
Court granted the respondent?s motion for an inspection of the vehicle. Based
on the estimony A the c1aimant, argument of counsel for the respondent and the
Court?s own inspection, it is the opinion of the Court that the claimant is
entitled to recover in the amount of $200.00, and an award in that amount is
hereby made.
Award of $200.00.
138 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued June 1, 1976
LUCY WHITE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-758)
J. P. McMullen, Jr., Attorney at Law, for the claimant. Nancy Norman, Attorney
at Law, for the respondent.
WALLACE, JUDGE:
Claimant, Lucy White, alleges that shortly after 11:00 p.m. on July 14, 1973,
she suffered injuries to her right foot and ankle when she stepped in a hole
and fell on Commerce Street, also West Virginia Route 2 in Wellsburg, West
Virginia, almost in front of the Glass residence where she was employed as a
registered nurse from April 14, 1973 to the night of her fall. The hole was
alleged to be approximately two feet from the curb on the west side of the
street.
On the night of her fall, she was going off duty and was proceeding across the
street to her parked automobile where she had parked on other occasions during
her employment.
It is well established that the State of West Virginia is not an insurer of the
safety of a traveler on the highway nor a person crossing the highway. Anyone
injured or who sustained damages must prove that the, negligence of the State
caused the injury or damage in order for the State to be liable.
The Court is of the opinion and so finds that the evidence does not establish
actionable negligence on the part of the respondent. The Court further finds
that the claimant was familiar with the surroundings of her employment and had
crossed the street at this point to and from her car on previous occasions in
daylight and after dark and with the exercise of reasonable care could have
avoided her injury.
Accordingly, the claim is denied.
Claim disallowed.
W. VA.j REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 139
Opinion issued June 1,1976
RALPH WILSON
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-885)
Charles D. Bell, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Nancy Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
WALLACE, JUDGE:
The claimant, Ralph Wilson, was a driver-salesman for the United Ohio Valley
Dairy. On November 24, 1972 he was proceeding southerly on Brady?s Ridge Road
in Brooke County, West Virginia about a mile south of the Washington Pike. It
was early morning, the weather was clear. Claimant testified that he travelled
this road twice a week in his milk truck; that the road was approximately twelve
to fourteen feet wide; that the truck was eight feet wide.
On the morning of the accident, the left hand berm, of three to four feet
proceeding southerly, had been scraped and cleaned and was muddy. The right
hand berm of approximately two feet appeared firm and smooth.
Claimant pulled his truck over on the right hand berm to a1ow an oncoming
vehicle to pass. When his right front vheels and right rear wheels were on the
berm, it gave way and the truck, with the claimant inside, rolled over and down
the hill.
The claimant suffered injuries for which he was hospitalized for five days and
was unable to return to work for six weeks.
The respondent, having constructed a hard surface road not wide enough for two
lanes, knew that the traveling public had to drive off the hard surface in
order to pass an approaching car and should have known a dangerous condition
existed. The berm of the road gave way through no fault of the claimant and the
Court finds the respondent negligent and is of the opinion that the claimant is
entitled to recover on the complaint.
The Court hereby awards the claimant $3,000.00.
Award of $3,000.00.
140 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued June 16, 1976
ACE DORAN HAULING & RIGGING CO.
vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
(No. D-1000)
Claimant appeared through its operations manager, Norbert John Doran.
Thomas N. Hanna, Attorney at Law,
Legal Division, Public Service Commission, for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
In December of 1974, the claimant filed its application for 1,000
identification stamps for the registration and identification of vehicles that
it intended to operate within West Virginia during the period from February 1,
1975 through January 31, 1976. It also filed a list identifying each vehicle it
intended to operate within the borders of the State during the above-mentioned
period. All of this was done pursuant to Code 24A-6A-4. This section further
requires a motor carrier to obtain from the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners (NARUC) a supply of uniform identification cab cards,
commonly referred to as ?bingo? cards for the registration and identification
of each vehicle it intends to operate in West Virginia for the ensuing year.
The carrier is required to fill in the front of the cab card so as to identify
itself and the vehicle, and the card is then kept in the cab of the vehicle. If
it is determined that a particular vehicle will be operated in this State, one
of the identification stamps is affixed to the back of the cab card in the
square bearing the name of this State. There are, of course, other squares on
the back of the cab card to accommodate stamps from other states in which the
particular vehicle will operate.
With its application, the claimant forwarded its check in the amount of
$3,000.00 covering the statutory fee of $3.00 per identification srrn, In 14yof
1975, the claimant determined that it had purchased 200 stamps in eces of the
amount it would need and offered to return these stamps to respondent and
requested a refund of $600.00. The respondent, having no statutory authority to
make such a refund, refused. Claimant is thus in this Court seeking an award of
$600.00.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 141
In the somewhat similar claims of Central
Investment Corporation v. Nonintoxicating Beer Commissioner, 10 Ct. Cl. 182, The
F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co. v. Nonintoxicating Beer Commissioner, D-904, and Queen
City Brewing Co. v. Nonintoxicating Beer Commissioner, D-923, we made awards for unused stamps, crowns and
lids for which taxes had been pre-paid. In those claims, the breweries had
either sold their business to another concern or had completely gone out of
business, and we were of the opinion that to allow the State to retain the p
re-paid tax would constitute unjust enrichment.
The claimant in this case is a going concern and will probably continue to
conduct its operations in this State for many years. To allow this claim would
result in every motor carrier doing business in this State filing a claim in this
Court every year for the cost of any unused identification stamps. This result
would not be desirable and certainly not one intended by the Legislature in
enacting Article 6A of Chapter 24A. We would point out that Article 6A gives
the motor carriers the right to file one or more supplemental applications for
additional stamps during the year if the need arises or is anticipated. We can
only suggest that motor carriers be conservative in submitting their original
applications and resort to supplemental applications if additional stamps are
needed or anticipated.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion i.ssued June 16, 1976
THE CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC
TELEPHONE COMPANY OF WEST VIRGINIA
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-900)
PER CURIAM:
The claimant and respondent have filed a written stipulation that the
respondent was engaged in a construction project to widen and improve Route 5/6
in Berkeley County, West Virginia from November, 1972 to March, 1973; that from
December 14, 1972, to March, 1973 the respondent removed by explosives certain rock
142 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
outcroppings adjacent to the highway. Claimant owned and maintained an aerial
telephone cable along the highway. The respondent did not notify claimant of
the planned blasting operation nor did respondent request remova1 of the cable
to avoid damage to the cable. Respondent was requested to stop blasting to
allow removal of cable but such request was refused. That as a result of the
blasting claimant?s cable was damaged on numerous occasions, requiring repairs
and subsequent replacement of the cable; that $10,731.08 is a fair and
equitable estimate of the damages sustained by the claimant. Believing that
liability exists on the part of the respondent and that the damages are reasonable,
an award of $10,731.08 is directed in favor of the claimant.
Award of $10,731.08.
Opinion issued June 16, 1976
JAMES D. LINVILLE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-14)
PER CURIAM:
The claimant and respondent have filed a written stipulation reflecting that
the respondent was engaged in blasting activities on November 11, 1975, near
West Hamlin in Lincoln County; that as a result of the blasting, five panels of
claimant?s house trailer were damaged, and that $306.00 is a fair and equitable
estimate of the damage sustained by the claimant. Believing that liability
exists on the part of respondent and the damages are reasonable, an award of
$306.00 is directed in favor of the claimant.
Award of $306.00.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 143
Opinion issued June 16, 1976
LARRY McCONAHA
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-1027)
PER CURIAM:
The claimant and respondent have filed a written stipulation indicating that on
or about October 27, 1975, the respondent by and through its employees, was
marking with yellow paint, Route 114 near the Town of Pinch, Kanawha County,
West Virginia, for eventual yellow striping of the middle of the highway.
Respondent?s employees directed traffic and the claimant from one lane of the
highway to the other; that the tii?s fclainiant?s vehicle splattered paint on
the body of claimant?s vehicle. That as a result claimant?s vehicle was
damaged, and $31.93 is a fair and equitable estimate of the damage sustained by
claimant. Believing that liability exists on the part of respondent and the
damages are reasonable, an award of $31.93 is directed in favor of the
claimant.
Award of $31.93.
Opinion issued June 16, 1976
NATIONAL ENGINEERING & CONTRACTING
CO.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-753a)
Gordon T. Kinder, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Dewey B. Jones, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
JONES, JUDGE:
The claimant, National Engineering & Contracting Co., filed this claim
against the respondent, Department of Highways, seeking payment of the sum of
$5,059.01 which was deducted from the final settlement under a paving contract
in Ohio County upon a determination by the respondent that concrete poured by
the claimant during the period August 19 to October 28, 1970, did not
144 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
reach a maximum strength of 3,000 pounds per square inch as required by the
contract.
Upon the hearing of this claim, counsel for the parties stipulated in writing
the following:
?It is hereby stipulated by and between National Engineering & Contracting
Co., claimant, and the Department of Highways and the State of West Virginia,
respondents, that the preponderating evidence in this claim is that the samples
of concrete taken from the concrete placed by the contractor between August 19,
1970, and October 28, 1970, for purposes of testing the strength of said
concrete, were not prdperly screened to remove a representative quantity of the
larger particles from said samples of concrete, therefore, the testing results
during the aforesaid referred to period of time by the West Virginia Department
of Highways were not a true representation of the strength and value of the
concrete that was placed during said period of time and this contention is
further supported by the fact that the same kind of concrete made and mixed in
accordance with the same specifications as the concrete referred to aforesaid
and placed by the contractor, after the aforesaid concrete was placed, but
sampled and tested under a method whereby the larger aggregate particles were
screened off and these test results showed in every test but one that the
concrete was of adequate strength and not defective.
Therefore, in view of said facts the preponderating evidence there should not
have been a reduction in the value of the concrete described and referred to in
this claim by the Department of Highways.?
The claim having been submitted upon tbe recOtd, and the Court having
considered the Notice of Claim, Answer, Stipulation and the recommendation of
the respondent that the claim should be paid, the Court accepts and approves
the Stipulation of the parties, and pursuant thereto hereby awards the sum of
$5,059.01 to the claimant, National Engineering & Contracting Co.
Concurrently with the submission of this case for the Court?s consideration, a
companion claim, D-753b, in the amount of $5,508.56 was dismissed upon
agreement of counsel.
Judge Garden did not participate in the hearing and decision of this claim by
reason of a conflict of interest.
Award of $5,059.01.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 145
Opinion issued June 16, 1976
PECK BROGAN BUILDING & REMODELING
vs.
WORKMEN?S COMPENSATION FUND
(No. D-1012)
Boyce Griffith, Attorney at Law, for claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for respondent. GARDEN, JUDGE:
In February of 1975, the Director of the Purchasing Division, Department of
Finance and Administration, pursuant to Code 5A-3-12, solicited bids for
certain remodeling work to be performed on the second floor of the Workmen?s
Compensation Building located at 112 California Avenue in Charleston. In
general, the contemplated work required the removal of 380 feet of existing
partitioning and the re-installation of 69 feet of partitioning in new areas.
The successful bidder was also required to clean up and deliver any unused
partitioning to State Surplus Properties in Dunbar.
Bids, which were opened on May 8, 1975, were received, from Robert E. Agsten,
Inc. in an amount of $4,M0.00,? from Leonard D. Brogan, d/b/a Peck Brogan
Building & Remodeling, hereinafter referred to as Brogan, in an amount of
$14,695.00, and from Charleston Acoustics in an amount of $16,831.47. Brogan
attended the bid opening but upon learning that a bid lower than his had been
submitted, he thought no further about the job until a few days later when he
received a letter dated May 9, 1975, from the Purchasing Division advising him
that he was the successful bidder. The letter further directed him to deliver
certain documentation such as a performance bond, labor and material bond, etc.
to the Purchasing Division on or before May 23, 1975. Brogan testified that he
then went to the office of Thomas Mathewson, a buyer for the Purchasing
Division, and Mr. Mathewson confirmed that he, Brogan, was the successful
bidder. Brogan then went to the office of Ray E. Lane, Director of Operations
for the Workmen?s Compensation Fund, and advised Mr. Lane that he was the
successful bidder. Lane then directed Brogan to get started so that the work
could be completed by June 3 0th, before the close of the fiscal year. Brogan
started work on the
146 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
project on May 22, 1975, and completed the same in a satisfactory manner. The
evidence disclosed that while a purchase order had been prepared, it was never
signed and delivered to Brogan. Obviously, the provisions of Article 3 of
Chapter 5A of the Code were not followed, and the agreement or contract with
Brogan was void and of no effect (see Code 5A-3-19).
The evidence clearly demonstrated the existence of an inter-agency foul-up, but
it is not clear to this Court which agency, the Workmen?s Compensation Fund or
the Department of Finance and Administration, was responsibile. Mathewson
testified that he was present at the bid opening on May 8, 1975, and that the
low bid was received from Agsten; however, and as a result of a short note that
he received from Lane, he wrote the letter of May 9, 1975, to Brogan advising
him that he was the successful bidder. In his later testimony, he stated that
he could not recall who authorized him to write the May 9, 1975, letter to
Brogan. Lane, on the other hand, testified that he had written a three sentence
letter to Mathewson in the middle of June in an attempt to justify the
execution of a purchase order to Brogan. He stated that this was done at the
request of Finance and Administration, but he denied having any contact with
Mathewson prior to Mathewson writing his letter of May 9, 1975.
It appeared that prior to the submission of bids, Lane orally advised each
bidder that the contract would not include any electrical work and the touch-up
painting and the removal of a certain Dutch door would be eliminated from the
work to be performed. Consequently, when Agsten submitted his bid, these items
were specifically excluded by him but were not so excluded by Brogan. Finance
and Administration, having not been advised by Lane that items were to be
excluded believed that Agsten obviously had not submitted a bid for all of the
work to be performed, and that this accounted for the large difference between
the Agsten bid and the Brogan bid, and without checking the matter further,
advised Brogan that he was the successful bidder.
Brogan testified that he had done work for the Workmen?s Compensation Fund
before and had also done some work on one occasion for the Department of
Welfar, and on ohe f these jobs, the work was almost completed before he
received a purchase order. With this prior experience in mind, he said he had
no hesitancy in proceeding with the subject work without a purchase
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 147
order. The respondent, in an attempt to limit any award to a quantum meruit
recovery, introduced testimony from Robert E. Agsten to the effect that he
could have done the work for the amount of his bid and could have made a
reasonable profit. Respondent also called Robert Estep, Vice President of
Asbestos Insulating Company of South Charleston, a reputable concern, and he
opined that his company could also have done the work and could have made a reasonable
profit for the figure of $4,540.00.
While we are of opinion that the B organ bid was high and the work could have
been accomplished for a lower figure, we feel that equity and good conscience
compel a different result. Brogan submitted his bid in good faith. Through no
fault of his own, an inter-agency dispute followed. He received written and
oral notification from Mathewson that he was the successful bidder and was
instructed by Lane to proceed with the work. The wheels that set this
unfortunate situation in motion were turned by either respondent or Finance and
Administration, or by both parties. Any result other than to award Brogan the
full amount of his bid or $14,695.00 would, in our opinion, be unconscionable.
Award of $14,695.00.
Opinion .ssued June 16, 1976
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY
AND EDGAR AND BESSIE DAMEWOOD
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-1035)
PER CURIAM:
By written stipulation of the parties it appeared that respondent in conducting
blasting operations iiear the home of Ecigar Damewood and Bessie Damewood
inflicted damage to the home in the amount of $1,200.00. Believing liability
exists and that the damages are reasonable, an award is hereby made in the
amount of
$1,200.00.
Award of $1,200.00.
148 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued June 16, 1976
ERNEST L. WHITE and FLORENCE WHITE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-751)
Eugene R. White, Attorney at Law, for the claimants.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. JONES, JUDGE:
This claim is for damages in the amount of $5,000.00 to property owned by the
claimants, Ernest L. White and Florence White, situate on the west side of
State Route No. 2, approximately one and one-half miles south of New
Martinsville, in Wetzel County. The subject property lies between lands now or
formerly owned by William C. Mclver and Wilma L. Mclver, and Earnest R. White
and J0 Ann White, respectively, who had similar claims against the respondent
founded upon the same failure to prevent or correct the slippage of a landfill
negligently constructed and maintained by the respondent adjacent to these
properties. The Mclver and White cases were decided by the Court in October
1973, the claims being allowed and awards made to the claimants. William C. Mclver et al. vs. Department of Highways and Earnest K.
White et al. vs. Department of Highways, 10 Ct. Cl. 23. Pilings were installed in the summer of 1971 in an effort
to stop the slide, and the primary issue in this case is whether the slippage
continued after that time.
A written Stipulation has been filed wherein it is stipulated and agreed by and
between the claimalits and the respnzi?ent that the slippage has persisted and
that beginning in 1971 and continuing thereafter the claimants? land has been
damaged thereby. The parties further stipulated that the sum of $2,500.00 is a
fair and reasonable valuation of the damages sustained by the claimants. Based
on statements of counsel and the Court?s own knowledge of the background and
basis of this claim, the Court accepts and approves the Stipulation, and hereby
awards the claimants, Ernest L. White and Florence White, the sum of $2,500.00.
Award of $2,500.00.
W. VA.1 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 149
Opinion issued June 16, 1976
MARILYN WIDLAN
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-1)
Judith A. Herndon,Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Nancy Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
JONES, JUDGE:
At 10:00 a.m. on November 7, 1975, the claimant, Marilyn Widlan, was driving
her 1975 Oldsmobile station wagon in a southerly direction on State Route No.
88N in Ohio County when she was suddenly confronted by a broken tree
limb hanging out into her lane of traffic. The claimant was unable to avoid
striking the limb, due to the location of the limb in a curve at the top of a
hill where there is a ?blind spot?, and the presence of oncoming traffic. It
had stormed during the night and the skies were threatening further turbulence.
The claimant was traveling in a thirty mile per hour speed zone; and she testified
that the limb extended about one foot over the paved surface of the highway.
The claimant found a place to drive off of the highway, where she examined the
vehicle and found considerable damage to its right side, repairs to which were
later estimated to cost $312.79. About a half mile further on the claimant saw
a Department of Highways truck and was able to report the broken limb and
accident to Edward Leach Wheeler, an employee of the respondent. Mr. Wheeler
immediately went to the accident scene and quickly removed the broken limb. It
was later determined that the damaged tree was growing on the State right of
way.
This was a live tree and there is nothing in the record to show that the
respondent had knowledge of the hazardous condition, or should have known or
foreseen that it might occur. Neither was there any notice to the
respondent that the limb was broken until that information was furnished by the
claimant. While the respondent in such a case may not unreasonably delay the
removal of a hazardous obstruction upon a State highway, neither will liability
arise until the respondent knows or should know that such a hazard exists. The
law in West Virginia is well established that the State is not an insurer of
its highways, and if there is not
150 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
preponderant proof of negligence on the part of the State?s employees, the user
of the highway travels at his own risk.
The Court finds the respondent free of negligence in this case, and, therefore,
the claim of Marilyn Widlan is disallowed.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued July 19,
1976
WILLIAM L. DAVIS
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-18)
The claimant appeared in person.
Nancy Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
JONES, JUDGE:
On February 14, 1976, at about 11:30 p.m. the claimant, William L. Davis, drove
his Ford station wagon up the ramp entering State Route No. 119 at Big Chimney
in Kanawha County. According to his testimony he was travelling at about 25
miles per hour when his left front arid left rear tires struck a hole in the
pavement, causing them to blow out. He alleged damages in the amount of $66.00.
The claimant says that he did not see the hole, and while he estimated its
depth at eight inches, no measurements were made, no pictures taken, nor any
corroboration had by any other witness. The claimant?s home is at Clendenin and
he is well-acquainted with Route No. 119 and its approaches, although he said
he had not travelled this ramp for about two months, at which time he saw no
defect at the point of the accident.
There is no evidence that the respondent had notice of any extraordinary
hazard, although the claimant said there was no way to avoid the hole and it is
well known that hundreds of vehicles traverse this ramp every day. While the
claimant says he did not see the hole, the Court is constrained to believe that
if he was travelling at the modest rate of 25 miles per hour and had adequate
headlights, he should have seen a hole of the size complained of, and that if
the claimant had been operating his vehicle with proper care, he would not have
struck the hole with such force as to blow out two tires.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 151
This Court consistently has followed the decisions of our Supreme Court of Appeals
in holding that the State is not an insurer of its highways and its duty to
travellers is a qualified one, namely, reasonable care and diligence in the
maintenance of its highways under all the circumstances. In view of the
foregoing principles, the Court finds that there is no satisfactory proof of
actionable negligence on the part of the respondent, and, to the contrary, we
find a lack of care by the claimant contributing to his injury.
Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion to and does hereby disallow the claim.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued July 19, 1976
ROBERT B. DORSEY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D.1029)
PER CURIAM:
The claimant and respondent have filed a written stipulation indicating that on
or about October 9, 1975, the respondent by and through its employees, was
engaged in certain construction work on Eli Road, a State highway in Sumerco,
Lincoln County, West Virginia. That respondent?s employees detonated explosive
charges in the construction area causing rock and debris to be thrown against
claimant?s trailer. That as a result claimant?s trailer was damaged and $89.55
is a fair and equitable estimate of the damage sustained by the claimant.
Believing that liability exists on the part of the respondent and the damages
are reasonable, an award of $89.55 is directed in favor of the claimant.
Award of $89.55.
152 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued July 19, 1976
PANSY HEFLIN
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-988)
The claimant appeared in person.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. JONES, JUDGE:
The claimant, Pansy Heflin, has filed her Notice of Claim against the
respondent, Department of Highways, in the amount of $4,000.00 for damages to a
culvert and bridge affording access from a secondary State road near West
Union, in Doddridge County to the claimant?s residence and land owned and
operated by her as a trailer court.
When she started her trailer court in 1970 the claimant installed the culvert
in a small stream running along the front of her property, utilizing two steel
cylinders cut from gasoline storage tanks and filling dirt and gravel around
and over the tanks. She also constructed tiers of crossties along both sides of
the stream to support its banks.
During the year 1971 a flashflood caused the culvert to clog and the stream?s
waters overflowed and flooded the State road. The respondent dispatched
employees to the scene who waded into the stream and did what was necessary to
clear the culvert, thereby accomplishing the draining of water from the State
road and opening it to traffic. The banks of the stream in the area of the
culvert were considerably eroded and damaged by the flood and the roadway over
the culvert was rendered impassable.
There is evidence that sometime after the flood other employees of the
respondent, in an effort to deepen the channel of the stream and build up its
banks, caused an endloader or other piece of state equipment to collide with
one of the culvert tanks, bending and damaging it. However, no claim was made
by the claimant for damage to the pipe and she set about building a bridge
across the stream. The bridge was constructed of steel pipes and has served its
purpose since that time, except that now the banks of the stream have again
eroded and have become so unstable as not to
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 153
afford safe support for the terminal portions of the bridge. It appears that it
will be necessary to construct buttress and wingwalls under the bridge to
eliminate dependence upon support of the stream banks and the claimant contends
that the respondent should pay the cost thereof.
There is no satisfactory showing by the claimant that the respondent is
responsible in any way for the upkeep of her bridge or the maintenance of the
banks of the stream. The respondent is only interested in maintenance of its
highway and its only concern has been to remove flood waters and to maintain
traffic thereon. The claimant testified that she owned land on both sides of
the stream, the bridge is her property and was built by her to serve both her
personal and commercial purposes.
Any possible fault of the respondent referred to by the claimant is entirely
too conjectural and speculative to form the basis of an award by this Court,
and accordingly, this claim is disallowed.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued July 19,
1976
KAREN HUTCHENS
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-5)
Claimant appeared in person.
Nancy Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
WALLACE, JUDGE:
On November 11, 1975 the claimant, Karen Hutchens, was driving her automobile
on Pennsylvania Avenue in the City of Charleston, West Virginia near the city
garage. It was approximately 7:00 p.m., the street lights were on.
She testified it was the period of day between dusk and daik; that her lights
were on and she was driving about 40 mph talking with her passengers. There was
no oncoming traffic. The claimant was traveling in the left lane of the two
lane avenue when she suddenly came upon an object in the road. She swerved to
the right
154 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
in an effort to miss it, but it struck the left rear wheel bending the rim out
of shape and damaging the tire.
One of the passengers took over the driving and proceeded to find a gas station
to fix the tire. They stopped at the city garage for help but tools there were
not small enough to fit an automobile. The incident was reported to the city
garage dispatcher. Neither the claimant nor her passengers knew what was struck
until a maintenance man from the garage came in and reported that he had
replaced a manhole cover.
There is no evidence in the record to show that the respondent had knowledge
that the manhole cover was in the street. The city employees were notified and
they corrected the situation. The well established law in West Virginia is that
the State is not an insurer of its highways and the user thereof travels at his
own risk. In order for the respondent to be liable in this case there must be
proof that the negligence of the State caused the damage. There was no such
proof.
The Court finds the respondent free of negligence and disallows the claim.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued July 19, 1976
NANCY C. JETER
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-20)
Claimant appeared in person.
Nancy Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
WALLACE, JUDGE:
The claimant testified that her fiance was driving her automobile west on
MacCorkJe Avenue in the City of Charleston, West Virginia about 10:00 p.m. on
January 30, 1976; that he had slowed down to approximately 20 mph preparatory
to making a left hand turn. She further testified that the driver swerved to
miss a hole in the pavement but failed and the impact knocked off a hubcap
which in turn damaged the fender. She stated that they went back to the
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 155
scene of the accident a week later to take a picture of the hole but it had
been filled. The claimant did not see the hole but testified to what the driver
had told her. The driver did not testify.
The claims investigator for the Department of Highways, Jerry Walker, testified
that there was no physical evidence of the patching of holes at the alleged
scene of the accident.
The law is well established in West Virginia that the State is not an insurer
of the safety of a traveler on the highway. Anyone who sustains damages must
prove that the negligence of the State caused the damage complained of in order
for the State to be liable. There is nothing in the record to show that the
respondent had notice of any dangerous condition in the highway nor was there
any proof of negligence on the part of the respondent. In the absence of this,
the user of the highway travels at his own risk.
The Court is of the opinion that the evidence does not establish actionable
negligence on the part of the respondent and therefore disallows the claim.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued July 19, 1976
CHLOE THOMPSON
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-1O)
PER CURIAM:
The written Stipulation filed in this claim reflects that on September 8, 1975,
the claimant attempted to drive across a wooden bridge on Route 78 in Logan
County, West Virginia, and while so doing, the bridge collapsed causing damage
to claimant?s 1974 Maverick automobile, said damages amounting to $174.10.
Being of opinion that the written Stipulation demonstrates liability upon the
respondent and being of the further opinion that the damages are reasonable, an
award of $174.10 in favor of the claimant is hereby made.
Award of $174.10.
156 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued July 19, 1976
SPENCER TOPPINGS
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-987)
PER CURIAM:
The claimant and respondent have filed a written Stipulation which reveals that
in June of 1975, the respondent was upgrading Local Service Route 52/5 in
Lincoln County, West Virginia, and in performing the upgrading adjacent to the
property of the claimant, respondent?s machinery uprooted and destroyed certain
trees on claimant?s property. As a result four (4) fruit trees and twenty-two
(22) locust trees belonging to the claimant were destroyed, and that the fair
market value of these trees was $710.00. Believing that liability rests with
respondent and that the claimant?s damages are reasonable, we hereby award the
claimant $710.00.
Award of $710.00.
Opinion issued August 9, 1976
ELIZABETH ANN HEDGES, EXECUTRIX OF THE
ESTATE OF A. BRUCE HEDGES, DECEASED
vs.
BOARD OF REGENTS
(No. D-831)
Roderick Devison, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. WALLACE,
JUDGE:
This claim was brought by Elizabeth Ann Hedges as Executrix of the Estate of A.
Bruce Hedges, deceased, for compensation claimed due the d?cedenton a repairjob
atFairnnnt State Cage, Fairmont, West Virginia. The claimant?s decedent was a
p1atering contractor who over a period of time had done certain work for the
college.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 157
On or about April 19, 1973, the ceiling in the building of the college that
housed the swimming pooi fell, the plaster falling into the pooi. A. Bruce
Hedges and Robert E. Schmidt of L. D. Schmidt & Son, Architects, were
called to the school to discuss with the officials repairs to be made to the
ceiling.
The testimony shows that it was determined between the then college president,
Dr. E. K. Feaster and Dean Yost, Dean of Administrative Affairs, that in order
to have the pooi ready for use for the next term of school the repair work
should be done on an emergency basis rather than follow normal bidding
procedures.
Mr. Robert E. Schmidt, the architect, testified that there were three different
proposals discussed, ?one was for lathe, one was for just painting the
structural system, and the final one that was agreed upon was the elimination
of the glue ti the ceilirg and installing a plaster coat over a weld-crete
coats
Mr. Hedges, by his letter of May 10, 1973, addressed to Dr. Feaster, President
of the College, agreed to do the work. His letter states that it was a
preliminary estimate of approximately $4,000.00. As a result of the letter, the
State Purchasing Director issued an emergency work authorization directed to
Mr. Hedges, which authorization stated the cost shall not exceed $4,000.00.
During the course of the work, Mr. Hedges was paid $4,000.00 and upon
completion of the job he billed the college for an additional
$8,756.00.
Harold B. Lawson, Director of Physical Facilities at Fairmont State College,
testified that the decedent did most of the plastering repair work at the
college for a number of years; that he understood the organizational structure
very intimately, and that he was the architect?s prime contractor to do the
job.
Lawson further testified that the decedent installed the ceiling which fell and
for that reason did not intend to take the normal contractor?s profit. He
stated that Hedges opated undr very difficult conditions and that the school
had obligation o pay him the difference.
Lawson stated that ?it was a very honorable job done? and that he believed
Hedges incurred the costs in the performance of the job; that his bill was
valid and was within the acceptable allowances for a job of that nature. The
total cost figure compared with the number of square feet was allowable and
acceptable for
158 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
the trade. Mr. Lawson, by letter to Homer Cox, the business manager of the
college, recommended payment to the decedent.
Robert E. Schmidt, the architect employed by the college, testified that the
college was extremely anxious to get the job done and that Hedges intended to
do the job at his cost when he learned the wire system on the prior job was
inadequate.
Schmidt further testified that the decedent did a good job and his bill was
very reasonable and within the realm of industry standards.
The testimony developed that Mr. James Blackwoo?d an architect with L. D.
Schmidt & Son, apprOved the payment ot the decedent?s bill. On cross
examination, Mr. Schmidt was asked why his organization approved the bill for
payment. Schmidt testified that his company was representing the school and all
bills had to be approved. He testified that they knew Hedges did more work than
was anticipated requiring more labor and more time. In a meeting with Schmidt,
Dean Yost and Dr. Feaster, Hedges advised that his bid was too low and he could
not complete the job. The school officials insisted that he finish the job and
they would find a way to pay him out of repairs and alterations money. As a
result, the architects as the owner?s agent, approved the bill for payment.
Schmidt stated that the school officials felt they did not have time to get a
change order for the job.
The administration of the college changed and the new officials knowing nothing
of the situation apparently took the position that they had no legal basis for
the payment of the cost over-run. None of the college officials testified
except Mr. Lawson. The only witness for the respondent was Ben E. Rubrecht, the
Dire?tor of Purchasing for the State of West Virginia: wh knew only othe $4,000.00
purchase order which was paid. Te testified fat his investigation revealed that
there was no request for an additional payment.
However, it was the school officials that determined the work should be done on
an emergency basis. It was the school officials that, when learning of the cost
over-run, represented to the decedent that he would be paid. The close
relationship between the decedent and Fairmont State College established over
the years was such that the decedent acted on those representations and
completed the job expecting to be paid by the college.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 159
Nowhere in the testimony is there any evidence that the job was not done
properly, but on the contrary, the testimony reveals the decedent was well respected
in his trade and always did a good acceptable job as was done in the instant
case.
The law provides for awards of claims which in equity and good conscience the
State should pay. This is such a claim. There is no question that the work was
well done and the ests incurrI were reasonable. The State received the
benefit.of tile work done and to deny recovery would be unjust enrichment to
the State.
Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that the claimant has established an
equitable and just claim and awards the claimant the sum of $8,756.00.
Award of $8,756.00.
Opinion issued August 9, 1976
LASHLEY TRACTOR SALES
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(No. CC-76-27)
PER CURIAM:
The foregoing claim is disallowed for the reasens set forth ix the
Opinion of this Court heretofore filed i. decifling the Qtims of
Airkem Sales and Service, et al v.
Department of MentaL Realth, 8
Ct. Cl. 180, the factual situations and the law applicable thereto
being the same as that involved in the foregoing decision of this
Court.
Claim disallowed.
160 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued August 9, 1976
MONTGOMERY GENERAL HOSPITAL
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
(No. D-100i)
T. E. Myles, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. GARDEN,
JUDGE:
This claim was submitted for decision on the Notice of Claim, Answer and
Affidavits of J. R. Lewis, a former member of the Department of Public Safety,
Kenneth R. Fultz, the administrator of the Montgomery General Hospital, and J.
Zane Summerfield, the Prosecuting Attorney of Fayette County.
The pleadings and affidavits establish that on August 17, 1972, one William
Lowell Samples was arrested by members of respondent as a result of breaking
and entering, and as an incident to his arrest he was shot by one of the
arresting officers. He was thereupon taken by a member of the Department of
Public Safety to claimant?s hospital for treatment where he was admitted and
thereafter discharged on August 29, 1972. While in the hospital he was guarded
by members of respondent on an around the clock basis. Upon his discharge,
members of respondent took Samples before a Justice of the Peace and upon waiving
a preliminary hearing, Samples was then taken by members of respondent to the
Fayette County Jail where he was turned over to the jailer. Samples was later
indicted, plead guilty and wa sentenced W the West Virginia Penitentiary. The
affidavits clearly establish that the Sheriff of Fayette County had no contact
with the case until Samples was delivered to his jailer on August 29, 1972.
The claimant billed the County Court of Fayette County for its charges in the
amount of $2,898.59, which the affidavits establish to be a reasonable charge.
The County Court refused to pay the bill, and an attempt was then made to tax
the hospital bill as part of the court cost by an Order of the Circuit Court of
Fayette County entered in February of 1973. The State Auditor however refused
to approve the same, and the claimant having no other course to follow has thus
filed its claim in this Court.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 161
The refusal of the Fayette County Court to pay claimant?s bill was based on a
1965 Attorney General?s opinion, 51 Ops. Att?y. Gen. 348 (1964-1966). The facts
underlying that opinion stated briefly were as follows: one Pack was seriously
wounded by gunfire by members of the Department of Public Safety during the
breaking and entering of a store in Logan County and was thereafter taken to
the hospital by members of the Department of Public Safety. While the Sheriff
of Logan County was in an autorrobile outside of the store and participated in
watching for the suspects to appear, he took no part in the actual arrest, nor
did he, directly or indirectly, authorize the taking of Pack to the hospital or
authorize or direct the hospital to render treatment.
The Attorney General was of the opinion that the County Court of Logan County
was not legally responsible for the bill, stating as follows:
?Where a member of the State?s Department of Public Safety wounds and arrests a
prisoner and delivers such prisoner to a hospital for necessary treatment,
without authorization from a county sheriff, the county sheriff has neither
actual or constructive custody of the prisoner; such prisoner is considered to
be a State prisoner, and the liability for paying his medical and hospital
expenses rests not with the county court, but with the State.?
In reaching his 9pinion the Attorney General relied principally upon the
provisions of Code 7-8-2 which reads partly as foi1Ws:
?. ..
When any prisoner is sick the jailer shall
see that he has adequate medical and dental attention and nursing, and so far
as possible keep him separate from other prisoners. Any such medical care and
nursing as the jailer may be required to furnish shall be paid for by the
county court. .
We agree with the opinion of the Attorney
General, and we further agree that the County Court of Fayette County was
justified in refusing to pay claimant?s bill. The factual situation in the
present case is much stronger for such a refusal than it was in Logan County. In
the Logan County matter the Sheriff of Logan County did partially participate
in the arrest of the prisoner, but here there is no evidence that the Sheriff
of Fayette County even knew of the arrest and subsequent hospitalization.
We can find no statutory mandate casting an obligation on the State to pay a
hospital bill in cases such as this, but we are of the
162 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
opinion that a moral obligation to pay such a claim exists, and we therefore
award the claimant the sum of $2,89869.
Award of $2,898.59.
Opinion issued September 2, 1976
JAMES P. FOSTER,
dba WESTERN VIRGINIA DEMOLITION COMPANY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS*
(No. CC-76-8)
The claimant appeared in person.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. JONES, JUDGE:
The claimant, James P. Foster, doing business as Western Virginia Domolition
Company, seeks payment for part of his charges for the demolition and removal
of a two-story fame building situate at 1001-14th Street, in the City of Parkersburg.
He testified that he entered into an oral agreement with the City of
Parkersburg and A. James Manchin, Director of the Rehabilitation Environmental
Action Program, commonly known as REAP, a section of the respondent, Department
of Highways, to demolish and remove said building for the total sum of
$1,497.00, based on estimates of $499.00 for tearing down the house, $499.00
for removing trees and $499.00 for hauling dirt and leveling the work area.
According to the claimant the City and REAP were to pay one-half of the bill or
$748.50 each. REAP also furnished a loader which the claimant brought to the
site from the State Penitentiary at Moundsville. After the work was finished
the City of Parkersburg paid $499.00 for the dirt and $499.00 for the trees, a
total of $998.00, leaving a balance due of $499.00. However, the claim filed is
in the amount of $687.00, including non-allowable telephone charges and
collection costs.
There is some indication in the testimony that the building and land were
delinquent for the non-payment of taxes, but we fint nothing to show that the
State had any legal tte to the prQperty, that there was any obstruction to a
state highway, or any other reason why the State should join in the demolition
project, except as the removal of an eyesore might promote the public welfare.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 163
The claimant was the only witness in this case, and the Court is of opinion
that a valid, enforceable contract with the respondent has not been proved. No
witness was called by the claimant to establish any right or authority of the
Director of REAP to commit the respondent to pay the claimant the sums sought
to be recovered. While the Director was quoted as recommending payment of the
claim, he was not subpoenaed as a witness. Counsel for the respondent admitted
that the work was done in a satisfactory manner, and that presumably he was
entitled to be paid for it. However, the State?s attorney was not able to
enlighten the Court on the questions pertaining to the contract or any
statutory authority for REAP?s participation therein, and could not point out
any benefit or enrichment inuring to the State.
The claimant was not represented by counsel, and the Court is apprehensive that
there may be valid grounds for an award in this case which have not been
properly developed. Therefore, while the Court will not make an award in the
present posture of this case, we would be constrained to leniency in the
granting of a rehearing upon a proper showing of cause.
Claim disallowed.
*See also James P. Foster, ada
Western Virginia Demolition Company vs. Department ofHighways, 11 Ct. Cl. 199 wherein this decision is reversed on
rehearing.
Opinion issued September 2, 1976
J. E. LOVEJOY and EDITH LOVEJOY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-853)
Robert G. Wolpert, Attorney at Law, for the claimants.
Nancy Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
JONES, JUDGE:
The claimants, J. E. Lovejoy and Edith Lovejoy, are the owners of property
fronting one hundred feet on Campbell?s Creek Road near Maiden in Kanawha
County, with improvements consisting of two small frame cottage houses. The lot
is steep, running up the
164 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
hillside for twenty-five to thirty feet from the road to a level bench where
the buildings are located, and thence up another steep slope through a wooded
area. The notice of claim alleges that in the year 1973 the respondent,
Department of Highways, encroached upon and damaged the claimant?s property by
digging a deep ditch outside the State?s right of way and along the toe of the
slope of their land. The claimant, J. E. Lovejoy, testified that he tried to
stop the respondent?s employees, but they continued their digging operation and
threatened to have him arrested if he interfered. According to the claimants,
as a result of the weakening of the slope by the removal of earth by the
respondent?s workmen, a slide occurred about a month later and portions of the
claimants? front yard slid into the ditch and out into the road. The
respondent?s employees promptly removed the slide from the road and cleaned out
the ditch. It is the claimants? contention that the slide was the direct result
of the respondent?s digging a deep ditch on their property and that as a
consequence thereof the front porch pulled loose from the main house, the
cribbing theretofore constructed by the claimants in front of their residence
moved down the hill, and the front walk and steps and certain trees were
damaged. The parties produced qualified appraisers who testified regarding the
value of the property before and after the slide occurred, the claimants?
witness placing the damages at $3,400.00 and the State?s witness at $2,500.00.
George P. Sovick, for many years a maintenance engineer for the respondent,
testified that the claimants? residence was built on a gob pile left by a coal
mining operation in the 1920?s, and that the area upon which the damaged house
was built was very unstable. He further testified that the road was built about
1927 or 1928 and that it had never received anything more than normal
maintenance by the respondent. The claimants bought the property about 1946 and
built their house the following year. At some time the claimants constructed
the wood cribbing in front of the house, apparently to stabilize the area, and
Mr. Sovick?s testimony indicates that the movement of the house was
precipitated by the deterioration and giving-away of the cribbing and the
natural settling of the unstable ground.
A plat introduced in evidence by the respondent shows a thirty-foot right of
way with the ditch entirely within its boundaries. A sixteen-inch stump
thirteen and one-half feet from the centerline of the road and outside the
ditchline appears significant in view of the claimant?s contention that the
ditch was
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 165
dug approximately six feet deep and into the slope on their property. Another
exhibit offered by the respondent and admitted in evidence was a letter written
by an attorney representing the claimants under date of December 10, 1972,
directed to the respondent and advising in part that ?when the State grades
along the road and cleans out the ditch in front of his property that the high
bank is continually crumbling away and that this has caused a slip near his
front porch and Mr. Lovejoy is very concerned about and tells me that if this
condition continues to exist his house will slide over the embankment?.
It is well known that in West Virginia homes are built on hills along all of
our roads and highways, frequently with the hillside extending down to the
ditchline and, as in this case, allowing for limited shoulders from the edge of
the hard surface of the road to the toe of the slope. Along all but our most
sophisticated highways, there are ordinary ditches which, for the protection of
the roads and for the benefit of the area residents and the travelling public
in general periodically must be cleared of the dirt, rock and debris that in
the normal course of things moves down the slopes and clogs the drains. During
the year before the slide complained of, the claimants through their attorney,
protested the respondent?s actions in cleaning the subject ditch with a grader,
averring that if such maintenance continued, the claimant?s house would slide
over the embankment.
The evidence in this case was conflicting, confusing and in many important
details imcomplete, and as a result a clear understanding of the issues has
been difficult. A slide did occur and over a period of years there has been a deterioration
and settling of the earth supporting the claimants? residence. However, upon
consideration of the whole, the Court has concluded that the claimants have not
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that there was such misconduct on the
part of the respondent that any of its acts could be considered the direct
proximate cause of injury to the claimants.
Accordingly, this claim is disallowed.
Claim disallowed.
166 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued September
2, 1976
IRA D. SNYDER
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-908)
Guy R. Bucci, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Nancy Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
JONES, JUDGE:
On January 12, 1973, at about 6:00 to 6:30 p.m. the claimant, Ira D. Snyder,
was travelling along a narrow road leading from State Route No. 3 to Garrison
in Boone County, where he had an appointment with a prospective customer. The
claimant resides in Belle, Kanawha County, and is a salesman and installer of
fire alarms. He had not travelled the road before, and as he went along he
encountered snowy spots and patches of ice. The claimant testified that he
drove through an ?5? curve as he came to a one-way bridge over Seng Creek in
Boone County, at a speed of not more than twenty miles per hour; that he saw
ice on the bridge from lights in the yard of Mr. and Mrs. Harold Dean Thompson,
and presumably by his own headlights; that he applied his brakes, started
sliding, lost control and went over the side of the bridge into the water about
six feet below. He further testified that there were no signs warning of the
existence of the bridge or that it might freeze before the road surface; that
the ice on the bridge was approximately ten inches thick; and that he did not
see any guardrails. The front end of the claimant?s car came to a stop in the
stream, setting at a rather sharp angle. The claimant climbed out of the water,
up the bank and walked to the Thompson house across the road. Mr. Thompson
drove the claimant back to his home at Belle. On February 16, 1973, the
claimant went to Dr. R. A. Lewis of Charleston for a physical examination and
x-rays, which revealed cervical strain and a fractured rib. The claimant?s 1971
Comet automobile was damaged to the extent of $988.39, and his total claim, including
medical bills and loss of earnings is for damages in the amount of $10,000.00.
Harold Dean Thompson, who described the bridge as being in front of his house,
where he had lived for nine or ten years, testified as a witness for the
claimant, substantially as follows: The bridge is about twenty feet in length
and at the time of the accident had two
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 167
angle iron guardrails, about three feet high and one and one-half feet apart,
on each side; other accidents had occurred at the site of this bridge but no
specific details were given nor was there any reference to the condition of the
weather or the drivers; referring to the guardrails he testified that ?you?d
have to knock it off to get into the creek? and ?there?s several pieces of
fender sticking on them. I guess they did stop somthing.?; the witness?s
designation of the point where the claimant?s car left the road makes it
difficult to determine whether the vehicle actually reached the bridge or
perhaps just the righthand corner of the bridge as he approached (this being in
conflict with the claimant?s testimony that the front of his car had reached
the center of the bridge); and he did not corroborate the claimant?s contention
that ice on the bridge was ten inches thick or that such a layer of ice would
render the guardrails useless.
The claimant was travelling after dark over a strange, narrow, country-type
road, with occasional patches of snow and ice. He said he was proceeding
cautiously because the road was so narrow and because there was ice on the
road. He came out of the ?S? curve in sight of the bridge at a speed of about
twenty miles per hour and he could see the ice on the bridge. It is unclear
whether he applied his brakes before or after reaching the bridge, but when he
did so, his rear wheels started to slide and he lost control of his vehicle.
It is well settled law that a user of our highways travels thereon at his own
risk and the State does not insure him a safe journey. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals further has held that the placement of warning signs and
guardrails is within the discretion of the Department of Highways. Adlcins
v. Sims, 130W. Va. 645,46 S.E. 2d 81. It is a matter of common knowledge
that places of danger exist at innumerable points upon our state roads,
particularly on our lesser secondary roads. A sign indicating the existence of
the bridge in this case would have served no purpose, as the claimant says he
already was proceeding cautiously because of the ice on the road. A sign
warning that the bridge might freeze before the surface of the road would have
told the claimant little or nothing as ice already was frozen on the surface of
the road. The respondent had provided guardrails for this bridge. Obviously they
were not of the type nor as resistant as guardrails found on interstate
highways, primary roads or even most secondary roads, but the Court will assume
that the respondent in its discretion considered the angle iron guardrails
adequate in the
168 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
circumstances. The claimant?s own witness testified that it was necessary to
knock the guardrail off before anyone could go over the side of the bridge, and
there is no evidence in the record that any guardrail was either bent or
broken.
Travelling on an icy road is always a hazardous undertaking, and considering
the weather conditions and the kind of road the claimant was travelling, he
must have recognized that certain risks were involved, and particularly in
attempting to approach and cross this narrow, little-used bridge, he must have
foreseen some danger. However, we will not further examine the respondent?s
contention that the claimant?s damages were the result of his own negligence as
that will not be necessary.
In full consideration of all of the facts and circumstances developed in this
case, the Court is of opinion to and does hereby hold that the claimant has not
proved such a positive neglect of duty by the respondent as would constitute
negligence and create a moral obligation on the part of the State to award him
damages.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued September 9, 1976
CURTIS L. ERVIN
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-955)
Claimant appeared in person.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. WALLACE, JUDGE:
The claimant, Curtis L. Ervin, filed his claim for $1,600.00 against the
respondent for damages to his automobile caused by falling rocks. He testified
that he was driving on U.S. Route 52 from Welch, West Virginia to North Fork,
West Virginia in McDowell County in the month of May, 1975. The respondent?s
witness, Herman L. Roberts, testified it was March 22, 1975. When questioned
about the discrepancy in dates, the claimant stated that it was possible that
March 22 could be correct. The weather was clear, the surface of the highway
dry. It was about 1:30 a.m. He
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 169
stated he was traveling at about 40 mph and his headlights were on high beam.
At a point near Vivian, West Virginia he reduced his speed when he saw rocks
falling on the road. When he was about 15 feet to 20 feet from a big rock, he
attempted to stop his vehicle to avoid being hit. The rocks struck his car on
the left front or driver?s side damaging the front grill, radiator, fender and
door. The automobile, a 1969 Mercury Marquis, had been purchased secondhand for
$700.00 two months previously. The claimant introduced no evidence as to the
amount of his damages but testified that the driver of the wrecker, that towed
the car to the garage, had stated that it would cost more to fix it then it was
worth. He further testified that he drove the road every day and knew that
rocks fell in the area. He stated there were signs along the highway warning of
falling rocks but not at the place of the accident. He also stated a sign was
erected later at the scene.
Herman L. Roberts, employed by the respondent as the county maintenance
supervisor for McDowell County, testified that the rocks that caused the
accident fell at a point between Vivian, West Virginia and Landgraff, West
Virginia. He further testified there was no work of any type being conducted by
the respondent at the accident point which would have loosened or caused rocks
and other material to fall on the highway. He stated that there were signs
along the highway warning of falling rocks and that no additional signs were
erected after the accident.
The law of West Virginia is well established that the State is not an insurer
of its highways and the user travels at his own risk. There is no evidence in
the record of this case to show that the negligence of the respondent caused
the accident without which there can be no liability. Therefore, it is the
judgment of the Court to disallow the claim.
Claim disallowed.
170 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued September
9, 1976
JANICE M. NEAL
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
(No. CC-76-7)
PER CURIAM:
The claimant, Janice M. Neal, an employee of the West Virginia Department of
Mental Health, filed a claim in the amount of $52.48 against the respondent for
travel and motel expenses incurred at a meeting in Huntington, West Virginia.
The respondent filed its amended answer admitting liability and requesting the
claim be paid. A letter from Dr. M. Mitchell-Bateman, respondent?s director,
filed as an exhibit states that the claimant was an employee of the respondent;
that she was on approved official business in Huntington; that the expense
account was timely submitted but was lost by the respondent due to no fault of
the claimant and should be paid.
Therefore, it is the Opinion of the Court on the basis of the pleadings and
exhibit that the claim in the amount of $52.48 be allowed. Pursuant to West
Virginia Code 14-2-12, no interest can be allowed.
Award of $52.48.
Opinion issued September 9, 1976
RAYMOND PEAK
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-973)
PER CURIAM:
The claimant and respondent have filed a written stipulation indicating that,
commencing with the summer months of 1973 and continuing until July, 1975, the
claimant experienced excessive water buildup and inadequate drainage around the
foundation of his home located at 405 Midland Trail in Hurricane, Putnam
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 171
County, West Virginia which caused damage to the foundation, heating system,
walls and ceilings of the house.
In the completion of the widening of West Virginia State Route 34 in front of
claimant?s home, respondent?s employees had failed to connect claimant?s
drainage system into a nearby installed 18-inch drainpipe. Respondent has now
connected the drainage system and corrected the water buildup.
Two appraisals were filed with the stipulations, one on behalf of the claimant
made by Home Construction Corporation of Hurricane, West Virginia, the other,
made by West Virginia Appraisal Company, Inc. of Charleston, West Virginia for
the respondent. Both appraisals list the market value of the house before the
damage as $35,000.00 and $21,000.00 and $20,000.00 respectively as the value
after the damage.
It was stipulated that the fair and equitable estimate of the damages sustained
by the claimant is $9,000.00. The Court believing that liability exists on the
part of the respondent and the damages are reasonable, an award of $9,000.00 is
directed in favor of the claimant.
Award of $9,000.00.
Opinwn issued September 16, 1976
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
SUBROGEE OF CHARLES C. SIMPSON
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-912)
PER CURIAM:
The written stipulation filed in this claim establishes that on June 7, 1974,
one Margaret Simpson was driving her husband?s 1971 Chevrolet Kingswood Estate
Station Wagon to a picnic area in the Kanawha State Forest in Kanawha County,
West Virginia. Her husband, Charles C. Simpson, was also the named insured in
an automobile insurance policy issued by claimant, which policy extended
collision coverage with a $100.00 deductible feature.
172 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W.VA.
Mrs. Simpson was driving on a road maintained by respondent and was approaching
a point in the road where a bridge had been formerly erected to provide access
across a waterway located some 10 to 12 feet below the level of the road. This
bridge had apparently been removed some time prior to the subject incident, and
its absence could not easily be detected by an approaching motorist because of
the unusual elevation of the road. The stipulation further reveals that
motorists had earlier been warned of this condition by respondent?s employees
through the use of barricades which, unfortunately, had been removed on the day
of Mrs. Simpson?s accident. The former bridge had been, like the road itself,
maintained by the respondent.
By reason of the foregoing, Mrs. Simpson drove off of the road, and the car
fell the 10 to 12 feet into the waterway below. As a result, the station wagon
was greatly damaged. Thereafter, claimant paid Charles C. Simpson the sum of
$1,775.00 under the terms of the collision coverage and received a written
assignment of his claim against the party responsible for the accident and resultant
damage.
This Court believes that the respondent failed to exercise ordinary care in the
maintenance of this bridge and to warn the public of its lack of existence, and
that it was thus guilty of negligence. Being of the further opinion that the
amount of damages is reasonable, an award in the amount of $1,775.00 is
directed.
Award of $1,775.00.
Opinion issued September 16, 1976
CHARLES C. SIMPSON
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-60)
PER CURIAM:
This claim arises out of the same incident which was the subject of the claim
of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, subrogee of Charles C. Simpson, D912*,
that opinion also having been issued on this date, and reference is hereby made
to that opinion for a description of the facts.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 173
Claimant in this claim seeks recovery of his uninsured $100.00 property damage
loss and for reimbursement of a $25.00 charge he incurred for medical treatment
for his wife, Margaret Simpson.
Again being of opinion that liability exists and that the claimed damages are
reasonable, we award the claimant the sum of $125.00.
Award of $125.00.
* See p in this volume.
Opinion issued October 5, 1976
AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY CO.,
SUBROGEE FOR JIMMY L. MCKINNEY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-1036)
PER CURIAM:
The claimant and respondent have filed a written stipulation indicating that on
or about February 25, 1975, the respondent by and through its employees was
engaged in certain construction work on Widen Ridge or Route 52 in Clay County,
West Virginia; and that respondent?s employees in the course of their work
detonated explosive charges in the construction area causing rock, mud and
other debris to strike a 1973 Mazda 4-door automobile owned by claimant?s
subrogee, Jimmy L. McKinney, which was lawfully and properly parked off the
paved portion of the highway in the area of respondent?s work.
Neither the individual who parked the automobile nor the claimant?s subrogee
had notice of the blasting operations being conducted by the respondent.
As a result of the blasting operation, the automobile w damaged and it was
stipulated that the fair and equitable estimate of the damages sustained by the
claimant is $989.55. The Court believing that liability exists on the part of
the respondent and the damages are reasonable, an award of $989.55 is directed
in favor of the claimant.
Award of $989.55.
174 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued October 5, 1976
LOUIS TABIT, father and next friend
of MARY JANET TAB IT, and LOUIS TABIT
vs.
ADJUTANT GENERAL
(No. L-795)
John II. Mitchell, Attorney at Law, for the claimants.
James A. Swart, Assistant Attorney General, for the respondent.
JONES, JUDGE:
On Sunday, August 20, 1972, at about 1:00p.m. Mary Janet Tabit, then eight
years of age, sustained injuries while upon the premises of the respondent, the
Adjutant General, at the National Guard Armory at Falls View in Fayette County,
and this claim was instituted in her behalf by Louis Tabit, as her father and
next friend, as well as in his own right.
A surplus Army tank was placed by the respondent on the lawn in front of the
Armory, within a few feet of United States Route No. 60, sometime during the
year 1968. The tank was of World War II and Korean War vintage and was
displayed by the Guard as a war memorial or monument for public viewing. ?Keep
Off? signs were placed on the tank, but after about three months they were
removed as they were largely disregarded by the public and particularly by
children, and several of the signs were torn down. As a precautionary measure,
the respondent?s employees put sand in the paint used on the tank to prevent
its surface from becoming slippery. No fence or other device was employed to keep
the public away from the tank. Two of the employees of the respondent were on
duty until 4:30 p.m. from Monday through Friday of each week, but the grounds
were unattended on Saturdays and Sundays except for special events. None of the
respondent?s employees was present on the day of the accident.
On the Sunday in question the Tabits had visitors from Roanoke, Virginia, and
Janet asked her father?s permission to take three of the visiting children,
ages eight to twelve or thirteen, to the Armory, a short distance from their
home, to show them the tank ?because they never had seen an Army tank before?.
Permission was given with the admonition that they must not climb on the tank.
However, the attraction apparently was too appealing to the
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 175
visiting children, who climbed on the tank, and Janet, also disobeying her
father, followed them. She described her fall as follows:
?And there?s a back part of the tank we always used as a slickey slide and I
was getting ready to go down the slickey slide and my foot caught on this bolt
sticking up and I fell and I fell on my elbow.?
Janet was back at her home holding her injured left arm fifteen to twenty
minutes after she had left for the Armory. Her father immediately took her to
the Montgomery General Hospital where Janet?s arm was x-rayed, but no
orthopedic surgeon being available there, she was then taken to the Charleston
General Hospital where she was attended by Dr. Jack Pushkin.
Dr. Puskin testified that Janet was admitted to the hospital on August 20,
1972, with a displaced supracondylar fracture of the left elbow. He described
the fracture as involving the bone of the upper arm and explained that ?the
lower end of that bone just above the elbow was broken into (sic) and displaced
and required general anesthetic and had to be set and put in traction,? with a
pin through the elbow. On September 15, 1972, she was placed in a cast and was
discharged from the hospital the next day. Dr. Pushkin continued to attend
Janet as an outpatient approximately every four weeks until February 9, 1973,
arid he gain examined her on the day of the hearing. Dr. Pushkin stated that
Janet had healed well but she had some unevenness in the growth plate in her
elbQw causing her arm to turn in slightly, the elbow turning out from her body.
He further noted that if both arms were held together and compared one with the
other, the deformity was obvious, and this was demonstrated to the Court at the
hearing. The doctor termed the injury as permanent but would not predict
whether the condition might worsen. He said Janet should be watched until she
had finished her growth at approximately fifteen years of age at which time the
efficacy of a further surgical operation should be determined.
Another orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Sitaram Nayak, examined Janet on three
occasions, the first time on October 12, 1974, and last on September 23, 1975.
In his opinion Janet?s deformity will increase and another operation at age
fifteen or sixteen is indicated as probable. Special damages were proved in the
amount of $2,204.89, and Dr. Nayak estimated the cost of future surgical and
hospital services at $2,150.00.
176 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
A pertinent and leading case in West Virginia is that of Sutton V. Monongahela
Power Co., 151 W.Va. 961, 158 S.E. 2d
98 (1967) from which we quote the following:
?Although the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine is not recognized in this State,
this Court has adopted a rule quite similar to that Doctrine and has held that
where a dangerous instrumentality or condition exists at a place frequented by
children who thereby suffer injury, the parties responsible for such dangerous
condition may be held liable for such injury if they knew, or should have
known, of the dangerous condition and that children frequented the dangerous
premises either for pleasure or out of curiosity. Love v. Virginian Power Co., 86 W.Va. 393, 103 S.E. 352, Waddell v. New River Co., 141 W. Va. 880, 93 S.E. 2d 473; Hatten v. Realty Co., 148W. Va. 380, 135 S.E.
2d 236. Under this doctrine where the defendants know or should know of such
dangerous instrumentality and the repeated presence of children, the mere fact
that they are trespassers does not bar recovery. 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, ?118;
Parsons v. Applachian Electric Power
Co., 115W. Va. 450, 1?76 S.E. 862; Waddell v. New River Co., supra.?
With respect to Janet?s status as a trespasser, as respondent?s counsel stoutly
contends she was, we point out that this was not private property, but was open
to the public, including small children, without any limit or restraint. See Rine v. Morris, et al., 99
W. Va. 52, 127 S.E. 908.
The respondent further contends that the Army tank was no more a ?dangerous
instrumentality? than a statue on a Courthouse lawn. However, this instrument
of war, known even to children as a fighting machine for killing and
destruction, certainly would be more exciting and inviting to danger than a
statue of Senator J. Phineas Foghorn.
We also believe that the defense of contributory negligence does not apply in
this case because the presumption that an eight year old may not be guilty of
contributory negligence has not been rebutted by the respondent.
Normally, we would be inclined to agree with the respondent?s position that a
Stationary object which appears to be reasonably safe for its intended purpose
and free of structural or design defect, would not be held to be a dangerous
instrumentality under the definitions laid down by our Supreme Court of
Appeals. However,
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 177
we feel that this case is unique and based on evidence and reasoning
hereinafter outlined does come within the rule.
We cite excerpts from the testimony of Sgt. Charles L. Hardy, custodian of the
National Guard Armory from 1966 to the date of the hearing of this case and a
witness for the respondent, as follows:
?A As I stated before, during the weekly hours, if there?s any children out
there at all we go out there and if they?re on the tank we explain the dangers
of the tank and we politely ask them would they mind getting off. I have went
out there many times and have assisted people who have stopped by to take
pictures and assist in putting the children on the track and standing there
watching for their safety.?
?A Because as I stated, sir, before we wasn?t quite sure exactly how to go
about mounting this piece of equipment on the lawn, what could be done, you
know, as far as protection to the children. So we took it upon ourselves to put
signs up until we got notice from the Adjutant General?s office of the proper
procedures.?
?A I explained the articles that?s on the track that they can get their
clothing on, the dangers of slipping and could injure themselves.?
?Q Okay, in other words you sand anything that somebody
might climb on whether it be an active truck or a monument set out there
somewhere??
?A Right.?
?Q So then by that you anticipated people would be
climbing on it, didn?t you??
?A Right.?
?Q And by your own explanation it can be dangerous to
climb on that tank, can it??
?A Yes, sir.?
?Q And in fact it was dangerous to little Janet Tabit,
wasn?t it??
?A Yes, sir.?
The following statement with reference to knowledge of danger appears in
Section 72, 57 Am. Jur. 2d, Negligence:
178 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
?As hereinbefore stated, the duty to use care is based upon actual or imputed
knowledge of danger. It is also true that the care which must be exercised in
any particular situation is in proportion to the actor?s knowledge, actual or
imputed, of the danger to another in the act to be performed. The degree of
care necessary to constitute the ordinary care required of a person upon any
particular occasion is measured by reference to the circumstances of danger and
risk known to such person at the time. Conduct whicth will be considered
extremely careful under one condition of knowledge, and one state of
circumstances, may be grossly negligent with different knowledge and in changed
circumstances. The consequence likely to be the result of an act or omission is
a fact to be taken into consideration in determining the kind and amount of
caution to be exercised. The degree of care required to be used in any given
case to avoid the imputation of negligence must be according to the circumstances
or in proportion to the danger reasonably to be anticipated?such care as is
ordinarily sufficient under similar circumstances to avoid danger and secure
safety. Where a danger actually is foreseen, the duty is imposed to adopt
every possible precaution to avoid an injury therefrom.? (Emphasis
supplied.)
The respondent in this case has admitted knowledge of the frequent presence of
children on and about the Army tank, and its employees gratuitously undertook
to provide for their safety by mixing sand in the paint, providing ?Keep Off?
signs which after a time were determined to be ineffectual, and verbally
warning children of the dangers of the admittedly fascinating machine. While
the tank may not have been dangerous in the abstract, there was an obvious
subjective appreciation of danger on the part of the respondent, and the Court
finds that the respondent assumed the duty of providing for the safety of
children known to frequent and climb on the tank which in so many ways it
acknowledged to be dangerous. The mere removal of the ?Keep Off? signs
indicates acquiescence in the children?s playful conduct, and adds support to
the conclusion that respondent?s efforts to protect the children from falling
were insufficient. The respondent having assumed the duty of providing for
children?s safety and having committed acts to that end, the Court believes
that the claimants are entitled to rely on such assumption of duty. In the
circumstances, an attractive and relatively inexpensive fence would have solved
the problem.
13 M.J., Negligence, Section 10, states that the standard of care
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 179
under a gratuitous duty is less than that required under a legally required
duty; but here we are dealing with children who generally are entitled to a
greater degree of care. In this case we believe the standard of ordinary care
applies. Under a duty of ordinary care involving the danger of a fall, we hold
that the respondent breached that duty by employing inadequate means to prevent
the fall which injured Janet Tabit.
Considering all the facts and circumstances, the Court is of opinion that the
respondent?s acts and omissions proved in this case constitute such negligence
as entitles the claimants to recover, and awards are hereby made to Mary Janet
Tabit in the amount of $12,150.00, and to Louis Tabit in the amount of
$2,204.89, which includes $2,150.00 for future surgical and hospital services
which the Court believes will be necessary.
Awards: Mary Janet Tabit?$12,150.00.
Louis Tabit?$2,204.89.
Opinion issued October 6, 1976
JOHN J. BODO
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-28)
Claimant appeared in person.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. RULEY, JUDGE:
In this case the claimant, John J. Bodo, seeks an award of
property damage in the sum of $863.71 allegedly sustained by his
1973 model Chevrolet four door sedan automobile in a two vehicle
accident which happened at 8:40 A.M. on Monday, February 23,
1976.
The evidence in the case is as follows. The accident occurred at the point
where W. Va. Route 65, which runs generally east and west at the place where
the accident happened, is joined on its south side by Whitman Creek Road,
Secondary Route 9/1. Immediately to the south of the junction, Whitman Creek
Road runs over a slightly elevated bridge. The bridge has a steel frame
180 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS W. VA.
and is approximately twenty feet long and fifteen feet wide. The surface of
both highways including the portion of Whitman Creek Road which crosses the
bridge is blacktop. The claimant had departed from his home and had driven on
his way to work about 2.8 miles in a general northerly direction over Whitman
Creek Road to the place where the accident happened. He had been driving over
the same route regularly since November, 1975. On the day the accident
happened, as he travelled over that distance, he observed what appeared to him
to be a mixture of snow and frost in the woods and along the berms of the road
but its paved surface was clear and dry. The temperature was approximately
thirty degrees. He testified that he slowed the speed of his automobile as he
entered the bridge to about five miles per hour but, encountering ice upon its
surface, was caused thereby to slide across the bridge and into W. Va. Route 65
where the left front portion of his automobile collided with the right front
portion of an eastbound automobile.
The mere presence of ice upon a bridge in the wintertime, causing a traveler to
slide or skid thereon, does not constitute negligence on the part of the
respondent. 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways, Streets and Bridges ?506. In addition, it
is common knowledge that precipitation may accumulate and freeze on bridge
surfaces when it melts and runs off or evaporates on other portions of a
roadway. This Court has held several times that the State is not a guarantor or
insurer of the safety of persons who travel on its roads and bridges.
Illustratively, see Lowe v. Department
of Highways, 8 Ct. Cl. 210. See also Adkins v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 645, 46 S.E. 2d 81. For these reasons, this claim must be,
and it is hereby, disallowed.
Claim disallowed.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 181
Opinion issued October 6, 1976
BETTY H. DUNLAP
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-6)
Houston Smith, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. RULEY, JUDGE:
This case involves a claim for damages for personal injuries which the claimant
sustained when, while as a pedestrian walking across a one lane bridge, she
stepped in a hole in the bridge floor. At the time and place of the accident,
it was dark and raining.
Other facts of the case are as follows. The accident happened at about 7:00
P.M. on Sunday, November 30, 1975. At the time of the accident, the claimant
was on her way from her home to church. The bridge in question is part of a
secondary route and crosses Cobb?s Creek in McCorkle, Lincoln County. It is a
steel frame bridge about thirty-five feet long and fifteen feet wide with a wood
floor. Although the bridge was commonly used by both vehicular and pedestrian
traffic, there was no artificial lighting on the bridge. The claimant was
walking across her right side of the bridge. Ronald D. Holstein, Jr., a young
man or boy who was some distance in front of the claimant cautioned her to
watch out for the hole and, with her next step after that admonition, her right
foot and leg went through the hole striking some unidentified object about
eight inches below the surface as it descended until her right foot struck a
beam upon which it stopped. The evidence warrants the inference that the hole
had existed for a substantial time, perhaps as much as a month. The claimant
had not traveled across the bridge since the month of October and was not previously
aware that the hole existed.
From the foregoing facts, it is apparent that the respondent was guilty of
negligence which was a proximate cause of the claimant?s injury and that the
claimant was not guilty of any contributory negligence. The case falls within
the purview of and is similar to Harrah
v. Department of Highways, 9 Ct. Cl.
242. Accordingly, this claim should be allowed.
182 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Turning to the issue of damages, the evidence shows that the claimant was 41 at
the time of the accident. Her principal injury was a puncture wound in the
lower tibial area of her right leg which required little medical treatment and
which healed uneventfully with the only residual being a scar. She incurred
medical expense in the sum of $68.15 and lost one week?s wages in the sum of
$194.00 from her employment at the Hamlin Office of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. In view of these facts, the Court is of the opinion that the sum
of $750.00 will be a fair and just compensation for the injuries sustained by
the claimant and does hereby make an award in that sum.
Award of $750.00.
Opinion issued October 6, 1976
DEWEY ROBINETTE & SHIRLEY
ROBINETTE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-982)
Claimants present in person.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. WALLACE, JUDGE:
The claimants, Dewey Robinette and Shirley Robinette, his wife, filed their
claim before this Court for damages in the amount of $10,000.00 to the property
of the claimant, Dewey Robinette, allegedly caused by the grading of a roadway
by the respondent. The claimant, Dewey Robinette, offered all the testimony on
his behalf. He stated that his wife?s would be substantially the same as his
and therefore she did not testify.
The claimant has lived continuously on the property since he purchased it in
July, 1955. It is located in Mercer County on State Route 19/2 1 two and a half
miles north of Princeton, West Virginia.
The road, which is the subject of this complaint, runs up and out from State
Route 19/21 through the claimant?s property between his house and garage. It
serves ten or eleven families and terminates near a cemetery.
The claimant maintains the road is private and that the other
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 183
families using the road have acquired prescriptive rights in its use. He stated
the State did not maintain the road but that the people he bought the property
from indicated they had made a deed to the State. The testimony in this regard
is not clear.
The recOrd shows that a grader operated by an employee of the respondent graded
the road in August, 1974. Respondent?s witness testified it was on August 2,
1974. The claimant attempted to stop the operator but stated he continued to
work.
The claimant maintained that the road was leveled and widened; that a drainage
ditch that he had dug to divert spring water from the road was destroyed. The
result being that all water drainage flows off the mountain down the road
washing out the dirt leaving rocks which have broken his windows when they are
thrown against his house by spinning wheels of automobiles using the road. No
water or debris flows onto the claimant?s property.
Garfield Hazeiwood, Mercer County Superintendent for the Department of
Highways, testified that the road was graded at the request of the residents
using the road. He testified that he had been on the road before the grading
was done because of complaints; that the road was rocky both before and after
the grading and had no drainage system whatsoever. The road was fairly steep
and the only way the water can get down is through the road. The water drains
down the road to the culvert at the foot of the mountain which is maintained by
the respondent.
The claimant was questioned at length by the Court as to his damages but he had
no damage figures. He stated, ?there?s no way I can put a dollar value on it?.
He further stated that he never complained to the respondent unless his former
attorney had done so. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that the
negligence of the respondent caused the water to flow down the road but instead
the testimony and exhibits show that the road is and always has been a natural
rocky drain down the mountain. Upon the testimony and the lack of evidence in
respect to damage, the Court is of the opinion to deny the claim of claimant.
Claim disallowed.
184 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued October 6, 1976
ROY G. SHAWVER
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-42)
Claimant appeared in person.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. WALLACE, JUDGE:
The claimant, Roy G. Shawver, instituted this claim in the amount of $183.91
for damages to his automobile occasioned by an accident on Big Tyler Road west
of Charleston, West Virginia.
The claimant was driving his 1973 green Mercury Montego automobile in an
easterly direction up Tyler Mountain toward Charleston, West Virginia about
daybreak on a February morning in 1976. The exact time and date were not clear.
The claimant testified he did not remember the exact date, but that the time of
the accident was about 7:45 a.m. Upon cross examination he stated it was
probably before 7:00 a.m. due to the fact that he had an appointment at 7:00
a.m. or shortly thereafter. He was travelling at approximately 20 to 25 miles
per hour. His parking lights were on.
Although it was not snowing at the time of the accident, the road was covered
with ice and there was an accumulation of light snow on the berm of the road.
The claimant lived about 280 yards from the place of the accident and had lived
there about 28 years. He travelled the road almost daily. The testimony of the
claimant was that a KRT bus was proceeding down the mountain, the bus skidded
across the road, and the claimant in order to avoid hitting the bus, drove to
the right, at which time his right front wheel struck the first of two holes.
When the car struck the first hole it continued to the second hole where it
stopped. The car had to be jacked up in order to move it out of the hole. The
testimony reveals that the holes were three or four inches from the edge of the
highway about nine inches apart and about one to two feet deep.
The claimant contends that there had been many holes in the road and that the
respondent had patched them from time to time. After the accident, the claimant
reported it to employees of the
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 185
respondent who furnished him with the necessary forms to file this claim.
Although not substantiated by the testimony, the claimant stated that other
persons had reported the condition of the road to the respondent.
Although the claim filed herein alleged that the claimant hit an eight-inch
drop-off on the right side of the road as he passed a bus, the claimant
testified that the accident was caused when he hit two holes three to five
inches from the edge of the paved portion of the road.
Respondent?s witness, Claude C. Blake, a claims investigator, testified that
the claimant advised him that a KRT bus coming down the hill forced him off the
road into a ditch beside the road. He also testified there was an eight-inch
ditch at the edge of the road and that the entire edge of the curb had been
patched.
Every day in all parts of this State the travelling public contends with holes
in the roadway and drops, frayed edges and ruts along the borders of our
highways. In the event there was a defect in the highway, the question is,
whether the holes in the highway or a break in the pavement was such a defect
as would support a claim of negligence and a consequent moral obligation of the
State to compensate the claimant. This State is not an insurer of the travelers
on the highways. They travel at their own risk. In the instant case, the
preponderance of the evidence does not establish that the accident was caused
by the negligence of the respondent, but instead the claimant was damaged in an
effort to avoid an accident with a bus.
Anyone who sustains damages must prove that the negligence of the State was the
proximate cause of the injury complained of in order to render the claim and
the State liable.
Claim disallowed.
186 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued October 26, 1976
THE AJVIERICAN ROAD INSURANCE COMPANY,
SUBROGEE OF SHELLIE MORGAN, JR.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-1O1)
PER CURIAM:
The claimant and respondent have filed a written stipulation indicating that on
or about June 1, 1976, the respondent by and through its employees was engaged
in certain repair work on Bridge #888 on U.S. Route 52 located in Mingo County,
West Virginia. One of respondent?s employees dropped a welding shield while
working on the bridge, which shield struck the windshield of a vehicle owned
and operated by Shellie Morgan, Jr., the subrogee of the claimant; that as a
result, the windshield was damaged and $199.26 is a fair and equitable estimate
of the damages sustained by the claimant. Believing that liability exists on
the part of the respondent and that the damages are reasonable, an award of
$199.26 is directed in favor of the claimant.
Award of $199.26.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 187
Opinion issued November 19, 1976
WILLIAM F. BARKER and ELFA MAE BARKER
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-966a)
and
JOYCE ELAINE BARKER
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-966b)
John Troelstrup, Attorney at Law, for the claimants.
Nancy Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
RULEY, JUDGE:
These consolidated cases grow out of a single vehicle accident which happened
on Nellis Road between Ashford and W.Va.-U.S. Route 119 about one-half mile
from the top of Len?s Creek Mountain in Boone County, West Virginia, at about
7:30 A.M. on Saturday, June 16, 1973. At that time and place, the claimant,
Elfa Mae Barker, was driving a 1965 model Chevrolet owned by her husband,
William F. Barker, on her way from their home to Ashford to a bus station in
Charleston. Their daughter, the claimant, Joyce Elaine Barker, then 18, was
riding as a passenger in the right front seat. Elfa Mae Barker and Joyce Elaine
Barker assert claims for damages for personal injuries and William F. Barker
asserts a claim for property damage to the vehicle and loss of the ?society and comfort? of his wife.
In the vicinity of the place where the accIdent happened, the respondent had
been engaged in construction consisting of widening the berm along Nellis Road
for a substantial time, perhaps as much as two or three months, before the
accident happened. This work involved excavation into the hillside or
embankment (which contained a seam or vein of rock) along the road, loading the
excavated material by an endloader into dump trucks and hauling it away to
various dumping sites. The travelled portion of Nellis Road was paved with a
blacktop surface and accommodated two traffic lanes. As it ascended the mountain
from
188 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Ashford, it contained several curves but it was substantially straight for
several hundred feet in the vicinity of the place where the accident happened.
As she approached that place and in proximity to it, Mrs. Barker passed
successively highway signs which she testified that she saw and read which
warned ?Slippery When Wet? and ?Road Under Construction?. She was
traveling upgrade, on a grade estimated to be about five percent, at a speed of
about forty miles per hour. The surface of the pavement was dry until she
reached the place where the accident happened. Mrs. Barker testified that, as
she approached that place, she saw a substance which looked to her like water ?across
the road? at a distance of about 100 feet and that she then ?let up on
the gas?. After the vehicle entered that substance, it slid and spun
around, leaving the pavement and traveling across the berm and into collision
with the seam of rock, causing both Mrs. Barker and her daughter to be thrown
into its windshield. At the time and place of the accident, there was no other
vehicular traffic in sight on Nellis Road.
There is no doubt that the accident happened and that the injuries and damages
claimed resulted from it but the cause of the accident, upon the evidence
before the Court, is left to conjecture and speculation. And, of course, in
making such a determination of fact this Court has no more right to speculate
or guess than does a jury. Apparently there was some substance on the pavement
which caused the vehicle to slide, although the evidence is in conflict on that
point ranging in its extremes from the testimony of one witness for the
claimants, who arrived at the scene of the accident shortly after it happened,
to the effect that there was mud from one to two inches thick covering both
sides of the pavement for a distance of about 1,000 feet to the testimony of
two witnesses for the respondent, who arrived at the scene about one hour after
the accident, that there then was no mud or any other substance on the
pavement. The claimants made an effort to prove through one witness, Larry
Kenneth Garretson, that the respondent had put calcium chloride on the road
surface and that it had caused it to become slippery but that effort collapsed
when he testified, on cross examination:
?Q Now, when you testified previously I thought you said
you thought the slick substance looked like mud; is that correct?
A Well, it had rained that morning and it was wet and yellow clay mud on the
road. It was muddy.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 189
Q So it was not calcium?
A Well, it was mud. That?s all I can say. I don?t know what all was in it then.
The calcium had been used on it to settle the dust. I say that.
Q Could those bags have contained anything else besides
calcium?
A Yes, they could.?
And this conclusion is inevitable particularly in view of the testimony of the
witnesses for the respondent to the effect no calcium chloride or any other
chemical compound had been used by the respondent. The respondent?s witnesses
also testified?and it was undisputed?that the pavement in the vicinity of the
construction was cleaned at the end of every day?s work. In sum, while it may
be apparent that there was some substance on the pavement which caused the
Barker vehicle to slide, there is no evidence that its presence there was
caused by negligence on the part of the respondent. That ultimate conclusion
could be reached only by speculation and conjecture and, accordingly, this
Court has no alternative but to deny these claims.
Claims disallowed.
Opinion issued November 19, 1976
BLACK ROCK CONTRACTING, INC.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-597)
Stephen A. Weber & Thomas V.
Flaherty, Attorneys at Law, for the
claimant.
Dewey B. Jones & Stuart Reed
Waters, Jr., Attorneys at Law, for the
respondent.
WALLACE, JUDGE:
The claimant, Black Rock Contracting, Inc., sometimes hereinafter referred to
as Black Rock, filed its claim in the amount of $141,644.18 against the
respondeiat Department of Highways for damages allegediy causeti by:
190 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
1. A verbal shut-down order issued by respondent?s employees.
2. Damages for equipment time lost due to interference with its field of
operations caused by the failure of American Telephone and Telegraph Company to
remove an overhead cable within the time prescribed by the contract.
The claimant was the successful bidder on a certain project of the respondent
in Doddridge County, West Virginia, known as Project
APD 282 (61).
In preparation for the making and presentation of the bid proposal to the
respondent, the claimant relied on information contained in plans prepared by
the respondent and also the requirements of the 1960 Standard Specifications
and Supplemental Specifications of October, 1965.
There were certain utilities existing on the job site which had to be removed
before the project could be completed. On page two of the contract there was an
attached sheet entitled ?Status of Utilities?. The first paragraph of this
sheet is entitled ?The following dates for completion of utility relocations
are estimated dates and actual completion may vary as much as thirty days.?
One of the utilities, American Telephone and Telegraph Company, hereinafter
referred to as AT&T, had a relocation date of September 30, 1969 and in
accordance with information furnished the claimant it was considered that the
AT&T lines would be removed by that date or not more than thirty days
thereafter.
Black Rock relied on this information in making its bid and claims the
increased costs incurred were caused by the failure of AT&T to remove its
lines.
The claimant started work on the project in October, 1969. On October 30 a
representative of AT&T requested the claimant to suspend its operations for
fear that blasting would damage its lines. This request was refused but a
verbal shut-down order was issued by the respondent at the request of AT&T.
The job was suspended from October 30, 1969 through I?lovember 3, 1969 when it
was determined that the respondent had no authority to shut down the operation.
As a result the claimant and the respondent stipulated this portion of the
claim for $6,884.50.
Since the matter of the verbal shut-down order was settled by the parties, this
opinion will concern itself with the alleged claim for damages for equipment
time lost.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 191
There were two cables involved in this construction, one an AP overhead cable,
the other a coaxial underground cable. Both cables were for interstate use and
of great importance in the operations of
AT&T.
The underground cable was never moved. After the contract was let it was
determined that the excavations and fills were not going to be such as would
require its removal.
The contractor continued to work and claimed that its work was limited due to
the cables not being removed. This restricted the size of shot to be used for
its blasting operations, .thus limitjng the amount of material that could be
loosened and removed. The contractor had to work over the underground cable and
under the overhead cable.
In order to complete the project, the claimant had to remove rock and fill
material from each end of the job site. A rock blanket had to be laid in the
fill areas and then be covered by dirt arid fill material. The claimant
maintains that it was not able to move sufficient material at any one time,
thus limiting its operation.
The overhead cable was located at a point where fill material was to be dumped
if they had been able to form a base. To continue at this spot without removal
of the cable would result in the burial of the cable. After complaint by the
contractor, the respondent paid extra compensation to AT&T to set a higher
pole in the area. Two small poles were replaced by a fifty-foot pole so the
claimant could haul under the cable. This however was not sufficient to allow
full operation by the claimant.
The claimant maintains that the delay resulting in the failure of AT&T to
remove the lines caused a large quanttj of expefisive equipment to set
idle day after day accumulating rental costs and costs normally accruing to
claimant?s own equipment when cIle. This continued until February 22, 1970 when
the cable was relocated.
The respondent maintains that this case should be governed by the decision in
the Tn -State Stone Corporation vs.
State Road Commission, 9 Ct. Cl. 90
(1972), wherein this Court held that the contractor in making a bid must take
into consideration the removal of utilities and assume the risk. The claimant?s
position is that this case differs from the Tri-State Stone case in that Page
two of the contract document lists the approximate removal dates for certain utilities,
among them AT&T, and states the removal date
192 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
will not vary more than 30 days. The claimant alleges that in making its bid it
relied on these dates and bid accordingly. Counsel for the respondent argued
that there was no difference between the two cases. Upon inquiry it was stated
that Page two in the contract document was there to satisfy a Federal Highway
Administration requirement pertaining to the removal of utilities. This Court
in its pre-trial order entered ot March 31,?976 held that at that time this
claim could be distinguished from the factual situation presented in the
Tn-State Stone case. After hearing the testimony, the Court is of opinion that
this case is distinguishable from the Tn-State Stone case for the reason that
the removal dates for utilities are made certain by the contract provisions and
that the contractor was led to rely upon them.
The respondent maintains that this claim has no merit before the Court because
it is governed by the Rules and Regulations of the respondent and by the 1960
Standard Specifications which are a part of the contract. The specifications
provide that in the event any misunderstanding arises as to the intent or
meaning of the provisions of the contract, then it is the duty of the
Commissioner of Highways to make a determination and decision, which decision
shall be final and conclusive. The Commissioner, in this case, made the
decision that the claimant was not entitled to additional compensation. However,
in the payment to the claimant of the fmal estimate on this contract, it was
made subject to the right of the claimant to file its claim before this CDurt.
During the course of the hearing of this case there were several
motions made by the respondent which were not disposed of but
taken under advisement. There were two motions to strike Exhibit
1 and one to strike the testimony of the witness Jarvis and Exhibit
7. After reviewing all of the testimony and evidence, these three
motions are hereby overruled.
At the close of the claimant?s testimony the Court took under advisement the
respondent?s motion to strike all of claimant?s testimony and disallow this
claim. The motion renewed previous motions and cited further grounds which were
that the case was not proved by a preponderance of the evidence and that the
Commissioner of Highways has under the provisions of the Standard
Specifications already determined there is no claim. This motion was renewed at
the end of the hearing. The Court feels that there is sufficient evidence to
warrant a finding on the merits and overrules the motions to strike.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 193
Although the Court has ruled on the motions, it feels that some comment should
be made in this decision pertaining to the theory that the Highway
Commissioner?s ruling in this case is final.
This Court was created for the express purpose to hear and determine cases
which but for the constitutional immunity of the State from suit could be
maintained in the regular courts of the State and in which there is a moral
obligation of the State to pay any such claim. Granted the 1960 Standard
Specifications provide that the finding of the Commissioner is final, this
Court does not agree that the provisions prohibits a proceeding in this Court
to determine what in equity and good conscience is a moral obligation of the
State.
The claimant bases the amount of its claim on its daily equipment records which
show the days on which equipment is worked, when idle, and the cost attributed
to each particular piece of equipment. However, the Court is not satisfied that
the claimant has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that each piece of
equipment was idled each day claimed by AT&T?s failure to remove its line.
There is no doubt that the AT&T line hampered and delayed the work and the
claimant should be compensated but not to the extent claimed.
The claimant continued to increase the amount of equipment on the job site and
at the same time complained that the work was being impeded by the failure of
AT&T to remove its cable. Claimant?s witness testified that it was
necessary to bring more equipment on the job site even though it was not to be
used immediately because they had to get it when available.
The stockpiling of equipment is a matter of judgment and not the responsibility
of the respondent. Claimant?s testimony reveals that it had no other job
pending and yet claimed compensation for its own idle equipment stored on the
job site when it had no immediate use for it elsewhere.
The job was actually completed ahead of schedule but not as soon as expected.
It was stipulated in the record that no activity was anticipated by the
claimant between January 1, 1970 and April 30, 1970, yet the claimant claims
extra compensation through January 30, 1970.
In the course of the hearing it was brought out that the equipment records did
not take into account certain days that the
194 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
job was shut down due to weather conditions. The claimant conceded this and
accordingly reduced the amount of its claim.
The Court is of the opinion that the claimant in submitting its bid relied on
the removal dates for the utilities in the contract and that the claimant is
entitled to extra compensation caused by the delay in the removal of the
AT&T cable, and therefore an award is made to the claimant in the amount of
$23,874.59 in addition to the stipulated amount of $6,884.50 agreed to by the
parties.
Award of $30,759.09.
Opinion issued January 13, 1977
RANDY R. ADAMS, ET AL
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(No. CC-76-128 A,C-T)
No appearances on behalf of the claimants.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. PER
CURIAM:
All of the claimants in these consolidated claims were employed as farmers on
State owned farms by the Department of Public Institutions for varying periods
of time prior to June 30, 1976. Senate Bill #143 created the Farm Management
Commission to control all State owned farms, effective July 1, 1976. None of
these claimants were re-employed by the Farm Management Commission pursuant to
Code 19-12A-8, and they are now before this Court seeking payment of their
respective accrued annual leaves, the amounts of their claims varying depending
on their length of service prior to June 30, 1976.
Respondent in its answer and in open court admitted the validity of these
claims. No funds were appropriated for fiscal year 1976-77 to pay these claims,
although sufficient funds were expired at the end of fiscal 1975-76 from which
these claims could have been paid. Certainly these are claims which the State
in equity and good conscience should discharge and pay. We therefore make
awards to the claimants as follows:
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 195
CC-76-128 A Randy R. Adams $ 73.15
CC-76-128 C Louis E. Gilbert 375.63
CC-76-128 D John Gough 982.70
CC-76-128 E Lacy Gwinn 477.27
CC-76-128 F Beecher D. Hamons 135.85
CC-76-128 G William E. Hefner 252.06
CC-76-128 H Edward L. Hill 125.40
CC-76-128 I Robert L. Hill 39.54
CC-76-128 J Carl Mitchell 828.72
CC-76-128 K Clyde Moats 227.35
CC-76-128 L William Mullins 621.36
CC-76-128 M Fred Poling, Sr 391.34
CC-76-128 N Charles Reynolds 212.52
CC-76-128 0 Homer Reynolds 291.60
CC-76-128 P Ronald Robinson 271.70
CC-76-128 Q
Harold Sypolt 33.00
CC-76-128 R Charles Wilson 222.41
CC-76-128 S Melvin Stemple 683.36
CC-76-128 T Robert Miller 296.55
Opinion is,suedJanuctr?y 13,1977
K. L. BLOCK & PATRICIA A. BLOCK
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-4)
Richard K. Swartling, Ronald R.
Hassig, and Logan Hassig, Attorneys
at Law, for the claimants.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. WALLACE, JUDGE:
I?ne claimants and the respondent have filed a written stipulation indicating
that in 1958 the West Virginia Department of Highways, formerly the West
Virginia State Road Commission, in the construction of the West Virginia
approach to the New Martinsville, West Virginia Bridge to the State of Ohio
made substantial cuts and excavations into the hillside above and east of the
approach, which hillside is adjacent to the property of the claimants. This
activity by the respondent initiated a landslide which continued and extended
into the area of the property of the claimants. The excavations by the
respondent caused movement beneath and around the dwelling of the claimants
causing considerable damage to their home and property.
196 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
The claimants experienced cracking and movement in the foundation of their home
and surrounding earth. Attempts to repair the damages failed. In 1971 the
claimants purchased other land and removed their house to the new location.
On January 16, 1976 the claimants filed their claim with this Court for damages
to their house and lot.
The respondent in defense of this claim contended that so much of the claim
that represented damages sustained more then two years prior to the filing of
the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Chapter 55, Article 2,
Section 12 of the Official Code of West Virginia, 1931, as amended provides in
part as follows:
?Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be
brought: (a) within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have
accrued, if it be for damage to property; . .
The Court is of the opinion that the
statute of limitations does not run where there is a continuing and
intermittent trespass to real estate, but under the provisions of the statute
there can be no recovery for damages sustained more than two years prior to the
filing of the claim. Damages to the home of the claimants were sustained more
than two years prior to this action and are thus not recoverable.
While, as indicated above, the home of the claimants was moved to a new lot,
the claimants still retain ownership to the subject lot which was and still is
being damaged. This damage is continuing and the statute of limitations does
not bar claimants from recovering this damage.
Appraisals were filed with the stipulation on behalf of the claimants and the
respondent in respect to this damage. It was stipulated that the fair and
equitable estimate of the damages sustai ed to the claimants? lot is $2,500.00.
The Court, believing that liability exists on the part of the respondent and
the damages are reasonable, an award of $2,500.00 is directed in favor of the
claimants.
Award of $2,500.00.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 197
Oprnion
sued Januar?y 13,1977
LANE S. BOHRER & BARBARA S. BOHRER
(No. D-684a)
RICHARD L. MASON & JEANNE MASON
(No. D-684b)
W. E. DURIG & MINNIE DURIG
(No. D-684c)
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
Richard K. Swartling, Ronald R.
Hassig, and Logan Hassig, Attorneys
at Law, for the claimants.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. WALLACE, JUDGE:
For the purpose of submission the above claims were consolidated.
The claimants and the respondent have filed a written stipulation indicating
that in 1958 the Department of Highways, formerly the West Virginia State Road
Commission, in the construction of the West Virginia approach to the New
Martinsville, West Virginia Bridge to the State of Ohio made substantial cuts
and excavations into the hillside above and east of the approach, which
hillside is adjacent to the property of the claimants. This activity by the
respondent initiated a landslide which continued and extended into the area of
the property of the claimants. The excavations by the respondent caused
movement beneath and around the dwellings of the claimants causing considerable
damage to their homes and property.
During the years 1971, 1972 and 1973, the claimants experienced cracking and
movement in the foundations of their homes and surrounding earth. Attempts to
repair the damages failed. The claimants, Bohrer and Mason, purchased other
land and removed their homes to new locations. Damage to the home of the
claimants, W. E. Dung and Minnie Dung, was so extensive that the house could
not be relocated. Filed with the stipulation were appraisals obtained by the
claimant and the respondent for each of the properties involved. Thomas E. Blum
of New Martinsville,
198 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
West Virginia made the appraisals for the claimants and John W. Campbell, Jr.
of the West Virginia Appraisal Company, Inc. made the appraisals for the
respondent. The Court made an extensive personal examination of the premises
and observed the damages to the respective properties.
It was stipulated that the fair and equitable estimate of damages sustained by
the claimants were: the Bohrers, $9,750.00; the Masons, $9,750.00; and the
Durigs, $28,000.00. After viewing the premises and in reviewing appraisals
filed with the stipulation, the Court finds that liability exists on the part
of the respondent and that the amounts are reasonable. The Court makes the
following awards to the claimants: Lane S. Bohrer & Barbara S. Bohrer,
$9,750.00; Richard L. Mason & Jeanne Mason, $9,750.00; and W. E. Dung &
Minnie Dung, $28,000.00.
Awards of: $9,750.00 to Lane S. Bohrer & Barbara S. Bohrer $9,750.00 to
Richard L. Mason & Jeanne Mason
$28,000.00 to W. E. Dung & Minnie Dung
Opinion
issued January 13,1977
COLUMBIA GAS OF WEST VIRGINIA, INC.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(No. CC-76-llOb)
John C. Lobert, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. PER
CURIAM:
This claim when filed sought an award of $9,073.04. At the hearing a
stipulation was filed setting forth the fact that the amount claimed was only
$4,325.90. This reduction came about as a result of a decision of the West
Virginia Public Service Commission which reduced claimant?s rate increase which
had been in effect under bond, the decision having been rendered during the
interim between the filing of the claim and the date of the hearing.
After this claim was submitted for decision, counsel for the claimant directed
a letter to this Court advising that the true
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 199
amount claimed should be further reduced to $156.72. We treat the letter as an
amendment to the pleadings and thus treat the claim as being for the latter
amount.
The claim is for gas furnished the West Virginia Penitentiary during fiscaI
year 1975-76, and it further appears that there were insufficient funds on hand
at the close of the fiscal year from which this claim could have been paid.
Again we must apply the law as set forth in the claims of Airkem Sales and Service, et al v. Department of
Mental Health, 8 Ct. Cl. 180 (1971) to
which reference is hereby made.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued January 13,1977
JAMES P. FOSTER,
D/B/A WESTERN VIRGINIA DEMOLITION COMPANY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS*
(No. CC-76-8)
The claimant appeared in person.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
In an opinion issued on September 2, 1976, this claim was disallowed for the
reasons expressed therein. The claimant thereafter on October 25, 1976, moved
this Court to grant a rehearing pursuant to Rule 15 of the Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Court of Claims. This Court, being of opinion that good
cause had been shown for the granting of a rehearing, even though the motion
was made in excess of the thirty (30) day period required by Rule 15, granted a
rehearing which was held on November 17, 1976.
The facts which were developed at the prior hearing are fully set forth in the
opinion issued on September 2, 1976, and reference to that opinion is hereby
made for a recitation of such facts. At the rehearing, in addition to the
claimant, A. James Manchin, former
*SJa P. Foster, dba Western Virginia Demolition Company vs.
Department of
Highways, Claim No. CC-76-8, 11 Ct. Cl. 162.
200 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
State Director of REAP, and William P. A. Nicely, Mayor of the City of
Parkersburg, testified on behalf of the claimant.
Mr. Manchin testified that on March 14, 1975, he together with one George
Uller, the Director of Public Works of the City of Parkersburg, met with the
claimant and that an agreement was entered into between the claimant and Mr.
Uller on behalf of the City of Parkersburg and Mr. Manchin on behalf of the
Department of Highways, whereby the claimant would raze a certain building
situated at 14th and Latrobe Streets in the City of Parkersburg for a stated
consideration. The existence of the contract was corroborated by Mayor Nicely.
Exhibits were introduced at the hearing which clearly demonstrated that this
property in March of 1975 was owned by the State, having been earlier sold to
the State for the non-payment of the 1969 taxes on the real estate. During the
course of the work Mr. Manchin secured the use of respondent?s equipment for
use by claimant in the demolition.
REAP, a former quasi federal agency, but, as admitted by counsel for respondent
at the rehearing, had prior to March 14, 1976, been absorbed by the Department
of Highways. Respondent resists payment of the claim on the ground that the
subject property was not within a Department of Highways right of way and that
no benefit was received as a result of the demolition of this building.
Respondent further contends that Mr. Manchin had no authority to enter into the
contract with the claimant and had exceeded his authority in so doing. While it
may be true that Mr. Manchin did not have the authority to bind respondent to
the contract with the claimant, we are of the opinion that respondent is bound
under the doctrine of apparent authority. This doctrine was thoroughly
discussed by our Supreme Court of Appeals in the case of General Electric
Credit Corp. v. Fields, 148 W.Va. 176, 133 S.E. 2d 780, (1963) where
quoting from 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Agency, Section 73, page 475, it is stated:
?Apparent authority, or ostensible authority, as it is also called, is that
which, though not actually granted, the principal knowingly permits the agent
to exercise, or which he holds him out as possessing. In effect, therefore, an
agent?s apparent authority is, as to third persons dealing in good faith with
the subject of his agency and entitled to rely upon such appearance, his real
authority, and it may apply to a single transaction, or to a series of
transations?
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 201
For the foregoing reasons we believe equity and good conscience compel us to
make an award in favor of claimant in the amount of
$499.00.
Award of $499.00.
Opinion issued Jan?wiry 13,1977
LOIS MULLINS AND FLORENCE I. STEPHY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-954)
W. Dale Greene, Attorney at Law, for claimants.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
On January 8, 1975, at about 5:15 p.m., the claimant, Lois Mullins, was driving
south on State Route 10 near Harts Creek, Lincoln County, when she was involved
in an accident with a northbound pickup truck owned and operated by Julius
Dingus. She was operating a 1973 Vega automobile which was owned by her mother,
the claimant Florence I. Stephy. She was en route from Napoleon, Ohio, to
Harts, West Virginia where she intended to visit her mother-in-law. As a result
of the collision, extensive damage resulted to the left front of the Stephy
Vega and to the left rear side of the Dingus pickup. A repair estimate from
Minton Chevrolet Co. of Logan, W.Va. was introduced by stipulation into
evidence which reflected that the repairs to the Vega would cost $1,281.53. In
addition, Lois Mullins claimed that she received injuries to her head and one
of her legs as a result of striking these parts of her body against the
interior of the car.
Lois Mullins testified that she. was travelling south at a speed of about 30
miles per hour on State Route 10 which is a comparatively straight, slightly
downhill, asphalt, two-lane road of some 18 to 20 feet in total width. While it
was dusk and approaching darkness, it was not sufficiently dark for the use of
her headlights. She testified that she observed the northbound Dingus pickup
truck and that as
202 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
they neared each other, ?.
.. all of a sudden something took the
wheel away from me. It was unknown force, and then I heard my back tire blow
out as the wheel was taken away from me, and the next thing I knew, I was
wrecked with Mr. Dingus? vehicle.? As a result of losing control of the car, it
went left of center and struck the left rear of the pickup truck.
After regaining her composure and after the investigating officer arrived at
the accident scene, the claimant Mullins walked north on the road in her former
lane of travel to determine what, if any, obstruction she had struck and caused
her to lose control of her vehicle. She discovered, not a pothole, but an area
in the paved portion of the road along the west side where the asphalt had
completely disappeared, leaving a hole some 6 to 8 inches deep, about 15 feet
in length and which extended from the edge of the road an average of 5 to 6
inches into the travelled portion of the southbound lane. She testified that
while she had travelled over this road some eight months earlier that she had
not seen this condition nor had she seen it immediately before the accident.
Donald Mullins, a Deputy Sheriff of Lincoln County, testified on behalf of the
claimants. He first testified that he was not related to claimant Mullins nor
had he ever met her prior to the evening of the accident. He also testified as
to the existence of the defect in the highway and in fact had noted the same on
his report as a contributing cause of the accident. He estimated, having not
actually taken measurements, that it was 8 to 10 feet in length, 5 to 6 inches
in depth and extended into the paved portion of the road, and further that it
was 60 to 70 feet north of the impact site of the two involved vehicles.
Deputy Mullins also testified that he had been aware of the condition of the road
and that it had been in existence for about 8 months prior to the accident.
Photographs of the road taken in April of 1976 were stipulated into evidence
and although the defective area had been patched and its former depth could not
be observed, the length and width of the defective area was clearly
discernible. The deputy further testified that Robert Vance was the supervisor
of respondent?s operations in Lincoln County prior to and on the date of the
accident, and that he, Mullins, had seen Vance travelling the subject area of
the road during the period when the defect was in existence.
While we have consistently held that the Department of Highways is not an
insurer of those using the highways in this
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 203
State and is only required to exercise ordinary care to maintain roads and
highways in a reasonably safe condition, we believe that the facts in this case
justify a departure from the general rule. The testimony clearly established
that respondent?s supervisor in Lincoln County knew or should have known of the
dangerous condition of this portion of State Route 10, and we believe that the
failure of respondent to repair this condition constituted negligence which was
the proximate cause of the accident. We further find no evidence of
contributory negligence on the part of the claimant, Lois Mullins.
We therefore conclude that the claimant, Florence I. Stephy, is entitled to
recover the cost of repairs to her 1973 Vega automobile in the amount of
$1,281.53, and that the claimant, Lois Mullins, is entitled to an award of
$300.00 to compensate her for her pain and suffering resulting from the
accident.
Awards of: $1,281.53 to Florence I. Stephy
$300.00 to Lois Mullins.
Opinion issued January 3, 1977
CHESTER MURPHY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-133)
John McCuskey, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Nancy Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
PER CURIAM:
The agreed stipulation reflects that on September 28, 1976, employees of
respondent were removing gravel from the surface of a bridge over United States
Route 50 in Doddridge County, West Virginia, and that the gravel struck the
claimant?s vehicle which was travelling on a highway running beneath the
bridge. Damages in the amount of $350.00 were stipulated, and being of the
opinion that liability exists, an award in the amount of $350.00 is hereby
made.
Award of $350.00.
204 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued January 13,1977
HAROLD L. PIrI?SENBARGER
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-83)
No appearance by the claimant.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. PER CtJRIAM:
It appeared from a written stipulation filed by the parties hereto that on or
about the 13th day of July, 1976, the claimant was operating his automobile on
and along Route 29 in Raleigh County, West Virginia, and that he had been
stopped in a line of traffic by employees of the respondent; that while he was
stopped, employees of the respondent, who were engaged in a tree trimming operation,
dropped a brush hook on claimant?s car damaging the hood, right fender and
antenna, causing damage to the extent of
$149.35.
Being of the opinion that a clear case of liability is presented and that the
damages claimed are reasonable, an award of $149.35 in favor of the claimant is
thus made.
Award of $149.35.
Opinion issued January 13,1977
THE POTOMAC EDISON CO.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-135)
PER CURIAM:
The claimant and respondent have filed a written stipulation indicating that in
September, 1976, the respondent by and through its employees was engaged in
cutting brush along Local Service Route 3/1 in Berkeley County, West Virginia.
In the course of the work, respondent?s employees cut down a tree which fell
against the service wires of the claimant causing damage to the wires. It
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 205
was stipulated that $93.41 is a fair and equitable estimate of the damage
sustained by the claimant. Believing that liability exists on the part of the
respondent and that the damages are reasonable, an award of $93.41 is directed
in favor of the claimant.
Award of $93.41.
Opinion issued January 20, 1977
EXXON COMPANY, U.S.A.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(No. CC-76-91a&b)
Claimant did not appear.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent.
PER CURIAM:
During fiscal year 1975-76, employees of the West Virginia Penitentiary made
credit card purchases from claimant, and at the end of the fiscal year a
balance of $514.75 was due and owing the claimant. The amount due and owing is
not disputed by respondent, but they assert that there were not sufficient
funds on hand at the close of the fiscal year from which this claim could have
been paid.
Under this factual situation we are compelled to disallow the claim for the
reason set forth in the opinion of this Court heretofore filed in deciding the
claims of Airkem Sales and Service, et al v. Department of Mental Health, 8 Ct. Cl. 180 (1971) to which
reference is hereby made.
This decision is also applicable to the pending claims of Reynolds Memorial Hospital vs. Department of Public
Institutions, Claim No. CC-76-94;
Standard Exte?rminating Company vs.
Department of Public Institutions, Claim No. CC-76-96; Ohio Valley Drug Company vs. Department of Public
Institutions, Claim No. CC-76-98; Wheeling Electric Company vs. Department of Public
Institutions, Claim No. CC-76-103; and
C & P Telephone Company of W.Va. vs.
Department of Public Institutions, Claim
No. CC-76-105, and the claims are disallowed in those claims as is the claim in
the subject case.
Claims disallowed.
206 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS W. VA.
Opinion issued February 4,1977
LARRY G. CONLEY & BONITA E. CONLEY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-93)
The claimants appeared in person.
Nancy Loar, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
WALLACE, JUDGE:
The claimant filed their claim in the amount of $278.52 for damages to a 1974
Chevrolet pickup truck belonging to the claimant, Larry G. Conley.
On August 3, 1976, the claimant, Bonita E. Conley, was driving the truck
registered in the name of her husband, Larry G. Conley, on a secondary road on
Hewetts Creek or Meadow Fork in Boone County, West Virginia. It was
approximately 2:30 p.m., the weather was clear, the road dry. She was
proceeding alone from Chapmanville, West Virginia to the home of her mother. At
a point along the road, employees of the respondent were instaIling new
drainpipes. As the claimant approached the work scene, she observed a
Department of Highways vehicle on the right hand side of the road partially in
the creek. The respondent?s employees were waiting for a wrecker to pull the
vehicle back onto the road. On the left hand side of the road there were two
large steel drainpipes. The road was a one-lane dirt road approximately 12 ro
15 feet wide. The claimant, Bonita E. Conley, stopied the truck believing that
she could not get between the respondent?s vehicle and the drainpipes. An
employee of the respondent directed her to proceed between the respondent?s
vehicle and the pipes. At his instructions, she proceeded, but there was not
sufficient room for the truck to pass. The right front fender was damaged when
it struck the Highway Department vehicle, and the left front of the truck hit
the drainpipes. The claimant stopped as the truck became lodged between the
pipes and the vehicle. In order to fr.eethe truck, James Bell, one of the
witnesses to the accident, climbed through the left window of the truck and
drove it between the pipes and the vehicle.
The witnesses, James Bell and Ricky Backus, testified thay they saw the
respondent?s employee direct the claimant between the
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 207
vehicle and the pipes. No testimony was presented by the respondent.
It is the opinion of the Court that the truck was damaged by the failure of the
respondent?s employee to exercise proper care under the circumstances and the
driver being free from fault, the Court makes an award of $278.52.
Award of $278.52.
Advisory Opinion issued February 4,1977
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(No. CC-76-138)
Hershel R. Hark, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. GARDEN,
JUDGE:
These two State agencies have requested this Court to issue an advisory opinion
pursuant to Code 14-2-18. The facts from which this claim arise are stated
briefly as follows: during the last quarter of fiscal year 1975-76, the
claimant sold gasoline, other automotive supplies and two used 1966 model Ford
dump trucks to the respondent. The amount of $1673.19 represents the total sum
due claimant from respondent for these various items at the close of the
above-mentioned fiscal year.
Respondent in its answer admits the validity of the claim but further alleges
that there were not sufficient funds remaining within respondent?s
appropriations in fiscal year 1975-76 from which this claim could have been
made. If this was a claim being heard under our regular procedure, rather than
a request for an advisory opinion, we would not make an award on the basis of
this Court?s decision in Airkem Sales
and Service, et al v. Department of Mental Health, 8 Ct. Cl. 180 (1971).
The Clerk of this Court is requested to forward copies of this advisory opinion
to the heads of the two agencies involved herein.
?4
208 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion i$sued Februarp 4,1977
WARNER P. SIMPSON CO.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
(No. CC-76-137)
PER CURIAM:
The claimant, Warner P. Simpson Co., filed its claim in the amount of $406.18
against the respondent for payment of Purchase Order No. 169 for 10,000
Economic Profiles. The respondent filed its answer admitting the validity of
the claim and that there were funds available at the end of the fiscal year out
of which the claim could have been paid. Attached to the answer was a letter to
the claimant from Robert B. Moran, Administrative Assistant of the Department
of Commerce, admitting liability and stating that there was no explanation as
to what had happened to the original invoice. The letter admits that the
respondent expired sufficient funds at the end of the fiscal year to pay the
invoice. The letter further states that the invoice cannot now be legally processed
because the fiscal year had ended and recommended that a claim be filed before
this Court.
On the basis of the pleadings and exhibit, the Court is of the opinion that the
claim in the amount of $406.18 should be allowed.
Award of $406.18.
Opinion issued February 18,1977
FRED POLING, SR.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
(No. CC-76-128M)
GARDEN, JUDGE:
Subsequent to the issuance of the opinion in the above-styled claim, this Court
has been advised by Stewart Werner, Commissioner of the Department of Public
Institutions, that the claimant, Fred Poling, Sr., was employed by the Farm
Management Commission after June 30, 1976 and that his annual
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 209
leave of 19? days was transferred to the Farm Management Commission.
Consequently, the award made by this Court to him in the amount of $391.34 was
improper, and our opinion, to the extent of making an award in his favor and in
the above-stated amount is set aside and held for naught.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued February 18,1977
ST. JOSEPH?S HOSPITAL
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
(No. CC-76-114a-f)
GARDEN, JUDGE:
The answer filed by the respondent in these claims allege that the Department
of Mental Health in the close of fiscal year 1975-76 had sufficient funds on
hand from which these claims could have been paid, and the Court consequently
made awards to the claimant in each of the six (6) claims. This Court has now
been advised that the allegations in the answer in respect to the existence of
sufficient funds was incorrect and that in fact there were not sufficient funds
on hand at the close of the subject fiscal year from which these claims could
have been paid. In view of this factual change, this Court must deny these
claims on the basis of our decision in Airkem
Sales and Service, et al v. Department of Mental Health, 8 Ct. Cl. 180 (1971) and, consequently our former
opinion is set aside and held for naught.
Claim disallowed.
210 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued March 21,1977
THE C & P TELEPHONE COMPANY OF
W.VA.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-997)
John J. Cowen and Robert D.
Lynd, Attorneys at Law, for the
claimant.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. PER CURIAM:
By written stipulation filed by the parties in this matter, it appears that on
August 30, 1973, the respondent was engaged in ditching operations at the
intersection of Lucas Drive and Christian Road in Beckley, Raleigh County, West
Virginia, and that during the course of these activities a buried telephone
cable of claimant was damaged and that claimant expended the sum of $308.61 for
labor and material in order to effect the necessary repairs. This Court, being
of opinion that the damage was caused by the negligence of respondent and that
the amount of the repair bill is reasonable, an award in favor of the claimant
in the amount of $308.61 is hereby made.
Award of $308.61.
Opinion issued March 21, 1977
ROBERT ENGLAND
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-50)
William J. Oates, Jr., Attorney at Law, for the claimant. Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. GARDEN, JUDGE:
On July 20, 1975, the claimant contacted the REAP Section of the Department of
Highways and requested them to remove and dispose of his 1964 Ford which was
parked on his property in the
W. VA.1 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 211
Town of Montrose, Randolph County, West Virginia. Several weeks later,
representatives of REAP arrived at claimant?s property but instead of removing
the 1964 Ford, they removed claimant?s 1967 Pontiac Catalina.
The Pontiac was later returned to claimant, but while it had been in REAP?s
possession, the car had been damaged by vandals and the considerable number of
personal items, which claimant stored in his car, had been stolen. These
personal items consisted of clothing, tools, sheet music, etc. The parties, by
counsel, have filed a written stipulation setting forth the above-mentioned
facts, and in addition a statement that the claimant had sustained damages in
the amount of $1,000.00. Based on the foregoing, we are of opinion that
respondent is liable and that the damages are reasonable, and we hereby make an
award of $1,000.00 in favor of claimant.
Award of $1,000.00.
Opinion issued March 21,1977
GAMBRO, INC.
vs.
BOARD OF VOCATIONAL EDUCATION,
DIVISION OF VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION
(No. CC-76-9)
Martin Becker, Attorney at Law, for claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for respondent. PER CURIAM:
The claimant, Gambro, Inc., filed its claim in the amount of $536.40 against
the respondent for the balance due on equipment furnished the respondent. The
respondent filed its answer admitting the validity of the claim and that there
were funds available at the end of the fiscal year out of which the claim could
have been paid. Attached to the answer was a letter to the claimant from Joseph
W. Thompson, Assistant Director, Fiscal Affairs, of the Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation, admitting liability and stating that because of delays in
determining the amount to be paid by the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation
in excess of what was paid by Medicare and by the client?s insurance company,
the
212 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Division did not receive invoices in time to process them within the fiscal
year in which the services were provided.
On the basis of the pleadings and exhibit, the Court is of the opinion that the
claim in the amount of $536.40 should be allowed.
Award of $536.40.
Opinion issued March 21,1977
TWILA JEAN GILES
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-43)
Claimant appeared in person.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
The claimant, Twila Jean Giles, a nurse and student from Gallagher in Kanawha
County, testified that on April 7, 1976, she was proceeding in a northerly
direction on Paint Creek Road, which is a hard-surface, two lane road?one lane
for southbound traffic and one lane for northbound traffic?in her 1976 Chevette
automobile. Her mother-in-law was accompanying her and was seated in the right
front seat. She was proceeding to her home in Gallagher after a shopping trip
to a grocery store in Montgomery. The weather was good, and although it had
rained earlier, the road was dry around noon when the accident occurred.
The claimant testified that she was following a car and another car was
following her; that she was travelling at a speed between 25 and 30 miles per
hour, although the posted speed in the immediate area was 45 miles per hour.
She further testified that as she neared the scene of the ultimate accident a
southbound van was approaching her, and that although she was aware of the
existence of the pothole which she later struck, she was unable to veer to the
left because of the approaching van or to the right because of a narrow berm
and a rock cliff. Both her right front and rear wheels hit the hole which was
oblong in shape and 2 to 2? feet wide and 3/2 to 4 feet in length. The
hole was located about 18 inches from the right hand edge of the travelled
portion of the road, but because
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 213
the hole was partially filled with water, the claimant could not testify as to
its depth. As a result of striking this hole both right wheels of the car were
damaged and both tires were ruptured. To repair the damage, including the cost
of two new tires, the claimant expended the sum of $107.84.
The claimant?s mother, Blanche Gwin, testified that she lived in the
Bluefield-Princeton area and had travelled to Charleston on business in
November of 1975, and took that occasion to visit her daughter arid had driven
Paint Creek Road to reach her daughter?s residence. She testified that she
could only travel at the rate of 20 miles per hour because of the condition of
the road, and that upon her return home on November 19, 1975, she telephoned
respondent?s maintenance department in Charleston and complained of the
condition of the road and requested that it be checked and repaired. She
further indicated that no repairs had been effected between the date of her
telephone call and the date of her daughter?s accident.
The respondent presented no testimony in defense of the claim asserted against
it, but we do not believe that the record establishes any evidence of
negligence on the part of the claimant which proximately caused or proximately
contributed to causing this accident. We have held on numerous occasions that
the respondent is not an insurer of the safety of those using the highways of
this State, but we feel that the facts in this claim justify a departure from
the general rule by reason of the notice received by the respondent some six
months prior to claimant?s accident, and its subsequent failure to effect
repairs of any nature. We accordingly award the claimant the sum of $107.84.
Award of $107.84.
214 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued March 21, 1977
HELEN M. KELLY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-29)
Herbert H. Henderson, Attorney at Law, for claimant. Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
At approximately 9:00 p.m. on the evening of November 4, 1975, the claimant fell
into a rather large hole on a bridge adjacent to U.S. Route 119 in Logan
County, West Virginia. The hole was approximately two feet in diameter, and she
fell into the hole up to the area of her hips. She was taken to the Logan
General Hospital where whe was given emergency treatment and thereafter
returned home, but later that evening she was forced to return to the hospital
and was admitted by reason of hemorrhaging.
She remained in Logan General Hospital until November 11, 1975 where her injury
was diagnosed as traumatic vaginal bleeding. She returned to the Logan Hospital
on November 17, 1975 and remained there until November 19, 1975 when she was
transferred by ambulance to the Charleston Area Medical Center where she was
confined until November 26, 1975. She returned to the Charleston Area Medical
Center on November 27, 1975 and was discharged on November 29, 1975. Again on
January 8, 1976 she was admitted to the Charleston Area Medical Center and was
subsequently discharged on January 18, 1976. During these five
hospitalizations, she underwent at least three surgical procedures in an
attempt to correct the vaginal bleeding.
Claimant and respondent, by counsel, in a written stipulation, stipulate that
the respondent was aware of the deteriorating condition of the bridge but had
effected no repairs to the bridge until after the claimant?s accident.
Consequently, we conclude that the respondent is liable for the injury
sustained by the claimant. The stipulation further sets forth the fact that the
claimant and respondent by counsel have agreed to settle this claim for an
amount of $6,000.00.
While the Court file does not contain copies of all the medical expenses
incurred by the claimant, it does reflect that the total
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS -
215
hospital expense for the five separate confinements amounted to $4,553.65. A
bill from Dr. Ray M. Kessel of Logan in the amount of
$165.00 and a bill for the ambulance for the trip from Logan to Charleston in
the amount of $107.50 were both filed as exhibits in the case. It can thus be
seen that the total specials exceed the sum of $4,800.00.
As indicated above, believing that liability exists and being of the further
opinion that the proposed settlement is fair and equitable, an award is hereby
made to the claimant in the amount of $6,000.00.
Award of $6,000.00.
Opinion issued Mardi 21,1977
DEBORAH ANN LANDES
vs.
BOARD OF REGENTS
(No. CC-76-31)
Richard L. Vital, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for respondent. GARDEN, JUDGE:
On September 18, 1974, the claimant, Deborah Ann Landes, was participating in a
supervised physical education class during her sophomore year at respondent?s
Potomac State College located at Keyser, West Virginia. The young female
claimant, a resident of Keyser for some number of years and at that time a
student at the College, was requested to participate in a doubles tennis match
by her instructor, and the evidence revealed the following:
As requested by her instructor, the claimant was attempting to run from one end
of the tennis court to the other in order to participate in the proposed
doubles match, and upon nearing the area to the right of the net, she suddenly
ran into a wire or metal cable which was strung from the side of the net to a
steel pole, some 4 or 5 feet from the side of the net: Photographs of the
subject side of the net, the supporting wire or cable and the steel pole were
introduced, which plainly depicted a most unusual and certainly not a standard
support system commonly adopted on most modern tennis courts under present day
standards of construction.
216 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
The claimant testified that she struck the wire or metal cable at breast height
which resulted in her being catapulted over the wire after which she landed on
her head. The claimant, being a resident of Keyser, testified that she had
played on this particular tennis court on many prior occasions and had never
observed the presence of this particular wire. As a matter of fact, she
testified that she had played on the subject court two days before and had
passed through the subject area without incident and that the wire or metal
cable was not installed at that time. She explained her inability to observe the
wire or metal cable on the date of the accident was due to the dark color of
the wire or steel cable which caused it to blend into the dark asphalt surface
of the tennis court area. The testimony further revealed that the offending
wire or metal cable was wrapped with a white tape after claimant?s accident so
that the same could be more readily visualized, and the photographs of the
accident scene taken a month after the accident, fully support claimant?s
testimony in this regard. The respondent offered no testimony on its behalf to
dispute the foregoing testimony of the claimant.
As a result of the accident the claimant was confined in the Potomac Valley
Hospital from September 18, 1974, to September 26, 1974 where her injuries were
diagnosed as a moderately severe cerebral concussion, a three-inch laceration
on the vertex of her skull, traumatic cervical myositis and contusions of both
breasts. After the hospital confinement, the claimant was required to rest at
home for a period of one week after which she returned to her studies at a
reduced schedule. As a result her ultimate graduation from Marshall University
where she is presently enrolled has been lengthened by one semester.
As a result of the accident, the claimant incurred a hospital bill of $579.65
and an optometry bill of $65.00 for regular glasses to replace the contact
lenses she was wearing at the time of the accident, which she was required to
wear for several weeks prior to resuming the use of her regularly worn contact
lenses. At the hearing the claimant testified that she no longer was
experiencing severe headaches from which she suffered after the accident but
was experiencing frequent discomfort in her breasts.
An interesting annotation on the subject of tort liability of public schools
and institutions of higher learning for accidents occurring in physical
education classes appears in 36 ALR 3rd 361, and while none of the cases
carried within the annotation appear to be ?on all
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 217
fours?, we do feel from a study of the annotation that the respondent herein
was under a duty to maintain its physical education facilities in a reasonably
safe condition and that it breached its duty. Being of the further opinion that
the claimant was not guilty of contributory negligence, we hereby make an award
to the claimant in the sum of $3,144.65.
Award of $3,144.65.
Opinion issued March 21, 1977
LANG BROTHERS, INC.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-685)
Roger J. Morgan, Attorney at Law, for claimant.
Stuart Reed Waters, Jr., Attorney at Law, for respondent. WALLACE, JUDGE:
The claimant was the successful bidder to construct, for the respondent, a
highway from U.S. Route 50 to an industrial park adjacent to Benedum Airport in
Harrison County just east of Bridgeport, West Virginia, known as Project
APL-91-45 (001).
The claimant filed its claim listing three parts, designated as Claim No. 1,
Claim No. 2 and Claim No. 3 growing out of the construction.
Claim No. 1 in the amount of $1,542.76 was for compensation claimed for
additional work performed excavating around a waterline owned by the City of
Bridgeport, which line was not shown on the original plans and specifications
and not considered in the bid for the project.
Claim No. 2 was for reimbursement of $1,274.20 paid by the claimant to the City
of Bridgeport for repairing a break in the waterline.
Claim No. 3 was for payment of $25,915.40 for rock fill obtained and used from
unclassified material within construction limits of job site.
218 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Claim No. 1 and Claim No. 2
Claim No. 1 and Claim No. 2 will be considered together.
After the claimant commenced work on the project, it was determined there was a
waterline within the construction limits belonging to the City of Bridgeport,
which line was not shown in the plans and specifications and not considered in
the bid. The pipe was located in an unstable area. The respondent instructed
the claimant to remove the unstable material underneath the pipe and replace it
with rock to prevent an impoundment of water. This would enable water to bleed
out of the unstable area.
The claimant first excavated manually then changed to mechanical equipment. As
the unstable material was excavated it kept falling in and the ditch became
larger than the respondent had directed. One of the claimant?s witnesses
testified that, due to the expense, no shoring or sheeting was used. The
claimant dug eight to ten feet under a ten foot section of pipe which was
covered by a concrete truss. The weight of the concrete and the pipe caused it
to break and spread water over the area. Claimant did not have the necessary
equipment to repair the waterline so employees of the City of Bridgeport did
the repair work, and the City billed the claimant for $1,274.20.
The Court is of the opinion and finds that the claimant should be compensated
for the extra work not anticipated in the original bid price but not for the
damages to the waterline caused by claimant?s negligence in failing to provide
proper shoring and sheeting to prevent a break in the waterline located in
unstable material. Therefore, Claim No. 1 in the amount of $1,542 .76 is
allowed. Claim No. 2 is disallowed.
Claim No. 3
The project was located in a slip area. The plans required unstable
material to be removed and to be replaced with rock to stabilize the rock base.
14,980 cubic yards of rock were to have been brought on the job from an outside
site. The contract was considered to be a ?waste job?, that is, there was more
material located within the area than necessary for completion, which had to be
removed.
The claimant was in the process of wasting the material and encountered rock
within the excavation boundaries of the project, which rock was approved by the
respondent for use in the select
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 219
rock fill embankments. This eliminated the requirement to waste all excess
material and bring in rock from an outside site. The rock used had to be shot,
drilled and sized for its proper use while the unclassified material was
essentially ?pan or scraper? material and easier to remove.
The contract bid price provided for $1.73 per cubic yard for both the
unclassified material and the select rock.
The claimant contends that it should be paid at both the unclassified rate and
the rock borrow rate which it would have received if the rock had been brought
in from an outside site.
The respondent contends that the claimant would be receiving payment twice for
the same material.
Verbal request for payment was made prior to the completion of the contract and
again in writing after the work was completed, which payment was refused by the
respondent.
The claimant introduced evidence that the respondent had previously paid both
items to S. J. Groves and Son Company on Project 1-79-2 (24) 109-C-i, Harrison
and Lewis Counties and also in conjunction with Project S-682 (4), in Lewis
County.
For further support of its contention, the claimant cited Section 104.6 of the
Standard Specifications of 1968 adopted by the respondent, which section
provides in part:
?The Contractor, with the approval of the Engineer, may use in the project such
stone, gravel, sand, or other material determined suitable by the Engineer, as
may be found in the excavation and will
be paid both for the excavation of such materials at the corresponding contract unit
price and for the pay item for which the excavated material is used. . .
We agree with the claimants contention.
The contract provided that the claimant would be paid for the wasting of
unclassified material and for rock obtained from a site outside of the
construction limits. Instead, sufficient select rock was found within the
construction limits wnich was approved by the respondent for use on the job.
This material was removed, sized for proper use and utilized.
Contracts let by the respondent for road and bridge construction, in addition
to the conditions contained in the respective contracts, are governed and
controlled by the Standard Specifications
220 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
adopted by the respondent whether specifically set out in the contract or by
reference thereto.
In the instant case, the 1968 Standard Specifications are to be considered in
conjunction with and as a part of the contract.
It is the opinion of this Court that the respondent is bound by its own adopted
specifications and that the claimant is entitled to be paid for the select rock
fill. Accordingly, Claim No. 3 in the amount of $25,915.40 is allowed.
In conclusion, to summarize the findings herein, this Court allows Claim No. 1
in the amount of $1,542.76 and Claim No. 3 in the amount of $25,915.40 for a
total award of $27,458.16.
Award of $27,458.16.
Opinion issued March 21, 1977
MIKE ROMEO
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-77-22)
No appearance by the claimant.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
PER CURIAIVI:
A written stipulation was filed in this claim which was executed by the
claimant and by counsel for respondent, and the stipulation reveals the
following: On February 12, 1977 the claimant struck a hole in W.Va. Route 61 in
1Iononga1ia County, West Virginia; the hole was completely obscured by water and
was over one foot in depth; that the hole had been in this condition for over
one week preceding claimant?s accident; that as a result of the accident the
claimant sustained damages in the total amount of $190.00, and the stipulation
further revealed that in the opinion of the claimant and counsel for the
respondent that the damages in that amount were fair and equitable.
Pursuant to the aforementioned stipulation and because we believe that
negligence has been established and that the damages are fair and equitable, we
hereby make an award to the claimant in the amount of $190.00.
Award of $190.00.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 221
Opinion issued March 21, 1977
CHRISTINE AMBROSONE SMITH AND
WILLIAM JOSEPH SMITH
vs.
DEPARThIENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No.
D-946)
Michael F. Gibson, Attorney at Law, for the claimants. Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. WALLACE, JUDGE:
On August 30, 1974 at approximately 6:12 a.m., the claimant, William Joseph
Smith, was driving a 1969 Chevrolet van in a southerly direction along West
Virginia Route 20 in Summers County, West Virginia between the Bluestone Dam
and the Bluestone Bridge. He was accompanied by the claimant, Christine
Ambrosone, now his wife, Christine Ambrosone Smith, who was asleep at the time
of the accident. The van was registered in the name of Christine Ambrosone.
Both of the claimants were employed at Pipestem State Park. On the day of the
accident they had left Nimitz, West Virginia at approximately 5:45 a.m. to go
to work. The claimants had lived at Nimitz approximately two months. The
claimant, William Joseph Smith, testified that he had travelled this road 20 to
25 times; that he had knowledge of rocks falling in the area and was aware of
rock fall signs along the highway. Both claimants testified that the van had no
apparent mechanical difficulties.
The claimant, William Joseph Smith, testified that they were proceeding along
West Virginia Rxtte 20 at 45 fnph maybe 50mph. He stated he could see a car
approaching from the opposite direction about 300 feet away. As he approached
the oncoming vehicle, he dimmed his lights and the other car blinked its lights
a few times. He dimmed again and the other car blinked several times more. Not
understanding why the other car was blinking its lights, he became concerned.
He checked his instrument panel to see if anything was wrong and looked back in
his rear view mirror to observe if the other car was stopping or if anything
was wrong with it. This consumed a few seconds time. When he looked back at the
highway he saw a rock in the highway 30 to 40 feet away. He braked the van as
hard as he could but hit the rock; the van veered
222 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
to the left across the highway and berm through wooden guard posts and over an
embankment. There is no testimony that he reduced his speed.
The claimants seek damages in the amount of $150,000.00. The parties stipulated
damages to the van in the amount of $1,375.00. There was ample medical evidence
that both claimants sustained injuries.
The testimony pertaining to the weather was conflicting. The claimant, William
Joseph Smith, testified that it was foggy when they left their home but there
was not enough fog to prohibit him from seeing the lights of the oncoming car at
the point of the accident. He further testified it was very wet, that a good
bit of rain had fallen and that he remembered being soaked. Other witnesses,
both for the claimants and respondent, testified that the road was dry.
Corporal G. B. Browning of the Department of Public Safety was notified of the
accident at about 7:00 a.m. and arrived at the scene at approximately 7:20 a.m.
He found no rocks in the road nor did he notice rocks in the ditch line on the
cliff side of the road large enough to cause an accident. He stated that if the
van struck a rock it probably pushed it over the embankment. Corporal Browning
testified there were several gouge marks in the pavement which could have been
caused by a rock. These marks were located two or three feet from the west side
of the road. He found no skid marks leading up to the gouge marks. There were
skid marks from the gouge marks to the edge of the pavement and in the dirt
berm to the embankment for a distance of 135 feet.
Denzil Dare Lyons, in his post-trial deposition, testified that he removed
falling rocks from the area. He further stated the road was not level but had
?ups and downs? and that the road at the scene of the accident could be seen
for a ?couple of hundred feet?.
The law of the State of West Virginia is well established that the State is not
an insurer of the user of its highways, and this Court has so held on many
occasions. Parsons v. State Road
Commission, 8 Ct. Cl. 35, Adkins V. Sims, 130 W.Va. 645, 46 S.E. 2d 81.
The record in this case however discloses that for many years, in the area
where the accident occurred, rocks were known to fall from the cliff side onto
the road. The respondent had removed rocks many times that had fallen in this
area. It is.apparent that the
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 223
accident occurred in a falling rock area along which were located falling rock
signs to warn those using the highway.
James Vincent Coste, a resident of Hinton, West Virginia, near the scene of the
accident, testified that the rock fall condition had existed since the road was
constructed either during or after World War II. He took pictures of rock
slides prior to the accident involved in this claim and mailed them to the
respondent. The Hinton Daily News had carried articles and pictures of rock
slides prior to this accident.
A letter from William S. Ritchie in response to a complaint states:
?Our district office at Lewisburg advises that the Summers County forces are
aware of the potential hazards along this section of roadway and are constantly
on the watch for fallen rocks. . .. We have
further been advised that plans are being made to scale and shelve the slopes. . .
Other people of the community had
complained to representatives of the respondent of the inherent dangers caused
by the continued rock falls in the area of the accident. The testimony by
witnesses for both the claimants and the respondent leave no doubt that the
area in which the accident occurred was a rock fall area known to the
mespondent in fact, one of the respondent?s witnesses testified that it was
part of his responsibilities to watch for slides during the summer months while
driving along this particular road to and from work. The evidence did not
establish that the respondent had knowledge of the particular rock or rock
slide responsible for this accident, but for the respondent to do nothing more
than to merely patrol the road, known for many years to be hazardouu, is not
sufficient to remove a known danger.
This Court in finding the State Road Commission liable in the case of Varner?s Adm?n. v. State Road Comm?n., 8 Ct. Cl. 119 stated:
.When the State Road Commission knows or should know that an unusually
dangerous condition exists, there is a duty to inspect and to correct the
condition within the limits of funds appropriated by the Legislature for
maintenance purposes. There is substantial evidence in this case of a dangerous
condition and no showing that the respondent did anything beyond the routine
cleaning of ditches and the removal of rocks which previously had fallen on the
highway.?
224 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
A careful review of the facts as established by the evidence indicates to the
Court that the negligence of the claimant, William Joseph Smith, contributed to
the cause of the accident. The record reveals that the driver knew that the
scene of the accident was a falling rock area and that falling rock signs were
posted along the highway. The driver further admitted that an oncoming car had
blinked its lights apparently to warn of danger ahead; that he continued his
speed at approximately 45 to 55 miles per hour while he checked his instrument
panel and looked behind at the passing car to determine if anything was wrong.
This period of time consumed several seconds. When the driver looked back at
the road, he was confronted with a rock immediately in front of the van. If the
driver had kept the van under proper control and speed, he could have seen the
rock and could gone around it in the two lane highway with no other vehicles
approaching. The negligence of the claimant, William Joseph Smith, was such as
to bar him from recovery.
However, the negligence of the driver of a vehicle cannot be imputed to
the passenger therein, when the passenger is free from personal negligence and
has no control over the driver. C. H. Gilmer v. C. C. Janutolo, Et al, 116
W.Va. 501, 182 S.E. 572; Pierce v. B & 0 R.R. Co., 99 W.Va. 333, 128
S.E. 832. The claimant, Christine Ambrosone Smith, was asleep at the time of
the accident and free from negligence.
After considering all of the testimony and evidence, this Court finds the
claimant, William Joseph Smith, is barred from recovery and his claim is
disallowed. The Court further finds that the claimant, Christine Ambrosone
Smith, is entitled to an award. As a result of the accident, she incurred
expenses and property damage totalling $7,286.55, and in view of the pain and
suffering and loss of wages she is entitled to a total award of $16,000.00.
Award of $16,000.00.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 225
Opinion issued
March 21,1977
WILMER W. TEETS
AND SHARON J. TEETS
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-3)
Claimant, Wilmer W. Teets, appeared in person.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. GARDEN, JUDGE:
Claimants are the owners of a 20-acre tract of land situated on the south side
of Route 10/1, about three miles from Sherman in Jackson County, West Virginia,
purchased by them in December of 1972. In September and October of 1974, the
respondent in order to correct a bad slide on the north side of Route 10/1
conducted blasting operations for a period in excess of six days. Respondent
thereafter deposited the slide material and additional earth that they removed
from the hillside where a bench was constructed on the property of the
claimants. The mat?rial deposited err ?the claimants? property covered an area
of over three acres. The respondent, after dumping this earth on claimants?
property, graded the same but since that time, this fill has slid causing further
damage to claimants? property and also destroying a number of trees.
While permission to dump this material had apparently been given by claimants,
the respondent neither secured a written temporary construction easement nor
has it ever paid claimants for the resulting damage to their property.
Claimant, Wilmer W. Teets, testified that when respondent would perform the
blasting, their home situated on their property would shake and that several
days after the blasting operations were completed, he noticed that cracks were
appearing above the door sills and that the floor and foundation were also
cracked. Prior to the work performed by the respondent, the claimants had
drilled a well on their property which was performing in a satisfactory manner.
Two days after the blasting operations were completed this well went dry, and
it was necessary for the claimants tt ha?ze -another well driUed to a deeper
depth at a different locetlon on their property.
226 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Martin L. Bush, the survey crew chief for the maintenance division of District
3 in Parkqrsburg, Rossie Parsons, the foreman for respondent on this particular
job, and Raymond I. Casto, a claims investigator for respondent, testified on
behalf of respondent. All of these witnesses testified that in their opinion
the blasting operations did not cause the alleged damage to the claimants?
property. This was based principally on the fact that a residence within a much
closer distance from the blasting operations received no damage, and that
consequently, in their opinion, the Teets property which was located over 900
feet from the blasting operations could therefore not have suffered damage as a
result of the blasting.
With this conclusion we disagree. Particularly in view of the fact that this
Court has consistently followed the rule of law established by our Supreme
Court in the case of Whitney v. Ralph Myers Contracting Corporation, 146
W.Va. 130, 118 S.E. 2d. 130 (1961), which held that a person c?nducting
blasting operations will be liable for damage caused by sucE blasting even if
the blasting operations were conducted without negligence on the part of the
person performing the blasting. We are of opinion in view of the testimony of
the claimant that the blasting operations did in fact cause this damage and
that the claimants are entitled to an award. Because the well driller was
committed to other drilling jobs, the claimants were required to have water
hauled for a period of six months at a total cost of $194.40. The driller
charged the claimants $2,474.00 for drilling the new well, and an expense of
$47.64 was incurred in order to dig a trench to accomodate the electric conduit
running from the home to the new well house. In respect to the damage to the
real estate and to the home, the measure of damage of course is the difference
between the fair market value of the property prior to the blasting operations
and the fair market value of the property after the blasting operations have
been conducted. Konchesky v. S. J. Groves & Sons, Inc., 148
W.Va. 411, 135 S.E. 2d. 299 (1964). In order to support this portion of their
damage claim, the claimants introduced a report from one Charles B. Keefer, an
associate of Lee Mac Associates, Inc., in Ripley, West Virginia. Mr. Keefer?s
report refle.d that he was of the opinion that approximately 11 acres of the
claimants? property had been damaged, and that it was his opinion that this
property, prior to the work performed by respondent, was worth $425.00 per
acre. He thus multiplied this figure by the 11 acres and concluded that the
damage amounted to $4,675.00. The problem with this report is that
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 227
it obviously eliminates any value whatsoever to the 11 acres, and even though
damaged, this Court is of opinion that the same did have at least some value. A
subsequent report was filed indicating that it would cost approximately
$1,500.00 to repair the damage to the residence of the claimants. On the other
hand the respondent had an appraisal of the property conducted by John W.
Campbell, Jr., of Charleston, West Virginia. This report was most
comprehensive, and Mr. Campbell reflected therein that it was his opinion that
the difference between the fair market value of the property before the blasting
and the fair market value of the property after the blasting was in an amount
of $6,500.00. This report clearly reflects on its face that the damage to the
residence was also taken into consideration in arriving at the $6,500.00
figure.
We are therefore of the opinion that the claimants are entitled to an award
representing the $6,500.00 difference in value in respect to the real estate
and residence, the expense of hauling water in the amount of $194.40, the
expense of digging the conduit trench in the amount of $47.64 and the cost of
drilling the new well in the amount of $2,474.47, or a total of $9,216.51, and
we therefore make an award to the claimants in that amount.
Award of $9,216.51.
Opinion issued March 22,1977
CLINTON ADAMS, ET AL.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-1O11)
Raymond H. Yackel, Attorney at I,w, for the claimants.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
RULEY, JUDGE:
The claimants are residents of Delta Road No. 56, commonly known as the Cherry
Hill Road, in Monongalia County. In this case they seek the recovery of damages
in the sum of $3,800.00 for an alleged breach of an oral contract allegedly
made in July, 1974, by and between them on the one hand and the Department of
Highways on the other hand.
The contract allegedly was made on behalf of the respondent by Dan L. Shearer
(who then was employed by the respondent at its
228 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
office in Monongalia County and was in the business of selling or brokering
drainage pipe as a sideline) and by the respondent?s Monongalia County
Superintendent, J. Robert Chittum. The gist of the contract according to the
allegations was that the respondent would install certain drainage pipe and
stone upon and along the Cherry Hill Road, with the understanding that the
drainage pipe would be delivered to that site b Mr. Shearer, to whom the
claimants agreed to pay and did pay $3,800.00 for such pipe. A large part of
the drainage pipe was delivered and installed, the breach charged being failure
to deliver and install properly all of the materials. It is not contended by
the claimants that any employee of the respondent had actual authority to make,
in its behalf, the alleged contract. Rather, their theory of liability on the
part of the respondent is bottomed on the doctrine of apparent agency. The
problem with that theory as applied to this case is that the West Virginia
decisions have declined uniformly to apply it to cases involving public
officers and employees. Illustratively, in Samsell v. State Line Dev. Co., 154
W.Va. 48, 174 S.E. 2d 318 (1970), it is stated in Syllabus 4:
?4. Agent?s Acts?Scope of Authority?
?Acts of a private agent may bind the principal where they
are within the apparent scope of his authority; but not so with a public
officer, as the State is bound only by authority actually vested in the
officer, and his powers are limited and defined by its laws.?
See also Mountain State Consultants,
Inc. v. State, 7 W.Va. Ct. Cl. 213
(1969), at 216, where it is stated:
?* *
* Parties contracting with the State or
any of its Agencies do so at their peril, and must inquire into the legal
powers of the State representatives to incur liability on behalf of the State.?
In view of the law applicable to this issue, it is not necessary for the Court
to pass upon other issues in the case and this claim must be, and it is hereby,
disallowed.
Claim disallowed.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 229
Opinion issued March 22, 1977
GLADYS A. ANTON
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-45)
Chester Mynes, for the claimant.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. RULEY, JUDGE:
The claimant in this case seeks compensation for property taken by eminent
domain by the respondent over and above a judgment of the Circuit Court of
Kanawha County entered November 7, 1973, on the grounds that the verdict on
which it was based was inadequate and that the respondent?s appraisers were
negligent in ?failing to recognize the value? of her property. The respondent
filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that the proceeding in the circuit
court constituted a full adjudication of the controversy (the judgment having
been paid). That motion came on for hearing on July 13, 1976, at which time it
was continued at the request of the claimant in order to afford her more time
to consult and employ counsel. It was rescheduled for hearing on August 3,
1976, on which date there was no appearance by or on behalf of the claimant. It
appears to the Court that the motion should be sustained for the reason
assigned and also because it is excluded from the jurisdiction of this Court
under the provisions of West Virginia Code, Chapter 14, Article 2, Section 14
(5). (Parenthetically, it is observed that the legal recourse available to the
claimant would have been appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court of
Kanawha County.) Accordingly, it is ordered by the Court that this claim shall
be, and it is hereby, dismissed.
Claim disallowed.
230 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued March 22, 1977
VIRGINIA F. ASBURY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-145)
Virginia F. Asbury, the claimant, in person.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. PER CURIAM:
Upon the stipulation of the parties to the effect that on or about July 11,
1976, a sharp end of a one inch pipe protruding above a ditch which the
respondent had dug across Local Service Route 60/33 in Cabell County struck the
gasoline tank upon the automobile of the claimant causing damage to the
claimant?s automobile in the sum of $89.26, an award in that sum should be, and
it is hereby, made.
Award of $89.26.
Opinion issued March 22,1977
OLIE G. BASTIN & PRISCILLA BASTIN
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS*
(No. CC-76-24)
Charles G. Johnson, Attorney at Law, for claimants.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
This claim is an outgrowth of the construction of Interstate 79 in Harrison
County, and more particularly described as Parcel No. 17 of Project 1-79-3 (39)
126. The claim was submitted for decision on the basis of a written stipulation
of facts. The stipulation reveals the following facts:
*This decision was
reversed on rehearing. See Bastin v. Dept. of Highways, Claim No. CC-76-24, February 10, 1978.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 231
The claimants were the owners of a parcel of land fronting on State Route 20,
south of Clarksburg, in Elk District, Harrison County, upon which they operated
a business, which was subsequently relocated on other property. The claimants
were entitled to $4500 as relocation assistance funds in lieu of actual moving
expenses, the amount of which was determined by a formula set forth in the
rules and regulations of respondent?s Relocation Assistance Program, all of
which is described in a brochure prepared by respondent, a copy of which had
been given to the claimants. The brochure sets forth the requirement that a
claim for relocation must be filed by claimants with respondent within 18
months of the date claimants were required to relocate. It is admitted that a
formal claim was not filed within that time frame, and respondent contends that
it therefore had no authority to pay such claim.
The stipulation further reveals that on October 8, 1974, a conference was held
in Charleston and that the claimant, Olie G. Bastin, was in attendance, and at
which the respondent?s T. H. Holden offered to settle the then pending
condemnation action for the amount of the original valuation offer, and in
addition the sum of $1200 representing the value of the septic tank located in
the right of way, and the sum of $4500 for relocation expense, even though the
18-month period had then expired. This offer was later confirmed by a letter
dated February 8, 1975, to claimant, Olie G. Bastin, from Joseph S. Jones,
respondent?s then State Highway Engineer-Construction. This offer of compromise
was refused by claimants, and the issue ofjust compensation, including damage
to residue, was later resolved by jury trial in the Circuit Court of Harrison
County, in July of 1975.
Claimants contend that respondent had actual notice of the relocation claim
within the necessary 18-month period. The stipulation however does not so
indicate. Claimants further contend that by making the offer to pay the
relocation expense after the expiration of the 18-month period that the
respondent has waived the requirement of notice.
This Court cannot agree with claimants? contention. Even if it is assumed that
respondent had actual notice of the claim within the required time period, we
believe that respondent?s rules and regulations, as embodied in the brochure
mentioned above, required the actual filing of a written claim for relocation
assistance within the 18-month time period. It is admitted that this
232 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
was not done, and believing that respondent had no authority to waive this
requirement, we must disallow the claim.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued March 22,1977
MARVIN E. DEBOER
vs.
BOARD OF REGENTS
(No. CC-76-69)
Claimant appeared in person.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. GARDEN,
JUDGE:
The claimant, Marvin E. DeBoer, is seeking an award in this claim for 20 days
of accumulated annual leave that were due him when his services at Concord
College were terminated on June 30, 1975. The respondent, Board of Regents,
contends that claimant was fully paid for his services through June 30, 1975,
and that he is not entitled to payment for any unused accumulated leave.
Dr. DeBoer was initially employed on February 8, 1971 as Vice President for
Academic Affairs and Dean of Faculty. During the academic year of July 1, 1973
to June 30, 1974, he earned an annual salary of $25,320.00 payable in 12
monthly installments of $2,110.00 each. On July 1, 1973, B. L. Coffindaffer
became the President of the College, and apparently, problems arose between
President Coffmdaffer and the claimant. Although the testimony failed to
disclose the nature of this conflict, Dr. Coffindaffer on May 23, 1974, wrote
to the claimant and advised him that wiTh the close of business on May 24,
1974, he was relieved of his administrative duties as Vice President for
Academic Affairs and Dean of Faculty. The letter which was introduced as
evidence as an exhibit, further advised that for the 12-month period from July
1, 1974 through June 30, 1975, he would be assigned to the College?s
professorial staff at a salary comparable to salaries of other members of the
faculty with similar academic credentials. The letter further advised the
claimant that his employment at Concord College would not extend beyond June
30, 1975.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 233
As of June 30, 1974, it was undisputed that the claimant had accumulated 33 days
of unused annual leave. During his final year at the College, Dr. DeBoer taught
a full 12-hour semester at an annual salary of $19,260.00 or $1,605.00 per
month. On May 12, 1975 through June 30, 1975 the claimant took, with the
approval of President Coffindaffer, 35 days of annual leave. The respondent?s
policy relating to annual leave was set forth in respondent?s Policy Bulletin
No. 35, which had been adopted by respondent on January 15, 1974, and it was
undisputed that claimant was subject to the provisions of this Bulletin. A copy
of Policy Bulletin Io. 35 was also introduced into evidence as an exhibit.
Policy Bulletin No. 35 provides that major administrators and
faculty members with 12-month contracts shall be eligible for 22
days leave per year, and sub-paragraphs ?H? and ?I? of paragraph I
of the Bulletin provides as follows:
?H. Accumulated annual leave for continuing employees may be extended beyond
that earned during a period of one year by written approval of the president
but in no case shall it exceed twice the amount earned in any 12-month period.
and
I. An employee is entitled to accumulated leave at termination of service, but
in no case may this exceed the limits set in ?H? above. Leave time may not be
earned during a term-of-leave period.?
Sub-paragraph ?H? permits the extention of accumulated annual leave beyond that
earned during the periQd of one year by.w.itten approval of the President of
the College. Jack Grose, Business Manager of Concord College, testified that it
was not the policy of the College to enforce the provision relating to the
obtaining of written approval from the President in respect to extending
accumulated annual leave. It appears to us that had the claimant accumulated 44
days of annual leave as of June 30, 1974, all 44 of the days could have been
extended into his final year at the College, and we therefore agree with
claimant that when he entered his final year at the College, he had 33 days of
annual leave due him and further that he earned an additional 22 days in his
final year or a total of 55 days. Having taken 35 days in May and June of 1975,
he was entitled to be paid for these remaining 20 days as of June 30, 1975.
Sub-paragraph ?I? quoted above certainly adds support to this conclusion.
234 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Claimant contends that these 20 days should be computed on the basis of his
salary as Vice President for Academic Affairs and Dean of Faculty, and that
these 20 days entitle him to an award of $2,033.00. We do not agree with this
contention and believe the so-called ?first in?first out rule? should be
applied. Under such rule these remaining 20 days were earned as a member of the
professorial staff of the College at the reduced salary of $1,605.00 per month.
As there were 20 working days in the month of June, 1975, the claimant is
entitled to a full month?s salary or $1,605.00, and we therefore make an award
to the claimant in that amount.
Award of $1,605.00.
Opinion tssued March 22,1977
JOHN DEE HAMMOND
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No.
D-796)
Robert W. Lawson, III, Attorney at Law, for claimant. Nancy Norman, Attorney
at Law, for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
The accident which is the subject of this claim occurred at 6:20 a.m. on April
10, 1974, on U.S. 119 about 2?/2 miles south of Madison, West Virginia. The
claimant was proceeding in a northerly direction on this road enroute from his
home in Logan to his place of employment as an end loader operator with the
Omar Mining Company, which is located at Pond Fork some seven or eight miles
from Madison. U.S. 119 at the accident scene is a two-lane asphalt roadway, one
lane for northbound travel and one lane for southbound travel. The road was
wet, and it was a dark, foggy morning necessitating the claimant to operate his
vehicle with its headlights burning. The claimant was operating his
father-in-law?s 1963 Volkswagon automobile and was travelling at a speed of
about 40 miles per hour. According to the claimant, by reason of the foggy
condition, his visibility was limited to a distance of 50 feet.
The claimant had just completed making a slight turn to the left when he
observed a small rock in his lane of travel which he felt that he could
stradd1e, but he ajso observed a larger rock 10 to 15
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 235
feet north of the smaller rock but also in his lane of travel. This latter rock
was about two feet in height, and there being no approaching traffic in the
southbound lane, the claimant started to swerve to his left to avoid the larger
rock when he saw a large boulder rolling from his right, striking the right
front side of his car. As a result the claimant lost control of his car and
ultimately struck another large boulder in the road located further to the
north.
As a result of the accident, the claimant?s right ankle was fractured in two
places. He also suffered a lacerated lip and gum, a lacerated left wrist and
severe contusions to his chest, right shoulder and left elbow. He was confined
in the Boone Memorial Hospital for a period of five days and was unable to
resume work until June 1, 1974, as a result of his injuries. As an additional
result, he incurred medical expenses and loss of earnings in excess of
$2,300.00, and the car which he was operating, which he had previously agreed to
purchase from his father-in-law for $400.00 was rendered a total loss.
The testimony established that at and near the accident scene, the terrain of
U.S. 119 to its east, or to the right of the northbound claimant, consisted of
a high rock cliff, customarily found in the mountainous areas of West Virginia,
and it was established that the rocks hereinabove described, without doubt, had
fallen from this rock cliff. This rock cliff extends for a distance of some 100
feet, and at the southern end of this rock cliff, there is a rather large
abandoned stone quarry where stone had been quarried from the face of the
hillside and back into the hillside for a distance of about 150 feet. The
testimony further established that operations at this quarry had ceased around
1940.
The claimant testified that he had travelled U.S. 119 five days a week for a
period of three months prior to the accident and had never observed any loose
rocks in this particular area. Fred Conley, called as a witness by claimant,
testified that he was also employed by Omar Mining Company and had been
travelling U.S. 119 to and from work for a period of six years, and that while
he had never seen any rocks fall from this cliff, he had from time to time
observed small rocks n the berm uNhe- road which he as6umed had fallen from the
cliff.
The respondent called as a witness, Danny Gunnoe, who testified that he was
employed by respondent in April of 1974 and had been employed for a period of
four years prior thereto; that he had
236 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
driven a truck for the first two years and had thereafter operated a high lift
end loader; that he travelled the accident area at least once a week and that
while one of his duties was to remove rocks from highways, he had never observed
any rocks in the road or the berm in the accident area. James C. Chambers who
in April of 1974 was a foreman for respondent, also testified for respondent.
His testimony revealed that while he had travelled the accident area almost on
a daily basis for some six years, he had never observed any fallen rocks near
the quarry area nor had he ever recieved any report of loose rocks in the area.
This Court consistently has held in many similar cases that the State is not a
guarantor of the safety of travelers on its highways and that its duty to
travelers is one of reasonable care and diligence in the maintenance of a
highway under all the circumstances. Ecigell v. Department of Highways, 10
Ct. Cl. 161; Walker v. Department of Highways, 10 Ct. Cl. 32; Mullins
v. Department of Highways, 9 Ct. Cl. 221; Lowe v. Department of
Highways, 8 Ct. Cl. 210; and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company v. State Road Commission, 7 Ct. Cl. 54. The unexplained falling of
a rock or boulder into a highway, without a positive showing that the
Department of Highways knew or should have known of a dangerous condition and
should have anticipated injury to person or property, is insufficient in our
opinion to justify an award.
The claimant, who was most ably represented by counsel, attempted to
distinguish this case from the factual situations in the above cited cases. The
claimant called as an expert witness, William G. Whisnand, a consulting
geologist with over 25 years experience in the field of geological engineering.
Mr. Whisnand testified that he inspected the accident scene on November 10,
1975, and that he observed a large boulder located off of the highway and in
the entrance to the quarry. He stated that it was as large as the front of a
standard automobile and some 3? to 4 feet high. Although there was some dispute
in the evidence, we feel that the evidence did establish that the boulder which
struck the claimant?s car, subsequent to the accident, had been shoved into the
quarry entrance. He further testified that about 75 feet north of the entrance
to the quarry, he found a freshly exposed area on the face of the rock cliff,
and that it was his opinion that the large boulder which struck the claimant?s
car had fallen from this area. Mr. Whisnand was of the further opinion that the
blasting operations that had taken place in the quarry prior to 1940, and in
particular the blasting on the north side of the quarry near U.S. 119,
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 237
had caused induced fractures in the rock behind the face of the rock cliff, and
these induced fractures that started near the entrance to the quarry could
extend as far north as 150 feet behind the face of the rock cliff.
Moisture within these fractures which thereafter froze would increase the size
of the fracture and thus cause a general instability to the rock cliff
formation, according to Mr. Whisnand. It was his opinion that this condition
caused the boulder to break away the morning of April 10, 1974, and strike the
claimant?s car.
This testimony was introduced to demonstrate that respondent should have known
of this condition and should have taken remedial measures to correct the
condition. Mr. Whisnand did admit that the induced fracture immediately behind
the boulder that fell could not have been visualized prior to the fall. While
we are most sympathetic to the claimant who suffered painful and permanent
injuries through no fault on his part, we do not feel that the testimony of Mr.
Whisnand is sufficient to make this claim an exception to the general rule as
hereinabove set forth, and we, therefore, disallow the claim.
Claim disallowed.
Opnon issued March 22, 1977
HORACE MANN INSURANCE COMPANY
SUBROGEE FOR AGNES STEWART BRADSHAW
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-61)
David L. Shuman, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. WALLACE,
JUDGE:
Horace Mann Insurance Company as Subrogee for Agnes Stewart Bradshaw filed its
claim in the amount of $3,356.62 representing damages to her automobile.
On February 14, 1976, Agnes Stewart Bradshaw was driving her 1971 Corvette
Stingray westerly on West Virginia Route 61 in Kanawha County, West Virginia
proceeding from Pratt to
238 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Charleston. She had started her trip at approximately noon. As she was leaving
Crown Hill traveling on a straight stretch of road toward East Bank, her car
hit a bump or dip in the road which threw her car into the oncoming lane of
traffic. There were two cars coming from the other direction. She turned the
steering wheel to her right to avoid hitting the oncoming cars and, in doing
so, her car went out of control, crossed the highway and over the embankment on
the right hand side of the road. She testified that she had previously driven
the road in December just before Christmas. She further stated that she was
proceeding at 30 to 35 miles per hour and did not see the bump or dip prior to
hitting it. The speed limit was 55 miles per hour. There were no cars in front
of her nor were there any signs warning of any defect in the road.
Counsel for both parties stipulated that the distance from the beginning of the
straightaway to the dip was 982 feet and that the length of dip was 40 feet.
Jack C. Hutchinson, the operator of the wrecker service which towed the car in,
testified on behalf the the claimant. He stated that he traveled the road every
day and was familiar with the road and the dip. He testified that the dip could
be seen when approaching it in an automobile but the depth was not
ascertainable. The dip was in existence at Christmas time but became worse in
January due to rains. He also stated that he drove the road at the maximum
speed limit of 55 miles per hour but slowed down to 35 to 40 miles per hour
when approaching oncoming cars.
This Court has held on many occasions that the State is not a guarantor of the
safety of its travelers on its roads. The oft-cited case of Adkins vs. Sims, 130 W.Va. 645; 46 S.E. 2d 81 holds that the user of the highways travels
at his own risk and that the State does not and cannot assure him a safe
journey.
In the instant case the accident occurred in the daytime on a straight stretch
of road. The claimant stated that she did not see the defect in the road but
the witness who testified on her behalf stated that the dip could be seen and
had existed since Christmas time. The claimant?s insured?s testimony indicates
that when her car hit the dip she lost control of her automobile which caused
it to go over the embankment.
To operate a motor vehicle in disregard of visible hazards, such as potholes or
breaks in the pavement, of which a driver is aware or on the exercise of
reasonable care should be aware, constitutes
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 239
assumption of a known risk which bars recovery. Swartzmiller vs. Department of Highways, 10 Ct. Cl. 29 (1973). On the basis of testimony and
evidence presented in this case, the Court is of the opinion and finds that the
claimant is barred from recovery and the claim is disallowed.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued March 22, 1977
EUGENE LAFFERTY
AND WANDA LAFFERTY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS*
(No. CC-76-44)
Claimants appeared in person.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. GARDEN, JUDGE:
The evidence in this claim was presented by the claimants, Eugene Lafferty and
Wanda Lafferty, and their son, William Lafferty, II, and on behalf of the
respondent by Bill Hanshew, its District Engineer in District 9, which included
Fayette County, wherein this claim arose. Certain photographs of the claimants?
property and adjacent areas were also introduced by claimants as exhibits.
We believe the evidence established that in 1968 or 1969 the respondent
completed the construction of new Route 19 which runs in a north-south
direction from Oak Hill to Beckley. This new highway, in this particular area,
was a four-lane interstate highway type in design. The claimants were the
owners of certain real estate located immediately to the west of the new
highway, and their property was located on the southwest side of a natural
valley or hollow which ran in an east-west direction, both to the east and west
of the new highway. In order to construct the new highway through this valley
or hollow, it was necessary for the respondent to do a substantial amount of
fifing to accomodate the roadbed through this valley or hollow. To accomodate
the natural drainage,
?This claim was revised on rehearing. See Lafferty
v. Dept. of Highways,
Claim No. CC-76-44, February 10, 1978.
240 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
the respondent constructed an eight foot culvert in the fill. They also
constructed four open concrete drains on the fill, two on the north side and two
on the south side. These drains were constructed to permit the discharge of
surface water from the new highway, and these surface water drains emptied into
a creek in the valley or hollow.
Ingress and egress to claimants? property was provided by a small private dirt
road on the north side of their property. It ran in a westerly direction from
the claimants? property to the old Scarbro Road, but before reaching that road,
it ran through an underpass in a railroad tressel, the railroad running in a
north-south direction and generally parallelling the newly constructed Route
19. Immediately to the north of and running parallel with the claimants?
private road was the aforementioned creek. This creek also ran through the
underpass. Apparently, an open culvert had been constructed for the creek in
the underpass which was covered by railroad ties, thus permitting vehicular
traffic to drive over the culvert in the underpass.
The claimants testified that prior to the construction of the new highway, the
creek had very little water running in it and during the summer the creek would
be dry, but after the construction of the new road, the volume of water
increased tremendously, frequently overflowing after heavy rains and after the
melting of a previous snow. They testified that the excess water would overflow
their land depositing sand or silt on property previously used by them as a
garden, making the land unusable for. gardening purposes; that the excess water
had washed out their roadbed and had washed away the railroad ties over the
culvert in the railroad underpass and made the underpass unusable for the
purpose of ingress or egress. During the winter months, according to claimants,
their children were unable to use the underpass and were prevented from attending
school. There is no question that the evidence established that the claimants
and their property were damaged. The respondent, through its District Engineer,
Bill Hanshew, contended that the construction of Route 19 did not cause this
overflow of water; that the claimants? property was located at the low end of
the valley or hollow and that the creek accomodated a drainage area of in
excess of 50 acres. He was of the opinion that the creek was accomodating as
much surface water before the construction of Route 19 as it did after the
construction and that consequently the construction could not be the cause of
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 241
the claimants? problems. He further testified that while he had not inspected
the claimants? property until sometime in 1970 and at the request of
Commissioner Ritchie, his investigation disclosed that several years prior to
the construction of Route 19, the White Oak Public Service District had
constructed a 10 or 12-inch sewer line in the creekbed and through the
underpass and that possibly at that time the railroad ties in the underpass had
been removed or damaged.
With these contentions we disagree. A given amount of surface water following
its given natural courses may not cause damage, but the same volume of water if
diverted from its natural channels by artificial means, can in our opinion be
turned into a destructive force, and we feel that this has occurred in this
matter. We further do not feel that the construction of the sewer line caused
this problem because the uncontradicted testimony of the claimants established
that their problems did not begin until after the construction of the new road.
While we are disposed to make an award, the record before us falls to reveal
what monetary damage the claimants sustained. Any attempt on our part to arrive
at a figure would constitute speculative guessing. Claimants were not
represented by counsel at the hearing and apparently were unaware of the
necessity or the manner of properly proving damages to real estate, and we must
reluctantly, on the basis of the record before us, disallow this claim.
However, this Court would be disposed to react favorably to a motion for
rehearing filed within 30 days from the date this opinion is issued, and in
accordance with Rule 15 of our Rules of Practice and Procedure. We therefore
quite candidly suggest to claimants that they consider the employment of
counsel so that at a later date this Court might make a proper determination of
the damages sustained by the claimants.
Claim disallowed.
242 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issted March 22, 1977
ROMEO G. PERKINS
AND SHELVA JEAN PERKINS
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-57)
INA M. HAMRICK
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-58)
Ernest V. Morton, Jr., Attorney at Law, for the claimants. Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
RULEY, JUDGE:
Upon agreement of the parties, the above styled cases were consolidated for
hearing.
The claimants are the owners of adjacent tracts of land located on West
Virginia Route 20 in Webster County, West Virginia. According to the evidence,
a three man crew of the Department of Highways was engaged in erecting signs
along that highway on February 20, 1976. At about 2:00 P.M. at a point in proximity
to the subject property, they inadvertently drove a steel signpost into a
culvert head and then, since they could not remove it, used an acetylene torch
to cut it off. While that was being done, a piece of hot steel struck one of
the employees and then fell into nearby leaves resulting in the fire which is
the basis of these claims. According to the evidence, the respondent?s
employees ?kicked the leaves around
when we was digging the hole? but ?didn?t clear an area around the sign?. When the fire started, one of the three employees went
to call the Webster Springs Volunteer Fire Department, which responded to the
call, and the two remaining tried to extinguish the fire. The evidence
demonstrates that the fire burned up a cliff near the highway and entered both
the Perkins and Hamrick properties. On February 20, 1976, it burned along the
common line between the Perkins and Hamrick properties and apparently did not
burn more than one acre of each before it was extinguished. That evening there
were stumps and logs in the burned area that were smouldering but apparently no
one thought
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 243
they posed any hazard. However, on the morning of February 21, 1976, a wind
arose and, at about 10:00 A.M. the fire apparently resumed resulting in a total
of approximately 18 acres on the Hamrick property and approximately 35 acres on
the Perkins property being burned. The acreage which was burned was covered by
mixed timber. The sap had begun to rise in the trees and, when they were
examined by Arden Cogar a week or two after the fire, it was running out
through the bark which had cracked open in the heat of the fire. Mr. Cogar is
an internationally known timber expert and woodcutter who resides in Webster
Springs. His estimate of the damage done by the fire to the timber on both
tracts was $100.00 per acre.
The only witness called by the respondent was John Tuttle, a forest ranger
employed by the Department of Natural Resources in Webster and Braxton Counties
who testified that he examined the burned acreage on both February 20 and 21.
He ventured the opinion that the fire which occurred on February 21 was set
intentionally but there was no evidence of facts providing a basis for that
opinion. To the contrary, Mr. Tuttle conceded, on cross examination, that such
secondary fires usually are attributable to ?reawakening of the first fire?, a
conclusion that appeals both to logic and experience.
This case appears to be very similar to Myers v. Department of Highways,
9 W.Va. Ct. Cl. 268 (1973) and it is apparent that the respondent?s
employees were guilty of negligence in failing to take sufficient precautions
to prevent the ignition of leaves near the signpost where they were working.
The evidence on the issues of damages being uncontroverted, the Court is
disposed to make awards in the sum of $1,800.00 to the claimant Hamrick and in
the sum of $3,500.00 to the claimant Perkins.
Awards of $1,800.00 and $3,500.00, respectively.
244 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued March 22, 1977
HAROLD WILLIAM RIFFLE AND
VERNIA RIFFLE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No.
D-794)
George A. Daugherty, Attorney at Law, for the claimants. Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
On May 4, 1972, at about 6:00 p.m. the claimant, Harold William Riffle, was
operating his 1969 Ford automobile in a northerly direction on secondary Route
12, commonly referred to as the ?new Jackson?s Mill Road? in Lewis County, West
Virginia. He was apparently proceeding from his place of employment near Weston
to his home in the Jane Lew area. It was still daylight but overcast, and the
road was jry. Secondary Route 12 at and near the accident scene runs generally
in a north-south direction. It is a two-lane asphalt road, one lane being
reserved for northbound traffic and the other for southbound traffic. The road
from the accident scene south for a distance of about 534 feet is relatively
straight. Riffle?s automobile, after traversing this straight stretch, left the
travelled portion of the road and struck a large tree located to the right of
an eight foot berm on the east side of the road. There were apparently no
eyewitnesses to the actual accident.
The right side of the automobile struck the tree with such force that the car
was literally wrapped around the tree. As a matter of fact the front half of
the car, back to the bell housing, was severed or split from the rear of the
car. Riffle suffered a basilar skull fracture, closed head injuries,
lacerations of the right ear and right leg, a segmental fracture of the right
tibia and a fracture of the fibula. He was taken to a Weston hospital but was
transferred the following day to University Medical Center in Morgantown where
he remained until May 23, 1972. He was released by his doctor on January 9,
1973, for light work but did not actually resume work until July 11, 1973.
As a result of the skull fracture, Riffle suffered retrograde amnesia, and as a
result, at the hearing, could not testify as to any of the facts of the accident.
As a matter of fact, he had no
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 245
recollection of any events for the week preceding May 4, 1972, and had no
recollection of being in the hospital undergoing treatment for his injuries. He
contended however that he lost control of his automobile as a result of
striking potholes and the general condition of disrepair that existed in the
road, and in particular, along the right hand side of the northbound lane and
south of the tree which he later struck.
In support of this contention, the claimants called as a witness on their
behalf Corporal Willard S. Crowe of the Weston detachment of the West Virginia
Department of Public Safety. Officer Crowe made the official investigation of
the accident, arriving at the scene some 15 minutes after it occurred. The
officer testified that he observed potholes on the right hand side of the
northbound lane over a length of 112 feet, but he did not recall the exact
number of the holes or their dimensions. Near the north end of this 112-foot
section, he observed skid marks 60 feet in length but admitted that he could
not state that these marks were made by the Riffle automobile. From the most
northerly end of the skid marks and where they run off the road on the right
and to where the car was located was a distance of 156 feet, and the path of
the car could be followed through marks left in the berm area. Officer Crowe
also testified as to the existence of additional potholes over a length of 56
feet, the most northerly hole in this area being 72 feet south of the
automobile. Physically these holes could not have been involved in the accident
because the Riffle automobile had left the road before they were reached.
Edward James Blake, Eva Mae Burkhammer and Beverly J0 Lambert testified on
behalf of claimants, the latter through an evidentiary deposition. Blake
testified that he had worked with Riffle until 5:00 p.m. on the day of the
accident, and that when they parted Riffle was in good physical condition and
in no distress. Burkhammer, a waitress at the Holiday Haven located a few miles
from the accident, testified that Riffle stopped at the Holiday Haven around
6:00 p.m. on the accident date, and while visiting with friends drank one can
of beer; that he then departed and gave no evidence of being under the
influence of alcohol. Lambert testified that a few days prior to the Riffle
accident, she was driving over the same area and had struck two potholes and as
a result nearly lost control of her car.
Various photographs taken the day after the accident were introduced into
evidence, and these photographs reflected the
246 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
existence of the potholes and generally tended to support claimants? contention
that this road was poorly maintained by respondent. However, even if we concede
that the respondent was guilty of negligence in its maintenance of this road,
there is not one scintilla of evidence which would prove that the Riffle
automobile struck these potholes, or in other words that the existence of these
potholes was the proximate cause of the accident and Riffle?s resultant
injuries. This accident could have occurred as a result of many other
circumstances, not solely by reason of the existence of potholes.
On the basis of the record, we are of opinion that the claimants have failed to
carry their burden of proof, and that we must disallow their claims.
Claims disallowed.
Opinion issued March 22, 1977
MAMIE M. RIFFLE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No.
CC?76-111)
Claimant appeared in person.
Gregory
W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. GARDEN, JUDGE:
The respondent owns and maintains a roadside park on Route 60, east of
Barboursville, commonly referred to as Kiwanivista State Park. The park
consists of a parking area, and from the parking area visitors ascend a flight
to steps to a level area where picnic tables and sanitary facilities are
provided and maintained for the enjoyment and use of visitors. The respondent
also provided three garbage cans in the picnic area, where visitors may dispose
of their trash or garbage.
On Sunday, July 25, 1976, the claimant, after purchasing Colonel Sanders
Kentucky Fried Chicken, stopped at the Park for a picnic lunch. She was
accompanied by her husband and two children. She testified that they arrived at
the Park around mid-afternoon, and that the weather conditions were beautiful.
After completing
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 247
their picnic lunch, and departing from the Park, the claimant proceeded to the
area where the garbage cans were located, and as she approached one of the
garbage cans, she stepped into a hole with her left foot which she claims she
had not seen because of the presence of high grass which obscured her vision of
the hole. However, on cross-examination she testified that she was carrying her
purse in one hand and a bag of garbage or trash in the other, and that she was
not looking at the ground as she walked toward the garbage can area. The
claimant opined that perhaps a rat had dug the subject hole.
The claimant testified that she suffered immediate pain and had to be assisted
to the car by her husband. The following day she went to St. Mary?s Hospital in
Huntington where her ankle was examined and x-rayed in the emergency room. She
was advised that no bones were fractured, but that she had sustained a sprained
ankle. She was advised to stay off of her feet for a few days and to soak her
ankie in a solution of Epsom salt and hot water. She did not seek further
medical attention, and her total medical expenses at the emergency room
amounted to $76.00. She had an uneventful recovery, but she testified that her
left ankle still feels weak from time to time.
Russell Wilson testified on behalf of respondent that he was employed by
respondent as a foreman in July of 1976 and worked out of the respondent?s
headquarters in Barboursville and during the summer months was charged with the
responsibility of maintaining roadside parks, including the Kiwanivista State
Park. He further testified that he, together with two additional employees,
maintained this particular roadside park every Monday and Friday and would mow
the grass so that it never exceeded a height of two or three inches. He further
indicated that if any holes were discovered that they would fill them with dirt
and fertilizer, and that he had never seen a hole as described by the claimant
near the garbage cans.
Without passing on the issue of negligence on the part of the claimant, we are
of opinion that the record fails to disclose any actionable negligence on the
part of the respondent, but on the contrary, we feel that the record amply
demonstrates that respondent exercised reasonable care in the maintenance of
this roadside park. By reason of the foregoing, we do not feel that the
claimant is entitled to an award.
Claim disallowed.
248 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued March 22, 1977
ALAN MACKENZIE ROBERTS
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-126)
No appearance by the claimant.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. PER CURIAM:
The claimant and respondent have filed a written stipulation indicating that on
or about June 6, 1976, the flooring of a wooden bridge on local Service Route
16/6 in Wood County, West Virginia collapsed, and the claimant?s vehicle was
damaged while crossing the bridge. It was stipulated that a fair and equitable
estimate of the damages sustained to the claimant?s vehicle was $80.70. The Court
believing that liability exists on the part of the respondent and that the
damages are reasonable, an award of $80.70 is directed in favor of the
claimant.
Award of $80.70.
Opinion issued March 22, 1977
ELOISE BALLARD SIMMS
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-86)
Eloise Ballard Simms, the claimant, in person.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. RULEY, JUDGE:
On November 14, 1975, the Department of Highways granted a five per cent wage
increase effective retroactively to August 1, 1975, to all of its salaried
employees who had been employed for six months or more since their last merit
increase.
The claimant was employed by the State of West Virginia for thirty-six years
and retired from the Department of Highways
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 249
effective October 31, 1975. She seeks an award equal to the amount of the wage
increase upon her salary for August, September and October, 1975, viz., the sum
of $110.22. The Court is sympathetic to this claimant but there is undisputed
evidence: (1) that final approval to grant the wage increase was not received
until November 14, 1975; (2) that in years prior to 1975 wage increases were
applied only to persons on the payroll at the time approval was received; and
(3) that, in this instance, the wage increase, although retroactive to August
1, 1975, was denied equally and uniformly to all employees including the
claimant, numbering 111, whose services had terminated for whatever reason,
retirement or otherwise, between August 1, 1975, and November 14, 1975. In view
of the evidence, it is apparent that the claim must be, and it is hereby,
disallowed.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued March 22, 1977
FRED E. SLOANE, JR. AND
MINNIE ARLENE SLOANE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-121)
No appearance by the claimants.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. PER CURIAM:
The claimants and respondent have filed a written stipulation indicating that
on or about October 31, 1976, the respondent was engaged in certain work on a
road maintained by it in South Charleston, West Virginia. Respondent?s employee
backed a gravel truck into the claimants? private driveway and as a result,
their waterline was broken. It was stipulated that a fair and reasonable
estimate of the damages sustained by the claimants was $194.22. The Court
believing that liability exists on the part of the respondent and that the
damages are reasonable, an award of $194.22 is directed in favor of claimants.
Award of $194.22.
250 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS W. VA.
Opinion issued March
22, 1977
SOUTHERN STATES
MORGANTOWN COOPERATIVE, INC.
(No. CC-76-140)
TRI/STATE BUILDERS HARDWARE, INC.
(No. CC-76-142)
RALSTON PURINA COMPANY
(No. CC-76-146)
NORTH-CENTRAL DAIRY HERD
IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION, INC.
(No. CC-77-5)
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
Claimants did not appear.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. GARDEN,
JUDGE:
The Southern States Morgantown claim is for animal feed sold and delivered by claimant
to the West Virginia Industrial School for Boys during April, May and June of
1976. The Tn-State Builders Hardward claim is for Russwin Padlocks sold and
delivered by claimant to the Huttonsville Correctional Center in April of 1976.
The Ralston Purina claim is for goods sold and delivered to the Pinecrest
Hospital in June of 1976. The North-Central Dairy Herd claim is for weighing
and testing milk at Hopemont State Hospital in May of 1976.
The money to pay these various claims had been maintained in special Farm
Accounts, but as of July 15, 1976, the funds were transferred to the newly
created Farm Management Commission. As a result, when the invoices for these
claims were received, there were no funds available from which payments could
be made. The respondent has filed answers in each of these claims admitting the
validity of the same, and further admitting that at the close of fiscal year
197 5-76 there were sufficient funds on hand to pay each of the claims.
It is obvious that these claims are valid and that equity and good
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 251
conscience demand their payment. Accordingly, awards are made to the respective
claimants as follows:
Awards of: $7,425.98 to Southern States Morgantown Cooperative, Inc.;
$131.40 to Tn-State Builders Hardware, Inc.;
$620.96 to Ralston Purina Company; and
$82.04 to North-Central Dairy Herd Improvement Association, Inc.
Opinion issued March 22, 1977
ST. JOSEPH?S HOSPITAL
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
(No. CC-77-1O)
H. F. Saisbery, Attorney at Law, for claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
From March 21, 1976 through April 13, 1976 one Joseph C. Stanley, an inmate in
respondent?s Spencer State Hospital, was confined in claimant?s hospital for
medical reasons. This claim is similar to the six claims that arose in Claim
No. CC-76-114 a-f. In those claims we made awards on February 4, 1977, in view
of the fact that the respective answers filed on behalf of the respondent indicated
that there were sufficient funds on hand at the close of fiscal 1975-76 from
which the claims could have been paid. We later, in a subsequent opinion issued
on February 18, 1977, reversed our position in view of the fact that we were
advised that there were not sufficient funds on hand from which these claims
could have been paid, and we denied the claims on the basis of Airkem Sales and Service, et al v. Department of
Mental Health, 8 Ct. Cl. 180 (1971).
In the answer filed in the present claim the respondent admits the validity of
the claim, but again alleges that there were insufficient funds on hand from
which this claim could have been paid at the close of fiscal 1975-76. In this
case we again must apply Airkem Sales
and Service, supra, and deny an award.
Claim disallowed.
252 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion
issued March 22, 1977
ROBERT WOODLEY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-130)
James B. McIntyre, Attorney at Law, for the claimant. Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. PER CURIAM:
Upon the stipulation of the parties tathe effect that on October 5,
1976, blasting by the respondent on W.Va.-U.S. Route 119 in
Kanawha County caused the left rear window of the claimant?s
1970 model Volvo automobile which was parked in his driveway to
break resulting in damage in the sum of $55.00, an award in that
sum should be, and it is hereby, made.
Award of $55.00.
Opinion issued March 22, 1977
JESSE WRAY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-87)
Jesse Wray, the claimant, in person.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. RULEY, JUDGE:
This case involves a claim for damages to a water well upon the claimant?s 103
acre farm located at Frazier?s Bottom in Putnam County allegedly caused by the
respondent?s negligence incident to repair of a slip in Local Service Route
30/1, a secondary road with a gravel surface upon which the farm abuts.
The following facts appear from the evidence. The well was 14 feet deep, three
feet in diameter and lined with rock walls. It was approximately 75 to 100 feet
from the road and at a lower elevation or on the downhill side of the road. In
1975 a slip occurred in the
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 253
road above the well. The respondent filled the slip and incidentally caused mud
to slip into and permeate the well reducing its depth to 18 to 20 inches and
effectively ruining it. Attempts by the claimant to restore its operation were
ineffective inasmuch as each time the mud was removed more mud slid into the
well. Finally, the claimant was obliged to have a new well drilled. The new
well was 67 feet deep and lined with steel casing. It required a pump and a
pump house and was connected to plumbing located in the dwelling house on the
farm. Previously, water had been hand carried in buckets from the old well to
the dwelling. There were admitted in evidence on behalf of the claimant,
without objection, bills reflecting costs incurred for the new well, pump and
pump house in the total sum of $723.71.
No evidence was offered on behalf of the respondent.
In sum, it appears that the claimant?s property sustained damage as the result
of negligence on the part of the respondent incident to the repair of the slip
in the road. The evidence on the issue of damages is imperfect and it must be
recognized that the claimant wound up with a better means for supplying water
to the dwelling house. But it also must be recognized that the claimant was not
represented by counsel. In view of all of the circumstances, the Court is
disposed to make an award to the claimant in the sum of $542.00, such sum,
according to the evidence, being the actual cost of drilling the new well or
replacing the source of water.
Award of $542.00.
Opinion issued March 22,1977
MARIE YANASY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-76)
Marie Yanasy, the claimant, in person.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. PER CURIAM:
Upon the stipulation of the parties to the effect that on June 8 1976, a loose
spike in a traffic counter which had been p1acd
254 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
across W.Va.-U.S. Route 250 in Randolph County by the respondent penetrated a
front tire of the claimant?s vehicle causing the cable to which it was attached
to wrap around the wheel and resulting in damage in the sum of $79.25, an award
in that sum should be, and it is hereby, made.
Award of $79.25.
Opinion issued April 18,1977
RONALD L. BICKERSTAFF
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No.
D-746)
Ross Maruka, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. GARDEN, JUDGE:
On March 16, 1973 around 4:00 a.m. the claimant, while driving east on the Old
Monongah Road in Marion County, failed to negotiate a sharp turn to his left,
went through a wire fence and rolled over. Claimant was thrown free from the
car as it rolled over, the car finally coming to rest upside down in a small
creek. Needless to say, the claimant suffered serious permanent injuries.
The claimant, a resident of the City of Fairmont, had worked the afternoon
shift the day before the accident at the Owens-Illinois plant in Fairmont. When
his shift was completed around 11:00 p.m., he then proceeded to a friend?s home
where a card game was being held. During the card party which continued until
3:30 a.m., the claimant testified that he consumed two, maybe three, beers.
After the party was over the claimant drove a friend, who lived in Kingmount,
home. It was on his return trip to his home in Fairmont that the accident
occurred.
From photographs of the Old Monongah Road at and near the scene of the accident
which were introduced in evidence, it appears that this is a typical hard
surfaced, two-lane, secondary road situated in the open country area of Marion
County. The claimant testified that he was traveling at a speed of 35 miles per
hour and that there were no speed limit signs posted that he
W. VA.j REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 255
observed. As the curve which the claimant failed to successfully negotiate is
approached, the road is straight, slightly descending, to the point where the
admittedly sharp curve to the left commences. The main thrust of the claimant?s
complaint was that respondent was negligent in failing to erect signs
indicating to a motorist that he was approaching a sharp curve or in the
alternative in failing to erect signs directing a motorist to travel at a
reduced speed.
In support of this contention, testimony was introduced, without objection,
that respondent shortly after the claimant?s accident erected signs which warned
approaching motorists of this sharp curve. The owner of the property upon which
the claimant intruded, Ernest Melvin Chipps, Jr., testified that at least 7 or
8 accidents had occurred at this particular curve while he had owned the
subject property and that he had called on at least one occasion, the
respondent?s headquarters in Fairmont and had complained of their failure to
erect signs and was advised that the matter would be looked into. Mr. Chipps
also testified that he was a member of the Kuhn?s Run Improvement Association,
a group interested in an area near the accident scene and that this group had
also complained of the dangerous condition of the curve. On the other hand,
Gary L. Warhoftig, Traffic Operations Engineer for respondent?s Traffic Engineering
Division, and Charles Edward Chuckery, respondent?s Regional Traffic Supervisor
for the region embracing the accident scene, both testified that neither of
them in their official capacities had received any complaints concerning the
condition of the subject curve prior to March 16, 1973.
The claimant had been in the military service from 1969 until October of 1972
when he returned to the Fairmont area and resumed work at his former place of
employment, Owens-Illinois, on January 15, 1973. He indicated that he had not
traveled the subject road between the time of his return from military service
and the date of the accident, but he admitted on cross-examination that he did
remember this particular curve from years past. However, before exploring any
further the issue of claimant?s contributory negligence in failing to keep his
car under control or to maintain a proper lookout, etc., we believe that we
should first address ourselves to the threshold issue as to whether negligence
on the part of the respondent has been demonstrated.
This Court was faced with a similar issue in the claim of Cassel v. Dept of Highways, 8 Ct. Cl. 254, which also involved serious
256 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
personal injuries. In that case the claimant contended the respondent had been
negligent in, among other things, failing to mark a curve with any signs or
warning devices of any nature, and this Court held that the duty to erect guard
rails, center lines or danger signals at a particular location was discretionary
and that its failure to comply with such a limited duty did not constitute
negligence. This Court in Cassel adopted the following language of our
Supreme Court of Appeals as set forth in Adkins v. Sims, 130 W.Va. 645,
46 S.E. 2d 81(1947) concerning this issue:
?We do not think the failure of the state road commissioner to provide
guardrails and roadmarkers, and to paint a center line on the highway,
constitutes negligence of any character, and particularly no such negligence as
would create a moral obligation on the part of the State to pay damages for
injury or death, assumed to have occurred through such failure, and as the
proximate cause thereof. The very nature of the obligation of the State, in
respect to the construction and maintenance of its highways, precludes the idea
that its failure to exercise discretion in favor of a particular location over
another, or whether it should provide guardrails, center lines or danger
signals at that point, is an act of negligence. Certainly, it must be known, as
a matter of common information, that places of danger on our highways exist at
innumerable points, particularly on our secondary roads, and in many instances
on primary roads. This being a mountainous country, many of these roads are
narrow, with steep grades and sharp curves.
We do not believe the evidence, in view of the prior law followed by this Court
and for which we perceive no justification for a departure, supports any
finding of negligence on the part of the respondent, and consequently we deny
an award in this claim.
Claim disallowed.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 257
Opinion issued April 18, 1977
LYNNE B. FOX
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-899)
Charles E. Heilman, Attorney at Law, for claimant.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
On October 6, 1973, the claimant was riding her ten-speed bicycle on West
Virginia Secondary Route 3/5 in Mingo County near Cabwaylmgo State Park. She
was accompanied by a young man, Mike Lucas, who was preceding her on his own
bicycle. Apparently Route 3/5 in this general area was constructed on a former
railroad right of way. The road also crosses about three converted railroad
bridges, and it was while the claimant was crossing one of these bridges that the
accident occurred.
The subject bridge is rather narrow, not being wide enough to accomodate more
than one lane of traffic. Apparently the deck of the bridge was constructed by
laying planks across the rails, perpendicular to the flow of traffic. On top of
these planks, boards were secured which ran the length of the bridge and more
or less formed two fairly wide tracks for the use of vehicular traffic. The
sides of the bridge were constructed of steel siding, but there was an opening
along each side of the bridge between the wooden deck and the steel siding.
This opening was about two feet wide and, as indicated, ran along the side of
the bridge deck and steel siding the entire length of the bridge and on each
side thereof. Claimant testified that she lost control of her bicycle when it
struck a crack in one of the boards that made up one of the tracks which ran
the length of the bridge. As a result of losing control of her bicycle, the
claimant fell through the Opening to her right and between the bridge deck and
the steel siding. She fell a distance of 30 feet on rocks with her bicycle
landing on top of her.
As a result the claimant suffered serious personal injuries. She was taken to
the Logan Medical Foundation where a closed reduction of her fractured right
wrist was performed and a laceration on her head was reduced. She was then
transferred to the Huntington Hospital where it was determined that she had
also
258 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
sustained a compression fracture in her lumbar vertebra. She was fitted with a
Taylor back brace and was discharged from the hospital on October 19, 1973. She
was unable to return to work as a registered nurse until May of 1974. At that
time she discovered that due to the continuing pain and weakness in her low
back that she couldn?t lift heavy patients, and as a result she was forced to
resign as a nurse at the Huntington Hospital. She then started private duty
nursing, accepting only those cases that did not involve the lifting of heavy
patients.
Some twelve to thirteen months after the accident, the claimant noticed that
her vision was blurred, and again she sought medical advice and was informed
that she had developed cataracts on both of her eyes. Subsequently she was
confined in a Morgantown hospital for one week in February of 1976 during which
period the cataract on her right eye was surgically removed by Dr. Ralph Ryan.
In September of 1976 she had the cataract on her left eye removed by Dr. M. C.
Korstanje of Huntington. Dr. Korstanje was of the opinion to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty that the cataracts were either aggravated or were
the direct result of the traumatic injury sustained on October 6, 1973. On the
other hand, Dr. Donald G. Hassig of Charleston, who examined the claimant on
behalf of the respondent, was of the opinion that it was highly improbable that
the head trauma could have been the antecedent cause of the cataracts.
Be that as it may, there is an abundance of evidence that the claimant
sustained serious, painful and permanent injuries as a result of this accident.
Her out-of-pocket expenses for hospital bills, doctor bills and other necessary
expenses, when coupled with her claim for lost wages, results in a claim for
special damages in excess of $16,000.00. The evidence of damages sustained by
the claimant is clear and convincing, but our problem in this claim is in
respect to the issue of liability. The only testimony adduced at the hearing in
respect to liability was the testimony of the claimant that there was a crack
in the board, and that her bike wheel got caught in the crack. Photographs of
the bridge and the crack in the board were introduced into evidence, and while
a small crack does seem to appear in one of the boards, it certainly is at
best, minor in nature and size. This bridge was constructed and maintained by
respondent primarily to accomodate automobiles, and we do not feel that the law
requires respondent to be an insurer of the safety of pedestrians or bicyclists
using the bridge. No evidence was presented indicating that respondent was
aware of the crack in the
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 259
board, and we do not feel the evidence justifies a finding on our part that
respondent should have been aware of the existence of the crack.
While we are most sympathetic toward the claimant, we do not believe that the
claimant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent
was guilty of any negligence which was the proximate cause of the accident and
resultant serious injuries of the claimant.
Claim disallowed.
Judge Daniel A. Ruley, Jr. did not participate in this decision.
Opinion issued April 29,1977
NELSON GILBERT CASTO
AND PATRICIA JOYCE CASTO
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No.
D-744)
Robert Lee White, Attorney at Law, for the claimants.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. WALLACE, JUDGE:
This claim was presented upon the written stipulation of the claimants and the
respondent.
The claimants were the owners of a two-story frame dwelling location at 218
Cross Lanes Drive, Nitro, West Virginia fronting on W.Va. Route 62, a highway
maintained by the respondent. The respondent also maintained the drainage area
adjacent to and within the right of way of the road.
In April of 1973 the earth began to move underneath the dwelling causing damage
to the floor and walls. An investigation by the respondent revealed that there
was an embankment failure causing the earth underneath and dwelling to move.
Two drainage structures in the immediate vicinity of the claimants? property
were blocked with silt and sand and had been so blocked for some time.
260 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
On or about July 12, 1974, the claimants sold their dwelling for $7,500.00 and
it was removed from the premises.
It was stipulated that the proximate cause of the earth movement was the
improper drainage of the highway and the respondent?s failure to maintain the
existing drainage and that the claimants sustained damages in the amount of
$15,000.00.
The Court believing that liability exists on the part of the respondent and
that the damages are reasonable, an award of $15,000.00 is directed in favor of
the claimants.
Award of $15,000.00.
Opinion issued April 29,1977
LEWIS EDMON COX
(No. CC-77-20a)
RUTH MCPHERSON
(No. CC-77-20b)
JOHN C. RACER
(No. CC-77-20c)
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
The respective claimants appeared in person.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. PER
CURIAM:
The claimants in these claims are or were employees at the respondent?s CoHn
Anderson Center, and they are seeking awards for unpaid overtime compensation.
Claimant, Lewis Edmon Cox, claims that he worked 52 overtime hours for which he
was not paid during the months of February and March, 1976, and as such is
entitled to an award of $185.64; claimant, Ruth McPherson, claims that she
worked 2831/2 overtime hours for which she was not paid during the months of
January, February, March, April, May and June, 1976, and as such is entitled to
au award of $1,7.25; and ie claimant, John Racer, claims that he worked 40
overtiine hours for which he was not paid during the month of June, 1976, and
as such is entitled to an award of $178.80.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 261
The respondent in its answers and in open Court admitted the validity of the
respective claims, but asserted that there were not sufficient funds remaining
in the appropriation for the respondent for the fiscal year 1975-76 from which
these claims could have been paid, and respondent further contends that by
reason of the foregoing, the claims should be disallowed on the basis of our
decision in Airlcem Sales and Service
v. Department of Mental Health, 8 Ct.
Cl. 180. With this contention we agree and on the basis of Airlcem Sales and Service, supra, these claims are disallowed.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued April 29, 1977
BARBARA HENSON
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-77-21)
No appearance by the claimant.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for respondent.
PER CURIAM:
A written stipulation filed in this claim reflects that the claimant?s vehicle
was damaged when it was struck by a loose metal plate on a bridge owned and
maintained by the respondent in Kanawha County, West Virginia. Being of the
opinion that liability exists and that the stipulated amount of the damages;
namely, $128.14 is reasonable, an award to the claimant in that amount is
hereby made.
Award of $128.14.
262 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion issued April 29,1977
RALPH UNDERWOOD, JR.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF MINES
(No. CC-76-53)
Claimant appeared in person.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent.
WALLACE, JUDGE:
The claimant, Ralph Underwood, Jr., filed this claim against the respondent for
the cost of correcting contamination of his water well located on his farm at
Alma, West Virginia.
The claimant testified that the Department of Mines improperly plugged an
abandoned gas well within one hundred yards of his house and water well causing
gas to infiltrate into the well water. The abandoned well had been there for
years but no problems occurred until the respondent caused the well to be
plugged.
In order to secure an uncontaminated water supply, the claimant originally
intended to put in a cistern but instead drilled a new well. This claim, which
is not denied by the respondent, is for the cost of drilling the new well and
installing a Culligan service to remove the taste of gas from the water. The
costs submitted by the claimant consisted of $280.00 for casing and the cost of
drilling the new well, $334.35 for installation of a pump and fixtures, and
$1,140.00 for the Culligan service. The total cost being $1,754.35.
Chapter 22, Article 4, Section 19 of the Code of West Virginia provides:
?In any action for contamination or deprivation of a fresh water source or
supply within one thousand feet of the site of drilling for an oil or gas well,
there shall be a rebutable presumption that such drilling, and such oil or gas
well, or either, was the proximate cause of the contamination or deprivation of
such fresh water source or supply.?
The Court is of the opinion that liability exists on the part of the respondent
and finds that the claimant is entitled to a recovery of
$1,754.35.
Award of $1,754.35.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 263
Opinion
issued April 29,1977
WILLIAM N. WILLIAMS
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-112)
Claimant appeared in person without counsel.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. WALLACE, JUDGE:
The claimant, William N. Williams, filed a claim for damages to his 1973
Triumph automobile in the amount of $1,700.00.
On July 24, 1976, at approximately 2:00 to 2:30 p.m. Freddie Grounds was
driving the claimant in the claimant?s automobile along W.Va. Route 79, known
locally as Cabin Creek Road, in Kanawha County. They were returning from a
meeting in Decota, West Virginia.
The claimant testified that they were proceeding northerly along the road at
approximately 35 to 40 miles per hour. The road was straight and dry. The
weather was clear. As they were crossing a two lane wooden bridge at Lang, West
Virginia, the plank flooring of the bridge became loose, the boards ?bounced
up? and became lodged underneath the automobile.
Freddie Grounds, the driver of the car, testified that he had driven the road
every day and that they had crossed the bridge the morning of the accident on
their way to Decota. He stated the bridge always rattled. He further testified
that a the car crossed the bridge the floor planks became loose, one board went
or the hood and two boards lodged underneath the car. The radiator,
transmission, frame and other parts of the automobile were damaged.
There was no prior warning or indication that the flooring of the bridge would
suddenly become loose.
The respondent introduced no evidence.
In the case of Gene R. Monk v. State Road
Comm?n., 8 Ct. Cl. 32, this Court
held:
a person exercising ordinary care for his safety would not reasonably have
anticipated that the floor boards on the bridge
264 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
would be missing and claimant cannot be charged with contributory negligence or
assumption of the risk.?
In this case, the Court is of the opinion that a dangerous condition existed on
the bridge which directly and proximately caused the damage to the claimant?s
automobile and that the claimant was free from contributory negligence.
The claimant in proof of his damages submitted estimates and bills totaling
$1,128.66. It is the opinion of the Court that the claim should be allowed in
the amount of $1,128.66.
Award of $1,128.66.
Opinion issued May 13, 1977
VIRGIE GIBSON
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INTSTITUTIONS
(No.
D-1017)
Charlotte R. Lane, Attorney at Law, for claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for respondent. WALLACE,
JUDGE:
The claimant was injured and her property damaged by three escaped convicts
from Huttonsville Correctional Center, Huttonsville, West Virginia.
On Friday night, March 28, 1975, the three convicts, together with two others
gained entrance to the basement of the Correctional Center through an unlocked
cross-over door. From there they were able to enter the machine shop where they
used a welding torch to cut out a ground level window and escaped. Two of the
prisoners were captured early the next morning. The other three made their way
to the home of claimant at Elk Waters, West Virginia about six miles away. They
pried open a window and entered the house. They ransacked the house, destroying
furniture and food from the freezer and using several of the rooms as a
bathroom.
The claimant was employed at the Wamsley house to take care of Mrs. Wamsley, a
stroke victim. The Wamsley home was about one-half mile from the Correctional
Center. The claimant testified
W. VA.] REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS 265
that she went to her home about 4:30 p.m. the day after the escape. The doors
were locked the same as they were on the previous Wednesday when she went to
work. She unlocked the door to the porch and entered the kitchen from the porch.
One of the convicts, with a silk stocking over his head, came out of the living
room and stuck a 12-guage shotgun up to her face and told her not to scream. He
demanded the keys to her car which she gave to him. She was forcibly put in a
chair and tied up.
The convicts ripped out the telephone and left in her car taking with them the
gun and some clothes. The claimant managed to get loose and screamed for her
sister-in-law who lived nearby. Her sister-in-law responded and took her to the
Pine Service Station where they notified the prison and the deputy sheriff at
Valley Head, West Virginia, who subsequently apprehended the convicts. The
claimant passed out and was taken to the David Memorial Hospital where she
remained until she was released on the following Monday.
The claimant?s arm was bruised by the action of the convicts, and she is still
being treated for nerves and hypertension. The claimant maintains there was no
warning of the escape of the convicts.
For this Court to allow recovery in this case, any liability for damages must
be based upon acts constituting negligence which were the proximate cause of
the damage.
In the case of Lelia Hurst v. Department of Public Institutions, 9 Ct.
Cl. 155, this Court held:
?This Court realizes that it is most unfortunate for anyone to suffer from the
acts of an escapee from anyAnstitution operated by the State, and naturally
regrets it cannot afford some relief, but the only defense which is waived in
action against the agencies of the State is the immunity from suits specified
in the Constitution, which immunity is the necessary basis of this Court?s
jurisdiction. All other defenses are available to the State as they are in
cases where individuals and corporations are defendants. Failure to prove actionable
negligence is such a defense and such negligence must be the proximate cause.?
The Court finds that the claimant has not proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that there was actionable negligence on the part of the respondent,
which was the proximate cause of her damages and injuries, and disallows her
claim.
Claim disallowed.
266 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Opinion ssuecL May 13, 1977
FRANCES N. LEE, MOThER & NEXT
FRIEND
OF RODNEY K. LEE
vs.
BOARD OF EDUCATION
(No. CC-76-59)
Mike Mullins and Leonard Knee, Attorneys at Law, for the claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. WALLACE,
JUDGE:
Frances N. Lee, as mother and next friend of Rodney K. Lee filed this claim for
injuries received by her son, Rodney K. Lee, while a student at the Romney
School for the Deaf and Blind at Romney, West Virginia.
Rodney K. Lee is a mute aphasic, 20 years old with the mentality of a 10-12
year old boy. He was enrolled at the School to learn sign language to enable
him to communicate. When he was first enrolled at the School, he roomed on the
first floor of Seaton Hall Dormitory but was later moved to the second floor
with boys more his size.
Each floor is supervised by an employee of the respondent known as a houseparent.
Kirk Lockwood was the houseparent on the floor where Rodney Lee was quartered.
His job, according to the testimony, was that of a substitute parent. He was to
supervise the students, plan recreation, and perform whatever other functions
that might be necessary.
On Saturday, March 1, 1975, Rodney was cleaning his room with his roommates.
This was the normal Saturday morning routine at the School. Kirk Lockwood, the
houseparent, was supervising the students in the cleaning. On this particular
morning he left the floor for a few minutes to assist another student in
emptying a trash can. On his return several students motioned to him to come
quickly and led him to the bathroom where he found Rodney standing beside a
sink injured and bleeding from the mouth. He took him to the infirmary and from
there to a dentist for treatment. Later that day he was taken home his parenbs.
Rodney had three teeth knocked out. The resulting damage to his mouth and other
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 267
teeth caused the remaining teeth to abscess necessitating the eventual removal
of all of his teeth.
The claimant, Mrs. Lee, testified that the incident so affected Rodney
emotionally that it was necessary to remove him from the School.
Neither of Rodney?s roommates was able to communicate with others, but by means
of pantomime, they indicated that there had been some sort of fracas in their
room. Rodney indicated he was hit in his mouth. Mark Minnick, a student with a
room across the hail, had apparently come into Rodney?s room and for reasons
unknown struck or pushed Rodney against the metal beds. Upon inquiry, he
admitted being in the room but denied hitting Rodney, claiming that he only
pushed him. There was some indication that Rodney grabbed Minnick by the shirt,
but whether it was before or after he was hit and/or pushed, was never
determined. Jack Brady, the Superintendent of the School, testified that
Minnick was not mentally retarded but had impaired hearing and some speaking
ability.
The claimant maintains that Rodney would not have been injured if the School
had provided closer supervision. She testified that she visited Rodney every
two weeks and that her observation of the houseparents indicated they spent
their time sitting in the lounge. However, she stated that ?Mr. Lockwood made
rounds and was nearly always on the move, watching after his boys.?
Mr. Brady, as well as Robert W. Linzey, Principal of the School for the Deaf
and Blind and Kirk Lockwood, the houseparent, testified they had no reason to
believe that Mark Minnick would harm any of the other students. The testimony
indicated that students at the School had discipline problems from time to
time, but there was no evidence that these problems would lead to serious
injuries to the students or property of the School. Mr. Brady stated that the
students were given their freedom within reason and were treated as normal as
possible.
It is regrettable that Rodney received the injuries that he did, but the record
of the case does notaic1ose a ntgence on the Rart of the respondent that would
justify a recovery. The fact that Kirk Lockwood left the floor for a few
minutes to assist a student in removing the trash is not in itself sufficient
evidence to believe the accident could have been prevented if he had been
there. He would have had to have been in Rodney?s room, which was not the case.
268 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Employees of the respondent testified they had no reason to believe there was
such aggressiveness among the students that an accident of this type would
happen. In any school where students are assembled and in this ease lived
together in dormitories, fracases will and do occur. In this case the
respondent provided closer supervision due to the impairments of the various
students but at the same time attempted to create an atmosphere where the
students could pursue a near normal life. The students are not considered
inmates nor the houseparents as wardens. Enrollment in the School is on a
voluntary basis. No student is committed to the School. The guarantee of safety
is no more or no less than if the student is enrolled in any other public
school. The injuries received by Rodney were not forseeable, and the record
fails to reveal any negligence on the part of the respqident whict was th?
proximate cause of the accident. Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion to
and does disallow the claim.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued May 13,1977
MR. AND MRS. JOHN C. PERKINS, JR.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-77-13)
No appearance by the claimants.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. PER CURIAM:
Upon the stipulation of the parties to the effect: that the respondent had
placed a piece f steel het ?wer a hole on the Miami Bridge at Cabin Creek; that
a piece or that steel on January 17, 1977, which was bent upward about one foot
struck one of the wheels on the claimants? truck; and that the claimants
thereby sustained damage to their truck in the sum of $72.30; an award in that
sum should be, and it is hereby made.
Award of $72.30.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 269
Opinion issued June 9, 1977
MARVIN KIDD
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-77-12)
PER CURIAM:
By written stipulation filed herein, the claimant and respondent stipulated
that on or about January 17, 1977, the claimant?s vehicle hit and struck a
loose metal plate on a bridge owned and maintained by the respondent in Kanawha
County, West Virginia. The complaint alleged the bridge was located in Miami,
West Virginia. The vehicle was damaged, and it was stipulated that the fair and
equitable estimate of the damages sustained by the claimant is $52.50.
Believing that liability exists on the part of the respondent and that the
claimant is free of negligence and that the damages are reasonable, an award of
$52.50 is directed in favor of the claimant.
Award of $52.50.
Opinion issued June 28, 1977
BOONE SALES, INC.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHW*.YS
(No. CC-76-119)
Roy S. Samms, Jr., Attorney at Law, for claimant.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
By real estate contract dated May 2, 1975, the claimant agreed to purchase
certain real estate from Theresa Irene Snodgrass and others (hereinafter
referred to as vendors) for a consideration of $12,000.00. On October 14, 1975,
employees of respondent through its Rehabilitation Environmental Action Program
entered upon the property and tore down a building on the property. On October
17, 1975, the vendors executed and delivered a deed conveying the
270 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
subject property to the claimant for the aforementioned consideration of
$12,000.00. The real estate contract contained the following provision:
?RISK OF LOSS: That any risk of loss to the property shall be borne by the
Seller(s) until title has been conveyed to the Purchaser(s) anct to deliver
sth?d property to said Purchaser(s) in as good condition as it is on the date
of this agreement, ordinary wear and tear excepted.?
Respondent has filed an amended motion to dismiss contending by reason of the
above paragraph that only the vendors have the right to file a claim for
damages and not the claimant, Boone Sales, Inc. With this contention we do not
agree. The ?Risk of Loss? paragraph would have given the claimant the right to
rescind the contract and recover its down payment, but claimant apparently
elected to consumate the contract. While the bare legal title remained in the
vendors after the real estate contract was executed, the claimant did acquire
the equitable title.. When the deed was executed and delivered, the legal title
and the cause of action for damages were transferred to claimant. This general
rule of law is well expressed in 77 Am. Jur. 2d, Vendor and Purchaser, ?362 as
follows:
?It is a general rule that the vendee in an executory contract for the sale of
land, wh has thereunder possession or the immediate right t posss?, maj
flitttain ft
ttiofl for damages against third-party
trespassers or tortfeasors for injuries sustained after the making of the
contract and affecting either his possessory rights or the freehold, and
recover full damages, in the absence of evidence that the recovery would not
afford complete compensation for the injuries, or that a further claim for
damages for such injuries, or a part thereof, could be made by the vendor, at
least where, if the latter was not a party, no valid objections were interposed
either on the ground of his nonjoinder or the ground that the damages should be
separated.?
In view of the foregoing, respondent?s amended motion to dismiss is overruled.
Motion to dismiss overruled.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 271
Opinion issued June 28,1977
MOSES KOLESAR
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. 0-992)
Paul J. Kaufman, Attorney at Law, for claimant.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Counsel for claimant and respondent have filed a written stipulation which
reveals that for a period in excess of six years beginning in 1968, the
respondent maintained an open storage dump for road salt at a location above
claimant?s property which is located on West Virginia Route 16 in McDowell
County. As a result, run-off from the storage dump drained upon claimant?s
property, infiltrating the same and a water well located thereon. As a result
the well water became undrinkable by reason of the salt content therein, all of
which was confirmed by three separate reports of tests performed by tne West
Vlrghiia Jerteht of l4ealtl-r. As a further result, the plumbing in claimant?s
residence was damaged by corrosion, his land would no longer bear crops, his
health was adversely affected and he was compelled to vacate his property.
The parties have further stipulated that an amount of $6,500.00 is a fair and
equitable estimate of the damages sustained by the claimant. Based on our
opinion in Dixon v. Department of
Highways, 9 Ct. Cl. 81, we are of
opinion that liability exists and believing that the stipulated amount of
damages is not unreasonable, we hereby make an award to the claimant in the
amount of $6,500.00.
Award of $6,500.00.
272 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Advisory Opinion issued June 29, 1977
ROBERT H. SLACK
vs.
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES INSURANCE BOARD
(No. CC-77-105)
Authur T. Ciccarello, Attorney at Law, for claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for respondent. GARDEN, JUDGE:
The Auditor of the State of West Virginia, Glen Gainer, Jr., has requested the
Court to render an advisory opinion concerning the State?s liability for
payment of accrued annual leave that may be due and owing Robert H. Slack,
formerly the executive secretary of the Public Employees Insurance Board. Mr.
Slack resigned his position on February 14, 1977, and at that time had accrued
22? days of annual leave. At the time of his resignation, he was earning an
annual salary of $22,500.00.
It is our opinion, as expressed in prior decisions of this Court, that
liability exists, and the Mr. Slack?s accrued annual leave should be paid. We
have also computed that 22? days of annual leave at an annual salary of
$22,500.00 has a total monetary value of
$1,496.92.
Opinion issued June 30, 1977
DOWNER B. BOLEY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-136)
Claimant appeared in person.
Nancy Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent.
WALLACE, JUDGE:
The claimant, Downer B. Boley, filed his claim for $926.83 against the
respondent for damages to his 1970 Ford F-100 truck. On August 25, 1976 at
approximately 6:05 a.m. the claimant was
W. VA.J REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 273
traveling at approximately 45 miles per hour along the northbound lane of West
Virginia Route 31 about 2? miles from Williamstown, West Virginia. Route 31 is
a two-lane blacktop highway. The speed limit is 55 miles per hour.
The claimant testified that he was familiar with the road, having driven it for
10 to 12 years. As he proceeded around a curve in a low place in the road, his
vehicle came up on a rise in the highway. He was blinded by an approaching
vehicle which dimmed its lights. The claimant dimmed his lights and then
returned them to high beam, at which time he saw an object in his lane of
traffic. He swerved to miss it but struck it with the right side of his truck.
The impact forced him over on the left side of the road onto the berm. He
stopped his truck and upon investigation discovered that a road sweeper
belonging to the respondent was across his lane of traffic, one end being about
six inches from the center line of the road, and the tongue, which is attached
to a truck when in use, extended to the right hand berm. There were no lights,
reflectors, flares, or a watchman to warn of the danger.
Gregory Bailey, an employee of the respondent, testified that he helped detach
the sweeper from the truck and park it some 20 feet off of the road the evening
before the accident. It was parked in a wide area with other vehicles of the
respondent to be ready for use the next day. The sweeper was secured in place
by lowering the broom to the ground. The broom was raised or lowered by means
of a hydraulic system which could be operated by hand. The berm of the road
where the sweeper was parked sloped downward some 10 to 11 inches from the
elevation of the road itself.
The claims investigator for the respondent testified there was sight view of
300 feet from the curve to the point of impact. His investigation did not
reveal how the sweeper came to be on the road.
Although there was a sight view of 300 feet, it must be remembered it was taken
in daylight, the accident occurred in the dark, and the claimant was
momentarily blinded by the lights of an oncoming car. The sweeper itself had a
relatively low profile to be seen under the existing conditions.
From the record it is apparent that someone pulled the sweeper onto the highway
where it remained until struck by claimant?s truck. It is also apparent that
the sweeper was not properly secured for the night because it was able to be
moved back onto the highway by persons unknown.
274 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
The record discloses no negligence on the part of the claimant that would bar
his recovery. He was proceeding over a road he had driven many times at
approximately 45 miles per hour. It was dark, the road dry. His visibility was
momentarily diverted by the headlights of an oncoming automobile. As soon as
the car passed he saw an object in the road, which later was determined to be
the sweeper. Although he attempted to avoid hitting the sweeper, his efforts
were unsuccessful.
The evidence further discloses that the respondent parked the sweeper off the
road overnight and that it was secured by lowering the broom with a hand lever
system which apparently could be operated by others. The equipment was then
left unattended the remainder of the night.
The Court is of the opinion that the respondent?s negligence in failing to
properly secure its sweeper was the proximate cause of the accident and that
there was no negligence on the part of the claimant that would bar his
recovery. Accordingly, an award is hereby made to the claimant in the amount of
$926.83.
Award of $926.83.
Opinion
issued June 30, 1977
LONNIE W. BRADBURY
vs.
NONINTOXICATING BEER COMMISSION
(No. CC-77-30)
Claimant appeared in person.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for respondent. GARDEN, JUDGE:
The claimant was employed by the respondent from March 1, 1969 to January 17,
1977, and during the last three years of that period he occupied the position
of Deputy Beer Commissioner at a monthly salary of $1,035.00. At the close of
calendar year 1976, he had accumulated thirty days of annual leave, and having
worked from January 1, 1977 to January 17, 1977, he had accumulated an
additional day and one-half, or a total of 311/2 days.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 275
The Attendance and Leave Regulations of the Board of Public Works, promulgated
on May 28, 1968, and in effect during claimant?s employment provide as follows
in respect to annual leave:
?No more than thirty (30) working days of accumulated annual leave may be
carried forward from one calendar year to another. If an employee?s services are terminated for any
reason he cannot be paid for more than thirty (30) days of accumulated annual
leave. Accumulated annual leave shall
be granted by the Appointing Authority or upon the authority delegated by him
at such time or times as will not materially affect the efficient operations of
the agency.? (Emphasis added.)
It is apparent that the claimant is entitled to payment of accumulated annual
leave, but that he is only entitled to 30 days. We hereby make an award to the
claimant in the amount of
$1,569.20.
Award of $1,569.20.
Opinion zssued June 30, 1977
RONALD BURGHER
vs.
BOARD OF REGENTS
(No. CC-76-64)
Michael F. Gibson, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the respondent. GARDEN,
JUDGE:
In April of 1972, the claimant was employed as an associate professor of Speech
and Dramatics at Concord College in Athens, West Virginia. At that time the
applicable provision of the Concord College faculty handbook in respect to
tenure provided as follows:
?A person who has taught on the college or university level three or more years
before being employed for teaching service in a college or university under the
control of the West Virginia Board of Education (of Regents) shall normally be
employed on probationary status for three years before becoming eligible
276 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
for tenure. At the end of this period the president shall recommend to the
governing board either that the probationary faculty member be placed on tenure
or that his employment be discontinued at the end of the contractual period. In
the latter event, notice shall be given at least one year prior to the
expiration of the probationary period.?
Dr. Burgher, who had sufficient prior teaching experience, was thus on a
probationary status for the academic years 1972-73, 1973-74 and 1974-75, the
end of which he would be granted tenure or his employment would be discontinued
provided notice of the discontinuance had been given him at least one year
prior to the expiration of the probationary period. At the direction of
President B. L. Coffindaffer, a letter dated May 16, 1974, was directed to Dr.
Burgher by Dr. Marvin E. DeBoer, the Vice President for Academic Affairs and
Dean of the Faculty. Because this letter is of such importance to our decision
in this claim, the same is set out in full as follows:
?Dr. Ronald L. Burgher
Associate Professor of
Speech and Dramatic Arts
Concord College
Athens, West Virginia 24712
Dear Dr. Burgher:
You have reached that point in service with the College wherein to be in
compliance with the stipulations in the Faculty Handbook regarding conditions
of moving from a probationary to a tenure status, it is required that your
appointment be reviewed.
Specifically, in your case, coming to Concord with prior service, the
regulations require a review at the end of the second year of service at
Concord so that in the event tenure is not to be awarded, the faculty member
may be given the required twelve-month notice coinciding with the conclusion of
the fifth probationary year of service.
Following an extensive divisional review, consultations, and an administrative
review, it is with regret that I must inform you that the letter of appointment
to be offered to you for the 1974-7 5 academic year must be a terminal one.
Under separate cover, you will receive a copy of the new Board of Regents
Policy Bulletin 36 (March 12, 1974), Policy
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 277
Regarding Academic Freedom and Responsibility, Appointment, Promotion, Tenure
and Termination of Employment of Professional Personnel. I would urge you to study
that document as it relates to tenure, especially, and to note the cover
resolution. If you wish to be considered for coverage by these provisions, it
will be necessary for you to send your request to this office prior to July 1,
1974, for consideration and appropriate action by the President and the
Board of Regents. (Emphasis added.)
If I can be of any assistance to you, please do not hesitate to stop by the
office.
Sincerely,
Marvin E. De Boer?
Policy Bulletin 36, referred to in the letter was adopted by the Board of
Regents on March 12, 1974, to become effective July 1, 1974. In respect to
tenure Policy Bulletin 36 provides for a maximum period of probation of seven
years and that at the end of six years any non-tenured faculty member will either
be given notice in writing of tenure or offered a one-year written terminal
contract of employment. In respect to the personnel covered by Policy Bulletin
36, the following language is used:
?The provisions of this policy relating to qualifications, contracts and tenure
status, shall not apply to personnel with an effective date of employment prior
to July 1, 1974; provided, however, any such appointee wishing to be covered by
the provisions relating to qualifications, contracts and tenure status, may request
such coverage in writing prior to July 1, 1974, which request for such
coverage, if approved by the President of the institution and the Board of
Regents, shall entitle the appointee to coverage, and such coverage shall
be noted in, and become a part of the individual?s permanent file.? (Emphasis
added.)
Dr. Burgher, in an attempt to retain at least the status of a probationary
employee, elected to be covered by the provisions of Policy Bulletin 36 and
directed a written request to be so covered to President Coffindaffer prior to
July 1, 1974, but the evidence clearly demonstrates that his request was never
approved by President Coffirdaffer and the Board of Regents. Dr. Burgher
pursued his rights through a faculty grievance procedure, but an
278 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
ultimate appeal of his termination to the Board of Regents resulted in an
affirmance of President Coffindaffer?s decision to terminate.
Dr. Burgher contends that Dr. De Boer?s letter of May 14, 1974, was not an
effective termination in that it was conditional and that his request to be
covered by Policy Bulletin 36 isolated him from any effective termination. He
contends that as a result he was unlawfully deprived of an additional one
year?s salary or $13,140.00, which he now seeks to recover in this claim.
In our opinion Dr. Burgher, even though he requested to be covered by Policy
Bulletin 36, was never so covered because his request was never accepted by
President Coffindaffer and the Board of Regents as was required by the clear
language of Policy Bulletin 36 itself. Dr. DeBoer?s letter in our opinion was
unconditional and unequivocal in advising Dr. Burgher that his last year of
employment was a terminal one, and fully complied with the provisions of the
Concord College faculty handbook relating to tenure and which was in effect on
May 14, 1974, the date of Dr. Burgher?s termination notice. For the reasons
expressed above, we are disallowing this claim.
Claim disallowed.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 279
Opinton issued June 30, 1977
DAVID L. CLARK, SR.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-17)
AND
MARTINSBURG CONCRETE PRODUCTS COMPANY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-76-118)
Ralph C. Dusic, Jr., and Jerome
Radosh, Attorneys at Law, for claimants.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for respondent.
WALLACE, JUDGE:
For the purpose of the hearing these claims against the Department of Highways
arising out of the same accident were consolidated.
The claimant, David L. Clark, Sr., was employed as a truck driver for the
claimant, Martinsburg Concrete Products Company, of Martinsburg, West Virginia.
Clark had been a truck driver for the Company approximately three years. For
the past two years he had driven the particular type of truck involved in the
accident which was a concrete truck weighing 20,000 pounds empty and equipped
with 16 gears, air brakes and power steering.
On August 29, 1975, Clark was returning to the plant of his employer at
Martinsburg, West Virginia after delivering a load of concrete at Barteen. He
was driving in a northerly direction on West Virginia Route 9 approaching
Kearneysville, West Virginia in Jefferson County. The road was blacktopped, 20
feet 7 inches wide. The weather was clear, the road dry. The accident occurred at
approximately 10:00 a.m.
The claimant, Clark, who was familiar with the road, testified that as he was
approaching Kearneysville he down-shifted the truck to fourth-third gear as he
entered the first of two curves. At this point the road straightens out then
enters a second, sharper
280 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
curve. He stated that his speed was approximately 40 miles per hour. The
maximum speed in fourth-third gear was 40 to 45 miles per hour. He further
stated that as he drove out of the second curve he saw for the first time a
road crew of respondent?s employees some 150 to 200 feet in the distance; that
a tan van vehicle was stopped in his lane of traffic and a man was talking to
the driver. Trucks belonging to the respondent were stopped on the left berm of
the highway and several employees were standing nearby, one or two in the left
lane of the highway. He saw no signs or flagmen to warn him of any danger.
Clark testified, ?Well, when I saw the tan van, I knew that if I kept going I
would hit him and probably it would have killed him, and so I checked real
quick to the left to see if I could go around him, but as I said, the State
road trucks were off to the side of the road and the men were standing along
the road and one or two men were in the road; and as I hit my brakes, the guys
who were in the road kind of froze. . .so
the only thing I could do, I headed for the bank on the right hand side of the
road.?
The truck hit the bank and overturned. Clark was thrown out of the truck and
pinned under it until he was able to free himself.
The claimant Clark?s leg was broken and he suffered severe cuts on his head and
leg. He was not able to work for 18 weeks and, after returning, lost two more
weeks of work occasioned by additional leg trouble. His doctor and hospital
bills were $281.00 and $458.25 respectively. He testified that he was paid
$3.75 for a 40 hour week and $5.13 for overtime. He stated he averaged 45 to 47
hours per week prior to the accident.
Donald Boyer, in his evidentiary deposition, testified that he had been
employed by the respondent for six months, the last four months as a certified
flagman. On the day of the accident he was one of the flagmen for a patching
crew that was patching West Virginia Route 9 from the Jefferson County line to
the Virginia state border. There was a flagman stationed at each side of the
work crew, each with a red flag. He stated he was positioned a good 200 feet
from the curve around which the concrete truck came. He first saw the truck as
it was coming around the curve. He stated he couldn?t have seen it before
because it was a good sized curve. He further testified that he attempted to
flag down the truck but when the driver put on the brakes they locked and the
accident occurred. His testimony revealed that no signs were out because the
crew was moving from spot to spot and they were in the process of
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 281
putting signs up when the accident happened. The signs had been out previously
but, since the crew had moved five miles, they had been put back in the truck
where they had remained for the last mile. There were no flares or other
warning devices. The signs were put out five minutes after the accident. Boyer
testified that his supervisor sent him up to the curve after the accident to
flag and stop the traffic. He admitted that he had stopped a plumbing van prior
to the accident but denied talking to the driver.
Donald Vernon Densmore, a 3? year employee of the respondent, testified in his
evidentiary deposition that he was the driver of the truck with the ?men
working? signs. He stated he was in the process of putting out the signs when
the accident occurred. The signs on the far side of the crew were out. The
other signs had not been put out because he stopped to help the work crew with
a roller. He further testified that the flagman Boyer was 20 to 30 feet in
front of the work crew and that he attempted to stop the truck but his brakes
locked and it turned over.
John Mobley, manager of M & M Mobile Home Sales, located at the curve in
question, testified he had seen the work crew earlier in the day on his way to
the post office; that they had a flagman about ten feet in front and behind the
crew. He saw no other warning signs. He stated there was no flagman at the
curve until after the accident.
Another witness, Patricia Louise Grimm, who witnessed the accident, testified
that she did not recall any signs; that the truck was going no more than 35
miles per hour; and that it was too late for the driver to do anything when he
came upon the situation. She also testified that there was no flagman at the
curve but there was one close to the work crew.
The testimony of the witnesses establishes that although there were flagmen
present and flagging, there was no protection for traffic coming around the
curve until it was too late. Claimant, Clark, did what he could to avoid the
accident but to no avail. A flagman or a warning sign should have been located
at the curve to warn of the presence of the work crew ahead. The Court is of
the opinion that the negligence of the respondent was the cause of the accident
and that the claimant, Clark, should recover. The claim of the Martinsburg Concrete
Products Company which was consolidated and heard with the Clark claim was for
damages to the truck involved in this accident. No evidence of damages to the
truck was introduced for consideration by this Court and the Court is unable to
make a finding and therefore disallows its claim.
282 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Accordingly, the Court makes an award to the claimant, Clark in the amount of
$5,572.00.
Award of $5,572.00 to David L. Clark, Sr.
Claim of Martinsburg Concrete Products Company disallowed.
Opinion zssued June 30, 1977
DUNBAR PRINTING COMPANY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
DIVISION OF VOCATIONAL EDUCATION
(No. CC-77-34)
Eugene R. Hoyer, Attorney at Law, for claimant.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for respondent. GARDEN, JUDGE;
In May of 1975 the respondent requested the claimant to print 5500 copies of
the eight page May issue of FFA News at a cost of
$749.20. Thereafter the respondent requested some additional folding of the
printed material at an additional cost of $10.00. The material was printed,
folded and delivered to respondent in June, and the claimant invoiced the
respondent for $759.20 by invoice dated June 11, 1975. Thereafter a purchase
order dated June 18, 1975, for $749.20 was issued, but the claimant was never
paid for the services rendered.
The handling of this matter was most unusual and regrettably improper, but the
respondent did receive the benefit of this printing. This certainly is a claim
that in equity and good conscience should be paid. There were sufficient funds
on hand at the close of the fiscal year 1974-75 from which this claim could
have been paid. The Court is of opinion to and does hereby make an award to the
claimant in the amount of $759.20.
Award of $759.20.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 283
Opinion
issued June 30,1977
CLARENCE V. EASTES, JR.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-77-41)
Claimant appeared in person.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
On December 7, 1976, at about 4:45 p.m. the claimant was operating his 1966
Chevrolet station wagon in an easterly direction on West Virginia Route 25 in
Nitro, West Virginia. His wife was employed at Waybright?s Bakery located at
2402 First Avenue in Nitro, and he was attempting to pick her up after work.
Route 25 at and near the ultimate scene of the accident was a two-lane roadway,
one lane for eastbound traffic and the other for westbound traffic. During the
summer of 1976, the respondent through its independent contractor, Orders and
Haynes, had widened the south side of the eastbound traffic lane by some two
and one-half feet of additional paving. Prior to this construction, a storm
sewer drain had been located some two and one-half feet from the edge of the
highway. No attempt had been made during construction to raise the elevation of
this storm sewer drain. Consequently, after the construction, there was a drop
of about 18 inches from the surface of the widened highway to the storm sewer
drain.
The claimant had been unable to find a regular parking space in the vicinity of
his wife?s place of employment and had attempted to pull his car off of the
traveled portion of Route 25. As a result his left front and left rear wheels
struck this severe depression in the berm. As a further result the claimant
damaged his muffler and tail pipe and his gas tank was ruptured. Necessary
repairs were later effected at a total cost of $144.20.
We believe the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the respondent
negligently created a dangerous cQndition along the berm of this road and that
suth neg1igece was the prOximate cause of the accident and resultant damage to
the claimant?s vehicle. Believing further that the claimant was not guilty of
negligence which proximately caused or proximately contributed
284 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
to causing the accident, we hereby
make an award of $144.20 in favor of the claimant.
Award of $144.20.
Opinion issued June 30, 1977
CLIFFORD E. HONSAKER, JR.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-77-29)
PER CURIAM:
The claimant and the respondent filed a written stipulation with the Court
which stipulated that on or about August 31, 1976, claimant?s vehicle was
struck by concrete debris from a dynamite blast detonated by employees of the
respondent while working on West Virginia Route 26 in Berkeley County, West
Virginia. Claimant?s vehicle was damaged. It was stipulated that $10.14 is a
fair and equitable estimate of the damage sustained by the claimant. Believing
that liability exists on the part of the respondent and that the claimant is
free from negligence and that the damages are reasonable, an award of $10.14 is
directed in favor of the claimant.
Award of $10.14.
Opinion issued June 30, 1977
EMMETT HUNDLEY & FRANCES
HUNDLEY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No.
D-941)
Harry N. Barton, Attorney at Law, for the claimants.
Nancy J. Norman and Nancy
Loar, Attorneys at Law, for the
respondent.
WALLACE, JUDGE:
The respondent entered into a contract with Vecellio & Grogan, Inc. and
Foster & Creighton Company to construct a public road in
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 285
Kanawha County, West Virginia known as Project 1-64-2 (15) 57. The claimants
brought action against the contractors and the respondent in the Circuit Court
of Kanawha County, West Virginia, for damages to their property at 98 Cook
Drive, Charleston, West Virginia, allegedly caused by the contractors when they
trespassed on the property and cut and destroyed a large number of trees and
shrubs. On motion, the respondent was dismissed as a defendant pursuant to
Chapter 17, Article 4, Section 37 of the Code of West Virginia, which prohibits
the State from being named defendant in a proceeding in Civil Court.
Subsequently, the matter was settled with the contractors who were released by
the claimants.
The claimants filed their claim in this Court against the respondent as a joint
tort feasor. The respondent filed its motion to dismiss the claim upon the
ground that the release executed by the claimants in the settlement of the
civil action against the contractors also released the respondent.
The release released the two contractors ?and all of their principals,
employees, agents, subsidiaries, parent corporations, successors, and assigns?.
Counsel for the respondent contends that the respondent is a principal and was
released. Claimants maintain that the contractors were independent contractors
performing under a contract executed with the respondent.
In the case of Tracy N. Spencer, Jr. v. The Travelers Insurance Company, 148
W.Va. 111, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held:
?The question as to whether a person is an employee or an independent
contractor depends on the facts in any given case and all elements must be
considered together. 27 Am. Jur., Independent Contractor, *5, page 485. Among
the elements to be considered are the manner of selection of the person who is
to do the work, how the person is to be paid for such work, the right to hire
and to fire, and the right or power of control or supervision in connection
with the work to be done, but the most important of all is the last mentioned
element, that of power of control or supervision over the manner of doing the
work. If the right to control or supervise the work in question is retained by the
person for whom the work is being done, the person doing the work is an
employee and not an independent contractor.? See Greaser v. Appaline Oil
Company, 109 W.Va. 396, Davis v. Fire Creek Fuel Co., 144 W.Va. 537.
286 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
In the instant case, the respondent entered into a contract with the contractor
based on its plans and specifications. The respondent retained only such
control and supervision as was necessary to assure that the plans and
specifications were followed but did not control or supervise the contractor?s
work or their employees.
?The mere retention by the owner of the right to supervise or inspect work of
an independent contractor as it progresses for the purposes of determining
whether it is completed according to plans and specifications, does not operate
to create the relation of master and servant between the owner and those
engaged to work...
An employer of an independent contractor may retain a broad general power of
supervision and control as to the results of the work so as to insure
satisfactory performance of the contract, including the right to inspect, to
stop the work, to make suggestions or recommendations as to the details of the
work, or to prescribe alterations or deviations in the work, without changing
the relationship from that of owner and independent contractor.? 41 Am. Jur.
2d, Independent Contractor, *10.
It is the opinion of this Court that the supervision by the respondent was not
such control aS to create a rnaster-ervant relationship and that the
contractors, Vecellio & Grogan, Inc. and Foster & Creighton Co. were
independent contractors. The respondent was in fact the principal or employer
in the employment of the independent contractors to perform the contract in accordance
with its plans and specifications.
Accordingly, the word ?principal? as used in the release executed by the
claimants does in fact release the respondent.
Respondent?s motion to dismiss the claim is sustained. Motion to dismiss
sustained.
W. VA.J REPORTS STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 287
Opinion issued June 30, 1977
EDNA MAY LYONS
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-879)
William B. Carey, Attorney at Law, for the claimant.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for the respondent. WALLACE, JUDGE:
The claimant, Edna May Lyons, filed her claim against the respondent in the
amount of $50,000.00 for damages resulting from a fall occasioned when she
stepped into a pothole.
The accident occurred on May 22, 1974, at approximately 10:00 a.m. on
Washington Street near the intersection of Congress Street in Berkeley Springs,
West Virginia. Washington Street is also U.S. Route 522, maintained by the
respondent. The weather was clear; the street dry.
A friend of the claimant, James E. Morrison, was in the habit of driving the
claimant to work. It was customary to let her out of his car in front of a
newsstand where she purchased a paper and then proceeded to walk to work in a
store about four buildings?away. At the place where he usually let her out of
his automobile, the curb was painted yellow indicating a no parking zone.
On the morning of the accident, Morrison, as was his custom, let the claimant
out of his automobile in front of the newsstand. He stopped his car 14 to 20
inches from the curb. The claimant got out of the car on the passenger side
next to the curb. She shut the door, took a step or two, and tripped in a hole
in the street and fell. Her left knee was severely injured. There were no other
cars parked there and there were no obstructions between the car and the
newsstand. The claimant testified she did not see the hole nor remembered it
being there before.
The claims investigator for the respondent testified the hole was odd shaped,
19 inches long and 16 inches wide at the widest point. The deepest point was
one inch.
Marshall Michael, who was the County Supervisor for the respondent in Morgan
County, testified Washington Street or U.S;
288 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
522 was part of his responsibility. He testified that he and his crew tried to
keep all potholes in the street filled. He stated he had no knowledge of the
hole involved in this accident until the claims investigator made his
investigation in February, 1976. No one had previously reported it.
The evidence in this case does not establish negligence on the part of the
respondent but instead the record reveals that the negligence of the claimant
caused her accident. The claimant was familiar with the place where she fell,
having gotten out of the car there on numerous occasions, and with the exercise
of reasonable care could have avoided her injury. In her testimony, she
testified as follows: ?Well, I remember that I was close to the curb and there
was a lot of dirt on the curb where they had planted a pole, and I was looking
at the curb to see where I could step up without getting in all of this loose
dirt.? ?I was looking at the edge of the curb, and all at once, I just went
forward. I stepped in this hole, and just fell flat on my stomach.? ?. . .1 had my mind centered on the edge of the curb where
all this dirt was and that, and I did not see that there was a hole there.?
The Court is of the opinion and so finds that the evidence does not establish
negligence on the part of the respondent and that the claimant?s negligence was
the cause of her accident and, accordingly, disallows her claim.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued June 30, 1977
MACIL J. NULL & MELVIN L. NULL
vs.
BOARD OF REGENTS
(No. CC-77-16)
Claimants appeared in person.
Henry C. Bias, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for respondent. WALLACE,
JUDGE:
The claimants, Macil J. Null and Melvin L. Null, filed their claim in the
amount of $20,000.00 before this Court against the Board of Regents. Attached
to the claim is a copy of the deec dated
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 289
September 11, 1975 executed by the claimants to the Board of Regents conveying
the southern half of Lot 7, Block 1 as shown on the map of the Town of
Montgomery and described as a parcel of land fronting approximately 40 feet on
Fayette Pike extending northerly 45 feet, 8 inches. The deed was signed and
acknowledged by the claimants on October 14, 1975.
The only testimony given on behalf of the claimants was offered by the
claimant, Macil J. Null. She testified that she acquired the property in the
name of Macil L. Jeffrey in 1946 and further that she and her husband, the
claimant, Melvin L. Null, resided for 30 years in the property which was
located at 806?806? Fayette Pike, Montgomery, West Virginia. She stated that
the description in the deed to the Board of Regents was incorrect, that the
size of the lot was 45 feet 8 inches by 60 feet. Mrs. Null acknowledged that
she and her husband agreed to sell the property to the respondent for
$27,000.00.
The claimants contend that representatives of the respondent did not discuss
nor negotiate the sale with them. Mrs. Null testified that the consideration
should have been $50,000.00 but she would settle for $20,000.00, the amount of
the claim. She further stated that she was a graduate of West Virginia
Institute of Technology and also had sold real estate.
The respondent introduced as its Exhibit No. 1 a copy of a map showing the
properties acquired by it including the claimants? property. The map shows
claimants? property fronting 40 feet on Fayette Pike and extending northerly 45
feet 8 inches, the same as the description in the deed. The map shows a parcel
between the north side of claimants? property and the south line of property
owned by one Riggio, which claimants maintained should be included in their
deed.
Respondent also introduced as its Exhibit No. 2 a copy of its letter to the
claimant, Macil Null, dated April 7, 1975 entitled:
?Subject: Tax Parcel 156, part of Lot 7, Block 1 of Montgomery (806 Fayette
Pike)?. The letter stated in part:
?The purpose of this letter is to make you a firm offer of $27,000 for the
subject property, with the right reserved for you to remove any items from the
premises after completion of the sale
This sale can be closed upon certification of your title as good and marketable
by the state?s attorney. If you desire to
290 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
accept this offer, please affix your signature to the enclosed copy of this
letter on the line so designated and return it to this office no later than
April 30, 1975.?
This letter is signed as accepted by Macil J. Null.
The claimant, Macil J. Null, testified that she and her husband agreed to sell
their property ?under pressure because we couldn?t be heard and because we had
so much illness. .
.?. She further admitted that she received
and signed the letter to accept the respondent?s offer to buy her property for
$27,000.00. She also admitted that she and her husband signed and acknowledged
the deed to the respondent on October 14, 1975, consummating the sale.
It is apparent from the record that the claimants agreed to sell their property
for $27,000.00. There is no evidence that the property was worth more than the
agreed consideration except Mrs. Null?s statement that the consideration should
have been $50,000.00. If there was a mistake in the description as to the
proper size of the lot, that is a matter for the respondent to determine. Mrs.
Null testified that she sold real estate and claims she had some knowledge in
real estate transactions. If the amount offered for her property was
insufficient, she was not obliged to accept. She could have refused the offer
and let the issue of fair market value be determined in a condemnation suit.
Based on the record, the Court is of the opinion and does disallow the claim.
Claim disallowed.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 291
Opinion issued June 30, 1977
THELMA RATCLIFF AND
WILLIAM GLEN RATCLIFF
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-884)
Menis Ketchum, Attorney at Law, for claimants.
Gregory W. Evers and Dewey
Jones, Attorneys at Law, for
respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
On November 3, 1972, the respondent entered into a contract with Kenneth M.
Dunn Co., Inc., Day Construction Company and Orders Construction Company, Inc.,
whereby the latter companies agreed to construct, in accordance with plans and
specifications furnished by respondent, the Fort Gay?Nursery Gap Road in Wayne
County, Project No. S-617 (18), and commonly referred to as a portion of the
Tolsia Highway. The contract also effected a relocation of the then existing
County Road 29 or Mill Creek Road.
The claimants were the owners of certain real estate that fronted on Mill Creek
Road. Running parallel to the Mill Creek Road was a small creek, and during
good weather and when the water level in the creek was low, the claimants in
order to reach their residence would simply drive their car off of Mill Creek
Road, ford the creek and then proceed over bottom land a distance of some 200
to 300 feet, up a small embankment and park next to their home. At times when
the water level in the creek was high and the bottom land was flooded, the
claimants would park their car off of Mill Creek Road, cross the creek by means
of a pedestrian bridge and then walk the remaining distance to their home. At
the time of the hearing William Glen Ratcliff and Thelma Ratcliff were 75 and
68 years of age respectively.
The plans for the new road relocated the then existing IVIill Creek Road to a
point on the other side of the creek and very near the residence of the
claimants and generally bisected the property of the claimants. At and near the
home of the claimants the plans also required an extensive amount of fill for
the road bed, and as a result the level of the newly constructed highway exceeded
the elevation of claimants? home. It was admitted by respondent at the
292 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
hearing that the plans did not specifically provide for a road or anything else
which could be used by claimants as a means of ingress and egress during
construction, although the plans did provide for permanent access after
construction and which was later actually provided.
The claimants had left their home on the morning of May 24, 1973, so that Mrs.
Ratcliff might keep an appointment with her doctor. She testified that the fill
for the roadbed at that time was twelve to fifteen feet in height. The fact was
disputed by respondent, but from pictures of the roadbed taken a few days later
and which were introduced into evidence, we believe that the testimony of Mrs.
Ratcliff is entitled to the greater weight. It had rained the day before and
was raining again when the claimants returned from the visit to the doctor
about 11:30 a.m. No means of ingress or egress having been provided for them,
the Ratcliffs attempted to climb up and over the fill and in so doing Mrs.
Ratcliff fell and sustained severe personal injury to her left knee.
The respondent introduced into evidence Section 104.5 of the West Virginia
Department of Highways Standard Specifications?Roads and Bridges?adopted 1972,
which reads in part as follows:
?The Project, while undergoing improvement, shall be kept open to all traffic
by the contractor in such condition that both local and through traffic will be
adequately and safely accomodated.?
The respondent contends, pursuant to the above, that it was the duty of the
contractor to provide the Ratcliffs with a means of ingress and egress to their
property, and that it therefore had no duty in this respect to the Ratcliffs.
We are not certain that the above-quoted section specifically covers the
providing of ingress and egress to individual residences such as the Ratcliffs.
Even if it does, we are of opinion that the respondent has a duty to provide
ingress and egress and that such duty is non-delegable. A right of access to
and from a public highway is a property right of which a property owner can not
be deprived without just compensation. State
ex. rel. Riddle v. Department of Highways, 154 W.Va. 722, 179 S.E. 2d 10 (1971). Respondent also contends that the
Ratcliffs were guilty of assumption of risk in attempting to climb the fill in
adverse weather conditions when the fill was slippery. As indicated above,
climbing the fiil was the only course that they could follow to reach their
home. To be guilty of assumption of
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 293
risk, a voluntary exposure must take place. Acceptance of risk is not voluntary
if a defendant?s tortious conduct has left a plaintiff no reasonable
alternative course of conduct in order to avert harm to himself. 57 Am. Jur.
2d, Negligence *283. We are of opinion that the respondent was guilty of
negligence in failing to provide access or in failing to see that access was
provided for the Ratcliffs during the construction of this highway and that
such negligence was the proximate cause of Mrs. Ratcliff?s fall and resultant
injuries. We are of the further opinion that the Ratcliffs were not guilty of
assumption of risk.
Counsel for the parties during the hearing stipulated that the Ratcliffs had
instituted a civil action against the contractors, Kenneth M. Dunn Co., Inc.
and Day Construction Company, but that before trial a settlement had been
effected whereby the Ratcliffs received $18,000.00 in settlement of their claims.
This of course does not prevent the Ratcliffs from pursuing their claims
against the respondent in this proceeding. Had the civil action been proceeded
to trial and a verdict, later satisfied, been returned in the Ratcliffs? favor,
that would have barred this proceeding, for an injured plaintiff is entitled to
only one satisfaction for a personal injury. On the other hand it is clear that
any award that we might make must be reduced by the amount of the settlement
previously paid by the joint tort feasors.
As a result of her fall Mrs. Ratcliff experienced immediate pain in her left
knee. She was seen the following day by her family physician, Dr. Lester of
Louisa, Kentucky, who referred her to Dr. J. Marshall Carter, an orthopedic
specialist of Huntington, West Virginia. An evidentiary deposition of Dr.
Carter was read into evidence, and it was the doctor?s opinion that Mrs.
Ratcliff at the time of her fall had an advanced osteoarthritic condition in
both knees. He was of the opinion that she possibly tore the medial cartilage
of her left knee and that the fall aggravated the osteoarthritic condition and
triggered an on-set of pain. Dr. Carter saw Mrs. Ratcliff a total of nineteen
times prior to the hearing of this claim. On at least seven of these visits the
doctor injected her knee with cortisone. He also fitted her with an elastic
knee cage. The doctor was of opinion to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that the fall aggravated her pre-existing condition and that she
would suffer pain and experience difficulty in walking the rest of her life.
Dr. Carter?s bill was in the amount of $878.00, which in his opinion was
reasonable and necessary.
294 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Mrs. Ratcljff testified that prior to her fall she had no trouble in walking,
but she admitted that her knees would bother her if she were working on her
feet for an extended period of time. Since the fall she testified that she has
been in constant pain and takes Darvon five or six times a day in an effort to
control the pain. She is unable to do her house work and estimated that she had
spent $2,000.00 in hiring help to do this work. While she is able to move
around a little bit, she testified that she must use her knee brace and a cane.
Prior to her fall two young grandchildren were living with her, children of her
widowed daughter. Her daughter was paying her $200.00 a month for this service,
but shortly after the fall it became necessary to place the children elsewhere
because of Mrs. Ratcliff?s inability to physically take care of them.
Pain and suffering is the largest element of damages in this claim and is of
course most difficult to equate in a monetary figure. In view of all of the
facts in respect to this physical injury, we feel that an award of $22,500.00 is
justified, and crediting the respondent with the $18,000.00 settlement, we
hereby make an award of $4,500.00.
Award of $4,500.00.
Opinion issued June 30, 1977
RAY R. REED & SHARON REED
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-919)
Walter L. Wagner, Jr., Attorney at Law, for claimants.
Gregory W. Evers and Nancy
Norman, Attorneys at Law, for
respondent.
WALLACE, JUDGE:
The claimants filed their claim against the respondent in the amount of
$75,000.00 for damages to their property allegedly caused by a slide occasioned
by the respondent cutting into the toe of the hill in front of their property.
The claimants? property was located on West Virginia State Route 25/5, also
known as Dutch
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 295
Hollow Road in Kanawha County, West Virginia. They purchased their property in
1961 and thereafter constructed a pre-cut home. The claimant, Ray R. Reed, did
the interior finishing of the house as well as the installation of the septic
tank system to service the house. A seat or shelf was cut out of the hillside
for the location of the house. The hill directly in front of the house slopes
down to the State road. A creek or stream runs along the opposite side of the
road. The septic tank system installed by the claimant was installed in the
hillside in front of the house. A 950 gallon tank was installed with four lines
of field tile extending approximately 110 feet each, into the leeching field.
The system was improperly installed and worked approximately 90 days. Three of
the lines of field tile ran up hill necessitating the use of one line running
down the hill and opening onto the road.
The claimant, Ray Reed, testified that in the early part of 1971, the
respondent ditched back into the toe of the hill in front of claimants? property
placing the excess dirt on the creek side of the road. In the early part of
1972 a large crack appeared in the road which later continued up the hill
crossing in front of the house and then back down the hill to the road causing
a slide in the hillside. Over a short period of time, the slide broke the gas
line, destroyed the driveway and did considerable damage to the house.
When the crack in the road first appeared the respondent was notified and it
was patched. Later as the slide developed the respondent was notified on
several occasions. The respondent corrected the slide between January and March
of 1973 by constructing a retaining wall of piling along the road in front of
the claimants? property.
John R. Sefton testified that he was an engineering geologist for the
Department of Natural Resources and was employed by the Department of Highways
from June, 1971 to October 14, 1975 in the landslide section. He made the
initial investigation of the slide involved in this claim on September 27, 1972
for the Materials Control Division. Investigation revealed that the material
beneath the surface was sandy clay and the area had some seepage. Although Mr.
Sefton stated he could not determine the exact cause of the slide, it was his
opinion that there were several factors involved. The undercutting of the road
by the creek probably caused a series of movements which eventually got into
the yard. Another factor was the seepage from the claimants? yard itself which
weakened its stability. He further testified that in this case
296 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
land use played an important part; that the location of the septic tank field
was in a very unfortunate place with respect to contributing to slide problems
in the yard because it was located in the head of the slide.
Although the respondent did not deny that it cut into the toe of the hill,
Alvin Hammonds, District Maintenance Engineer for District I, which included
Kanawha County, testified there were no orders to make any relocations or excavations
beyond normal maintenance in the area of the slide at the time the claimant
testified the respondent cut into the hill.
Prior to the hearing of this claim the Court was requested to and did view the
premises. The view revealed the present condition of the property including
corrective measures taken by the respondent to restore the claimants? property
and to stop the slide.
The installation of the septic tank system by the claimant, Ray Reed, in a
hillside unstable from natural seepage may have been a contributing factor;
however, the proximate cause of the slide was the action of the respondent in
clearing the ditch line and cutting into the toe of the hill.
Therefore, the Court finds that the action of the respondent was the proximate
cause of the slide and resulting damages and further, after considering the
view of the premises and the corrective measures taken by the respondent, makes
an award to the claimants in the amount of $5,000.00.
Award of $5,000.00.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 297
Opinion issued June 30,1977
S. J. GROVES & SONS COMPANY
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-614)
Jack Huffman and Jeniver J.
Jones, Attorneys at Law, for claimant.
Stuart Reed Waters,
Jr., and Dewey B. Jones, Attorneys at Law, for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
By contract dated September 23, 1969, entered into by the respondent and
claimant, the latter contracted to construct a portion of 1-79 in Braxton
County and known as Project 1-79-2 (32)
64. For use on the project, the claimant in December, 1970, purchased 52,420
tons of crushed aggregate from Kenton Meadows Company, Inc., at a cost of
$104,840.00. The claimant in turn on December 21, 1970, invoiced the respondent
for this aggregate and shortly thereafter the respondent paid claimant for this
quantity of aggregate. This aggregate, with cement to be added later, was to be
used on the project as cement treated base course. When this aggregate was
purchased by respondent, it was not on the project site but was a part of
Kenton Meadows? stockpile of aggregate located in Braxton County.
By May, 1971, the respondent through sophisticated testing had determined that
the aggregate was deleterious and as such did not meet specification. The
testing had revealed that the aggregate contained shale in excess of 5% and
that in accordance with the specifications was not usable on the project.
Twenty-three tests were made of the aggregate from samples taken from Kenton
Meadows? stockpile, and these tests confirmed earlier testing that had been
performed by respondent as the aggregate passed over a conveyor belt at the
crusher, that the aggregate was deleterious. Conferences were held between
officials of claimant and respondent in an effort to determine what could be
done with the aggregate in order to bring it up to specifications. It was
determined that if an additional 1.5% of cement was added to the aggregate,
that the same would then have sufficient strength to be usable on the project.
298 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W.VA
As a result the respondent and the claimant entered into a written agreement on
May 27, 1971. and which was entitled Supplemental Agreement No. 7, Change Order No. 14. This agreement which was
introduced into evidence authorized the additional cement and in describing the
reason for the supplemental agreement, the following language was set forth in
the agreement:
?This crushed aggregate available for use in Cement Treated Aggregate Base
Course has been repeatedly sampled and tested, and was found to have a higher
shale content than allowed. In order to use this material, an additional 1.5%
of Portland Cement is needed to produce a quaJity finished product. The addition of 1.5% cement above the present 4 1/2%
to 5 1/2% band will be added by the contractor at no extra cost to the
Commission.? (Emphasis supplied.)
The claimant thus added the additional 1.5% of cement and the cement treated
aggregate base course was used on the project. The claimant computed that it
incurred an expense of $11,437.40 in adding this additional cement to the
aggregate, and being prohibited from charging this amount to respondent by
reason of the language of the supplemental agreement, it recouped this expense
by back charging it to Kenton Meadows.
While it would appear from the style of the claim that the same was filed by S.
J. Groves & Sons Company as claimant, it was admitted at the hearing by
counsel for the claimant that the claim was in reality an attempt on the part
of Kenton Meadows to recover in the name of S. J. Groves & Sons Company the
$11,437.40 which it had been back charged. They (Kenton Meadows) assert, and
quite correctly we believe, that they could not file suit directly against
respondent by reason of lack of privity of contract. While Kenton Meadows
cannot file a direct claim against respondent in its own name, S. J. Groves
& Sons Company could have assigned its chose in action to Kenton Meadows
and the latter could have proceeded against respondent as an assignee. This was
not done, but even if it had, we believe the language of the supplemental
agreement would have constituted a complete defense.
Kenton Meadows of course is of the opinion that the sampling from their
stockpile was done improperly and that the samples were taken from
unrepresentative parts of the stockpile and as such did not represent the true
quality of the aggregate in the stockpile. We believe that the issue of the
samplthg, the testing and
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 299
the back charging of the expense of the additional cement are truly issues
between S. J. Groves & Sons Company and Kenton Meadows and that the proper
forum for the resolution of this issue is in a State court in a civil action
brought by Kenton Meadows against S. J. Groves & Sons Company. For the
reasons expressed above, we will make no award.
Claim disallowed.
Opinion issued June 30, 1977
PAUL SOWARDS, ET AL
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No, D-865)
James W. St. Clair, Attorney at Law, for claimants.
Gregory W. Evers, Attorney at Law, for respondent.
GARDEN, JUDGE:
On the morning of September 2. 1974, the claimant, Paul Sowards, was operating
his van type truck in a southerly direction on Charley?s Creek Road in Cahell
County. He was accompanied by his wife, Gail Sowards, his infant daughter,
Christina Sowards, and his infant son, Christopher Sowards, all of whom are
also claimants in this claim. A week or so prior to the accident date the
claimant, Paul Sowards, had purchased a 1966 GMC truck which had been converted
into a catering van, it being his hope that he could realize additional income
by attending public events and selling soft drinks, popcorn, candies and other
sundries from the catering van.
On the morning of the accident he and his family were on their way to a public
auction where the claimant intended to pursue his newly acquired ?moonlighting?
occupation. In order to reach the site of the auction, it was necessary for the
claimant to traverse Charley?s Creek Road which is about 3.5 miles in length,
and which we believe the evidence established was in deplorable condition.
Claimants contend that the respondent was negligent in failing to maintain this
strip of road in a reasonably safe condition. In any event the claimants
contend that as a result of th condition of the road, the claimant, Paul
Sowards, lost control of the van truck,
300 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
causing him to veer off of the road and down a steep embankment to his right.
As the van truck rolled down the embankment the claimant, Paul Sowards, was
thrown from the truck, the truck rolled over and ultimately ended on its wheels
on top of the claimant, Paul Sowards, some 35 feet below the surface of
Charley?s Creek Road.
Forrest E. Vance testified on behalf of the claimants. Mr. Vance testified that
since 1970 he had traveled Charley?s Creek Road on a daily basis; that in 1970
the road was in poor condition and that he had spoken to employees of the
respondent at the Barboursville headquarters but no results were obtained; that
in 1974 he spoke to a Mr. Canfield in Commissioner Ritchie?s office but again
no repairs were effected. After the accident Mr. Vance saw the van over the
hill, and he testified that where the van had gone over the hill, Charley?s
Creek Road was covered with holes, some 8 to 10 inches deep. Mr. Vance?s
testimony in respect to respondent being on notice of the condition of the road
and in respect to the deplorable condition of the road was corroborated by
witnesses Clay E. Byrd, Preston Miller and William E. Smith, Jr., who was an
inspector for respondent from June of 1970 to Noveniber of 1971.
On behalf of the respondent Trooper Stanley Farley of the Department of Public
Safety testified as to the results of his investigation of the accident. On
cross-examination he admitted that the road was rough and that holes were
present. He stated the road was not blacktopped and was deteriorating. William
E. Bell, former assistant county maintenance supervisor for Cabell County, from
March 1, 1974 and most of 1975, testified that Chancy?s Creek Road, being a
secondary route, received routine maintenance in the spring and fall of 1974.
He stated that in June or July of 1974 the road was graded and that slag was
applied where needed. At the same time some of the ditch lines were pulled with
the remainder being pulled in the fall of that year. Mr. Bell admitted that
there were holes in the road, some the size of teacups and others the size of a
football.
This is not a claim where an injured claimant has struck an isolated pothole on
a West Virginia road. Those claims, unless unusual circumstances are present,
are uniformly denied by this Court. Here however, we believe that the testimony
abundantly demonstrated that Charley?s Creek Road was not maintained in a
reasonably safe condition and that the respondent, through many notices, knew
or should have known of this condition. While the
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 301
respondent is not an insurer for the safety of those using the highways in this
State, we do feel in those cases where the respondent has actual notice of a
deplorable and dangerous condition in a highway or road, that it should take at
least some steps to remedy the condition for the sake of motorists who are
required to use such highway or road,
All of the claimants were taken to St. Mary?s Hospital in Huntington.
Christopher Sowards was treated for abrasions and shock and released, and
thereafter sought no further medical treatment. A hospital bill for his
treatment was rendered in the amount of $70.50. Christina Sowards received a
laceration of the left upper lid, a laceration of the left forehead, a
laceration of the left scalp and a laceration of the right hand. These
lacerations were repaired by Dr. Au A. Garmestani, a plastic surgeon. The scars
resulting from these lacerations are permanent in nature. Dr. Garmestani
rendered a bill for $180.00 for his services, and Christina?s hospital bill
amounted to $53.50, The claimant?s wife, Gail Sowards, received numerous
contusions in the accident, but she did not require any medical treatment or
services.
As earlier indicated, the claimant, Paul Sowards, was thrown from the van, and
when it came to rest the claimant was pinned under it. He was admitted as a
patient at St. Mary?s Hospital where he remained until September 9, 1974, under
the care of Dr. Robert W. Lowe, an orthopedic specialist. His injuries were
diagnosed by Dr. Lowe as a fracture of the right proximal humerus in the
subcapital region, acute cervical strain, sprain and strain of the thoracic
girdle area and an abrasion and laceration of the right side of his abdomen.
Upon admission to the hospital, it was detected that the claimant was suffering
from high blood pressure, and Dr. John F. Otto, an internist, was called in
consultation, and Dr. Otto successfully treated the claimant for this condition
through medication.
Mr. Sowards was unable to resume his employment at ACF Industries until October
28, 1974, and as a result lost a total of $907.01. He continued to consult Dr.
Lowe, who last saw him on February 10, 1976, at which time he was still
suffering pain in his thoracic area. In addition to the loss of wages set forth
above, the claimant?s total medical expenses amounted to $1,078.05. His van was
destroyed as well as its contents and inventory, all of which were valued at a
total of $1,650.00.
Believing that liability on the part of the respondent exists, we award the
claimant, Paul Sowards the sum of $11,000.00, the
302 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS --
[W. VA
claimant, Christina Sowards the sum of $500.00, and to the claimants,
Christopher Sowards and Gail Sowards, the sum of $250.00 each.
Award of $11,000.00 to Paul Sowards.
Award of $500.00 to Christina Sowards.
Award of $250.00 to Christopher Sowards.
Award of $250.00 to Gail Sowards.
Opinion issued June 30, 1977
PAUL EDWARD TUCKER
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. CC-77-14)
PER CURIAM:
The claimant and the respondent filed a written stipulation which stipulated
that on or about January 25, 1977, the claimant?s vehicle hit and struck a
large hole in the right hand lane of U.S. Route 60 in South Charleston, Kanawha
County, West Virginia. The respondent had previously covered the hole with a
metal plate which had become dislodged. The vehicle was damaged, and it was
stipulated that the fair and equitable estimate of the damages sustained by the
claimant is $93.32. Believing that liability exists on the part of the
respondent and that the claimant is free from negligence and that the damages
are reasonable, an award of $93.32 is directed in favor of the claimant.
Award of $93.32.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 303
Opinion Lssned June 30. 1977
L. E. WINE
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
(No. D-?985)
William C. Garrett, Attorney
at Law, for claimant.
Nancy J. Norman, Attorney at Law, for respondent.
WALLACE, JUDGE:
The claimant, L. E. Wine, lived at Gem, West Virginia, which is approximately
2? miles south of Burnsville in Braxton County, where he owned and operated a
dairy farm. All but 8 acres of his land was condemned by the respondent for the
construction of Interstate 79 or 1-79. The remaining acreage is located between
W.Va. State Route 3 and 1-79. W.Va. State Route 3, which runs in a north-south
direction west of and parallel to 1-79, is located west of the claimant?s
property. To reach his property, it was necessary for the claimant to proceed
on a road from W.Va. State Route 3 easterly crossing Salt Lick Creek by means
of a ford. The claimant maintains that this road is his private road, the
respondent claims it is Local Service Road 3/2 owned by it. The claimant
testified that there is another creek approximately 200 yards south of his
house known as Paddy?s Run which flows under the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
track and empties into Salt Lick Creek. He stated there is or was prior to the
construction of 1-79 a road in the vicinity of Paddy?s Run which he contends is
Route 3/2.
The Nello Teer Company was the contractor for the respondent in the
construction of this particular section of 1-79. The road in question was used
both by the contractor and the respondent. Vehicles proceeding to and from the
construction site damaged the ford and the road. The claimant?s house and its
septic tank were damaged by trucks of the Nello Teer Company. Obert Wine
testified that he rented claimant?s house in June, 1971, and moved out on March
7, 1972, because of the conditions caused by the construction. He stated that
the septic tank was damaged before he vacated the house and a truck ran into
the house in April, 1972. He further testified that Local Service Road 3/2 was
the road near Paddy?s Run and not the road through the claimant?s property
304 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Gerald L. Nicely, testifying for the claimant, testified that he was employed
by the respondent as chief inspector in charge of field work on the
construction of 1-79. He stated that he knew there was a dispute over the road
and that they were directed not to use it. He further testified that respondent
had quit using the road when he left its employment in May, 1973.
George P. Sovick, employed by respondent as chief engineer of the Right-Of-Way
Division, testified that the road in question was not a private road but was
Local Service Road 3/2. He stated it became part of the respondent?s road
system in 1933 pursuant to an act of the West Virginia State Legislature.
The claimant and his wife, in the settlement of the respondent?s condemnation
suit against them for property needed in the construction of 1-79, executed a
deed to the respondent for 27.74 acres of land. A copy of the deed was attached
to the claimant?s claim and the respondent introduced a copy as its Exhibit No.
1. The recording data indicates it is recorded in Deed Book 326 at Page 259 in
the Braxton County, West Virginia Clerk?s office. The deed, bearing date March
9, 1973 and executed on March 13, 1973 and reciting the consideration of
$19,900.00, described by metes and bounds the property conveyed to the
respondent. The description by which the claimant and his wife conveyed
property to the respondent recognized the existance of Local Service Road 3/2
over and through claimant?s property. The 13th and 14th calls located in the
westerly boundary of the description are as follows:
?Thence continuing with the said proposed controlled access right-of-way line
in a northern direction 225 feet, more or less, to a point in the southern
existing right-of-way line of State Local Service Road 3/2, 189 feet radially
left of 1-79 Center Line Station 4280+ 75; thence crossing State Local Service
Road 3/2 in a northern direction 33 feet, more or less, to a point in the
northern existing right-of-way line of State Local Service Road 3/2, 192 feet
radially left of 1-79 Center Line Station 4281+ 08;?.
The description continues and the calls again recite the disputed road in the
eastern boundary line. The 23rd, 24th and 25th calls are as follows:
?Thence continuing in a southwesterly direction 842 feet, more or less, to a
point in the northern existing right-of-way line of State Local Service Road
3/2, 296 feet radially right of 1-79 Center Line Station 4281+ 75; thence
continuing across
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 305
State Local Service Road 3/2 in a southerwesterly direction 25 feet more or
less, to a point within the existing right-of-way line of State Local Service
Road 3/2, said point being 290 feet radially right of 1-79 Center Line Station
4281+50; thence continuing with the said proposed controlled access
right-of-way line in a southeasterly direction 10 feet, more or less, to a
point in the southern existing right-of-way line of State Local Service Road
3/2, 295 feet radially right of 1-79 Center Line Station 4281+43;?.
The claimant?s property and Local Service Road 3/2 with the above calls are
clearly ascertainable on the maps introduced as claimant?s Exhibits 2 and 5.
The deed further contained the following release which released the respondent
from subsequent damage:
?For the consideration hereinbefore set forth the Grantor hereby releases
Grantee, ...
from any and all claims for damages. . . of any nature. . . arising.
. . from the construction and maintenance of the highway...
or from work performed
Grantor further expressly releases all claims of Grantor for damages to any
residue of land retained. .
. it being agreed that the compensation
herein provided for as purchase price in full compensation both for the land
herein described and for all rights and easements hereby released and all
damages herein mentioned which Grantor has or may hereafter suffer.?
The preponderance of the evidence establishes that the road claimed by the
claimant is Local Service Road 3/2. This Court pursuant to West Virginia Code
14-2-21 cannot take jurisdiction over claims that are barred by the statute of
limitations. The claimant filed his claim on July 17, 1975. The damage to the
septic tank occurred prior to March, 1972, the damages to the house were in
April, 1972. Claimant?s witness, Nicely, testified the respondent had ceased to
use the road when he left the construction job in May, 1973.
For the foregoing reasons as established by the record, the Court is of the
opinion to and does disallow the claim of the claimant.
Claim disallowed.
306 REPORTS STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 307
REFERENCES
Abandoned Property Negligence-See also
Blasting; Falling
Advisory Opinions Rocks; Landslides Motor Vehicles;
Streets and Highways
Annual Leave
Notice
Assumption of Risk
Nuisance
Blasting
Board of Education Parks and Playgrounds
Board of Regents-See Colleges and Uni- Physicians and Surgeons-See Hospitals
versities Police
Bridges Printing
Building Contracts Prisons and Prisoners
Colleges and Universities Public Institutions
Condemnation Public Officers
Contracts-See also Building Contracts Real Estate
Damages Rehearing
Dangerous Instrumentality Relocation Assistance
Deeds Sick Leave
Drains and Sewers-See also Waters and State
Watercourses State Agencies
Electricity State Schools
Eminent Domain-See Condemnation Statutes
Expenditures Stipulation and Agreement
Falling Rocks-See also Landslides; Neg- Streets and Highways-See also Falling
ligence Rocks; Landslides; Motor Vehicles;
Fires and Fire Protection Negligence
Flooding Taxation
Hospitals Travel Expenses
Interest Trees and Timber
Judgments and Decrees Trespass
Jurisdiction Wages
Landslides-See also Falling Rocks; Neg- Waters and Watercourses-See also Drains
ligence and Sewers
Motor Vehicles Wells
National Guard W. Va. University-See Colleges and Uni versities Workmen?s
Compensation Fund
308 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
ABANDONED PROPERTY
Where the claimant demolished
and removed a two-story frame building at the direction of the Director of REAP, but there was no evidence that the
State had legal title to said property, there was no benefit or
enrichment inuring to the State to justify a payment of the claimant?s
claim. Foster V.
Dept. of Highways
(No. CC-76-8) 162
ADVISORY OPINIONS
Where a claim is filed in
the Court presenting issues that are between two State agencies, the
Court will render an advisory determination only pursuant to Cede 14-2-18. Dept.
of Employment Security v. Dept. of Pub. Institu tion (No.
D-798a&b) 6
The Court issued an advisory opinion where one State agency sold automotive
supplies, gasoline and two trucks to another State agency for which that
agency was not able to make payment as it over expended its budget. The
Court indicated that payment should not be made based upon the decision
in Airkem Sales and Service, et al v. Department of Mental
Health, 8 Ct. Cl. 180 (1971). Dept. of Highways v.
Dept. of Public Institutions
(No. CC-76-128) 207
The Couit rendered an advisory opinion concerning the States liability for
payment of accrued annual leave indicating that liability did
exist and the employee involved should be paid for his annual leave.
Slack v. Public
Employees Ins, Bd. (No. CC-77-105) 272
An advisory opinion was issued by the Court indicating that the claimant
had legal claim against the respondent for the payment of invoices which were
not paid within the proper fiscal year and for which the
appropriated funds expired before the invoices could be paid. W.
Va. State Indsistries V.
Dept. of Mental Health (Nos. D-876a&b) 19
The Court rendered an advisory decision in this claim where the claimant alleged failure of the
respondent to pay for goods delivered to the respondent State agency but the
respondent failed to pay for the same within the proper fiscal
year, certain amounts of the claim should be paid by the respondent
State agency but a portion of the claim comes within Airkem Sales
and Service, et al v. Department of Mental Health, 8 Ct
Cl. 180 as this portion is an over expenditure. W. Va. State
Industries v. Dept. of Public
Institutions (No. D-811b) 88
ANNUAL LEAVE
Where the claimants were employed as farmers on State owned farms
by the Department of Public Institutions which farms were subsequently
placed under the Farm Management Commission which did not retain these
employees and as a result the claimants lost accrued annual leave, the Court
made an award to these claimants for the annual leave that they
would have been paid as the agency expired sufficient funds to pay said
claims. Adams, et al v. Dept. of Public Institutions (Nos.
CC-76-128a, c-t).. 194
The Court made an award to the claimant for annual leave
which he had accumulated during his employment by the respondent
State agency for which he had not been paid at the time of the termination
of his employment as the Attendance and Leave Regulations of the Board of
Public Works, promulgated on May 28, 1968, provided for the payment of
such
annual leave.Bradbury v. Ncmintoxicating Beer Commission (No.
CC-77-30) 274
Where the claimant alleged that he was entitled to annual leave
left on the books after his termination from employment with the
respondent, the Court held that the ?first in-first out
rule? should be applied in calculating the
amount due the claimant and therefore the claimant was made
an award for his annual leave based upon his salary at
the time of termination. DeBoer
v. Board of Regents (No. CC-76-69) 232
REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS 309
Where the respondent contended that the
claimant was fully paid for his services and was not entitled to
payment for any unused accumulated leave, Policy Bulletin provisions in
effect at the time that the claimant terminated his employment
with the respondent applied to the claimant which entitled the claimant to the annual
leave for which the Court made an award. DeBoer
v. Board of Regents (No. CC-76-69) 232
The Court reversed a prior decision making an award to the claimant where the
Court was informed that the claimant?s annual leave had been transferred
from one State agency to another and therefore, the claimant was not entitled
to an award for annual leave which was involved in the
prior decision, (See Adams et al v. Public Institutions,
CC-76-128a, c-t, p
194). Poling v. Dept. of Public Institutions (No. CC-76-128m)
208
The Court rendered an advisory opinion concerning the State?s liability
for payment of accrued annual leave indicating that liability did exist
and the employee involved should be paid for his annual leave. Slack
v. Public
Employees Ins. Bd. (No. CC-77-105) 272
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Where the respondent contended that the claimant was guilty of assump
tion of risk in attempting to climb a fill which blocked the ingress and
egress to her home, the Court held that to be guilty of assumption of
risk, a voluntary exposure must take place and acceptance of the
risk is not voluntary if the defendant?s tortious conduct has left the claimant
no reasonable alternative course of conduct in order to avert harm to himself. Ratcliff
i,.
Dept. of Highways
(No. D-884) 291
BLASTING
See also Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., subrogee for Jimmy L.McKinney v.
Department of Highways (No. D-1036) 173
Where a contractor was ordered to shut down his blasting operations on a
project due to the failure of a utility to remove its lines, the
respondent stipulated this portion of the claim as it had no authority to shut down
said operations and the Court made an award to the contractor in the stipulated
amount. Black Rock Contracting, Inc. v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-597) ...
189
See also The C & P
Telephone Company of West Virginia v. Department of
Highways (No. D-900) 141
See also Dorsey v. Department of Highways (No.
0-1029) 151
Testimony by claimant expert, a consulting geologist, which
indicated that blasting operations which had taken place in a quarry along
side of a highway in 1940 had induced fractures in the rock behind the face of the cliff and said fractures caused a boulder to
break away resulting in claimant?s accident, said testimony was not
sufficient to make this claim an exception to the general rule and the claim
was disallowed. Hammond v.
Dept. of Highways (No. D.796) 234
See also Honsaker v. Department of Highways (No.
CC-77-29) 284
See also Linville v. Department of Highways (No. CC.?76-l4)
142
See also Motors Insurance Corporation, subrogee of Quinc7j
E. Holstein v
Department of Highways (No. 0-1009) 98
See also Speer v. Department of Highways (No.
0-906) 18
See also State Farm Fire & Casualty Company and Edgar
and Bessie
Damewood v. Department of Highways (No. 0-1035) 147
See also State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company as subrogee
of Thelma Criner v. Department of Highways (No. 0-780) 6
Where blasting operations by the respondent resulted in damage to
the
claimant?s property, the Court followed the rule of law
established by West
310 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Virginia Supreme Court in the case of Whitney v. Ralph Myers Contracting
Corporation, 146W. Va. 130, 118 SE. 2nd. 130 (1961) and made an award to
the claimants. Teets v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-3) 225
With respect to damage to real estate and a residence resulting from blasting
operations conducted by the respondent, the measure of damage is the difference
between the fair market value of the property prior to the blasting and the
fair market value of the property after the blasting operations have been
concluded. Teets v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-3) 225
See also Woodley v. Department of Highways (No. CC-76-l30) 252
BOARD OF EDUCATION
Where claimant?s son, a student at a
State school for the deaf and blind, was injured as the result of a fracas
between him and another student, the Court held that the guarantee of safety to
a student is no more or no less than if the student is enrolled in any other
public school and, as the injuries received by the claimant were not forseeable
nor did the record reveal any negligence on the part of respondent which was
the proximate cause of the accident, the Court disallowed the claim. Lee v.
Board of Education
(No. CC-76-59) 266
Where the evidence disclosed that students in a State school for the deaf and
blind are enrolled on a voluntary basis and that the school attempts to create
an atmosphere where the student can pursue a near normal life, the guarantee of
safety of the students is no more or no less than if the student is enrolled in
any other public school. Lee v. Board of Education
(No. CC-76-59) 266
BOARD OF REGENTS.?See also colleges
and universities
The Court disallowed a claim by an
associate professor of Concord College for an additional one year?s salary as
the Court held that his last year was a terminal one in compliance with the
Faculty Handbook relating to tenure, which was in effect at the date of his
termination notice. Bwpher v.
Board of Regents (No. CC-76-64) 275
Where the claimant alleged that he was entitled to annual leave left on the
books after his termination from employment with the respondent, the Court held
that the ?first in?first out rule? should be applied in calculating the amount
due the claimant and therefore the claimant was made an award for his annual
leave based upon his salary at the time of termination. DeBoer
V. Board of Regents (No. CC-76-69) 232
Where the respondent contended that the claimant was fully paid for his
services and was not entitled to payment for any unused accumulated leave,
Policy Bulletin provisions in effect at the time that the claimant terminated
his employment with the respondent applied to the clain?ant which entitled the
claimant to the annual leave for which the Court made an award. DeBoer
V. Board of Regents (No. CC-76-69) 232
The Court made an award to the claimant for work performed by claimant?s decedent
on a repair job at a State college where an emergency work authorization
directed the decedent to proceed at a cost not exceeding $4,000.00 hut the
nature of the job turned out to require additional costs for which the decedent
was not paid due to a change in administration as any other result would be
unjust enrichment to the State. Hedges v. Board of
Regents (No. D-831) 156
Where claimant suffered injuries when she collided with a wire or metal cable
strung on a tennis court at a State College, the Court held that the respondent
school was under a duty to maintain the physical education facilities in a
reasonably safe condition, and, where it had breached that duty, the claimant
was entitled to an award. Londes V. Board of Regents
(No. CC-76..31) 215
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 311
Where the claimants alleged that the respondent State agency failed to fairly
compensate the claimants for property sold to the respondent, the Court held
that there was no evidence that the property was worth more than the agreed
consideration and the claimants have a remedy through
condemnation. Null V. Board of Regents (No. CC-77-16) 289
BRIDGES
It is common knowledge that
precipitation may accumulate and freeze on bridge surfaces when it melts and
runs off or evaporates on other portions of a roadway, therefore a claim of
damage resulting from the claimant?s automobile skidding on ice which had
accumulated on a bridge surface was
denied by the Court. Boclo V. Dept of Highways (No. CC-76-28) 179
The mere presence of ice upon a bridge in the wintertime causing a traveler to
slide or skid thereon, does not constitute negligence on the part of the
respondent, therefore a claim was denied where the claimant alleged that the
accident was the result of his skidding on ice on the surface of a
bridge, Bodo V. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-281 179
Even though the Court determined that the procedures followed by the respondent
in inspecting the Silver Bridge prior to December, 1967, when it collapsed,
were not sufficient inspecting procedures, the testimony overwhelmingly
established that the collapse resulted from the phenomenon of stress-corrosion
which phenomenon was unknown at the time of the collapse and, therefore, the
Court denied the claims. Cantreil & White V. Dept.
of Highways (Nos. D-240 and D-268o) 110
The Court held that the respondent was not negligent in purchasing the Silver
Bridge as designed in 1926 as said design was prepared in accordance with good
engineering practice at that time. Cantrell & White v. Dept. of
Highways (Nos. D-240 and D-268o) 110
Where the testimony of experts was not based upon actual facts as they existed,
the Court concluded that the claimants failed to establish by preponderance of
the evidence that the construction of the Gailipolis Dam, the construction of
the Point Pleasant Flood Wall or the run-away barge incident contributed to the
collapse of the Silver Bridge; therefore, the Court did not afford much weight
to such expert testimony. Cantrell & White v.
Dept. of Highways (Nos. D-240 and D-268o) 110
While the Court was of the opinion that the respondent was guilty of
negligence in its inspection procedures of the Silver Bridge this negligence
was not the proximate cause of the collapse of the Silver Bridge. Cant rell
&
White v. Dept. of Highways (Nos, D-240 and D-268o) 110
Where the claimant sustained injuries to her leg when she stepped into a hole
in a bridge floor, the Court held that the evidence warranted the inference
that the hole had existed for a substantial time and the respondent was guilty
of negligence which was the proximate cause of the rlaimant?s injury. Dunlap
v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-6) 181
Where the claimant was not aware of a hole which existed in the floor of a
bridge over which the claimant was walldng and the claimant stepped into said
hole, the Court held that the claimant was not guilty of any contributory
negligence. Dunlap u. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-6) 181
See also F?erguson v. Department o.f Highways (No. D-880)
Where no evidence was presented indicating that respondent was aware of a crack
in a board on a bridge where the claimant got her bicycle wheel caught in said
crack and was thrown from the bridge, the Court held that the evidence did not
justify a finding that the respondent should have been aware of the existence
of the crack and therefore the claim was denied. Fox
v. Dept. of Highways (No. D?899) 257
Where the claimant sustained personal injuries due to an accident which
occurred while she was riding her bicycle across a bridge constructed and
312 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
maintained by the respondent
primarily to accommodate automobiles, the Court held that the law does
not require the respondent to be an insurer of the safety of pedestrians
or bicyclists using such a bridge. Fox v. Dept. of
Highways (No. D-899) 257
Claimant alleged damages to a culvert and bridge which afforded her
access to her property which was operated as a trailer court
which damage occurred during a flash flood causing the culvert to clog and
overflow across a State road. Empioyees of the respondent attempting to
clear the culvert in order to drain the water from the State road damaged the
culvert, but the Court held that any negligence on the part of
the respondent referred to by the claimant was too conjectural and
speculative to form the basis for an award, and the claim was disallowed. Heflin
v. Dept. of Highways
(No. D-988) 152
See also Henson v. Department of Highways (No. CC-77-21)
261
Claimant was made an award based upon a stipulation entered by the claimant and
the respondent which indicated that the claimant had fallen through
a hole in a bridge where respondent was aware of the deteriorating
condition of said bridge but had effected no repairs until after
claimant?s accident, the Court concluded that liability existed and that
the proposed
settlement was fair and equitable. Kelly v.Dept. of Highways (No.
CC-76-29) 214
See also Kidd v. Department of Highways (No. CC-77-12) 269
See also Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, subrogee of Charles
C.
Simpson v. Department of Highways (No. D-912) 171
See also Maryland Casualty Company, subrogee of Michael
E. Heitz v.
Department of Highways (No. D-932) 14
See also Murphy v. Department of Highways (No.
CC-76-133) 203
See also Perkins v. Department of Highways (No.
CC-77-13) 268
See also Roberts v. Department of Highways (No.
CC-76-126) 248
Claimant was made an award of $305.85 for damages sustained to his
automobile when claimant was forced
to drive his automobile through a creek bed due to the fact that
the bridge over the creek was closed by the Department of Highways and
there was no other passage way other than by
foaling the creek. Shafer v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-898) 60
See also Simpson v. Department of Highways (No.
CC-76-60) 172
The Court denied a claim where claimant alleged that the lack of
guard- rails and warning signs on a bridge resulted in his skidding on
ice on the bridge surface, damaging his automobile and causing him
personal injury.
Snyder v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-908) 166
Travelling on an icy road is always a hazardous undertaking, and
considering the weather conditions and that the claimant was travelling
a secondary road, he must have recognized that certain risks were
involved, and where he attempted to approach and cross a very narrow, little-used
bridge he must have foreseen some danger. The Court will not make
an award to the claimant as the angle iron guardrails present on the
bridge would have been adequate under normal circumstances. Snyder v. Dept.
of Highways
(No. D-908) 166
Where claimant alleged that the lack of guardrails on a bridge
and lack of warning sign that the bridge would freeze before the
road surface resulted in claimant crossing the bridge when it was
covered with ice causing claimant to slide off the bridge, the Court
held that any such sign indicating the presence of the bridge would have
served no purpose as the claimant was aware of ice on the road and that the
bridge did have angle iron type guardrails adequate for a bridge of this
nature, there was no positive proof of neglect of a duty by the respondent
as would constitute negligence.
Snyder v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-908) 166
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 313
See also State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., subrogee of
Monroe Hamon v. Department of Highways (No. D-l040)
103
See also Thompson v. Department of
Highways (No. CC-76-10) 155
Where a claimant?s automobile sustained damages when the planking of a bridge
dislodged and came up underneath the automobile, the Court held that a
dangerous condition existed on the bridge which directly and proximately caused
the damage to the claimant?s automobile and the Court made
an award. Williams v. Dept. of Highways
(No. CC-76-112) 263
Where claimant?s automobile sustained damages when floor boards on a bridge
dislodged and struck said automobile the Court held in line with a prior
decision Gene R. Monk v. State Road
Comm?n., 8 Ct. Cl. 32, that a person
exercising ordinary care for his safety would not reasonably have anticipated
that the floor board on the bridge would be missing and claimant cannot be
charged with contributory negligence or the assumption of
risk. Williams v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-112) 263
BUILDING CONTRACTS
Where a contractor was ordered to shut
down his blasting operations on a project due to the failure of a utility to
remove its lines, the respondent stipulated this portion of the claim as it had
no authority to shut down said operations and the Court made an award to the
contractor in the stipulated
amount. Black Rock Contracting,
Inc. v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-597) ... 189 Where the contract between the claimant contractor
and the respondent
provided a status of utilities sheet indicating relocation dates for utilities
and the contractor, relying on this information in making its bid, sustained
damages due to a delay in the removal of the utilities at the job site
necessitating extra work on the part of the contractor, the Court made an award
to the claimant contractor for damages sustained due to said delay. Black
Rock Contracting, Inc. v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-597) 189 Claimant was awarded $3,856.86 for damage to its utility lines by an
agent
of the State which was installing traffic control signals at an intersection
and without knowledge of an underground cable of the claimant bored through the
cable. The lack of records on the part of the respondent to inform the
contractor of the presence of the cable was the respondent?s own fault and was
no defense to the claim. C & P Telephone Co.
v. Dept. of
Highways (No. D-674) 25
Where the claimant was granted a pennit to place a utility line within the
State?s right of way and one of the provisions of the permit was to save the
respondent harmless from any damage or recourse whatsoever arising from the
permission granted under the permit, the Court held that the provision was
contrary to public policy and therefore invalid. C & P Telephone Co. V.
Dept. of Highways (No. D-674) 25
Even though the agreement between the agents of the State and the claimant was
not in the form required bylaw, the fact that the claimant was not a lawyer and
would not be hilly aware of the legal requirements necessaryto make a perfectly
formal contract with the State, the respondent was unjustly enriched at
claimant?s expense. Cook v. Dept. of
Fin. & Admin. (No.
D-702) 28
The Court will not absolve the State of liability from a contract where its
agents made the contract even though it was made without compliance with the
letter of the law and there was no question except technically as to
the authority of the agents. Cook v.
Dept. of Fin. & Admin. (No. D-702)
... 28
Where the respondent was unjustly enriched at the expense of the claimant where
the claimant performed work to provide mobile home spaces to the respondent
under a written agreement with the claimant, the Court made an award to the
claimant for rent loss on the spaces which he was not
able to lease. Cook v. Dept. of Fin. & Admin. (No. D-702) 28
314 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
The Coui?t made an award to the claimant for work performed by claimant?s
decedent on a repair job at a State college where an emergency work
authorization directed the decedent to proceed at a cost not exceeding $4,000.00
but the nature of the job turned out to require additional costs for which the
decedent was not paid due to a change in administration as any other result
would be unjust enrichment to the State. Hedges v. Board of
Regents (No. D-831) 156
Claimant contractor was made an award for the balance due on a contract which
he performed and for which there were funds available in the proper fiscal year
but the funds had expired by operation of law when the architect failed to
approve the balance estimate until after the close of the fiscal year.
J. J. Englert Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Institutions (No. D-917) 22
Where the claimant and the respondent entered a contract for window replacement
work and the balance due on the contract was not paid due to the fact that the
architect did not approve the fmal estimate until after the close of the proper
fiscal year, the Court made an award to the claimant for the balance due on the
contract. J. J. Englert Co. v. Dept. ofPub. Institutions
(No. D-917) 22
Claimant contractor was made an award for extra work performed where a
waterline within the construction limits was not shown on the plans and
specifications nor considered in the bid but the respondent State agency
instructed claimant to work around said water pipe without payment for
the extra work. Lang Brothers, Inc. v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-685) 217
Where claimant contractor?s own negligence in failing to provide proper shoring
and sheeting to prevent a break in a waterline located on the project resulted
in damage to the waterline for which the claimant was bified by the owner of
the waterpipe, the Court denied recovery to the claimant. Lang
Brothers, Inc. v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-685) 217 Where claimant?s
contract was considered to be a waste job wherein there
is more material located within the area than necessary for completion of the
project which material had to be removed but claimant discovered rock within
this material which it was able to use on the project, the claimant contended
it should be paid at both the unclassified rate and the rock borrow rate which
it would have received if the rock had been brought in from an outside site,
the Court made an award to the claimant as the 1968 Standard Specifications
adopted by the respondent provides for said payment even though the respondent
contended that such payment would constitute paying twice for the same
material. Lang Brothers, Inc. v. Dept. of
Highways (No. t)-685) 217
Claimant and respondent stipulated that the samples of concrete taken from the
concrete placed by the contractor for the purposes of testing the strength of
said concrete were not properly screened to remove a representative quantity of
the larger aggregate particles from said samples of concrete, therefore, the
testing results were not a true representation of the strength and value of the
concrete. Tests by the contractor showed that the concrete was of adequate
strength and there should not have been a reduction in the contract price. The
Court made an award to the claimant for the amount deducted from the final
settlement under the paving contract.
National Engineering & Contracting Co. v. Dept. of Highways
(No. D-753a) 143 Claimant was made an award for damages suffered by her as
the result of
a fall where a contractor failed to provide ingress and egress to claimant?s
home during the construction of a new highway as the Court held that the
respondent has a duty to provide such ingress and egress and such duty is
non-delegable. Ratcl 1ff v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-884) 291
When the Court made an award to the claimant in an action wherein the claimant
had also recovered against a contractor in the settlement of a civil action,
the Court reduced the amount of its award by the settlement previously paid, as
the State and the contractor were joint tort feasors. Ro.tcliffv.
Dept. of Highways (No. D-884) 291
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 315
Where the claimant and respondent stipulate and agree that certain portions of
a contract claim are compensable, the Court will make an award to the claimant
in the amount agreed to by the parties. Ryan Inc. of Wisconsin
v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-570) 69
Where a subcontractor filed a claim in the name of the general contractor as
the subcontractor could not file suit directly against the respondent by reason
of lack of privity of contract, the Court held that the contractor could have
assigned its chose in action to the subcontractor. This was not done due to the
fact that the contractor entered a supplemental agreement with the respondent
which would have constituted a complete defense to the claim and the Court
denied the claim by the subcontractor. S. J. Groves &
Son Co. v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-6l4) 297
Where the respondent through its contractor attempted to provide access for the
claimant to her mail box and attempted to relieve the muddy condition of the
path by placing gray slate thereon, it can reasonably be said that all that
should have been expected was done, and therefore the claimant was denied
recovery for personal injury when she fell on the wet slate. Webb
v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-696) 33
Where claimant alleges damages as the result of a contractor using a roadway
through claimant?s property which claimant asserted was a private road, the
calls of the deed indicated and described the metes and bounds of the property
conveyed recognizing the existence of the road as a State Local Service Road
which was proof of the fact that the road was indeed a State Local Service Road
which the contractor could properly use. Wine v. Dept.
of Highways (No. D-985) 303
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES?See also
Board of Regents
The Court disallowed a claim by an
associate professor of Concord College for an additional one year?s salary as
the Court held that his last year was a terminal one in compliance with the
Faculty Handbook relating to tenure, which was in effect at the date of his
termination notice. Burgher v.
Board of Regents (No. CC-76-64) 275
Where the claimant alleged that he was entitled to annual leave left on the
books after his termination from employment with the respondent, the Court held
that the ?first in?first out rule? should be applied in calculating the amount
due the claimant and therefore the claimant was made an award for his annual
leave based upon his salary at the time of termination. DeBoer
v. Board of Regents (No. CC-76-69) 232
Where the respondent contended that the claimant was fully paid for his
services and was not entitled to payment for any unused accumulated leave,
Policy Bulletin provisions in effect at the time that the claimant terminated
his employment with the respondent applied to the claimant which entitled the
claimant to the annual leave for which the Court made an award. DeBoer
v. Board of Regents (No. CC-76-69) 232
The Court made an award to the claimant for work performed by claimant?s
decedent on a repair job at a State college where an emergency work
authorization directed the decedent to proceed at a cost not exceeding
$4,000.00 but the nature of the job turned out to require additional costs for
which the decedent was not paid due to a change in administration as any other
result would be unjust enrichment to the State. Hedges v. Board of
Regents (No. D-831) 156
Where claimant suffered injuries when she collided with a wire or metal cable
strung on a tennis court at a State college, the Court held that the respondent
school was under a duty to maintain the physical education facilities in a
reasonably safe condition, and, where it had breached that duty, the claimant
was entitled to an award. Landes v. Board of Regents (No.
CC-76-31) 215
316 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
CONDEMNATION?See Eminent Domain
A motion to dismiss a claim for compensation
for property taken by eminent domain by the respondent over and above
a judgment entered by a Circuit Court was sustained by the Court as
claims of this nature are excluded from the jurisdiction of the
Court under the provisions of the West Virginia Code, Chapter 14, Article 2,
Section 14 (5). Anton v. Dept. of High way (No.
CC-76-45) 229
Where the claimant sought recovery for expenses incurred during
condemnation proceedings wherein claimant?s property was condemned, the Court
held that it had no jurisdiction under West Virginia Code 14-2-14 which
excludes from the jurisdiction of this Court a proceeding which
may be maintained against the State in a state court. Hoover
v. Dept. of High way (No. D-769) 109
Where the final order entered by the Circuit Court involving this
claim indicated that the claimant and his wife accepted the amount
awarded before that Court as full and complete payment for the
taking or acquisition of the real estate and the damages alleged
in the claim are the same damages, the Court sustained a motion to dismiss filed
by the respondent.
Hoover v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-769) 109
Where the claimants alleged that the respondent State agency
failed to fairly compensate the claimants for property sold to the
respondent, the Court held that there was no evidence that the
property was worth more than the agreed consideration and the claimants
have a remedy through
condemnation. Null v. Board of Regents (No.
CC-77-16) 289
CONTRACTS
Claimant was awarded $3,856.86 for damage to its utility lines by
an agent of the State which was installing traffic control
signals at an intersection and without knowledge of an underground cable of the
claimant bored through the cable. The lack of records on the part of
the respondent to inform the contractor of the presence of the cable was
the respondent?s own fault and was no defense to the claim. C.
& P. Telephone Co. v. Dept. of
Highways (No. D-674) 25
Where the claimant was granted a permit to place a utility line within
the
State?s right of way and one of the provisions of the permit was to save
the
respondent harmless from any damage or recourse whatsoever arising from
the permission granted under the permit, the Court held that the
provision
was contrary to public policy and therefore invalid. C. & P.
Telephone Co. V.
Dept. of Highways (No. D-674) 25
Where the claimant had a contract
with the respondent to charge for 90
percent of its regular billing charges for patients sent to it by the
respon dent the respondent will be held to the contract as a letter to modify
said
contract constituted a unilateral agreement only and was not
binding upon
the claimant Charleston Area Med ical Center, Inc. v. Division of
Vocational
Rehab. (No. D-1014) 101
Even though the agreement between the agents of the State and the
claimant was not in the form required bylaw, the fact that the claimant was
not a lawyer and would not be frilly aware of the legal requirements
necessaryto make a perfectly formal contract with the State,
the respondent was unjustly enriched at claimant?s expense. Cook v. Dept.
of Fin. & Admin. (No.
D-702) 28
The Court will not absolve the State of liability from a contract where its
agents made the contract even though it was made without compliance with
the letter of the law and there was no question except technically
as to
the authority of the agents. Cook v. Dept. of Fin.
& Admin. (No. D-702) ... 28 Where the respondent was unjustly
enriched at the expense of the claimant where the claimant performed
work to provide mobile home spaces to
W. VA.]
REPORTS STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 317
the respondent under a written agreement
with the claimant, the Court made an award to the claimant for rent loss
on the spaces which he was not
able to lease. Cook v. Dept. of Fin. & Admin. (No. D-702) 28
Claimant was made an award for demolition work which he performed at the
request of a State employee on property which was sold to the State for
the nonpayment of taxes as the Court held that the respondent was bound under
the doctrine of apparent authority of the employee who so engaged
the claimant. Foster v. Highways (No. CC-76-8) 199
Where claimant failed to prove a valid and enforcible
contract with the
respondent, the Court denied recovery for the demolition and removal
of a
two-story frame building which claimant demolished at the direction of
the
Director of REAP. Foster v. Dept. of Highways (No.
CC-76-8) 162
Where the respondent contended that the employee of the
respondent had no authority to enter a contract with the claimant and in
so doing exceeded his authority, the Court held that the
respondent was bound under the doctrine of apparent authority and therefore
the claimant was made an award for work performed for the State. Foster
v. Department of
Highways (No. CC-76-8) 162
Claimant was denied recovery for interest on an alleged contract between
the claimant and the respondent for which the claimant was not
paid the principal amount of the contract for approximately two years
after the contract work had been accepted by the respondent as the Court
lacks jurisdiction in awarding interest unless the claim is based upon a
contract which specifically provides for the payment of interest. Hott and
Miller, General Contractors v. Department of Highways (No.
D-683) 3
Where the respondent entered a contract under which the respondent retained
only such control and supervision as was necessary to assure that
the plans and specifications were followed but did not control or
supervise the contractor?s work or the employees, the Court held the
supervision by the respondent was not such control as to create a
master-servant relationship as the contractor was an independent contractor.
Accordingly, the word ?principal? as used in the release executed by claimants
to the contractor for damages to real estate when the contractor trespassed
upon claimant?s property also released the respondent. Hundley v.
Dept. of
Highways (No. D-941) 284
Claimant contractor was made an award for the balance due on a contract
which he performed and for which there were funds available in the
proper fiscal year but the finds had expired by operation of law
when the architect failed to approve the balance estimate until after
the close of the fiscal year.
J. J. Englert Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Institutions
(No. D-917) 22 Claimant was denied recovery for interest alleged
due on the balance of a
contract which was not paid in the proper fiscal year and for
which the contractor was forced to file a claim thereon where W. Va.
Cede 14-2-12 prohibits the Court specifically from making an
award for interest unless the contract specifically provides for interest. J.
J. Englert Co. v. Dept. of
Pub. Institutions (No. D-917) 22
Where the claimant and the respondent entered a contract for window replacement
work and the balance due on the contract was not paid due to the
fact that the architect did not approve the final estimate
until after the close of the proper fiscal year, the Court made an award
to the claimant for the balance due on the contract.J. J. Englert
Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Institutions
(No. D-917) 22
Where the claimant agreed to perform architectural-engineering services
for the claimant in the construction of a Mental Retardation Rehabilitation
Center wherein specific deadlines were placed upon the claimant
and the claimant met said deadlines and performed extra work
required by the respondent State agency, but due to circumstances beyond the
control of the claimant, the project was abandoned and never
reactivated, the claim-
318 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
ant will be entitled to recover its fee. Jordon,McGettigan & Yule
v. Dept. of
Mental Health (No. D-680) 64
Where the claimant and respondent entered an architectural agreement providing
for an eight percent fee based upon the construction cost of the project
involved, and said project was never completed, the Court based its award on
eight percent of the amount aliocated for the project and six percent which was
the usual and customary service fee based upon the inflated cost of the project
as the additional two percent was intended to provide for the accelerated
schedule required to meet the deadline for Federal Funds which deadline the
architect was able to meet. Jordan, MeG ettigan & Yule v. Dept. of
Mental Health (No. D-680) 64
Claimant contractor was made an award for extra work performed where a
waterline within the construction limits was not shown on the plans and
specifications nor considered in the bid but the respondent State agency
instructed claimant to work around said water pipe without payment for
the extra work. Lang Brothers, Inc. v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-685) 217
Where claimant?s contract was considered to be a waste job wherein there is
more material located within the area than necessary for completion of the
project which had to be removed but claimant discovered rock within this
material which it was able to use on the project, the claimant contended it
should be paid at both the unclassified rate and the rock borrow rate which it
would have received if the rock had been brought in from an outside site, the
Court made an award to the claimant as the 1968 Standard Specifications adopted
by the respondent provides for said payment even though the respondent
contended that such payment would constitute paying twice for the same material.
Lang Brothers, Inc. v. Dept. of Highways
(No. D-685) 217
Where the claimant had bid on remodeling work to be performed by a State agency
and his bid was not the low bid but he was advised by the Division of
Purchasing to proceed with the work which was performed in a manner
satisfactory to the respondent, the Court made a full award to the claimant
based upon his contract bid. Peck Brogan Building & Remodeling
v. Workmen?s Comp. Fund (No. D-1012) 145
Where the claimant received written and oral notification from the Division of
Purchasing that he was a successful bidder and was instructed by an agent of
the department to proceed with the work, the Court held that to make an award
other than the full amount of the bid which the contractor submitted, any other
result would be unconscionable. Peck Brogan Building & Remodeling v.
Workmen?s Comp. Fund (No. D-10l2) 145
Where the testimony revealed that the purchase order directing the claimant to
perform remodeling work was not issued due to an inter-agency dispute, the
Court made an award to the claimant for the work performed based upon the bid
price. Peck Brogan Building & Remodeling v. Work men? Comp. Fund (No.
D-1012) 145
No award was made to the general contractor where the claim was actually by a
subcontractor as the Court held that the issues were really between the
subcontractor and the contractor and the proper forum for the resolution of
this issue is in a State Court not the Court of Claims. S. J. Groves &
Son Co. v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-614) 297
Where a subcontractor filed a claim in the name of the general contractor as
the subcontractor could not file suit directly against the respondent by reason
of lack of privity of contract, the Court held that the contractor could have
assigned its chose in action to the subcontractor. As this was not done due to
the fact that the contractor entered a supplemental agreement with the
respondent which would have constituted a complete defense to the claim, the
Court denied the claim by the subcontractor. S. J. Groves & Son
Co. v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-614) 297
W. VA.]
REPORTS STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 319
DAMAGES
Speculative and circumstantial
evidence by the claimant to prove damage to his automobile, will not
be deemed to approach the preponderance required for a recovery and the
claim will be disallowed. Bird & State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-934a&b) 91
Respondents motion to dismiss the action of the claimant
based upon the ?Risk of Loss? paragraph in a real estate contract was
denied as the Court held that when the deed was thereafter executed
and delivered, the legal title and cause of action for damages were
transferred to the claimant as the
vendee. Boone Sales, Inc. v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-119)
269
Where many contributing factors brought about the damages to the real estate
of the claimants, but there was not sufficient proof that any
acts or omissions of the respondent were the direct and proximate cause of the
damages, the Court will disallow the claims. Caidwell, et at v.
Dept. of
Highways (Nos. D-690, et al) 50
Where there was no evidence of damages to claimant?s truck involved in an
accident, the Court was unable to make a finding and therefore disallowed
the claim. Clark and Martinsburg Concrete Products Company V.
Dept. of Highways
(Nos. CC-76-17 and CC-76-118) 279
Where the respondent admitted the damages done to claimant?s
automobile but disputed the amount of the claim for a complete refinishing
of the paint of the automobile, the Court based its award to the
claimant upon the testimony, the argument of counsel for the respondent and the
Court?s own inspection of the vehicle and made an award to the claimant
in an amount which it judged to be fair and reasonable. Dunbrack
v. Dept. of
Highways (No. D-1015) 137
The Court permitted the claimant to testify as to the fair market
value before and after the damages sustained to the property as the Court held that
she was qualified to express her opinion as to valuation in respect
to her own property, however, the Court accorded greater weight
to the respondent?s witness, a qualified real estate appraiser, because his
qualifications were higher than those of the claimant. Gannon v. Dept.
of Highways
(No. D-675) 104
Where the final order entered by the Circuit Court involving this
claim indicated that the claimant and his wife accepted the amount
awarded before that Court as full and complete payment for the taking
or acquisition of the real estate and the damages alleged in the claim
are the same damages, the Court sustained a motion to dismiss by the
respondent. Hoover v.
Dept. of Highways (No. D-769) 109
Claimant was denied recovery for interest alleged due on the balance of
a contract which was not paid in the proper fiscal year and for which the
contractor was forced to file a claim thereon where Code 14-2-12
prohibits the Court specifically from making an award for interest
unless the contract specifically provides for interest J. J.
Englert Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Institu tion (No. D-917) 22
Claimant was denied recovery for personal expenses incurred in attending
a hearing on a contract claim which he had filed before the Court, as the
Court indicated that these expenses like attorneys? fees must be treated
as an expense of litigation and must be borne by the party
incurring the same.
J. J. Englert Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Institutions (No.
D-917) 22
Where the claimant and respondent entered an architectural agreement
providing for an eight percent fee based upon the construction cost of
the project involved, and said project was never completed, the Court based
its award on eight percent of the amount allocated for the project
and six percent which was the usual and customary service fee
based upon the inflated cost of the project as the additional two percent
was intended to provide for the accelerated schedule required to meet the
deadline for Federal Funds which deadline the architect was able
to meet Jordan, McGettigan & Yule v. Dept. of Mental
Health (No. D-680) 64
320 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
A given amount of surface water following its given natural course may not cause damage but if that same volume
of water is diverted from its natural channels by artificial
means in the Court?s opinion it can be turned into a destructive force,
especially where the uncontradicted testimony of the claimants established that
their problems did not begin until after the construction of the new
road which was alleged to have caused all of the water problems which
the claimants experienced on their property. Laf fert v. Dept. of
Highways (No. CC-76-44) 239
Where the claimants were not represented by counsel at their
hearing and were unaware of the necessity of the manner of
proving damages to their real estate, the Court suggested that the claimants
employ counsel and file a petition for rehearing within the 30
day period pursuant to Rule 15 of the
Court Rules. Lafferty v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-44)
239
Where the testimony revealed that the purchase order directing
the claimant to perform remodeling work was not issued due to an
inter-agency dispute, the Court made an award to the claimant for the work
performed based upon the bid price. Peck Brogan Building & Remodeling
v. Work men? Comp. Fund (No. D-1012) 145
Claimant was denied recovery for a doctor bill and damage to
an automobile where the claimant failed to introduce proper evidence to
support
the items of special damage. Plants v. Dept. of Highways
(No. D-672) 78
Where an appraisers report reflected a value on the property prior to the
damages but failed to place a value on the property after the damages,
the Court was of the opinion that the property did have at least some
value after the damages and therefore this report was disregarded.
Teets v. Dept. of
Highways (No. CC-76-3) 225
With respect to damage to real estate and a residence resulting from
blasting operations conducted by the respondent, the measure of damage is the
difference between the fair market value of the property prior to
the blasting and the fair market value of the property after the
blasting operations have been concluded. Teets v. Dept. of Highways
(No. CC-76-3) 225
Where the claimant and respondent agree by stipulation that slippage
of a road resulted in damage to the property of the claimant and the
amount of the claim has been stipulated and is a fair and
reasonable valuation of the damages, the Court will make an award to the claimant
in that amount
White v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-751) 148
DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITY
The Court found that a World War II Army tank displayed in front
of a National Guard Armory did constitute a dangerous
instrumentality based upon the evidence in this particular claim. Tabit
v. Adjutant General (No.
D-795) 174
DEEDS
Respondents motion to dismiss the action of the claimant based upon
the ?Risk of Loss? paragraph in a real estate contract was denied
as the Court held that when the deed was thereafter executed and
delivered, the legal title and cause of action for damages
were transferred to the claimant as the
vendee. Boone Sales, Inc. e. Dept. of Highways (No.
CC-76-119) 269
Where the claimants alleged that the respondent State agency failed
to fairly compensate the claimants for property sold to the
respondent, the Court held that there was no evidence that the
property was worth more than the agreed consideration and the claimants
have a remedy through
condemnation. NuU v. Board of Regents (No. CC-77-16)
289
Where claimant allege damages as the result of a contractor
using a roadway through claimant?s property which claimant asserted was a
private road, the calls of the deed indicated and described
the metes and bounds of
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 321
the property conveyed recognizing the existence of the road as a State Local
Service Road which was proof of the fact that the road was indeed a State Local
Service Road which the contractor could properly use. Wine v. Dept.
of Highways (No. D-985) 303
DRAINS AND SEWERS?See also Waters and
Watercourses
Where expert witnesses for both the
claimant and the respondent testified that continuous saturation by water of
the hillside above the claimants over a period of many years was the direct
cause of the downslope movement of the land causing the damages to the property
without sufficient proof that acts or omissions by the respondent where the
direct or proximate cause, the Court will disallow the claim. Caidwell, et
al v. Dept. of Highways (Nos.
D-690 et al) 50
Where the claimants alleged that the respondent was negligent in the
maintenance of their road and collected surface water diverting the same
through culverts and casting the same upon their land causing damage thereto,
the respondent will not be held liable unless he substantially changed the
course of the flow of the water down the hillside from the time the culverts
were installed on the road. CaldweU , et
al v. Dept. of Highways
(Nos. D-690 et al) 50
Where the claimant and respondent stipulated that the proximate cause of the
land movement which caused damage to the claimant?s dwelling was the improper
drainage on the highway and failure of the respondent to maintain the existing
drainage, the Court made an awaiti to the claimants in the amount stipulated
between the parties. Casto v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-744) 259
See also Cooper v. Department of Highways (No. D-922)
The Court made an award to the claimant for damage sustained to his vehicle
when he pulled off the traveled portion of the road and his automobile went
into a storm sewer drain 18 inches below the surface of the roadway where the
preponderance of the evidence established that the respondent negligently
created a dangerous condition along the berm of the road and such negligence
was the proximate cause of the accident. Eastes v.
Dept. of Highways (No. CC-77-41) 283
Claimant was made an award for property damage resulting from flooding of
property when a culvert belonging to the respondent was closed with concrete
causing water to back up and flood onto the claimant?s property.
Gannon v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-675) 283
Claimant alleged damages to a culvert and bridge which afforded her access to
her property which was operated as a trailer court which damage occurred during
a flash flood causing the culvert to clog and overflow across a State road.
Employees of the respondent attempting to clear the culvert in order to drain
the water from the State road damaged the culvert, but the Court held that any
possible fault on the part of the respondent referred to by the claimant was
too conjectural and speculative to form the basis for an award, and the claim
was disallowed. Heflin v. Dept. of High way (No. D-988) 152
Claimant?s claim was denied where the respondent established that it conducted
its highway improvement project in a reasonable prudent manner, did nothing to
appreciably increase the flow of water or change the character of the drainage,
and there was no act or omission of the respondent which proximately caused the
damages sustained by the claimant.
Hoklren v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-607) 75
A given amount of surface water following its given natural course may not
cause damage but if that same volume of water is diverted from its natural channels
by artificial means in the Court?s opinion it can be turned into a destructive
force, especially where the uncontradicted testimony of the claimants
established that their problems did not begin until after the
322 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
construction of the new road which was
alleged to have caused all of the water problems which the claimants
experienced on their property. Laf fert v. Dept. of ffighways (No.
CC-76-44) 239
Where the claimants were not
represented by counsel at their hearing and were unaware of the
necessity or the manner of proving damages to their real estate, the
Court suggested that the claimants employ counsel and file
a petition for rehearing within the 30 day period pursuant to Rule 15 of
the
Court Rules. Lafferty v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-44)
239
Where the claimant alleged that damage to his house occurred when
employees of the respondent while cleaning out a ditchline in front of his property
caused a slide, the Court held that the claimants had not proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent?s acts could be
considered the direct proximate cause of injury to claimant?s
property. Lovejoy v. Dept.
of Highways (No. D-853) 163
See also Peak v. Department of Highways (No. D-973) 170
Where the claimant alleged that a road adjacent to his property had been
negligently graded by an employee of the respondent resulting in
water drainage flowing down the road causing rocks to be left in the road which
in turn were thrown against his house by automobiles using the road
and the evidence revealed that the road had always been a natural
rocky drain down the mountain, the Court disallowed the claim. Robinette
v. Dept. of High way (No. D-982) 182
Claimant was made an award of $163.10 for damage to his automobile which
resulted when the claimant was forced into a culvert due to a
flooding hazard in the highway which respondent had notice of but
had failed to
rectify. Tinsley v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-979) 87
ELECTRICITY
See The C & P Telephone Company of West Virginia v. Department of
Highways (No. D-997) 210
See also Monongahela Power Company v. Department of Highways (No.
D-957) 58
See also The Potomac Edison Co. v. Department of Highways (No.
CC-76-
135) 204
EMINENT DOMAIN?See Condemnation
EXPENDITURES
Where the claimants were employed as farmers on State
owned farms by the Department of Public Institutions which farms
were subsequently placed under the Farm Management Commission which did not
retain these employees and as a result of claimants lost accrued annual
leave, the Court made an award to these claimants for the annual leave that
they would have been paid as the agency expired sufficient
funds to pay said
claims. Adams, et al v. Dept. of Public Institutions (Nos.
CC-76-128a, c-t) 194
See also American Can Company v. Department of Mental Health (No.
D-965) 83
See alsoAshland Chemical Company v. Department of Public Institutions
(No. D-928) 97
Claimant, Deputy Director of the Depariment of Mental Health, was
awarded $1,020.00 as the sum due and owing from the respondent State
agency to the claimant as salary properly payable to him for his raise
for the fiscal year where the claimant had refrained from giving himself
the raise in order that all other members of the Department might
have their increases first, and asa result the claimant?s raise was
granted tohim at the end of the fiscal year but the fiscal year ended
before his personal salary increase
W. VA.]
REPORTS STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 323
could be encumbered properly. Clowser v. Dept. of Mental
Health (No.
D-913) 35
See also Columbia Gas of West Virginia, Inc. v. Department of Public
Institutions (No. CC-76-110b)
198
Claimants were awarded
juiy fees where the claimants delayed in presenting their vouchers for reimbursement
until the appropriated funds were expired, but
there were funds available at the end of the fiscal year for the payment of
these jury fees. The Court held that the expiration of
the funds alter the end of the fiscal
year simply deprived the claimants of
their immediate satisfaction or remedy
of recovery but did not affect the
legality
of the claim. Day and Wright v. State Auditor (Nos. D-944 and
D-963) .... 42
Where the legislature failed
to appropriate funds for expenditure in
the proper fiscal year for the payment of unemployment taxes
due and payable by two hospitals to the West Virginia Unemployment
Compensation Commission, it would not have been proper for the
Commissioner to pay the taxes when no funds were available. Dept. of Employment security v. Dept.
of Public Institutions (Nos. D-789a&b) 6
The Court issued an advisory opinion where one State agency sold automotive
supplies, gasoline and two trucks to another State
agency for which that agency was
not able to make payment as it over expended its budget, the Court
indicated that payment should not be made based upon the decision inAirkem Sales and Service, et at v. Department
of Mental Health, 8 Ct. Cl.
180(1971). Dept. of Highways
v. Dept. of Public Institutions
(No. CC-76-128) 207
See also Doctors Butler, Aceto
& Assoc., Inc. v. Department of
Public
Institutions (No. D-969) 41
The Court made an award to the claimant for printing work which it
performed for the respondent but for which it was never paid as this is a
claim that in equity and good conscience should be paid by the State.
Dunbar Printing Co. v. Dept.
of Education, Div. of Voc. Ed. (No. CC-77-34) 282
See also Exxon Company, USA. v. Department
of Public Institutions
(No. CC-76-91a&b) 205
See also Gambro, Inc. v. Division
of Vocational Rehabilitation (No.
CC-
77-9) 211
See also International Business
Machines Corporation v. Sinking Fund
Commission (No. D-1013) 71
See also International Business
Machines Corporation v. Secretary of
State (No. D-1026) 85
Where claimant?s services were requested by respondent, the charges
reasonable and there were sufficient funds in respondent?s
appropriation to
pay for said services, the Court made an award to the claimant. Kitching V.
Div. of Voc. Rehab.
(No. D-971) 23
See also Lashley Tractor Sales
v. Department of Public Institutions
(No.
CC-76-27) 159
See also Mellon-Stuart Company
v. Department of Public Institutions
(No. D-772) 71
See alsoMountai neer Motel , Inc. v. Department of Public Institutions (No.
CC-76-15) 99
See also Parke, Davis & Company
v. Department of Mental Health (No.
D-1028) 85
See also Pfizer, Inc. v. Department
of Mental Health (No. D-956) 41
See also Physicians Fee Office
v. Department of Public Institutions (No.
D-816e) 59
324 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
See also R.occhio v. John M. Gates,
State Auditor (No. D-1022) 86
Claimant was awarded $679.50 for an invoice submitted for an advertisement placed
by the respondent in the magazine of the claimant where a confusion in bffling
resulted in the expiration of the fiscal year in which payment for
the invoice could have been made. Ski SouthMagazine v. Dept.
of Commerce (No. D-903) 17
Where claimants supplied merchandise and services to a Department
of the State but the funds of the Department were transferred to
a new commission at the end of the fiscal year, the Court made awards to the claimants
for said merchandise and services as there would have been sufficient funds
to pay for said claims if the transfer had not been made. Southern
States Morgantown Cooperative, Inc., Et al v. Dept. of Public Instituticms (No.
CC-76-140) 250
See Also St. Joseph?s Hospital v. Department of Mental
Health (No. CC-
77-10) 251
The Court reversed a prior decision in which it had made an award to the
claimant as the State agency involved notified the Court that there
were
insufficient funds with which to pay these claims at the end of the
fiscal
year, the Court denied the claims on the basis of Airkem Sales and
Service.
et al v. Department of Mental Health, 8 Ct Cl. 180(1971).
St. Joseph?s Hosp. v.
Dept. of Mental Health (No. CC-76-114a-f) 209
See also Valley Welding Supply Company v. Department of
Public In stitution (No. D-820b) 97
Where the claimant sought compensation for professional services rendered to State
patients in a State hospital but the proper procedure for the payment
of the services was not followed, the Court made an award to the
claimant for services accepted by the State. Wang v. Dept. of Public
Institutions (No. D-370a) 46
See also Warner P. Simpson Co. v. Department of Commerce (No.
CC-76-
137) 208
An advisory opinion was issued by the Court indicating that the claimant
had legal claim against the respondent for the payment of
invoices which were not paid within the proper fiscal year and for
which the appropriated funds expired before the invoices could be paid. W.Va.
State Industries v.
Dept. of Mental Health (Nos. D-876a&b) 19
The Court rendered an advisory decision in this claim where the claimant
alleged failure of the respondent to pay for goods delivered to the
respondent State agency but the respondent failed to pay for the same
within the proper fiscal year, certain amounts of the claim should be paid
by the respondent State agency but a portion of the claim comes
within Airkem Sales and Service, et al v. Department
of Mental Health, 8 Ct Cl. 180 as this portion is
an over expenditure. W. Va. State Industries v. Dept. of
Public
Institutions (No. D-811b) 88
See also Xerox Corporation v. Department of Public
Institutions (No.
D-948a&b) 62
FALLING ROCKS?See also Landslides; Negligence
Where there is nothing in the record to show that the failure
of the State to erect and maintain failing rock signs had
any cause or connection with the accident complained of by the claimant, the
Court will deny the claim.
Dickinson v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-938) 72
A claim for damages to an automobile caused by falling rocks was
denied where the Court held that there was no evidence to show
negligence of the respondent as there was no work of any type being
conducted by the respondent at the accident point which would have loosened or
caused rocks to fall and there were signs along the highway
warning of falling
rocks. Ervin v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-955) 168
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 325
Testimony by claimant expert, a consulting geologist, which indicated that
blasting operations which had taken place in a quarry along side of a highway in 1940 had
induced fractures in the rock behind the face of the cliff and said fractures
caused a boulder to break away resulting in claimant?s accident, said testimony
was not sufficient to make this claim an exception on the general rule and the
claim was disallowed. Hammond v.
Dept of Highways (No. D-796) 234
The Court has consistently held in many similar cases that the State is not
a guarantor of the safety of travelers on its highways and that its duty to
travelers is one of reasonable care and diligence in the maintenance of a
highway under all the circumstances; therefore, the Court disallowed a
claim where the claimant struck a rock in the road. Hammond v. Dept. of
Highways (No. D-796) 234
The unexplained falling of a rock onto a highway without a positive showing
that the respondent knew or should have known of a dangerous condition or could
have anticipated injury to personal property the evidence is insufficient to
justir an award to the claimant for an accident resulting when the claimant
struck a rock in the road. Hammond v. Dept. of
Highways (No. D-796) 234
Claimant was denied recovery for damages alleged to have occurred to his
automobile when he struck a large rock in the road which he alleged resulted
from a rock slide off of the hill adjacent to the road, as the claimant
admitted in his own testimony that his failure to see the rock resulted from
a lack of concentration. Huffman v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-771)
9
Claimant was denied recovery for damages alleged to have resulted when he struck
a rock in the road where the evidence failed to establish that the respondent
knew or should have known of the presence of the rock or that it had had
sufficient time to remove the same. Huffman v. Dept. of High way (No.
D-771) 9
The negligence of the driver of a vehicle cannot be imputed to the passenger
therein, therefore the Court made an award to a claimant passenger where the
Court found the Department of Highways to be negligent in its maintenance of a
roadway known to be subject to falling rocks. Smith v.
Dept. of Highways (No. D-946) 221
Where the record disclosed that for many years an area where the claimants?
accident occurred was subject to falling rocks continuously and known for many
years to be hazardous, it is negligence for respondent to do nothing more than
to patrol the road for said rocks. Smith v. Dept. of
Highways (No. D-946) 221
Where the evidence indicated that if the driver of the vehicle had kept his
vehicle under proper control and speed, he would have seen the rock in the road
which caused the accident, the negligence of the claimant barred him
from recovery. Smith v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-946) 221
FIRES AND FIRE PROTECTION
Respondents motion to dismiss the
action of the claimant based upon the ?Risk of Loss? paragraph in a real estate
contract was denied as the Court held that when the deed was thereafter
executed and delivered, the legal title and cause of action for damages were
transferred to the claimant as the
vendee. Boone Sales, Inc. v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-119)
269
Claimants were made an award for loss of timber where it was apparent that
respondents employees were guilty of negligence in failing to take sufficient
precautions to prevent the ignition of leaves near a signpost where the
employees were using an acetylene torch. Perkins & Hamrick v.
Dept. of Highways (Nos. CC-76-57 and CC-76-58) 242
Claimants were made an award for timber loss where a secondary fire
attributable to the reawakening of the first fire caused said damages as the
326 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
first fire was the result of
negligence on the part of respondents employees.
Perkins & Hamrick v. Dept. of Highways
(Nos. CC-76-57 and CC-76-58) ... 242
FLOODING
Claimant was made an award of
$10,492.50 based upon an agreement whereby the claimant provided toilets
in a disaster area in Logan County, West Virginia, but due to a
merger of two State agencies, the claimant had not been paid for
said services. Cczd.le v. Office of Emergency Services (No.
D-1006) 83
Claimant was denied recovery for alleged damages to her
automobile when she drove her car into flood waters which she should
have seen in the careful operation of her automobile. Clarke
v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-715) 15
Claimant was made an award for property damage resulting from
flooding of property when a culvert belonging to the respondent
was closed with concrete causing water to back up and flood onto the claimant?s
property.
Gannon v. Dept. of Highway (No. D-675) 104
Claimant alleged damages to a culvert and bridge which afforded her
access to her property which was operated as a trailer court which
damage occurred during a flash flood causing the culvert to clog
and overflow across a State road. Employees of the respondent attempting
to clear the culvert in order to drain the water from the State road
damaged the culvert, but the Court held that any possible
fault on the part of the respondent referred to by the claimant was too conjectural
and speculative to form the basis for an award, and the claim was
disallowed. Heflin v. Dept. of High way (No. D-988) 152
Claimant?s claim was denied where the respondent established that it
conducted its highway improvement project in a reasonable prudent manner, did
nothing to appreciably increase the flow of water or change the character of
the drainage, and there was no act or omission of the respondent which proximately
caused the damages sustained by the claimant.
Holdren v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-607) 75
Claimants damage to real estate allegedly caused by water flowing
off a mountainside from a State highway located 1,000 feet above the claimant
was denied where the Court held that the respondent exercised reasonable
care and diligence in the maintenance of its highways as surface water
is considered a common enemy which each landowner must fight off
as best he can, provided that the owner of higher ground cannot inflict
damages to an owner of a lower ground beyond which is reasonable and
necessary.
Hoidren v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-607) 75 Where the
claimant alleged that surface water caused damage to his real
estate, the Court held that one storm did not cause the
destruction of claimant?s home, but over the years the supporting ground
had become so saturated that it had become unstable and could
not support the structure.
Hoidren v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-607) 75
Where the claimants were not represented by counsel at
their hearing and were unaware of the necessity or the manner
of proving damages to their real estate, the Court
suggested that the claimants employ counsel and file a petition for
rehearing within the 30 day period pursuant to Rule 15 of the
Court Rules. Lafferty v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-44)
239
Claimant was made an award of $163.10 for damage to his automobile which
resulted when the claimant was forced into a culvert due to a flooding hazard
in the highway which respondent had notice of but had failed
to
rectify. Tinsley v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-979) 87
HOSPITALS
Where the claimant had a contract with the respondent to charge
for 90 percent of its regular bffling charges for patients sent to it
by the respon
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 327
dent, the respondent will be held to the contract as a letter to modiI? said
contract constituted a unilateral agreement only and not binding upon the
claimant. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. v. Division of Vocational
Rehab. (No. D-1014) 101
The Court made an award to the claimant hospital for services rendered to a
prisoner taken to the hospital by troopers who had arrested the prisoner, where
the prisoner was never in the custody of the county. The Court held that a
moral obligation existed to pay the claim and made an award to the
claimant. Montgomery General Hosp. v. Dept. of Public Safety (No.
D-1001) 160 See also Pfizer, Inc. v. Department of Mental Health (No.
D-956) 41 See also St. Joseph?s Hospital v. Department of Mental
Health (No. CC-
77-10) 251
The Court reversed a prior decision in which it had made an award to the
claimant as the State agency involved notified the Court that there were
insufficient ftinds with which to pay these claims at the end of the fiscal
year. The Court denied the claims on the basis of Airkem Sales and Services,
et al v.Department of Mental Health, 8 Ct. Cl. 180(1971). St.Joseph?sHosp.
V.
Dept. of Mental Health (No. CC-76-114a-f) 209
Where claimants? buildmg, equipment and merchandise were damaged by acts
committed by two patients of the respondent State hospital who were negligently
allowed to leave the State hospital, the claimant will be entitled to
reimbursement for the damages sustained. Swisher v. Dept. of
Mental Health (No. D-881a&b) 61
Where the claimant sought compensation for professional services rendered to
State patients in a State hospital but the proper procedure for the payment of
the services was not followed, the Court made an award to the claimant for
services accepted by the State. Wang v. Dept. of Public
Institutions (No. D-370a) 46
INTEREST
Claimant was denied recovery for
interest on an alleged contract between the claimant and the respondent for
which the claimant was not paid the principal amount of the contract for
approximately two years after the contract work had been accepted by the
respondent as the Court lacks jurisdiction in awarding interest unless the
claim is based upon a contract which specifically provides for the payment of
interest. Hott and Miller, General Contractors v. Department of Highways
(No. D-683) 3
Claimant was denied recovery for interest alleged due on the balance of the
contract which was not paid in the proper fiscal year and for which the
contractor was forced to file a claim thereon where Code 14-2-12 prohibits the
Court specifically from making an award for interest unless the contract
specifically provides for interest. J. J. Englert Co. v. Dept. of
Pub. Institu tion (No. D-917) 22
JUDGEMENTS AND DECREES
A motion to dismiss a claim for
compensation for property taken by eminent domain by the respondent over and
above a judgment entered by a Circuit Court was sustained by the Court as
claims of this nature are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court under the
provisions of the West Virginia Code, Chapter 14, Article 2, Section 14(5). Anton
v. Dept. of High way (No. CC-76-45) 229
Where the final order entered by the Circuit Court involving this claim
indicated that the claimant and his wife accepted the amount awarded before
that Court as full and complete payment for the taking or acquisition of the
real estate and the damages alleged in the
claim are the same damages, the Court sustained a motion to dismiss by the
respondent Hoover v.
Dept. of Highways (No. D-769) 109
328 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
JURISDICTION
A motion to dismiss a claim for
compensation for property taken by eminent domain by the respondent over and
above a judgment entered by a Circuit Court was sustained by the Court as
claims of this nature are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court under the
provisions of the West Virginia Code, Chapter 14, Article 2, Section 14 (5). Anton
v. Dept. of High way (No. CC-76-45) 229
Where the claimant sought recovery for expenses incurred during condemnation
proceedings wherein claimant?s property was condemned, the Court held that it
had no jurisdiction under West Virginia Cede 14-2-14 which excludes from the
jurisdiction of this Court a proceeding which could be maintained against the
State in a State court. Hoover v. Dept. of
Highways (No. D-769) 109
Claimant was denied recovery for interest on an alleged contract between the
claimant and the respondent for which the claimant was not paid the principal
amount of the contract for approximately two years after the contract work had
been accepted by the respondent as the Court lacks jurisdiction in awarding
interest unless the claim is based upon a contract which specifically provides
for the payment of interest. Hott and Miller, General Contractors v.
Department of Highways (No. D-683) 3
No award was made to the general contractor where the claim was actually by a
subcontractor as the Court held that the issues were really between the
subcontractor and the contractor and the proper forum for the resolution of
this issue is in a State court not the Court of Claims. S. J. Groves &
Son Co. v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-614) 297
Where the damages for which the claimant filed his claim had occurred more than
two years prior to the filing of the claim, the Court held that it could not
take jurisdiction as the claim was barred by the statute of limitations
pursuant to West Virginia Code 14-2-21. Wine v. Dept. of Highways
(No. D-985) 303
LANDSLIDES?See also Falling Rocks;
Negligence
Where a claimant filed for damages to
his home and property as the result of a landslide, the Court held that the
statute of limitations does not run where there is a continuing and
intermittant trespass to real estate but there could be no recovery for damages
sustained more than two years prior to the filing of the claim and therefore
the damages to the home of the claimants which were sustained more than two
years prior to this action are not
recoverable. Block v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-4) 195
Where claimants? property was damaged as a result of a landslide initiated by
the activity of the respondent, the Court made an award to the claimants for
damage to their lot where the damage was continuing as the statute of limitations
does not bar the claimants from recovery. Block v. Dept. of
Highways (No. CC-76-4) 195
Where the claimants and respondents entered a written stipulation indicating
that as the result of activity by the respondent a landslide was initiated
which continued and extended into the area of the property of the claimants
resulting in damage to their homes and property, the Court, having made an
extensive personal examination of the premises and observed the damages
to the respective properties, made awards to the claimants. Bohrer, Mason
& Dung v. Dept. of Highways (Nos. 684a-c) 197
Where expert witnesses for both the claimants and the respondent testified that
continuous saturation by water of the hillside above the claimants over a
period of many years was a direct cause of the downslope movement of the land
causing the daniages to the property without sufficient proof that acts or
omissions by the respondent were the direct or proximate cause, the Court wifi
disallow the claims. Caldwell, et al v. Dept.
of Highways (Nos. D-690 et al) 50
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 329
Where many contributing factors brought about the damages to the real estate of
the claimants, but there was not sufficient proof that any acts or omissions of
the respondent were the direct and proximate cause of the damages, the Court
will disallow the claims. Cajdwell, et at V. Dept. of
Highways (Nos. D-690, et al) 50
Where the claimant and respondent stipulated that the proximate cause of the
land movement which caused damage to the claimant?s dwelling was the improper
drainage on the highway and failure of the respondent to maintain the existing
drainage, the Court made an award to the claimants in the amount stipulated
between the parties. Casto v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-744) 259
Claimant was made an award of $12,039.52 for injuries sustained by him in
an accident where the Court found that the claimant was driving at a lawful
rate of speed and without knowledge or warning of the same, the claimant
drove into a slip which caused him to lose control of his vehicle, as the
evidence revealed that the respondent knew of the slip but had failed to
provide warning signs or to correct the condition. Harmon v. Dept. of
Highways (No. D-1016) 107
Where the claimant?s accident and resulting injuries occurred when claimant?s
truck drove into a slip of which respondent had prior notice and did nothing to
correct the same or to erect warning signs of danger, the
claimant is entitled to recovery. Harmon
v. Dept.
of Highways (No. D-1016) 107
Claimant was denied recovery for damages alleged to have resulted when he
struck a rock in the road where the evidence failed to establish that the
respondent knew or should have known of the presence of the rock or that it had had
sufficient time to remove the same. Huffman
v. Dept. of High way (No. D-771) 9
Where the claimant alleged that damage to his house occurred when employees of
the respondent while cleaning out a ditchline in front of his property caused a
slide, the Court held that the claimants had not proved by a preponderance of
the evidence that respondent?s acts could be considered the direct proximate
cause of injury to claimants? property. Lovejoy
V. Dept.
of Highways (No. D-853) 163
Claimant was made an award of $3,000.00 for damages to their barn when the
respondent negligently allowed a culvert to become plugged resulting in a slip
which eventually extended to the barn of the claimants causing
damage thereto. Melrose v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-629) 57
Where claimant installed a septic tank system which may have contributed to the
slide problems on his property but the proximate cause of the slide was the
action of the respondent, the Court made an award to the claimant for damages
which were a result of said slide. Reed
v. Dept. of
Highways (No. D-919) 294
Where the proximate cause of a slide which occurred on a claimants? property
causing damage to the real estate and residence was the action of the
respondent in clearing a ditchline and cutting into the toe of the hill, the
Court made an award to the claimants. Reed
v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-919) 294
Where the record disclosed that for many years an area where the claimants?
accident occurred was subject to falling rocks continuously and known for many
years to be hazardous, it is negligence for respondent to do nothing more than
to patrol the road for said rocks. Smith
v. Dept. of
Highways (No. D-946) 221
Where respondents employee while filling a slip accidentally caused mud to
slide into and permeate claimant?s well ruining said well, the Court made an
award to the claimant for the actual cost of drilling the new well. Wray V.
Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-87) 252
Where the claimant and respondent agree by stipulation that slippage of a road
resulted in damage to the property of the claimant and the amount of
330 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
the claim has been stipulated and is a fair and reasonable valuation of the
damages, the Court will make an award to the claimant in that amount.
White v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-75l) 148
MOTOR VEHICLES
See The American Road Insurance
Company, subrogee of She Ilie Morgan,
Jr. v. Depart?ment of Highways (No. CC-76-l0l) 186
See also Anderson v. Department of Highways (No. D-1018) 135
See also Asbury v. Department of Highways (No. CC-76-145) 230
Claimant was made an award for damages to its tractor trailer which was used by
employees of the respondent in establishing a roadblock in order to capture two
thieves fleeing in an automobile and the automobile crashed into the tractor
trailer causing the damages. Associated Dry Goods v. Dept.
of Pub. Safety (No. D-991) 21
Speculative and circumstantial evidence by the claimant to prove damage to his
automobile, will not be deemed to approach the preponderance required for a
recovery and the claim will be disallowed. Bird & State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Dept. of Highways (Nos. D-934a&b) 91
Where the respondent introduced direct, adverse testimony by its operator who
was the only person with specific knowledge as to the snow plowing operation
alleged to have caused the damages to claimant?s automobile, the Court will
disallow the claim. Bird & State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Dept. of Highways (Nos. D-934a&b)
91
It is common knowledge that precipitation may accumulate and freeze on bridge
surfaces when it melts and runs off or evaporates on other portions of a
roadway, therefore a claim of damage resulting from the claimant?s automobile
slidding on ice which had accumulated on a bridge surface was
denied by the Court. Bodo v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-28) 179
The mere presence of ice upon a bridge in the wintertime causing a traveler to slide
or skid thereon, does not constitute negligence on the part of the respondent,
therefore a claim was denied where the claimant alleged that the accident which
happened was the result of his skidding on ice on
the surface of a bridge. Bod.o v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-28) 179
The claimant was made an award for damages to his automobile when he struck a
highway road sweeper which was in his lane of traffic on the highway as the
evidence revealed that the respondent had failed to properly secure the sweeper
at the edge of the roadway and it was left unattended.
Boley v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-l36) 272
See also Buckeye Union Insurance Co., subrogee of Raymond L. Mo.ddy v.
Department of Highways (No. D-764) 9
Where the claimant is able to observe the edge and surface of the road and has
sufficient room on his side of the road to operate his vehicle with safety, he
should stay in his lane of traffic; therefore, a claim wifi be denied as
claimant?s contributory negligence bars recovery. Butcher v. Dept. of High
way (No. D-967) 49
Claimant was denied recovery for alleged damages to her automobile where she
drove her car into flood waters which she should have seen in the careful
operation of her automobile. Clarke v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-715) 15
The Court made an award to the claimant who sustained injuries while
driving a cement truck which went into a bank and overturned, as the
evidence revealed that respondent?s employees had failed to provide a
flagman or warning sign at a curve in the road to warn of the presence of a
work crew ahead. Clark and Martinsburg Concrete Products Co. v. Dept. of
Highways (Nos. CC-76-17 and CC-76-118) 279
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 331
Where an employee of the respondent directed claimant who was driving a truck
to proceed between the respondents parked vehicle and pipes on a roadway but,
due to insufficient room for the truck to pass, the same was damaged, the Court
made an award to the claimant for failure of the respondent?s employee to
exercise proper care under the circumstances. Con le v. Dept. of Highways (No.
CC-76-93) 206
Where the claimant alleged damage to his automobile when he struck a hole in
the road, the Court held that if the claimant was travelling at the modest rate
of 25 miles per hour as alleged and had adequate headlights, he should have
seen a hole of the size complained of and he would not have struck the hole
with such force as to rupture two tires. The Court denied the
claim. Davis v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-18) 150
Where the respondent admitted the damages done to claimant?s automobile but
disputed the amount of the claim for a complete refinishing of the paint of the
automobile, the Court based its award to the claimant upon the testimony, the
argument of counsel for the respondent and the Court?s own inspection of the
vehicle and made an award to the claimant in an amount which it judged to be
fair and reasonable. Dunbrack v. Dept. of
Highways (No. D-1015) 137
Where employees of the REAP Division of the Department of Highways removed the
wrong vehicle which sustained damages while in REAP?s possession, the Court
made an award to the claimant based upon a stipulation submitted by the
claimant and the respondent. England v. Dept. of
Highways (No. CC-76-50) 210
Claimant was made an award for damages to her automobile which were sustained
when she struck a hole in the road of which she was aware but which she was
unable to avoid due to a narrow berm and rock cliff on one side and a vehicle
approaching in the opposite lane of traffic and the evidence revealed that the
respondent had notice of the defect some 6 months
prior to claimant?s accident. Giles v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-43) .... 212
For the claimant to operate a motor vehicle in disregard of visible hazards
such as holes in the road or breaks in the pavement of which a driver is aware
or on the exercise of reasonable care should be aware, such action constitutes
assumption of a known risk which bars recovery. Horace Mann
Ins. Co., subrogee for Bradshaw v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-61) 237
See also McConaha v. Department of Highways (No. D-1027) 143
See also McFann v. Department of Highways (No. D-909) 17
See also Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co., subrogee of
Beverly J. Maxwell v. Department of Highways (No. D-921) 2 See also Riddle
v. Department of Highways (No. D-947) 59
An award was made to a claimant whose automobile sustained damages in going
through a creek bed where it was the duty of the respondent to either prohibit
the traffic or to provide reasonable measures of safety to the
public at that place. Shafer v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-898) 60
Claimant was made an award of $305.85 for damages sustained to his automobile
when claimant was forced to drive his automobile through a creek bed due to the
fact that the bridge over the creek was closed by the Department of Highways
and there was no other passage way other than by
fording the creek. Shafer v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-898) 60
Where the preponderance of the evidence did not establish that the accident
alleged by the claimant was caused by the negligence of the respondent but
instead the claimant was damaged in an effort to avoid an accident with a bus
which he testified had forced him off the road, the Court wifi disallow
the claim. Shawver v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-42) 184
Where the evidence indicated that if the driver of the vehicle had kept his
vehicle under proper control and speed, he would have seen the rock in the
332 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
road which caused the accident, the negligence of the claimant banned him
from recovery. Smith v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-946) 221
Claimant was made an award of $894.00 for damage to the insured automobile when
members of the National Guard commandeered said automobile and as a result of
their carelessness and negligence, said automobile was destroyed. Stonewall
Casualty Co. v. Adjutant General (No.
D-1037) 101
See also Travelers Insurance Company as subrogee of William R.
Beclcner
v. Department of Highways (No. D-901) 2
Where claimant?s automobile sustained damages when floor boards on a bridge
dislodged and struck said automobile the Court held in line with a prior
decision Gene R. Monk v. State Road Comm?n., 8 Ct. Cl. 32, that a
person exercising ordinary care for his safety would not reasonably have
anticipated that the floor board on the bridge would be missing and claimant
cannot be charged with contributory negligence or the assumption of
the risk. Williams v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-112) 263
See also White v. Department of Highways (No. D-1004) 47
NATIONAL GUARD
Claimant was made an award of $894.00
for damage to its insured?s automobile when members of the National Guard commandeered
said automobile and as a result of their carelessness and negligence, said
automobile was destroyed. Stonewall Casualty Co. v. Adjutant General (No.
D-1037) 101
Where members of the West Virginia National Guard commandeered an automobile
owned by claimant?s insured and as a result of their carelessness and
negligence said automobile was destroyed, the Court made an award to the
claimant for the value of the automobile less the salvage later realized
by the claimant. Stonewall Casualty Co. v. The Adjutant General
(No. D-1037) 101
The Court found that a World War II Army tank displayed in front of a National
Guard Armory did constitute a dangerous instrumentality based upon the evidence
in this particular claim and as such does come within the
dangerous instrumentality rule. Tabit v. Adjutant General (No. D-795)....
174
The defense of contributory negligence was not applied in a case where
an 8 year old claimant while playing on a surplus Army tank displayed as a
World War II monument suffered permanent injury due to a fall on the
same. Tabit v. Adjutant General (No. D-795) 174
Where a surplus Army tank was placed by the respondent on the lawn in
front of an Armory, which was open to the public including small children,
without any limit or restraint, the Court held that the claimant was not a
trespasser. Tabit v. Adjutant General (No. D-795) 174
While an Army tank on display by the respondent as a war memorial for public
viewing is not dangerous in the abstract, the Court held that respondent had
assumed the duty of providing for the safety of children known to climb on the
tank, and also that the failure of the respondent to protect children from
failing constitutes such negligence as entitles the claimant to recover for
injuries sustained while playing on the tank. Tabit v. Adjutant
General (No. D-795) 174
NEGLIGENCE?See also Blasting; Falling
Rocks; Landslides; Motor Vehicles; Streets and Highways
Where the cause of an accident was
alleged to be a substance on the pavement of the road due to negligence on the
part of the respondent but the evidence relating to the cause of the accident
was left to the conjecture and speculation of the Court, the Court denied the
claim. Barker V.
Depart rnen of Highways (No. D-966a&b) 187
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 333
Where the claimants alleged that a substance on the pavement caused their
vehicle to slide but there was no evidence that the presence of the substance
was caused by negligence on the part of the respondent, the
Court denied the claims. Barker v.
Department of Highways (No.
966a&h) 187
Where the Court found that the claimant was guilty of contributory negligence
in the lack of due care in striking a hole in the road and the respondent was
also guilty of negligence in allowing the hole to exist, the Court held that
the contributory negligence of the claimant was the proximate cause of the
accident and disallowed the claim. Beaucham
v. Dept. of High way (No.
D-1024) 103
Where a claimant sustained personal injuries in an accident which he alleged to
be the result of failure of the respondent to erect warning signs indicating to
a motorist that he was approaching a sharp curve, the Court held in accordance
with past decisions of both this Court and the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals that the duty to erect guard rails, center lines or danger signals at a
particular location was discretionary and such failure did not constitute
negligence. Bickerstaff V. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-746) 254
The mere presence of ice upon a bridge in the wintertime causing a
traveler to slide or skid thereon, does not constitute negligence on the part
of the respondent, therefore a claim was denied where the claimant alleged
that the accident which happened was the result of his skidding on ice on
the surface of a bridge. Bodo v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-28) 179
The claimant was made an award for damages to his automobile when he
struck a highway road sweeper which was in his lane of traffic on the
highway as the evidence revealed that the respondent had failed to properly
secure the sweeper at the edge of the roadway and it was left unattended.
Boley
v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-136) 272
Where the claimants alleged that the respondent was negligent in the
maintenance of their road and collected surface water diverting the same
through culverts and casting the same upon their land causing damage thereto,
the respondent will not be held liable unless he substantially changed the
course of the flow of the water down the hillside from the time the culverts
were installed on the road. Caidwell,
et al v. Dept. of Highways
(Nos. D-690 et al) 50
?The Court held that the respondent was not negligent in purchasing the Silver
Bridge as designed in 1926 as said design was prepared in accordance with good
engineering practice at that time. Cantrell
& White v. Dept. of
Highways (Nos. 0-240 and D-268o) 110
While the Court was of the opinion that the respondent was guilty of negligence
in its inspection procedures of the Silver Bridge, this negligence was not the
proximate cause of the collapse of the Silver Bridge as to constitute the
proximate cause the phenomenon of stress-corrosion must have been foreseeable. Cantrell & White v. Dept. of Highways (Nos. D-240
and D-268o) 110
Claimant was denied recovery for alleged damages to her automobile where she
drove her car into flood waters which she should have seen in the careful
operation of her automobile. Clarke v.
Dept. of Highways (No.
0-715) 15
The Court disallowed the claimant?s alleged claim where the Court found that
claimant?s damages were the proximate result of her own acts and
omissions. Clarke v. Dept. of Highways
(No. 0-715) 15
Where claimant sustained injuries while driving a cement truck which went into
a bank and overturned, the evidence revealed that respondents employees had
failed to provide a flagman or warning sign at a curve in the road to warn of
the presence of a work crew ahead. Clark
and Martinsburg
Concrete Products Co. v. Dept. of Highways (Nos. CC-76-17 and CC-76-118) 279
334 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
Where an employee of the respondent directed claimant who was driving a truck
to proceed between the respondent?s parked vehicle and pipes on a roadway but
due to insufficient room for the truck to pass the same was damaged, the Court
made an award to the claimant for failure of the respondent?s employee to
exercise proper care under the circumstances.
Conley v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-93) 206
See also Cremeans v. Department of Highways (No. D-980) 37
Where the condition which developed on the highway in the breaking up of the
pavement should have been anticipated by the respondent, its failure to
investigate the breakup of the concrete base and the dislodgement of the
portions thereof constituted negligence, which negligence resulted in a
dangerous condition causing the damage which the claimant suffered.
Crockett v. Department of Highways (No. D-790) 38
Where the claimant alleged damage to his automobile when he struck a hole in
the road, the Court held that if the claimant was travelling at the modest rate
of 25 miles per hour as a]leged and had adequate headlights, he should have
seen a hole of the size complained of and he would not have struck the hole
with such force as to rupture two tires and the Court denied
the claim. Davis v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-18) 150
Where the claimant sustained injuries to her leg when she stepped into a hole
in a bridge floor, the Court held that the evidence warranted the inference
that the hole had existed for a substantial time and the respondent was guilty
of negligence which was the proximate cause of the claimant?s injury. Dunlap
v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-6) 181
Where the claimant was not aware of a hole which existed in the floor of a
bridge over which the claimant was walking and the claimant stepped into said
hole, the Court held that the claimant was not guilty of any contributory
negligence. Dunlap v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-6) 181
The Court made an award to the claimant for damage sustained to his vehicle
when he pulled off the traveled portion of the road and his automobile went
into a storm sewer drain 18 inches below the surface of the roadway where the
preponderance of the evidence established that the respondent negligently
created a dangerous condition along the berm of the road and such negligence
was the proximate cause of the accident. Eastes v.
Dept. of Highways (No. CC-77-4l) 283
A claim for damages to an automobile caused by falling rocks was denied where
the Court held that there was no evidence to show negligence of the respondent
as there was no work of any type being conducted by the respondent at the
accident point which would have loosened or caused rocks to fall and there were
signs along the highway warning of falling
rocks. Eroin v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-955) 283
A claim for personal injury and property damage resulting from actions of three
escaped convicts from Huttonsville Correctional Center was denied where the
Court held that the claimant had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that there was actionable negligence on the part of the respondent which would
have constituted the proximate cause of the damage and injuries to the
claimant. Gibson v. Dept. of Public Institutions (No.
D-1017) 264
Even though road construction signs may have been properly in place where the
claimants came upon a hazardous condition suddenly and without sufficient
warning and the condition of the road was the result of negligence of the
respondent, the Court made awards to the claimants. Hale
and Wingate v. Dept. of Highways (Nos. D-842 and D-843) 93
Respondent was found to be negligent when its employees filled in a hole in the
highway with slag and pea gravel which proved to be unstable when subjected to
heavy traffic creating a hazardous condition which resulted in injuries to the
claimants. Hale and Wingate v. Dept. of Highways (Nos.
D-842 and DM3) 93
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 335
Where the claimant?s accident and resulting injuries occurred when claimant?s
truck drove into a slip of which respondent had prior notice and did nothing to
correct the same or to erect warning signs of danger, the
claimant is entitled to recovery. Harmon
v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-1016) 107
Claimant?s damage to real estate allegedly caused by water flowing off a
mountainside from a State highway located 1,000 feet above the claimant was
denied where the Court held that the respondent exercised reasonable care and
diligence in the maintenance of its highways as surface water is considered a
common enemy which each landowner must fight off as best he can, provided that
the owner of higher ground cannot inflict damages to an owner of a lower ground
beyond which is reasonably necessary. Holdren
v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-607) 75 For the claimant to operate a motor vehicle in disregard of visible
hazards
such as holes in the road or breaks in the pavement of which a driver is aware
or on the exercise of reasonable care should be aware, such action constitutes
assumption of a known risk which bars recovery. Horace Mann
Ins. Co., subrogee for Broxishaw v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-61) 237 Claimant was denied recovery for
damages alleged to have occurred to his
automobile when he struck a large rock in the road which he alleged resulted
from a rock slide off of the hi]] adjacent to the road, as the claimant
admitted in his own testimony that his failure to see the rock resulted from
a lack of concentration. Huffman v.
Dept. of Highways (No.
D-771) 9
Claimant was denied recovery for damages alleged to have resulted when he struck
a rock in the road where the evidence failed to establish that the respondent
knew or should have known of the presence of the rock or that it had had
sufficient time to remove the same. Huffman
v. Dept. of High way (No.
D-771) 9
Where there was no evidence in the record to show that the respondent had any
knowledge that a manhole cover had in some manner gotten into the street, the
Court held that the well established law in West Virginia is that the State is
not an insurer of its highways and the user thereof travels at his own risk,
the Court found the respondent free of negligence and disallowed the claim. Hutchens v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-5) 153
Claimant was awarded $58.00 for damage to her automobile which resulted from
tar splashing on her automobile when she was directed by a flagman to proceed
into an area where fresh tar had just been placed upon the highway by employees
of the respondent and claimant was not informed of this fact, such failure on
the part of the employees of the respon den established negligence. Kelly v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-882) 12
Where claimant suffered injuries when she collided with a wire or metal
cable strung on a tennis court at a State college, the Court held that the
respondent school was under a duty to maintain the physical education
facilities in a reasonably safe condition, and, where it had breached that
duty, the claimant was entitled to an award. Landes v. Board of Regents (No.
CC-76-31) 215
Where claimant contractor?s own negligence in failing to provide proper shoring
and sheeting to prevent a break in a waterline located on the project resulted
in damage to the waterline for which the claimant was billed by the owner of
the waterpipe, the Court denied recovery to the claimant. Lang
Brothers, Inc. v. Dept. of
Highways (No. D-685) 217 Where
claimant?s son, a student at a State school for the deaf and blind,
was injured as the result of a fracas between him and another student, the
Court held that the guarantee of safety to a student is no more or no less than
if the student is enrolled in any other public school and, as the injuries
received by the claimant were not forseeable nor did the record reveal any
negligence on the part of respondent which was the proximate cause of the
accident, the Court disallowed the claim. Lee v. Board of Education (No.
CC-76-59) 266
336 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
The Court disallowed claimant?s action where the evidence established that the
negligence of the claimant caused her to fall when she stepped into a hole as
the claimant was familiar with the site of the accident and with the exercise
of reasonable care could have avoided her own injury. Lyons v.
Dept. of Highways (No. D-879) 287
Where the claimant lost control of her automobile resulting in an accident
which occurred when she struck an area in the highway where the asphalt had
completely disappeared leaving a hole some six to eight inches deep and about
15 feet in length extending from the berm into the traveled portion of the
claimant?s lane of traffic, the Court made an award to the claimant for the
failure of respondent to repair this condition which was the proximate cause of
the accident. Mullins & Stephy v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-954) 201
Where the respondent failed to repair a dangerous condition in a State road
such failure constituted negligence which was the proximate cause of the
accident and an award was made to claimants who sustained damages
as a result of an accident. Mullins & Stephy a.
Dept. of Highways (No. D-954) 201
Claimants were made an award for damage to their timber where it was apparent
that respondent?s employees were guilty of negligence in failing to take
sufficient precautions to prevent the ignition of leaves near a signpost where
the employees were using an acetylene torch. Perkins & Hamrick v.
Dept. of Highways (Nos. CC-76-57 and CC-76-58) 242
Claimant was made an award for personal injuries which resulted when claimant?s
automobile struck a large hole covered with water which had existed on a main
artery for at least one to two weeks prior to claimant?s accident and the
preponderance of evidence clearly demonstrated that the respondent should have
known of the dangerous condition existing in the
roadway. Plants a. Dept. of Highways (No. D-672) 78
Where the proximate cause of a slide which occurred on claimant?s property
causing damage to the real estate and residence was the action of the
respondent in clearing a ditchline and cutting into the toe of the hill, the
Court made an award to the claimant. Reed v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-9l9) 294
Where the record failed to disclose any actionable negligence on the part of
the respondent but on the contrary amply demonstrated that the respon dent
exercised reasonable care in the maintenance of its roadside park, a claim by a
woman who fell into a hole in the grass in the park was denied.
Riffle v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-lll) 246
Where the preponderance of the evidence did not establish that the accident
alleged by the claimant was caused by the negligence of the respondent but
instead the claimant was damaged in an effort to avoid an accident with a bus
which he testified had forced him off the road, the Court will
disallow the claim. Shawver v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-42)
184
The claimant alleged damage to his automobile as the result of two tree limbs
striking claimant?s automobile but, as there was no evidence that the tree was
rotten, and the incident occurred during a storm, the Court denied the claim as
being an act of God for which the respondent can not be held responsible or
liable even though it occurred on the premises of the respondent. Short
ridge v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-984) 184
The negligence of the driver of a vehicle cannot be imputed to the passenger
therein, therefore the Court made an award to a claimant passenger where the
Court found the Department of Highways to be negligent in its maintenance of a
roadway known to be subject to falling rocks. Smith v.
Dept. of Highways (No. D-946) 221
Where the evidence indicated that if the driver of the vehicle had kept his
vehicle under proper control and speed, he would have seen the rock in the road
which caused the accident, the negligence of the claimant barred him
from recovery. Smith a. Dept. of Highways (No. D-946) 221
W. VA.1 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 337
Where the record disclosed that for many years an area where the claimants?
accident occurred was subject to falling rocks continuously and known for many
years to be hazardous, it is negligence for respondent to do nothing more than
to patrol the road for said rocks. Smith
v. Dept. of
Highways (No. D-946) 221
Travelling on an icy road is always a hazardous undertaking, and considering
the weather conditions and the kind of road that the claimant was travelling
which was a secondary road, he must have recognized that certain risks were
involved, and where he attempted to approach and cross a very narrow,
little-used bridge he must have foreseen some danger, the Court will not make
an award to the claimant for damages received by him when he slid on ice on
said bridge and his car slid off of the bridge as the angle iron guardrails
would have been adequate under normal circumstances on the bridge. Snyder v. Dept. of
Highways (No. D-908) 166
Where claimant alleged that the lack of guardrails on a bridge and lack of
warning sign that the bridge would freeze before the road surface, resulted in
claimant?s crossing the bridge when it was covered with ice causing claimant to
slide off the bridge, the Court held that any such signs indicating the
presence of the bridge would have served no purpose as the claimant was aware
of ice on the road and that the bridge did have angle iron type guardrails
adequate for a bridge of this nature, there was no positive proof of neglect of
a duty by the respondent as would constitute negligence and create a moral
obligation on the part of the State. Snyder
v. Dept. of High way (No. D-908)
166
Where claimants were injured as the result of striking a hole in the road and
the testimony indicated that the road was not maintained in a reasonably safe
condition and that the respondent through many notices knew or should have
known of the condition of the road, the Court made awards to the claimants for
their injuries. Sowards, et al v. Dept. of
Highways (No.
D-865) 299
Claimant was made an award of $894.00 for damage to its insured?s automobile
when members of the Nationai Guard commandeered said automobile and as a result
of their carelessness and negligence, said automobile was destroyed. Stonewall Casualty Co. v. Adjutant General (No.
D-1037) 101
Where members of the West Virginia National Guard commandeered an automobile
owned by claimant?s insured and as a result of their carelessness and
negligence said automobile was destroyed, the Court made an award to the
claimant for the value of the automobile less the saivage later reaiized by the
claimant. Stonewall Casualty Co. v. The
Adjutant General
(No. D-1037) 101
Where claimants? building, equipment and merchandise were damaged by acts
committed by two patients of the respondent State hospitai who were negligently
allowed to leave the State hospital, the claimant will be entitled to
reimbursement for the damages sustained. Swisher
V.
Dept. of
Mental Health (Nos. D-881a&b) 61
The defense of contributory negligence was not applied in a case where
an 8 year old claimant while playing on a surplus Army tank displayed as a
World War II monument suffered permanent injury due to a fail on the
same. Tabit v. Adjutant General (No. D-795) 174
While an Army tank on display by the respondent as a war memorial for public
viewing is not dangerous in the abstract, the Court held that respondent had
assumed the duty of providing for the safety of children known to climb on the
tank, and also that the failure of the respondent to protect children from
falling constitutes such negligence as entitles the claimant to recover for
injuries sustained while playing on the tank. Tabit v. Adjutant
General (No. D-795) 174
Where the claimant saw the condition of the slate-covered path constructed for
her to reach her mail box over a construction area and it was
338 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
clear that she knew the condition of the path and knew that the material was
slippery, it was her own negligence that proximately caused her accident and
bars her recovery. Webb v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-696) 33
Where the respondent through its contrsctor attempted to provide access for the
claimant to her mail box and attempted to relieve the muddy condition of the
path by placing gray slate thereon, it can reasonably be said that all that
should have been expected was done, and therefore the claimant was denied
recovery for personal injury when she fell on the wet slate. Webb
v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-696) 33
Where actionable negligence on the part of the respondent is not established by
the evidence, the Court will deny the claim of the claimant. White
a. Dept. of Highways (No. D-758) 138
It is well established law in West Virginia that the State is not an insurer of
its highways, and, if there is not a preponderance of proof of negligence on
the part of the State?s employees, the user of a highway travels at his own
risk. The Court used this reasoning in denying a claim where the claimant?s
automobile unavoidably struck a broken tree limb hanging out into claimant?s
lane of traffic. Widlan a. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-l) 149
Where a claimant?s automobile sustained damages when the planking of a bridge
dislodged and came up underneath the automobile, the Court held that a
dangerous condition existed on the bridge which directly and proximately caused
the damage to the claimant?s automobile and the Court made
an award. Williams v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-112) 263
Where claimant?s automobile sustained damages when floor boards on a bridge
dislodged and struck said automobile the Court held in line with a prior
decision Gene R. Monk a. State Road Comm?n., 8 Ct. Cl. 32, that a person
exercising ordinary care for his safety would not reasonably have anticipated
that the floor board on the bridge would be missing and claimant cannot be
charged with contributory negligence or the assumption of
the risk. Williams a. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-112) 263 See also Yano.sy
a. Department of Highways (No. CC-76-76) 253
NOTICE
Although the Department of Highways is not an insurer for the safety of those
using the highways in the State, in those cases where the respondent has had
actual notice of a deplorable and dangerous condition in a road it should take
steps to remedy the condition for motorists who are required to use such road
and since the claimants in the instant claim were injured as the result of the
dangerous condition of the road, the Court made awards to
the claimants. Sowards, et al a. Dept. of Highways (No. D-865) 299
Where claimants were injured as the result of striking a hole in the road and
the testimony indicated that the road was not maintained in a reasonably safe
condition and that the respondent through many notices knew or should have
known of the condition of the road, the Court made awards to the claimants for
their injuries. Soward.s, et al a. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-865) 299
NUISANCE
The defense of contributory negligence was not applied in a case where
an 8 year old claimant while playing on a surplus Army tank displayed as a
World War II monument suffered permanent injury due to a fall on the
same. Tabit a. Adjutant General (No. D-795) 174
Where a surplus Army tank was placed by the respondent on the lawn in
front of an Armory, which was open to the public including small children,
without any limit or restraint, the Court held that the claimant was not a
trespasser. Tabit v. Adjutant General (No. D-795) 174
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 339
While an Army tank on display by the respondent as a war memorial for public
viewing is not dangerous in the abstract, the Court held that respondent had
assumed the duty of providing for the safety of children known to climb on the
tank, and also that the failure of the respondent to protect children from
falling constitutes such negligence as entitles the claimant to recover for
injuries sustained while playing on the tank. Tabit v. Adjutant
General (No. D-795) 174
PARKS AND PLAYGROUNDS
Where no evidence was presented
indicating that respondent was aware of a crack in a board on a bridge where
the claimant got her bicycle wheel caught in said crack and was thrown from the
bridge, the Court held that the evidence did not justify a fmding that the
respondent should have been aware of the existence of the crack and therefore
the claim was denied. Fox
v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-899) 257
Where the claimant sustained personal injuries due to an accident which
occurred while she was riding her bicycle across a bridge constructed and
maintained by the respondent primarily to accommodate automobiles, the Court
held that the law does not require the respondent to be an insurer of the
safety of pedestrians or bicyclists using such a bridge. Fox v. Dept. of
Highways (No. D-899) 257
Where the record failed to disclose any actionable negligence on the part of
the respondent but on the contrary amply demonstrated that the respondent
exercised reasonable care in the maintenance of its roadside park, a claim by a
woman who fell into a hole in the grass in the park was denied.
Riffle v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-111) 246
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS?See Hospitals
POLICE
When a trustee from the Penitentiary,
who was assigned to a State Police barracks as a janitor, stole an automobile
belonging to a trooper and had an accident with the automobile, damaging the
same, the Court denied recovery to the trooper as there was no reason for the
respondent to anticipate
this criminal act. Catlett v. Dept. of Public Institutions (No. D-964)
135
Where claimant?s automobile was damaged through the act of a trustee assigned
to a State Police barracks, the Court found no negligence on the part of the
respondent in failing to anticipate that the trustee would joyride in an
automobile belonging to a trooper. Catlett v. Dept. of Public Inst itu tion (No.
D-964) 135
The Court made an award to the claimant hospital for services rendered to
a prisoner taken to the hospital by troopers who had arrested the prisoner,
and the prisoner was never in the custody of the county, the Court held that
a moral obligation existed to pay the claim and made an award to the
claimant. Montgomery General Hosp. v. Dept. of Public Safety (No.
D-100l) 160
PRINTING
The Court made an award to the
claimant for printing work which it
performed for the respondent but for which it was never paid as this is a
claim that in equity and good conscience should be paid by the State.
Dunbar Printing Co. v. Dept. of Education, Div. of Voc. Ed. (No. CC-77-34)
282
See also Warner P. Simpson Co., v. Department of Commerce (No. CC-76-
137) 208
PRISONS AND PRISONERS
When a trustee from the Penitentiary,
who was assigned to a State Police barracks as a janitor, stole an automobile
belonging to a trooper and had an
340 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
accident with the automobile,
damaging the same, the Court denied recovery to the trooper as there was
no reason for the respondent to anticipate
this criminal act. Catlett v. Dept. of Public Institutions (No.
D-964) 135
Where claimant?s automobile was damaged through the act of a trustee
assigned to a State Police barracks, the Court found no negligence on
the part of the respondent in failing to anticipate that the
trustee would joyride in an automobile belonging to a trooper. Catlett v.
Dept. of Public Institu tion (No. D-964) 135
Where the claimant was tried, convicted, sentenced, fined $1,000.00,
then
placed on probation after paying said fine and the indictment was later
dismissed, the portion of the fine paid was directed by the Circuit
Court to
be returned to the claimant and there was no statutory provision
by which
said fine could be refunded, the Court made an await! to the claimant
Duvernoy v. Auditor & Treasurer (No. D-905) 63
A claim for personal injuries and property damage resulting from actions
of three escaped convicts from Huttonsvffle Correctional Center was
denied where the Court held that the claimant had not proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that there was actionable
negligence on the part of the respondent which would have constituted
the proximate cause of the damage and injuries to the claimant. Gibson
v. Dept. of Public Institutions
(No. D-1017) 264
A claim for personal injuries and property damage resulting from the acts
of three escaped convicts from a State correctional center was denied as
the
Court followed the prior decision of Lelia Hurst v. Department of Public
Institutions, 9 Ct Cl. 155, wherein the Court held that any
liability for
damages must be based upon acts constituting negligence
which were the
proximate cause of the damage. Gibson v. Dept. of Public Institutions (No.
D-1017) 264
The Court made an award to the claimant hospital for services rendered to
a prisoner taken to the hospital by troopers who had arrested the prisoner,
and the prisoner was never in the custody of the county, the Court held that
a moral obligation existed to pay the claim and made an award to the
claimant. Montgomery General Hosp. v. Dept. of Public
Safety (No. D-l00l) 160
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
A claim for personal injuries and property damage resulting from
actions of three escaped convicts from Huttonsville Correctional Center was
denied where the Court held that the claimant had not proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that there was actionable
negligence on the part of the respondent which would have constituted
the proximate cause of the damage and injuries to the claimant. Gibson
v. Dept. of Public Institutions (No.
D-1017) 264
A claim for personal injuries and property damage resulting
from the acts of three escaped convicts from a State correctional center
was denied as the Court followed the prior decision of Lelia Hurst v.
Department of Public Institutions, 9 Ct. Cl. 155, wherein
the Court held that any liability for damages must be based upon acts
constituting negligence which were the proxurnte cause of the damage. Gibson
v. Dept. of Public Institutions (No.
D-1017) 264
PUBLIC OFFICERS
Where claimants theory of liability was based upon the doctrine
of apparent agency, the Court held that this theory is not applied to
cases involving public officers and employees and the claim was disallowed.
Adam, et al v.
Dept. of Highways (No. D-1011) 227
Claimant was made an award for damages to its tractor trailer which was used by
employees of the respondent in establishing a roadblock in order to capture two
thieves fleeing in an automobile and crashed the automobile
W. VA.1
REPORTS STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 341
into the tractor trailer causing the damages. Associated Dry Goods v. Dept.
of Pub. Safety (No. D-991) 21
Where claimant failed
to prove a valid and enforcible
contract with the
respondent, the Court denied recovery for the demolition and removal of
a
two-story frame building which claimant demolished at the direction of the
Director of REAP. Foster v. Dept. of
Highways (No. CC-76-8) 162
Where the claimant demolished and
removed a two-story frame building at the
direction of the Director of REAP, but there was no evidence that
the State had legal title to said
property, there was no benefit or enrichment inuring to the State to justify a
payment of the claimant?s claim. Foster
v.
Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-8) 162
The Court made an award to the claimant
for work which he performed in
good faith relying upon representations made in a brochure
distributed by the government The Court held in order to do justice, the Court
must be liberal in interpreting the acts of individuals in dealing with public
authorities. James v. Governor and Dept.
of Natural Resources (No.
D-785) ..
31
REAL ESTATE
Where the claimants and respondents
entered a written stipulation indicating that as the result of activity by the respondent a landslide was initiated
which continued and extended into the area
of the property of the claimants
resulting in damage to their homes and property, the Court, having made an
extensive personal examination of the premises
and having observed the damages to
the respective properties, made awards to the
claimants. Bohrer, Mason & Dung
v. Dept. of Highways (Nos.
D-684a-c) ..
197 The Court permitted the
claimant to testify as to the fair market value
before and after the damages sustained to the property as the Court held
that she was qualified to express her opinion as to valuation in respect to
her own property, however, the Court accorded greater weight to
the respondent?s witness, a qualified real estate appraiser, because his qualifications
were higher than those of the claimant. Gannon v. Dept. of Highways
(No. D-675) 104
See also Kayser v. Department of Highways (No.
D-810) 12
Where the claimants were not represented by counsel at their hearing and were
unaware of the necessity or the manner of proving damages
to their real estate, the Court
suggested that the claimants employ
counsel and file a petition for rehearing within the
30-day period pursuant to Rule 15 of the
Court Rules. Lafferty v. Dept. of
Highways (No. CC-76-44) 239
See also Nohe v. Department of
Highways (No. D-968) 33
See also Peak v. Department of Highways (No. D-973) 170
See also Sloane v. Department of
Highways (No. CC-76-121) 249
Where an appraiser?s report reflected a value on the property prior to the
damages but failed to place a value on the property after the damages, the
Court was of the opinion that the property did have at least some value after
the damages and therefore this report was
disregarded. Teets v. Dept. of
Highways (No. CC-76-3) 225
See also Wiley v. Department of Highways (No. D-781) 35
REHEARING
The Court granted a rehearing to the claimant
in order for the claimant to supply
evidence to substantiate his claim. Foster
v. Dept. of Highways (No.
CC-76-8) 199
Where the claimants were not represented by counsel at their
hearing and were unaware of the necessity or the manner of proving damages to
their real estate, the Court suggested that
the claimants employ counsel and
file a
342 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
petition for rehearing within the 30.day period pursuant to Rule 15 of the
Court Rules. Lafferty v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-44) 239
RELOCATION ASSISTANCE
Where a requirement for relocation
assistance was the actual filing of a written claim for said assistance, a
claim was denied where claimants did not comply with this requirement and the
Court held that the respondent had no authority to waive this requirement and
therefore the claim was
denied. Bastin v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-24) 230
SICK LEAVE
Claimant was denied payment for
accrued sick leave after leaving the employment of the State as the Rules and
Regulations governing working hours and time off filed by the respondent State
agency made no provision for the payment of accrued sick leave upon the
termination of employment.
Price v. Department of Pub. Safety (No. D-924) 4
STATE
Where the respondent was unjustly
enriched at the expense of the claimant where the claimant performed work to
provide mobile home spaces to the respondent under a written agreement with the
claimant, the Court made an award to the claimant for rent loss on the spaces
which he was not
able to lease. Cook v. Dept. of Fin. & Admin. (No. D-702) 28
Claimant was denied payment for accrued sick leave after leaving the employment
of the State as the Rules and Regulations governing working hours and time off
filed by the respondent State agency made no provision for the payment of
accrued sick leave upon the termination of employment.
Price v. Department of Pub. Safety (No. D-924) 4
STATE AGENCIES
Where the claimants were employed as farmers
on State owned farms by the Department of Public Institutions, which farms were
subsequently placed under the Farm Management Commission which did not retain
these employees and as a result the claimants lost accrued annual leave, the
Court made an award to these claimants for the annual leave that they would
have been paid as the agency expired sufficient funds to pay said
claims. Adams, et at v. Dept. of Public Institutions (Nos. CC-76-128a,
c-t) ..
194
The Court made an award to the claimant for annual leave which he had
accumulated during his employment by the respondent State agency for which he
had not been paid at the time of the termination of his employment as the
Attendance and Leave Regulations of the Board of Public Works, promulgated on
May 28, 1968, provided for the payment of such
annual leave. Brad bury v. Nonintoxicating Beer Commission (No.
CC-77-30) 274
Claimant was made an award of $10,492.50 based upon an agreement whereby the
claimant provided toilets in a disaster area in Logan County, West Virginia,
but due to a merger of two State agencies, the claimant had not been paid for
said services. Cadle v. Office of Emergency Services (No.
D-1006) 83
Where the claimant had a contract with the respondent to charge for 90
percent of its regular billing charges for patients sent to it by the respon
dent the respondent will be held to the contract as a letter to modify said
contract constituted a unilateral agreement only and not binding upon the
claimant. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. v. Division of Vocational
Rehab. (No. D-1014) 101
Where funds of the respondent were available at the end of the fiscal year
but were exhausted after the end of the fiscal year, the Court ordered
payment of the claimants for jury fees holding that the expiration of the
funds simply deprived the claimants of their immediate satisfaction or
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 343
remedy of recovery not the legality of the claims notwithstanding the fact that
there was a delay in presenting the vouchers for reimbursement. Day
and Wright v. State Auditor (Nos.
D-944 and D-963) 42
Where the legislature failed to appropriate funds for expenditure in the proper
fiscal year for the payment of unemployment taxes due and payable by two
hospitals to the West Virginia Unemployment Compensation Commission, it would
not have been proper for the Commissioner to pay the taxes when no funds were
available. Dept. of Employment Security
v. Dept.
of Public Institutions (Nos.
D-798a&b) 6
The Court issued an advisory opinion where one State agency sold automotive
supplies, gasoline and two trucks to another State agency for which that agency
was not able to make payment as it overexpended its budget, the Court indicated
that payment should not be made based upon the decision in Airkem Sales and Service, et al v. Department of
Mental Health, 8 Ct. Cl. 180 (1971). Dept. of Highways v. Dept. of Public Institutions
(No. CC-76-l28) 207
Even though there were no statutory procedures for the State to authorize the
refund of a fine paid, the Court held that it had jurisdiction to effect a
refund based upon W. Va. Code 14-2-13, which authorizes the Court to make an
award in claims against the State where the State in equity and good conscience
should pay, as any other result would constitute unjust enrichment to the State
of West Virginia. Duvernoy v. Auditor
& Treasurer (No.
D-905) 63
The Court reversed a prior decision making an award to the claimant where the
Court was informed that the claimant?s annual leave had been transferred from
one State agency to another and therefore, the claimant was not entitled to an
award for annual leave which was involved in the prior decision. (See Adams et
al v. Public Institutions, CC-76-l28a, c-t, p.
194). Poling v. Dept. of Public
Inslitutions (No. CC-76-128m) 208
See also Rocchio v. State Auditor (No. D-1022) 86
Where final approval for a wage increase was not received by the department
until November 14, 1975, and the policy of the department was to exempt
employees retired prior to that time from the salary increase even though it
was applied retroactively to other persons on the payroll, the claimant was not
entitled to said retroactive pay raise as she had retired effective October 31,
1975, therefore the Court disallowed her claim. Simms
v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-77-86)
248 The Court rendered an advisory opinion concerning the State?s liability
for payment of accrued annual leave indicating that liability did exist and the
employee involved should be paid for his annual leave. Slack v. Public
Employees Ins. Bd. (No. CC-77-l05) 272
Where claimants supplied merchandise and services to a department of the State
but the funds of the department were transferred to a new commission at the end
of the fiscal year, the Court made awards to the claimants for said merchandise
and services as there would have been sufficient funds to pay for said claims
if the transfer had not been made. Southern
States Morgantown Cooperative, Inc., et al v. Dept. of Public Institutions (No.
CC-76-140) 250
The Court reversed a prior decision in which it had made an award to the
claimant as the State agency involved notified the Court that there were
insufficient funds with which to pay these claims at the end of the fiscal
year, the Court denied the claims on the basis of Airkem Sales and
Service, et al v. Department of Mental
Health, 8 Ct. Cl. 180(1971). St. Joseph?s Hosp. V.
Dept. of Mental Health (No.
CC-76-114a-f) 209
An advisory opinion was issued by the Court indicating that the claimant had
legal claim against the respondent for the payment of invoices which were not
paid within the proper fiscal year and for which the appropriated funds expired
before the invoices could be paid. W.
Va. State Indwstries V.
Dept. of Mental Health (Nos.
D-876a&b) 19
344 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
The Court rendered an advisory decision in this claim where the claimant
alleged failure of the respondent to pay for goods delivered to the respondent
State agency but the respondent failed to pay for the same within the proper
fiscal year, certain amounts of the claim should be paid by the respondent
State agency but a portion of the claim comes within Airkem Sales and Service, et al v. Department of Mental
Health, 8 Ct. Cl. 180 as this portion is an over-expenditure. W. Va.
State Industries v. Dept. of Public
Institutions (No. D-81 ib) 88
STATE SCHOOLS
Claimant was awarded $1500 as
compensation for work done in anticipation of a scholarship for college where
the work was done under a program presented in a brochure distributed to young
people in high schools throughout the State. James v. Governor and Dept. of Natural Resources (No. D-785)
Where claimant?s son, a student at a State school for the deaf and blind, was
injured as the result of a fracas between him and another student, the Court
held that the guarantee of safety to a student is no more or no less than if the
student is enrolled in any other public school and, as the injuries received by
the claimant were not forseeable nor did the record reveal any negligence on
the part of respondent which was the proximate cause of the accident, the Court
disallowed the claim. Lee v. Board of Education (No.
CC-76-59) 266
Where the evidence disclosed that students in a State school for the deaf and
blind are enrolled on a voluntary basis and that the school attempts to create
an atmosphere where the student could pursue a near normal life, the guarantee
of safety of the students is no more or no less than if the student is enrolled
in any other public school. Lee v. Board of Education (No. CC-76-
59) 266
STATUTES
Where a motor carrier purchased an
excess supply of uniform identification cab cards for the registration
identification of its vehicles operating in West Virginia, the Court refused to
make an award for the excess stamps as there is statutory provision for motor
carriers to file for one or more supplemental applications if the need arises
and motor carriers need not purchase an abundant supply and thus end up with an
excess. Ace Doran
Hauling & Rigging Co. v. Public Service Commission (No. D-1000) 140
Where the claimant motor carrier purchased 200 motor carrier stamps in excess
of the amount that it would need and offered to return these stamps to the
respondent for a refund, the respondent, having no statutory authority to make
such refund, refused the same and the Court held that to allow the claim would
result in every motor carrier doing business with this State filing a claim for
the cost of any unused identification stamps which was not intended in the
statutory provisions, the claim was denied. Ace Doran
Hauling & Rigging Co. v. Public Service Commission (No. D-1000)
140
A motion to dismiss a claim for compensation for property taken by eminent
domain by the respondent over and above a judgment entered by a Circuit Court
was sustained by the Court as claims of this nature are excluded from the
jurisdiction of the Court under the provisions of the West Virginia Code,
Chapter 14, Article 2, Section 14 (5). Anton v. Dept. of High way (No.
CC-76-45) 229
Where a claimant filed for damages to his home and property as the result of a
landslide, the Court held that the statute of limitations does not run where
there is a continuing and intermittant trespass to real estate but there could
be no recovery for damage sustained more than two years prior to the filing of
the claim and therefore the damages to the home of the claimants which were
sustained more than two years prior to this action are not
recoverable. Block v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-4) 195
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 345
Even though there were no statutory procedures for the State to authorize the
refund of a fine paid, the Court held that it had jurisdiction to effect a
refund based upon W. Va. Code 14-2-13, which authorizes the Court to make an
award in claims against the State where the State in equity and good conscience
should pay, as any other result would constitute unjust enrichment to the State
of West Virginia. Duvernoy v. Auditor & Treasurer (No.
D-905) 63
Where the claimant was tried, convicted, sentenced, fined $1,000.00, then
placed on probation after paying said fine and the indictment was later
dismissed, the portion of the fine paid was directed by the Circuit Court to be
returned to the claimant but there was no statutory provision by which said
fine could be refunded, the Court made an award to the claimant.
Duvernoy v. Auditor & Treasurer (No. D-905) 63
Where the claimant sought recovery for expenses incurred during condemnation
proceedings wherein claimant?s property was condemned, the Court held that it
had no jurisdiction under West Virginia Code 14-2-14 which excludes from the
jurisdiction of this Court a proceeding which could be maintained against the
State in a State court. Hoover v. Dept. of
Highways (No. D-769) 109
Where the damages for which the claimant filed his claim had occurred more than
two years prior to the filing of the claim, the Court held that it could not
take jurisdiction as the claim was barred by the statute of limitations
pursuant to West Virginia Code 14-2-2 1. Wine v. Dept. of Highways
(No. D-985) 109
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT
Where the claimant and respondent
stipulated that the proximate cause of the land movement which caused damage to
the claimant?s dwelling wa* the improper drainage on the highway and failure of
the respondent to maintain the existing drainage, the Court made an award to
the claimants in the amount stipujated between the parties. Co.sto v. Dept.
of Highways (No.
D-744) 259
Where employees of the REAP Division of the Department of Highways removed the
wrong vehicle which sustained damages while in REAP?s possession, the Court
made an award to the claimant based upon a stipulation submitted by the
claimant and the respondent. England v. Dept. of
Highways (No. CC-76-50) 210
Claimant was made an award based upon a stipulation entered by the claimant and
the respondent which indicated that the claimant had fallen through a hole in a
bridge where respondent was aware of the deteriorating condition of said bridge
but had effected no repairs until after claimant?s accident, the Court
concluded that liability existed and that the proposed
settlement was fair and equitable. Kelly v. Dept. of Highways (No.
CC-76-29) 214
Where the respondent maintained an open storage dump for road salt above claimant?s
property which resulted in drainage onto claimant?s property
rendering the well water undrinkable, the parties stipulated the amount
of the damages and the Court made an award in that amount.
Kolesar v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-992) 271 Where the claimant
and respondent agree by stipulation that slippage of a
road resulted in damage to the property of the claimant and
the amount of the claim has been stipulated and is a fair and
reasonable valuation of the damages, the Cou.rt wifi make an award to
the claimant in that amount.
White v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-751) 148
STREETS AND HIGHWAYS?See also Falling Rocks; Landslides; Motor Vehicles;
Negligence
Where claimants theory of liability was based upon the doctrine
of apparent agency, the Court held that this theory is not
applied to cases involving
346 REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
public officers and employees and the claim was disall
owed.Adams, et al V.
Dept. of Highways
(No. D-1011) 227
Where the claimant was traveling
on a primary road and unavoidably
struck an unusually deep and wide hole in his
lane of traffic, the
Court will make an award to the claimant for the damages sustained to his automobile.
Baker v. Dept. of Highways
(No. D-933) 48
Where the claimants alleged
that a substance on the pavement caused
the vehicle to slide but there was no evidence that
the presence of the substance was
caused by negligence on the part of the respondent, the Court denied
the claims. Barker v. Department of Highways (Nos. 966a&b) 187
Where a claimant sustained personal injuries in an accident which he alleged to be
the result of failure of the respondent to erect warning signs indicating
to a motorist that he was approaching a sharp
curve, the Court held in accordance
with past decisions of both this Court and the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals that the
duty to erect guard rails, center lines or danger signals at a particular location
was discretionary and such failure did not constitute negligence. Bickerst aff v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-746) 254
See also Brassfield v. Department of Highways (No. D-970) 24
Where the claimant is able to observe the edge and surface of the
road and has sufficient room on his side of the road to operate his vehicle
with safety, he should stay in his lane of traffic; therefore, a
claim will be denied as claimant?s contributory negligence bars recovery. Butcher v. Dept. of High way (No. D-967) 49
Where the claimant was granted a permit to place a utility line within the State?s
right of way and one of the provisions of the permit was to save the
respondent harmless from any damage or recourse whatsoever arising from
the permission granted under the permit, the Court held that the
provision was contrary to public policy and therefore invalid. C & P Telephone Co. v.
Dept. of Highways (No. D-674) 25
Claimant was made an award for damage to his automobile when he struck a loose
slab of concrete which completely stopped the car and caused
the car to be lodged on the piece of concrete as the condition
of the road was such that the respondent should have known of the
dangerous condition and should have repaired
the same. Crockett v. Dept. of Highways
(No. D-790) 38
Where the condition which developed on the highway in the breaking up of
the pavement should have been anticipated by the respondent, its failure to
investigate the break up of the concrete base and the
dislodgement of the portions thereof constituted negligence, which negligence resulted in a
dangerous condition causing the damage which the claimant suffered.
Crockett v. Department of
Highways (No. D-790) 38
Where the claimant
alleged damage to his automobile
when he struck a hole in the road, the Court held that if the
claimant was travelling at the modest
rate of 25 miles per hour as alleged and had
adequate headlights, he should have seen
a hole of the size complained
of and he would not have struck the hole with such force as to rupture two tires;
therefore, the Court
denied the claim. Davis
v. Dept. of Highways (No.
CC-76-18) 150
Where the road was straight and the claimant was traveling at a moderate rate of speed, the case
falls within the purview of many prior holdings of the Court wherein the Court held that the State is not a
guarantor of the safety of its travelers
on its roads and bridges, and users of
the highway travel at their own risk as the State
cannot and does not assure a safe journey.
Dzckznson v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-938) 72 Where
there is nothing in the record to show that the failure of the
State to
erect and maintain failing rock signs had any
cause or connection with the accident
complained of by the claimant, the Court will deny the claim.
Dickinson v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-938) 72
W. VA.]
REPORTS STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 347
The Court made an award to the claimant for damage sustained to his vehicle
when he pulled off the traveled
portion of the road and his automobile went into a storm sewer drain
18 inches below the surface of the roadway where the preponderance of the
evidence established that the respondent negligently created a dangerous
condition along the berm of the road and such negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident. Eastes v.
Dept. of Highways (No. CC-77-41) 283
Claimant was made an award for damages to her automobile which were sustained
when she struck a hole in the road of which she was aware but which
she was unable to avoid due to a narrow berm and rock cliff on one side
and a vehicle approaching in the opposite lane of traffic and the evidence
revealed that the respondent had notice of the defect some 6
months prior to claimant?s accident Giles v. Dept. of Highways (CC-76-43)
212
See also Gregory v. Department of Highways (No. 0-972) 98
Even though road construction signs may have been properly in place
where the claimants came upon a hazardous condition suddenly and with ou
sufficient warning and the condition of the road was the result of
negligence of the respondent, the Court made awards to the claimants. Hale
and Wingate v. Dept. of Highways (Nos. 0-842 and D-843) 93
Respondent was found to be negligent when its employees filled in a hole
in the highway with slag and pea gravel which proved to be
unstable when subjected to heavy traffic creating a hazardous condition which resulted
in injuries to the claimants. Hale and Wingate v. Dept. of Highways (Nos.
0-842 and D-843) 93
The unexplained failing of a rock onto a highway without a positive
showing that the respondent knew or should have known of a dangerous
condition or could have anticipated injury to personal property the evi denc
is insufficient to justify an award to the claimant for an accident
resulting when the claimant struck a rock in the road. Hammond v.
Dept. of
Highways (No. 0-796) 234
Claimant was made an award of $12,039.52 for injuries sustained by
him in an accident where the Court found that the claimant was
driving at a lawful rate of speed and without knowledge or warning
of the same, the claimant drove into a slip which caused him to lose control
of his vehicle, as the evidence revealed that the respondent knew of the
slip but had failed to provide warning signs or to correct the
condition. Harmon v. Dept. qf
Highways (No. 0-1016) 107
Claimant was denied recovery for damages alleged to have occurred
to his automobile when he struck a large rock in the road which he alleged
resulted from a rock slide off of the hill adjacent to the road, as
the claimant admitted in his own testimony that his failure to
see the rock resulted from
a lack of concentration. Huffman v. Dept. of Highways (No.
0-771) 9
Where there was no evidence in the record to show that the
respondent had any knowledge that a manhole cover had in some manner
gotten into the street, the Court held that the well established
law in West Virginia is that the State is not an insurer
of its highways and the user thereof travels at his own
risk and the Court found the respondent free of negligence and
disallowed the claim. Hut chens v. Dept. of Highways (No.
CC-76-5) 153
Where there was no proof in the record to show that the
respondent had any notice of the dangerous condition in the
highway nor was there any proof of negligence on the part of the
respondent, the Court held that the user of the highway travels at
his own risk. In the instant claim the claimant?s automobile was
damaged when the driver of the vehicle struck a hole
in the road. Jeter v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-20) 154
Claimant was awarded $58.00 for damage to her
automobile which resulted from tar splashing on her automobile
when she was directed by a flagman to proceed into an area where
fresh tar had just been placed upon the kighway by employees of? the
respondent and claimant was not in-
348 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
formed of this fact, as such failure on the part of the employees of the
respondent established negligence.KeUy
v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-882) 12
Claimant was awarded $38.37 for damage to his automobile where he struck a hole
in the road on U.S. Route 60 east of Charleston, which is avery heavily
travelled highway in the State and deserves more attention from a maintenance
standpoint than possibly some secondary roads in remote
areas. Lohan v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-910) 39
The respondent, while not an insurer of its highways, does owe a duty of
exercising reasonable care and diligence in the
maintenance of its highways; therefore, if the respondent knew or should have
known of the defect in the highway, it must take the necessary steps within a
reasonable period of time to repair the defect such as a hole in the road which
claimant struck at night and sustained damage to his automobile therefrom. Lohan v. Dept.
of Highways (No. D-910) 39
The Court disallowed claimant?s action where the evidence established that the
negligence of the claimant caused her to fall when she stepped into a hole as
the claimant was familiar with the site of the accident and with the exercise
of reasonable care could have avoided her gwn injury. Lyons v.
Dept. of Highways (No.
D-879) 287
Where the claimant lost control of her automobile resulting in an accident
which occurred when she struck an area in the highway where the asphalt had
completely disappeared leaving a hole some six to eight inches deep and about
15 feet in length extending from the berm mto the traveled portion of the
claimant?s lane of traffic, the Court made an award to the claimant for the
failure of respondent to repair this condition which was the proximate cause of
the accident MuUins& Stephy v. Dept. of
Highways (No.
D-954) 201
Where the respondents failed to repair a dangerous condition in a State road
such failure constituted negligence which was the proximate cause of the
accident and an award was made to claimants who sustained damages
as a result of an accident. Muitins & Stephy
v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-954) 201
Claimant was made an award for personal injuries which resulted when claimant?s
automobile struck a large hole covered with water which had existed on a main
artery for at least one to two weeks prior to claimant?s accident and the
preponderance of evidence clearly demonstrated that the respondent should have
known of the dangerous condition existing in the
roadway. Plants v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-672) 78
Where there was not one scintilla of evidence which would prove that the
claimant struck potholes alleged to be the proximate cause of claimant?s
accident and resultant injuries, the Court disallowed the claim as the claimant
failed to carry the burden of proof. Riffle
v. Dept. of Highways
(No. D-794) 244
See also Romeo v. Department of
Highways (No. CC-77-22) 220
It is well settled law that a user of our highways travels thereon at his own
risk, and the State does not assure him a safe journey and the Supreme Court of
Appeals has further held that the placement of warning signs and guardrails is
within the discretion of the Department of Highways. Snyder
v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-908) 166
Although the Department of Highways is not an insurer for the safety of those
using the highways in the State, in those cases where the respondent has had
actual notice of a deplorable and dangerous condition in a road it should take
steps to remedy the condition for motorists who are required to use such road
and since the claimants in the instant claim were injured as the result of the
dangerous condition of the road, the Court made awards to
the claimants. Sowards, et at v. Dept. of Highways
(No. D-865) 299
Where claimants were injured as the result of striking a hole in the road and
the testimony indicated that the road was not maintained in a reasonably safe
condition and that the respondent through many notices knew
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 349
or should have known of the condition of the road, the Court made awards to the
claimants for their injuries. Soward.s, et al v. Dept. of Highways
(No. 0-865) 299
See also Tucker v. Department of Highways (No. CC-77-l4) 302
Where the claimant alleged injuries due to a fall in a hole in a road which
claimant had crossed on frequent, previous occasions in daylight and after
dark, the Court held that with the exercise of reasonable care she could
have avoided her injury. White v. Dept. of Highways (No. 0-758)
138
It is well established law in West Virginia that the State is not an insurer of
its highways, and, if there is not a preponderance of proof of negligence on
the part of the State?s employees, the user of a highway travels at his own
risk. The Court used this reasoning in denying a claim where the claimant?s
automobile unavoidably struck a broken tree limb hanging out into claimant?s
lane of traffic. Widlan v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-1) 149
Where the claimant?s automobile was damaged when the claimant struck a broken
tree limb hanging out into her lane of traffic the Court held that while the
respondent in such a case may not unreasonably delay the removal of a hazardous
obstruction upon a State highway, neither will liability arise until the
respondent knows or should know that a hazard exists.
Widlan v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-1) 149
Where the respondent constructed a hard-surface road not wide enough for two
lanes of traffic to pass and knew that the traveling public would have to use
the berm in order to pass an approaching vehicle which berm gave way through no
fault of the claimant, the respondent was held liable
for a dangerous condition. Wilson v. Dept. of Highways (No.
D-885) 139
TAXATION
Where a motor carrier purchased an
excess supply of uniform identification cab cards for the registration
identification of its vehicles operating in West Virginia, the Court refused to
make an award for the excess stamps as there is statutory provision for motor
carriers to file for one or more supplemental applications if the need arises
and motor carriers need not purchase an abundant supply and thus end up with an
excess. Ace Doran
Hauling & Rigging Co. v. Public Service Commission (No. D-1000) 140
Where the claimant motor carrier purchased 200 motor carrier stamps in excess
of the amount that it would need and offered to return these stamps to the
respondent for a refund, the respondent, having no statutory authority to make
such refund, refused the same and the Court held that to allow the claim would
result in every motor carrier doing business with this State filing a claim for
the cost of any unused identification stamps which was not intended in the
statutory provisions, the claim was denied. Ace Doran
Hauling & Rigging Co. v. Public Service Commission (No. D-1000) 140
Claimant was made an award of $24,474.67 for unused, prepaid tax crowns and
lids it had in
its possession when it discontinued doing
business in W.Va. for which the Beer Commission could not reimburse the
claimant, as any other decision would result in unjust enrichment to the State.
The F. &
M. Scho.efer Brewing Co. v. Nonintoxicating Beer Commission (No. 0-904) 73
Where the respondent recognized and admitted that there was only one
completed transaction and the State was entitled to only one tax but due to
circumstances beyond the control of the claimant, two license taxes were paid
for the same vehicle, the Court will make an award to the claimant as retaining
the duplicate tax would constitute unjust enrichment. Mid- Mountain Mack,
Inc. v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (No. D-962) 90
Claimant was made an award for crowns and lids purchased by it from the
respondent but unused when its operations ceased, as it would constitute unjust
enrichment to the State if the claimant is not to be reimbursed for said
expenditure. The Queen City Brewing Co. v. Nonintoxicating Beer
Commission (No. 0-923) 100
350 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
TRAVEL EXPENSES
An award was made to the claimant for
travel expenses incurred by the claimant while on official business for the
respondent State agency which were not paid by the agency due to its negligence
in losing the documentation of the travel expenses submitted by the claimant. Neal
v. Dept.
of
Mental Health (No. CC-76-7) 170
TREES AND TIMBER
See Jefferson v. Department of
Highways (No. D-1023) 90
See also Pittsenbarger v. Department of Highways (No. CC-76-83) 204
See also Toppings v. Department of Highways (No. D-987) 156
Where an employee of the respondent was operating a chain saw to remove tree
limbs on the grounds of the respondent and in doing so he negligently caused a
limb from a tree to fall against claimant?s automobile damaging the same, the
Court made an award to the claimant for said damage. Partlow & Inland
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Dept. of Mental Health
(No. D-981) 44
Claimants were made an award for loss of timber where it was apparent that
respondent?s employees were guilty of negligence in failing to take sufficient
precautions to prevent the ignition of leaves near a signpost where the
employees were using an acetylene torch. Perkins & Hamnck v.
Dept. of Highways (Nos. CC-76-57 and CC-76-58) 242
Claimants were made an award for timber loss where a secondary fire
attributable to the reawakening of the first fire caused said damages as the
first fire was the result of negligence on the part of respondent?s employees.
Perkins & Hamrick v. Dept. of Htghways (Nos. CC-76-57 and
CC-76-58) ...
242
The claimant alleged damage to his automobile as the result of two tree limbs
striking claimant?s automobile but, as there was no evidence that the tree was
rotten, and the incident occurred during a storm, the Court denied the claim as
being an act of God for which the respondent can not be held responsible or
liable even though it occurred on the premises of the respondent. Short
ridge v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-984) 45
Where the claimant?s automobile was damaged when the claimant struck a broken
tree limb hanging out into her lane of traffic the Court held that while the
respondent in such a case may not unreasonably delay the removal of a hazardous
obstruction upon a State highway, neither will liability arise until the
respondent knows or should know that a hazard exists.
Widlan v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-1) 149
See also Westfield Insurance Company, subrogee of David Sago v.
Department of Highways (No. D-859) 15
TRESPASS
Where the respondent entered a
contract under which the respondent retained only such control and supervision
as was necessary to assure that the plans and specifications were followed but
did not control or supervise the contractor?s work or the employees, the Court
held the supervision by the respondent was not such control as to create a
master-servant relationship as the contractor was an independent contractor.
Accordingly the word ?principal? as used in the release executed by claimants
to the contractor for damages to real estate when the contractor trespassed
upon claimant?s property also released the respondent. Hundley v. Dept. of
Highways (No. D-941) 284 Where a surplus Army tank was placed by the
respondent on the lawn in
front of an Armory, which was open to the public including small children,
without any limit or restraint, the Court held that the claimant was not a
trespasser. Tabit v.Adjutant General (No. D-795) . 174
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 351
WAGES
The Court disallowed a claim by an
associate professor of Concord College for an additional one year?s salary as
the Court held that his last year was a terminal one in compliance with the
Faculty Handbook relating to tenure, which was in effect at the date of his
termination notice. Burgher v.
Board of Regents (No. CC-76-64) 275
Claimant, Deputy Director of the Department of Mental Health, ws awarded
$1,020.00 as the sum due and owing from the respondent State agency to the
claimant as salary properly payable to him for his raise for the fiscal year where
the claimant had refrained from giving himself the raise in order that all
other members of the Department might have their increases first, and as a
result the claimant?s raise was granted to him at the end of the fiscal year
but the fiscal year ended before his personal salary increase could be
encumbered properly. Clowser v. Dept. of Mental Health (No.
D-913) 35
See also Cox v. Department of MenIal Health (No. CC-77-20a) 260
See also McPherson v. Department of Mental Health (No.
CC-77-20b).... 260
See also Racer v. Department of Mental Health (No. CC-77-20c) 260
Where final approval for a wage increase was not received by the department
until November 14, 1975, and the policy of the department was to exempt
employees retired prior to that time from the salary increase even though it
was applied retroactively to other persons on the payroll, the claimant was not
entitled to said retroactive pay raise as she had retired effective October 31,
1975, therefore the Court disallowed her claim. Simms
v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-77-86) 248
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES?See also
Drains and Sewers
Where expert witnesses for both the
claimant and the respondent testified that continuous saturation by water of
the hillside above the claimants over a period of many years was the direct
cause of the downslope movement of the land causing the damages to the property
without sufficient proof that acts or omissions by the respondent were the
direct or proximate cause, the Court will disallow the claim. Caldwell, et
al v. Dept. of Highways (Nos.
D-690 et al). 50
Where the claimants alleged that the respondent was negligent in the
maintenance of their road and collected surface water diverting the same
through culverts and casting the same upon their land causing damage
thereto, the respondent will not be held liable unless he substantially
changed the course of the flow of the water down the hillside from the time
the culverts were installed on the road. Caldwell, et al v. Dept. of
Highways
(Nos. D-690 et al) 50
A claim for damage to real estate due to surface water will be denied where all
of the evidence, direct and circumstantial, indicate that claimant did not
provide adequate protection against the ever-present water hazard
as he is required to do bylaw. Holdren v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-607)
75
Claimants damage to real estate allegedly caused by water flowing off a
mountainside from a State highway located 1,000 feet above the claimant was
denied where the Court held that the respondent exercised reasonable care and
diligence in the maintenance of its highways as surface water is considered a
commonenemy which each landowner must fight off as best he can, provided that
the owner of higher ground cannot inflict damages to an owner of a lower ground
beyond which is reasonably necessary. Holdren
V.
Dept. of Highways (No. D-607) 75
Where the claimant alleged that surface water caused damage to his real estate,
the Court held that one storm did not cause the destruction of claimant?s home,
but over the years the supporting ground had become so
352 REPORTS STATE
COURT OF CLAIMS [W. VA.
saturated that it had become unstable and could not support the structure.
Hoidren v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-607) 75
A given amount of surface water following its given natural course may not
cause damage but if that same volume of water is diverted from its natural
channels by artificial means in the Court?s opinion it can be turned into a
destructive force, especially where the uncontradicted testimony of the
claimants established that their problems did not begin until after the
construction of the new road which was alleged to have caused all of the water
problems which the claimants experienced on their property. Laf fert v. Dept.
of Highways (No. CC-76-44) 239
Claimant was made an award of $3,000.00 for damages to their barn when the
respondent negligently allowed a culvert to become plugged resulting in a slip
which eventually extended to the barn of the claimants causing
damage thereto. Melrose v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-629) 57
Where the claimant alleged that a road adjacent to his property had been
negligently graded by an employee of the respondent resulting in water drainage
flowing down the road causing rocks to be left in the road which in turn were
thrown against his house by automobiles using the road and the evidence
revealed that the road had always been a natural rocky drain down the mountain,
the Court disallowed the claim. Robinette v. Dept. of High way (No.
D-982) 182
WELLS
Where the respondent maintained an
open storage dump for road salt above claimant?s property which resulted in
drainage onto claimant?s property rendering the well water undrinkable, the
parties stipulated the amount of the damages and the Court made an award in
that amount.
Kolesar v. Dept. of Highways (No. D-992) 271
Where blasting operations by the respondent resulted in damage to the
claimant?s property, the Court followed the rule of law established by West
Virginia Supreme Court in the case of Whitney v. Ralph Myers Contracting
Corporation, 146 W.Va. 130, 118 S.E. 2nd. 130 (1961) and made an award to
the claimants. Teets v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-3) 225
With respect to damage to real estate and a residence resulting from blasting
operations conducted by the respondent, the measure of damage is the difference
between the fair market value of the property prior to the blasting and the
fair market value of the property after the blasting operations have been
concluded. Teets v. Dept. of Highways (No. CC-76-3) 225
Where employees of the respondent improperly plugged an abandoned gas well
causing claimant?s well to be contaminated and thus unusable, the Court made an
award for the cost of drilling a new well. Underwood V. Dept.
of Mines (No. CC-76-53) 262
Where respondent?s employee while filling a slip accidentally caused mud
to slide into and permeate claimant?s well ruining said well and claimant had
to have a new well drilled, the Court made an award to the claimant for
the actual cost of drilling the well. Wray v. Dept. of Highways (No.
CC-76-87) 252
W.VA. UNIVERSITY?See Board of Regents;
Colleges and Universities
WORKMEN?S COMPENSATION FUND
Where the claimant had bid on
remodeling work to be performed by a State agency and his bid was not the low
bid but he was advised by the Division of Purchasing to proceed with the work
which was performed in a manner satisfactory to the respondent, the Court made a
full award to the claimant based upon his contract bid. Peck Brogan Building
& Remodeling
v. Workmen?s Comp. Fund (No. D-1012) 145
W. VA.] REPORTS
STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 353
Where the claimant received written and oral notification from the Division of
Purchasing that he was a successful bidder and was instructed
by an agent of the department involved to proceed with the work, the
Court held that to make an award other than the full amount of
the bid which the contractor submitted where the work was done in a
satisfactory manner would be unconscionable. Peck Brogan Building &
Remodeling v. Work men? Comp. Fund (No. D-1012) 145
Where the testimony revealed that the purchase order
directing the claimant to perform remodeling work was not issued due to
an inter-agency dispute, the Court made an award to the claimant for
the work performed based upon the bid price. Peck Brogan Building
& Remodeling v. Work men? Comp. Fund (No. D-1012) 145